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How the Brahmins Won: From Alexander to the Guptas

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PREFACE

This book may be looked upon as the third of a trilogy that deals with the early development of classical Indian culture. The first, *Greater Magadha,* studied the culture of the eastern parts of the Ganges valley, a culture that was originally independent but came to be largely absorbed into brahmanical culture, and which contributed many defining features to the latter. The second book in the trilogy, *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism*, depicted how Buddhism in India, in spite of remaining nominally independent, underwent such strong brahmanization that it can be said to have joined forces with Brahmanism, in vain as it turned out. The present book concentrates on the extraordinary success story of Brahmanism, which developed, from a movement in danger of extinction during the last centuries before the Common Era into one that, in less than a millennium, succeeded in imposing its imprint on the Indian subcontinent and much of Southeast Asia, and did this without the help of a conquering army or an all-powerful empire. Religious conversion cannot have played a role, for one could not convert to Brahmanism. This book seeks to understand how the Brahmins did it.

Alexander does not usually receive the attention he deserves in studies that deal with late-vedic culture. And yet, Alexander entered the Indian subcontinent in what was at that time the heartland of vedic-brahmanical culture. It was the area where Pāṇini composed his famous grammar. It was also the area where some of the early vedic texts were or had been composed. Many Brahmins lived there who, moreover, had the political support that allowed them to create these literary compositions and who even exerted great political influence.

This book brings together material that has been published elsewhere. The material concerned has been freely modified, updated, and translated where necessary. A list of publications from which material has been taken includes the following:

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"Sylvain Lévi et les origines du théâtre indien." *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* 57(4) (2003), pp. 793-811.
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"Archetypes and bottlenecks: Reflections on the text history of the Mahābhārata." *Pūrvāparaprajñābhinandanam. East and West, Past and Present. Indological and Other Essays in Honour of Klaus Karttunen*. Ed. Bertil Tikkanen & Albion M. Butters. Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society. 2011. (Studia Orientalia 110, 2011.) Pp. 39-54.
"Manu and the Mahābhārata." *Indologica. T. Ya. Elizarenkova Memorial Volume Book 2*. Ed. L. Kulikov & M. Rusanov. Moscow: Russian State University for the Humanities. 2012. (Orientalia et Classica, 40.) Pp. 135-156.
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During the many years it took to write this book, I learnt much from many, either in person or through their publications. It is not possible to enumerate them here. I make an exception for my wife, who encouraged me throughout this process, and suggested the title.

INTRODUCTION

In scholarly literature, the cultural and religious history of early South Asia has long been considered to fit into the following somewhat simplified chronological scheme:
1. The religion and culture that find expression in the corpus of texts known as the Veda existed before all other literary manifestations of Indian culture and constituted its background.
2. Several religious currents — most notably Buddhism and Jainism — arose within this background and to some extent in opposition to it ~~this background~~.
3. Brahmanism (the religion of the Veda and of those who identified with it) subsequently interacted with Buddhism and Jainism, and this gave rise to the culture and religion of classical India.

This scheme was presented to the scholarly world in the nineteenth century, and was a continuation of the way many Indians — including Hindus and Buddhists — thought (and still think) about their past. Indological scholarship incorporated it as established fact, and based conclusions, most notably about the chronology of late-vedic literature, upon it.

Opposition to this scheme has taken a long time to manifest itself. Numerous publications observed deviations, but these were usually understood to be unimportant exceptions to a general scheme that remained unaffected. The tendency to gloss over ill-fitting cases was reinforced by the conviction that the scheme was based on data from different areas of research, some of them outside the realm of expertise of one single scholar. One might, for example, notice that an Upaniṣad that had been thought of as old was centuries younger (e.g. Oberlies 1988: 57 f.; 1995: 65 f.), yet maintain that the 'really' old Upaniṣads constituted the background of Buddhism and Jainism. Or one might discover that certain late-vedic texts had undergone their final redaction long after the date that had customarily been attributed to them (e.g. Witzel 1987; 1993; 1997; 2006), yet be reluctant to question their date of composition. Attempts were still being made to explain Jainism and especially Buddhism in relationship to their presumed brahmanical background, while at the same time an increasing number of scholars were coming to realize that a non-brahmanical movement (often called the Śramaṇa movement) had to be postulated to account for these religions (e.g. Jaini 1970; Pande 1974). The difference between the Vedic language (i.e., pre-classical Sanskrit) and classical Sanskrit continued to be invoked to prove that vedic literature had to pre-date the famous grammarian Pāṇini (who laid down the rules of classical Sanskrit); at the same time, detailed investigations showed that 'the language of Pāṇini' was closer to the language of certain middle-vedic texts than to that of any later texts (e.g. Cardona 1999: 215-216). Archaeologists (most notably Erdosy, e.g. 1988; 1995a) drew attention to the presence of non-vedic culture in the Ganges plain, but these observations were not used to question the fundamental scheme. Irregularities were also found with regard to geography. A recent example is Geoffrey Samuel's *The Origins of Yoga and Tantra* (2008), which draws attention to the cultural division of northern India (Samuel had not yet seen my *Greater Magadha*). Samuel does not however find fault with earlier views on chronology.

In my book *Greater Magadha* (2007) I have tried to deal with *all* the important arguments that were believed to uphold the traditional scheme. The combined force of the numerous anomalies in the various domains — revealed by others as well as by myself —

left no doubt as to the conclusion to be drawn: the traditional scheme is incorrect, and has to be replaced by a better one.

The new understanding of the cultural history of early India offers a different chronology. It does not take for granted that the vedic corpus in its entirety has to precede all non-vedic developments recorded in surviving literature. It also introduces a spatial dimension: the heartland of vedic-brahmanical culture was to the west of the confluence of the two rivers Ganges (Gaṅgā) and Jumna (Yamunā). East of this confluence, in the area I have called 'Greater Magadha', an altogether different culture had its seat. This cultural distinction still existed during the last centuries BCE, and had been considerable. It was primarily in the region of Greater Magadha that the so-called 'second urbanization' (after the first one of the Indus valley civilization, which had disappeared a thousand years before) took place. It was in this same region that the political unification of most of the subcontinent was centered, culminating in the Maurya Empire (ca. 320 – ca. 185 BCE).

While the new understanding of the cultural and historical situation in early northern India solves certain problems, it also raises new questions. These were not dealt with in *Greater Magadha* (or not in any depth), and have been dealt with only to a limited extent in more recent publications (such as my book *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism*, 2011). Some of these questions will be dealt with in the present book, especially such as concern the transformation and subsequent development of Brahmanism in South Asia.

The new theoretical framework of the early Indian situation no longer looks upon brahmanical culture and religion as the more or less universal background of all later developments. Quite the contrary, Brahmanism now presents itself as initially belonging to a geographically limited area, originally centred in the middle and western parts of northern India. It was in this region that Brahmanism continued the culture of a largely hereditary class of priests, the Brahmins, who derived their livelihood and special position in society from their close association with local rulers.

This changed with the drastic political changes that took place in the northern parts of South Asia, perhaps beginning with Alexander's invasion,[1] culminating in the unification of much of the subcontinent under the Mauryas, and ending with a number of catastrophic invasions after the empire's collapse. Alexander came from a different cultural world altogether, and tolerated Brahmins only to the extent that they did not stand in his way; where they did, they were slaughtered without mercy. The Mauryas had their base in Magadha (part of 'Greater Magadha' and therefore home to a non-brahmanical culture) and had no particular interest in Brahmins and their sacrificial tradition either.[2] The invaders that preceded and followed their rule were even less interested (at least initially). As a result, Brahmanism as an institution was under threat; it either had to face disappearance, or reinvent itself. It did the latter. Brahmanism underwent a transformation which enabled it to survive and ultimately flourish in changed circumstances.[3]

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[1] Perhaps already earlier. Lubin (forthcoming c) suspects a link with the new urbanization: "Indeed, if the rise of the city-states led to any economic drain on the countryside (in the form of taxes or tribute demands), village *śrauta* priests may well have suffered a loss of patronage."

[2] On the claim that the Maurya Empire owed its existence to the counsel of a brahmanical minister, Cāṇakya, see below.

[3] Cp. Francis 2013: 12: "Le brahmanism ancien doit dès lors se reformuler, devenant aux alentours de notre ère ce qu'on appellera l'hindouisme."

Brahmanism — here defined as the culture carried by and embodied in the Brahmins, a group of people who emphasize the purity of their descent from both father's and mother's side — descended from a priestly religion with heavy emphasis on elaborate sacrifices. The Brahmanism that in due time succeeded in spreading all over the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia, and which we will occasionally call the 'new Brahmanism', was primarily (though not exclusively) a socio-political ideology.[4] Brahmanism insisted on the separate position that Brahmins occupy in the world and in society. To the extent that they interact with society, they find their natural place at the top of the social hierarchy. Their separate position garanteed them the exclusive possession of spiritual knowledge and power. They also had superior knowledge of the correct hierarchical order of society (with the Brahmins at the top), and about the correct manner of running a state. Brahmanism had not abandoned its elaborate sacrificial heritage, to be sure, but now came to include different (and sometimes totally unconnected) forms of religious practice. In this way it could adjust to a variety of religious cults, with one non-negotiable condition: Brahmins were the ones most suited to establish and maintain links with 'higher' realms; they were the ones to advise rulers on social and political matters; and they were the ones to occupy the highest place in the social hierarchy.

The outcome of this brahmanical transformation was quite extraordinary. A thousand years after the establishment of the Maurya Empire (presumably a catastrophe for the Brahmins), brahmanical socio-political ideology predominated in an immense geographical area, reaching from Vietnam and Indonesia at one end to the western frontiers of the Indian subcontinent and Afghanistan at the other.[5] This dominating presence found expression in various ways, including the use of Sanskrit, the sacred language of Brahmanism, in political inscriptions, in courtly literature, and even in an important part of the literature of Buddhism and Jainism. The American researcher Sheldon Pollock (1996; 2006) has coined the term 'Sanskrit cosmopolis' to designate this phenomenon.

In order to understand the incredible success of the brahmanical vision of society and politics, it is important to recall that it was not the outcome of political conquest or colonization. Brahmanism spread by other means than the force of arms — initially in the Indian subcontinent, then also into Southeast Asia.[6] The spread of Brahmanism is also not a mere matter of religious conversion. As noted above, Brahmanism should not exclusively or even primarily be thought of as a religion, but as a socio-political ideology with a variable religious dimension. Rulers who adopted it, did not necessarily convert from one religion to another, and Brahmanism had no missionaries in the religious sense of the term.[7]

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[4] This has been observed by others, e.g. De Casparis & Mabbett 1992: 288.

[5] For Southeast Asia alone, Rau (1975: 7) speaks of 3.8 million km^2.

[6] "This Indianization and partly also Hinduization of other religions took place without military conquests and is therefore considered one of India's historical achievements by the Indologist Wilhelm Rau." (Michaels 2004: 38, with a reference to Rau 1975: 6-7.)

[7] Finding the right terminology is delicate. If we define, with Harari 2014: 210, religion as *a system of human norms and values that is founded on a belief in a superhuman order*, we might conclude that Brahmanism is a religion. However, its frequent but variable association with various cults renders a clear distinction between an 'ideological' core and various 'religious' adjuncts obligatory. (Note, however, Harari 2014: 228: "If a religion is a system of human norms

All this leaves modern research with a puzzle. How did Brahmanism succeed in becoming the dominant social and political ideology, at least for a considerable period of time, in an immense geographical area whose outer regions are thousands of kilometres apart? In this book I will address this puzzle by studying the main features that Brahmanism developed during its formative period, i.e. between Alexander and the Guptas.

The central thesis to be presented in this book is that Brahmanism, as it was re-created during the period under consideration, was not a haphazard collection of isolated features, but rather responded to a homogeneous vision of the world. In this vision, naturally, Brahmins play a central role. This is true to the extent that rather than describing Brahmanism as a vision of the world in which Brahmins play a central role, one should perhaps describe it as a vision of Brahmins that has consequences for the world. As a matter of fact, much if not most of brahmanical literature from this period is directed at Brahmins and deals with exclusively brahmanical concerns. It appears, indeed, that Brahmins of that time made major efforts to create a separate identity for themselves, an identity they could maintain in circumstances where they could not count on a tradition of respect.

In the course of time Brahmins regained the respect they assumed was rightfully theirs, but now in a much larger geographical area than ever before. With it, brahmanical ideas about society at large gained in importance. These ideas about society can be looked upon as natural extensions of the ideas Brahmins had developed about themselves: brahmanical standards of purity became applicable in society at large; brahmanical ritual practices came to accompany the lives of many non-Brahmins; brahmanical ideas of the Brahmins' position in society were extended so as to provide a template for society at large; brahmanical claims to royal protection turned into manuals of statecraft; etc.

In studying the spread of Brahmanism into the regions of South and Southeast Asia, one wishes to know how and why brahmanical ideas about non-Brahmins found acceptance. The claim here made is that one is unlikely to find an answer to this question without linking it to the more fundamental question of what Brahmins thought about themselves. As stated earlier, brahmanical ideas about society are derived from brahmanical ideas about Brahmins. Rulers and others who accepted Brahmanism, accepted first of all Brahmins as Brahmins, i.e. essentially the way they thought about themselves.

The way Brahmins thought about themselves cannot be reduced to mere publicity in view of impressing outsiders. Much of the brahmanical literature that is primarily or exclusively directed at fellow-Brahmins is of a technicality and sophistication that no outsider would neither be able to, nor bother, to understand. And yet, much of this technical literature (for example about linguistics) was part of the brahmanical self-image, composed to support brahmanical claims of superiority, but addressed to no audience apart from other Brahmins.[8]

Brahmanism, then, should be thought of as a homogeneous vision of Brahmins and their position in the world, and primarily the result of the self-centered preoccupation of Brahmins during a difficult period in which their traditional position in the world was

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and values that is founded on belief in a superhuman order, then Soviet Communism was not less a religion than Islam.")

[8] This is also true of legal texts. Olivelle (2012b) adds that we can also assume a degree of affluence.

under threat. This self-centered preoccupation became the basis of features that in due time transformed an important part of the world. But those successful features cannot be understood without an understanding of the self-centered preoccupation from which they arose. This means that Brahmanism has to be looked upon as a whole that cannot be grasped by cherrypicking and excluding aspects of our choosing.[9]

This book will try to arrive at a preliminary understanding of Brahmanism as a homogeneous whole by discussing some of its central features. It will proceed in the following manner. Part I is of an introductory nature. It briefly discusses the vicissitudes of the northwestern Brahmins shaken by political events. It necessarily concentrates on the northwestern parts of the Indian subcontinent, because this may be the only region about which we have enough information to justify such an attempt. It will also address some primarily chronological questions related to Brahmanism's new departures. Parts II will enter into the heart of the matter, dealing with a number of self-centered features that Brahmanism developed, apparently all on its own. It will become clear in Part IIA that these features are variants of two fundamental themes: separateness and resistance to change. Part IIB will concentrate on features that involved others than only Brahmins, and that determined the way in which Brahmanism interacted with society at large. These can be looked upon as an 'overflow' of the qualities resulting from the self-imposed life style of the Brahmins. Brahmanism, to be sure, did not develop in a mental vacuum. Yet it seems clear that the features studied in Part II originated without undergoing identifiable influences from outside. But Brahmanism was not immune to outside influence. Some instances of this will be studied in Part III. Part IV, the Conclusion, will return to the question that also finds expression in the title of this work: How did the Brahmins win?

[9] Indeed, this whole may in some respects have biological roots. Brahmanism's extreme conservatism and its preoccupation with purity may turn out to be two sides of the same coin. Recent neurological research (Ahn et al. 2014) shows that political conservatism and a strong private disgust reaction to nonpolitical but affectively evocative images go hand in hand.

I. CATASTROPHE AND NEW DEPARTURES

I.1. Catastrophe

I.1.1. Alexander and after

Alexander the Great Failure is the title of a recent book (Grainger 2007). It draws attention to Alexander the Great's boundless ambitions, and to what little came of them. Much before this book, Arnold Toynbee published a chapter called "If Alexander the Great had lived on" (chapter IV.3 of Toynbee 1969), which tells us what might have happened, if only ... In reality, Alexander did not conquer the whole world, and what is more important for this book, he did not conquer India. He successfully entered the northwestern regions of the Indian subcontinent (what is now Pakistan), but stayed there for barely two years (326-325 BCE). "Alexander had intended the permanent annexation of the North-West, and for that purpose he left colonies and garrisons behind him to consolidate what he had won, but within six years of his death, which took place in 323 B.C., Eudemus, the Greek Governor, withdrew from the Indus valley with all the forces he could muster to assist Eumenes against Antiochus, and about the same time, or perhaps even earlier, Candragupta drove out the Greek garrisons east of the Indus, and proceeded to incorporate Taxila and the other states of the Panjab into the Empire of Magadha" (Marshall 1918: 10).

It is tempting to speculate what might have happened if Alexander had not left the subcontinent so soon or, alternatively, if he had not died young and had come back. India might in that case have become part of the Hellenistic world, and Indian culture might have developed in an altogether different direction.

In spite of what might have taken place but did not do so, Alexander's short visit to the margins of the subcontinent deserves our attention for a number of reasons. The accounts of his mainly military activity are the earliest foreign precise, reliable and datable sources of information about the subcontinent we have. These foreign accounts are all the more important since the indigenous sources for the period concerned — primarily vedic and buddhist canonical texts — are hard to interpret and even harder to date. Additional information from the outside is therefore most welcome.

But Alexander and his fellow travelers did not just record what they saw in India. They also changed the political, social and cultural situation in the region they visited. Their impact in these domains does not always receive the attention it deserves, and is yet crucial for an understanding of the subsequent development of Indian culture.

The developments to be studied in this book began with catastrophe, at least for certain Brahmins, especially in the northwestern region of the Indian subcontinent. The available textual evidence is far from satisfactory, yet sufficiently clear to see that the events that directly affected Brahmins in that region were no cause for joy.

There had been Brahmins in the northwestern regions of the Indian subcontinent from an early date onward. Many vedic texts, including most notably the *Ṛgveda*, were composed in the region more or less overlapping with modern Panjab and surroundings, including eastern Afghanistan.[10] Centuries later, the famous Sanskrit grammarian Pāṇini

[10] See Witzel 1987; 1995: 210 f.

lived in Gandhāra, an important part of northwestern India.[11] Moreover, it has recently been argued that Gandhāra played a central role in the formation of the vedic canon.[12]

Regarding the date of Pāṇini, the commentator Patañjali appears to have believed that he lived and worked under the Mauryas, and therefore after Alexander.[13] Patañjali may have been mistaken: it is also possible, and perhaps more likely, that Pāṇini lived earlier, though most probably after 350 BCE.[14] If so, Pāṇini may have been a contemporary of Alexander, or he may have lived just before his forays. One thing is however certain: Pāṇini lived and worked in a brahmanical milieu. We may conclude from this that Alexander, when he visited his part of the world, entered into a region with a strong brahmanical presence.

A strong brahmanical presence in the northwestern part of the subcontinent is confirmed by the Alexander historians. Brahmanical populations are mentioned (sometimes mistakenly as if they constituted tribes),[15] and they appear to have exerted much political influence in those parts of the subcontinent. In fact, Brahmins evoked Alexander's ire in Sind, further southward, with the result that many of them were slaughtered.[16]

Soon after Alexander's departure, northwestern India became part of the Maurya Empire, initially, it seems, with help of there residing (Kaṭha)[17] Brahmins.[18] It appears that the central rulers in Pāṭaliputra had difficulty maintaining control in this part of the subcontinent, and it is only fair to assume that Brahmins once again played a rule in the revolt that took place. In fact, the *Aśokāvadāna* mentions *two* revolts in Taxila

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[11] Grammatical tradition gives Śalātura (north of the Kabul river [*kubhā*] and west of the Indus) as his place of residence (Agrawala 1963: 10), and the Chinese pilgrim Xuanzang recorded that there was a statue of Pāṇini there. An analysis of Pāṇini's grammar itself confirms his northwestern residence; see Thieme 1935: 76 f.; Deshpande 1983; Scharfe 2009: 28 f.

[12] Witzel 2011.

[13] Falk 1994: 326-327.

[14] Hinüber 1990: 34; Falk 1993: 304. Deshpande (2006: 216) wonders whether Pāṇini should be situated "between the Persian and the Nanda empires". Houben & Rath (2012: 22) — with a reference to Scharfe 2009: 28 [n. 1] — make the following observation about *rūpya*, a crucial term in determining Pāṇini's date: "It … cannot be entirely excluded that this *rūpya* (formed according to [P.] 5.2.120) referred to Persian or Greek coins … In view of Pāṇini's linguistic and cultural orientation towards the north of the Indian subcontinent … it would nevertheless be more likely that reference is made to an Indian coin …". Fynes (2015) argues that punch-marked coins were in use during the lifetime of the Buddha.

[15] See the General Index of McCrindle 1893 under 'Kathaia', 'Kathaians' (Skt. Kaṭha) and 'Kambisthol(o)i' (Skt. Kapiṣṭhala); further Witzel (1997: 304) about the Kaṭha 'tribe': "The Greek writers quite obviously identified the name of the local Brahmins with that of the inhabitants of the area." and Karttunen (1997: 31 with note 60). Note here that Pāṇini is acquainted with Brahmins who live by the sword; see Falk 1994: 318.

[16] Eggermont 1975: 20-22; 107-108. Bosworth (1998: 200) speaks of "the greatest repression the Brahman community had probably suffered at any time".

[17] Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, presumably composed in Kashmir (see below), is particularly close to the *Kāṭhaka*, and therefore to the Kaṭhas (Rau 1985: 103).

[18] McCrindle 1893: 406. This initial support may have crystallized out in the legend of Cāṇakya, Candragupta's brahmanical minister.

(Takṣaśilā). The Maurya emperor, Bindusāra, sent his son Aśoka to deal with the first.[19] Aśoka, who had by then succeeded his father, sent his son Kunāla to deal with the second.[20] Both times, the *Aśokāvadāna* specifies that evil ministers (*duṣṭāmātyāḥ, duṣṭātmāno 'mātyāḥ*) had inspired the revolt. It seems only natural to assume that those evil ministers were brahmanical counsellors. Recalling the vast numbers of people Aśoka killed and enslaved when conquering Kaliṅga later on, it seems safe to assume that his suppression of the revolt in Taxila was no gentle affair either, and that the local Brahmins felt the full force of his ire. Buddhism, though much beholden to Aśoka, preserved the memory of this ruler as particularly vicious and cruel, at any rate before his conversion to Buddhism.[21]

There is no textual evidence to prove that the northwestern Brahmins in particular suffered under the Mauryas. And their fate may have improved once Aśoka had come to regret his earlier blood-filled campaigns. Indeed, his subsequent inscriptions often insist that Brahmins, along with others, most notably Śramaṇas, deserve respect. But even in this later part of his life Aśoka did not approve of animal sacrifice, thus depriving the Brahmins of an essential part of their livelihood.[22] We may yet tentatively assume that the northwestern Brahmins could live more or less in peace, though with reduced political influence, during the final years of the Maurya Empire.

This changed again after its collapse. Invading Greeks and Scythians (Śaka) made their life miserable (if they were lucky enough to get away with it). This time we have direct testimony of their suffering. A number of texts — most importantly the *Yuga Purāṇa* — describe the brahmanical misfortunes, and lay the blame with the Greeks and the Scythians in particular. The author(s) of this text thought that these misfortunes were an indication that the end of the world was near. We will study this evidence in § I.1.2.

The brief sketch given so far suggests that the northwestern Brahmins may have had a rough time from Alexander onward,[23] interrupted perhaps by one or two short periods of respite. Details are hard to come by, but there were unmistakable consequences. The region of Gandhāra, as we saw, was a centre of brahmanical culture when Alexander arrived. More recent texts suggest that few Brahmins remained just a few centuries later. These texts will be considered in § I.1.3, below. In a later chapter (§ I.2) we will consider evidence that suggests that political events after the collapse of the Maurya Empire created opportunities for new departures.

I.1.2. The end of time

[19] Thapar (1963: 21 f.) refers to "contributory evidence to the authenticity of this tradition" in the form of an Aramaic inscription, which may mention Priyadarśi, the viceroy or governor; see Falk 2006: 252-253.
[20] Strong 1983: 208 ff.; 271; Div(V) p. 234, 262-263,
[21] Strong 1983: 210 f.
[22] See, e.g., Lubin 2013.
[23] This should not be interpreted to mean that life was always peaceful for Brahmins in the Northwest before Alexander. Witzel (1995b; 1997) has argued that invading Salvas were responsible for an interruption of literary production in that area, and for a general shift of brahmanical presence toward the east. According to his theory, the Northwest had regained its earlier preeminence at the time of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* and Pāṇini.

Catastrophes continued and probably intensified after the collapse of the Maurya Empire, in or around 185 BCE, due to a succession of foreign invasions. The Indo-Greeks were among the first to extend their power into the regions that had been part of the empire.[24] Indo-Scythian (or Śaka, to use the Indian term) invasions followed soon. The result was a breakdown of society. From the brahmanical point of view, this was a breakdown of the brahmanical order of society, or of what was left of it. In a way, they may have been right in this, for it seems that brahmanical influence on society had been strong during the days preceding Alexander's invasion, after which things had gone from bad to worse. Some texts give expression to brahmanical disarray following these invasions. The most important from among these is the so-called *Yuga Purāṇa*,[25] which describes preceding events in the form of a prophecy. It does so in great detail, and in this respect it is quite unique in early India.[26] It mentions the Greeks (*yavana*) and the Scythians (*śaka*) and the war and destruction these invaders will bring. Most interesting from our present perspective is that it views these disasters as indicators of the approaching end of an era, of a Yuga. The *Yuga Purāṇa* elaborates this notion by distinguishing between four Yugas that succeed each other, each succeeding one worse than the one that precedes it.[27] The invasions of the Greeks and the Scythians announce the end of the last of these four Yugas, the Kali-Yuga. The text concludes with an indication that a new series of four Yugas will begin soon.[28]

It seems clear that the author(s) of the *Yuga Purāṇa* really believed that the end of the Kali-Yuga was at hand.[29] He (or they) thought it would take place soon after the invasions of the Śakas, and this must therefore be the time when the text was composed.[30]

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[24] On the turbulent political history of the Indo-Greeks and their link with Bactria, see Sidky 2000: 181 ff.

[25] The *Yuga Purāṇa* is really part of a longer work called *Gārgīya-jyotiṣa* (and other names; see Mitchiner 2002: 1 f.). Another part of this work is studied in Kenneth G. Zysk's *The Indian System of Human Marks* (2015).

[26] Parasher 1991: 239. This may also be one of the earliest brahmanical texts that present a cyclical view of time, a feature borrowed from outside; see *Greater Magadha* p. 69 f.

[27] The idea that there is a beginning and a violent end to our world fits in with what Witzel (2012) calls Laurasian mythology; even the notion of the Four Ages is Laurasian according to him (p. 86 ff.). The idea of an eternal world without beginning and without end, to be considered in Part II, does not find a place in Laurasian mythology, and looks more like an intellectual construct.

[28] This circumstance allows us to use the expression 'millenarianism' here (see Thapar 2000). Note however that Christian millennialism "describes the hope for a final 'Golden Age' to come *before the end*" (McGinn 2002: 136; emphasis added), and does not therefore apply here. The term 'millenarianism' can no longer be appropriately applied to the classical Purāṇic vision of history, which we will consider below.

[29] Mitchiner 2002: 86; González-Reimann 2002: 98-99; 2009: 417.

[30] Second half of the first century BCE, according to Mitchiner (2002: 93). Interestingly, the Vikrama era, which begins "in the autumn of year 58/57 or in spring 57/56 BCE", is called *kṛta* in early inscriptions; its first inscriptional occurrence dates from 239 CE (D. R. Bhandarkar in *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum* vol. III, revised edition, pp. 187 ff.; Falk 2012: 131). *Kṛta* is, of course, also the name of the first of the four Yugas, and therefore of the beginning of a new cycle. Is this coincidence? Indian tradition links this era to a King Vikramāditya who presumably was victorious over the Śakas in that year (Mitchiner 2002: 81 f.; González-Reimann 2002: 99; Witzel 2003: 95-96; Kulke & Rothermund 1998: 72 f.). Understandably, already Bhandarkar (*ibid*., pp. 197-198) considered the possibility that the Kṛta era might have been thought of as the new Kṛta-Yuga.

Other accounts of the impending end of time have been preserved, as portions of larger texts. The *Mahābhārata*, for example, contains a prophecy about the end of the Kali-Yuga, in the form of a discussion between King Yudhiṣṭhira and the sage Mārkaṇḍeya.[31] It adds to the list of oppressive ruling dynasties, and one of these (the Ābhīras) appears to justify the conclusion that this prophecy was written, or given its present shape, in 250 CE or later.[32]

This concrete prophecy cannot but be a late addition to the *Mahābhārata*, but clearly earlier portions were very much aware of the notion of the end of the Yuga,[33] for the *yugānta* is frequently invoked in comparisons.[34] These comparisons give us a clear image of how the end of the Yuga was thought of: "It is a time of great destruction, caused mainly by natural forces: torrential rains, implied by the rolling clouds and the thunder; earthquakes, hinted at by the shaking produced by Arjuna's conch as well as by the fallen guardians of the quarters; terrible winds …; and an intense, resplendent Sun; but most of all fire, an all-consuming fire that destroys everything. There are also comets or meteors, as well as negative planetary configurations. … In the Epic … this destruction is often associated with the god Rudra (Śiva), who … is said to rage at yugānta."[35] The core *Mahābhārata* is perhaps roughly contemporaneous with the *Yuga Purāṇa* (additions were made at least until the prophecy of Mārkaṇḍeya).[36] This strongly suggests that these comparisons with the end of the Yuga were not mere innocent poetic metaphors. They rather compare events in the *Mahābhārata* with horrors that might arrive to the composers of the text in a not too distant future.

It is therefore hardly surprising that that the *Mahābhārata* contains, in the so-called *Āpaddharma*-section of its twelfth book, advice for kings as to how to deal with the difficulties accompanying the end of the Yuga. Yudhiṣṭhira here asks:[37]

> When *dharma* and the world are in decline in consequence of the *yuga* coming to an end (*yugakṣayāt*), and when bandits oppress them [*dharma* and *loka*], grandfather, how can one stand firm?

Surprisingly, R. S. Sharma (1982: 202-203 n. 79; 2001: 62 n. 97), with a reference to Dhruva 1930, states: "It is argued that the Kali description of the *Yuga Purāṇa* belongs to c. 50 BC but the Purana seems to have been a work of the third century AD." Dhruva himself, however, dates the text "to the beginnings of the first century B.C., that is to say, to the first or the second decade thereof" (1930: 45).

[31] Mhbh 3.186-189. Here, and only here, the *Mahābhārata* directly describes the end of the Kali-Yuga (using the expression *yugānta*; everywhere else this expression is used in comparisons); González-Reimann 2010: 69; 2002: 64 ff. On some other issues raised in connection with this section, see Bailey 2012.

[32] Mitchiner 2002: 46.

[33] "This destruction at *yugānta*, which clearly does not refer to the transition between one individual yuga and the next, seems to allude either to an undefined long period of time, or to the end of the cycle of all four yugas (Kṛta, Tretā, Dvāpara and Kali) taken as a whole. The four yugas taken together are commonly referred to as a yuga, what the Purāṇas would call the mahāyuga, the great yuga, or the caturyuga, the fourfold yuga." (González-Reimann 2002: 71-72)

[34] As shown in González-Reimann 2002: 64-73.

[35] González-Reimann 2002: 71.

[36] See, e.g., Hiltebeitel 2001; Fitzgerald 2004.

[37] Mhbh 12.138.1; tr. Bowles 2007: 264. Cp. Fitzgerald 2004: 529 ff.

Clearly, the then following advice is meant to be practical advice. This is only possible if the end of the Yuga was considered near enough to justify receiving advice about it. We now know that this is exactly what the author of this passage appears to have believed.

The approaching end of time may also find expression in the lists of royal dynasties that have been preserved in a number of Purāṇas.[38] These lists end in the early years of the Gupta dynasty, and describe in this connection the evils of the end of the Kali age.[39] However, the continuing rule of this same dynasty may have convinced brahmanical authors that time was not yet coming to an end.[40]

The brahmanical sources we have so far considered create the impression that the Yugas they talk about, or at any rate the last one, the Kali-Yuga, were thought of in manageable historical terms.[41] Indeed, the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* (Manu 1.68-70) gives the four Yugas a length of respectively 4'000, 3'000, 2'000 and 1'000 (human) years.[42] The Kali-Yuga, according to later Purāṇas, began at the moment of Kṛṣṇa's death, i.e. soon after the *Mahābhārata* war.[43] As we have seen, it was expected to come to an end soon after the invasions by Greeks and Śakas according to the *Yuga Purāṇa*, some centuries later according to other, younger, sources.

Events did not quite follow expectations.[44] One reaction, it appears, was to push the end of the Kali-Yuga ahead, while yet holding on to the view that this end was near. When the end still did not come, and when presumably the succession of foreign invasions and other catastrophes had come to an end, an altogether different appreciation of the situation became prevalent. Rather than thinking that the end of the Kali-Yuga was very near, brahmanical authors now came to think that this Yuga would extend far into the future. This change of perception was based on a number of reflections, among them the following. Time spans were no longer thought of in terms of *human* years, but rather in terms of *divine* days, or years, which lasted very much longer than their human equivalents. This made it possible to think of the end of the Kali-Yuga as being far away. The expectation of a speedy transition to a happier Yuga turned out to have been premature.[45]

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[38] Pargiter 1913.

[39] Pargiter 1913: 56 (*kaliśeṣe*); tr. p. 74; Rocher 1986: 116.

[40] So Kulke 1979: 106: "Es war m. E. dieser Widerspruch zwischen dem alten, zyklischen Weltbild sich stets verschlechternder Zeiten und dem 'linearen' Verlauf der ruhmreichen Geschichte der frühen Gupta-Kaiser, der zum Abbruch der frühen Königsgenealogien führte."

[41] Recall at this point that Sphujidhvaja's *Yavanajātaka* knows a *yuga* of 165 years; Mak 2013a: 75.

[42] To each of these Yugas a preceding and following twilight must be added, so that it all adds up to 12'000 human years, equal to one single Yuga of the gods (Manu 1.71).

[43] González-Reimann 2002: 51; further Thapar 1996: 29; Kane, HistDh III p. 896 ff.

[44] Fussman (2012: 26) observes: "The first century A.D. was a time of great turmoil and changes in Northern India. Wars raged between the last Indo-Greeks, the Śakas, the Indo-Parthians and the Kushans till Wima Kadphises, c. A.D. 50, was able to bring some peace. There may have been later local revolts or internal strifes, of which no evidence remains, and the rule of the Kushans may have been hard, but at least foreign invasions were stopped for more than two centuries." We must assume that Kuṣāṇa rule did not quite correspond to brahmancial expectations of the new Kṛta-Yuga.

[45] Note that the question of linearity and circularity of time plays no role in the observations here made. Both the 'short' and the subsequent 'long' Yuga were part of a cyclic vision of time, but the very length of the 'long' Yuga made it more linear than the 'short' Yuga: "Where cyclic time takes a spiral form, it can be seen as almost linear when sufficiently stretched" (Thapar 2011:

If this understanding of the early brahmanical texts on Yugas is correct, the notion of the Kali-Yuga, when it was first introduced into Brahmanism, had a very concrete historical sense. It had immediate relevance for the present, because the present was thought of as being the end of the Kali-Yuga, an observation that explained the political and social disasters of the time. It was concrete enough to be testable, to use an anachronistic term, and it turned out to be incorrect: the world did not come to an end during the first centuries of the Common Era. The length of the Kali-Yuga was therefore reconsidered, with the result that henceforth Brahmins no longer lived near the end of the Kali-Yuga, far from it: hundreds of thousands of years were to pass before its end would arrive. Disasters and mishaps could no longer be attributed to the *end* of the Kali-Yuga; instead they were attributed to the Kali-Yuga as such. A short but intense period of catastrophic events that announced the arrival of better times was in this way replaced with a very long period of hundreds of thousands of years characterized by misery and injustice. Texts no longer speak of the *end* of the Kali-Yuga, but of the Kali-Yuga *tout court*.[46] Certainly, general conditions, including most notably social conditions, will go from bad to worse. But this process of deterioration is nowhere near its end.

If our reflections so far are correct, a major change took place in the brahmanical conception of history.[47] The earlier conception finds expression in some of the texts considered so far, while the so-called Purāṇas are our main testimony for the updated version. However, the Purāṇas also contain traces of the transition.

Consider the following observations about the presentation of the Yugas in these texts, made by Ludo Rocher in his book *The Purāṇas* (1986: 124):

> One feature that sets the *yugas* apart from similar systems in other civilizations is that, in India, the world ages have been assigned specific durations. The four *yugas* extend over periods of 4000, 3000, 2000, and 1000 years. Each of these is preceded by a dawn (*saṃdhyā*) and followed by a twilight (*saṃdhyāṃśa*) equal to one tenth of the duration of the *yuga* proper. The figures for the *yugas* which appear most often in the purāṇas are, therefore, 4800, 3600, 2400, and 1200, the *caturyuga* being equal to 12,000 years. More often than not these years are said to be divine years. To convert them into human years they have to be multiplied by 360, i.e. 1,728,000 + 1,296,000 + 864,000 + 432,000 = 4,320,000.

Note the words "more often than not" in "More often than not these years are said to be divine years". Some Purāṇas say no such thing. An example is the *Vāyu Purāṇa* (see esp. 32.58-65), presumably one of the earliest surviving texts of this kind.[48] This Purāṇa contains a vivid description of the hardships connected with the end of the Kali-Yuga in chapter 58. This description culminates in the introduction of a destructive ruler called

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292). Yet 'historical awareness' played a far greater role when people believed in the 'short' Yuga. Strictly speaking, "the Indians did not believe in 'cyclic time', if by that is meant an endless and beginningless recurrence of events. It is true that the narratives recounted in the Purāṇas allude to vast cosmic cycles of repeated creation and dissolution (the *kalpas*), but these are cycles of change *within* linear time." (Perrett 1999: 314).

[46] See the example of the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, below.

[47] We will see in a later chapter (§ II.4.2) that these two cyclical conceptions of history ('short Yugas' vs. 'long Yugas') existed in parallel with a third brahmanical conception of history, this one linear.

[48] Rocher 1986: 245. Hazra (1940: 16) proposes 200-275 for the portion on Yugas.

Pramiti who kills countless human beings (primarily foreigners [*mleccha*]); following this, people start killing each other, and suffer untold miseries.[49] Then, however, the Yuga changes overnight (*ahorātraṃ … yugaṃ … parivartate*, 58.101), and a new Kṛta-Yuga comes about (*kṛtam avartata*, 58.102; *pravṛtte … kṛtayuge*, 58.103). An almost identical account is found in *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* 1.2.31. Nothing prevents us from assuming that these two Purāṇas preserve an understanding of the Yugas that prevailed before their lengths were multiplied by 360, i.e. before their lengths exceeded anything measurable in terms related to ordinary human experience.[50]

Vincent Eltschinger (2012) has drawn attention to the fact that the apocalyptic passages from the *Vāyu* and *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*s just considered say nothing about foreign invasions, and much about heretical views[51] as harbingers of the end of the Yuga. It seems fair to explain this in chronological and geographical terms. These passages date from a time when Gupta rule had put an end to foreign invasions, and from a region that could feel safe under their protection. The main threat facing Brahmanism was now felt to come from non-brahmanical religious currents including Buddhism and Jainism.

An example of a Purāṇa that represents the more recent position, in which the Yugas are thought of as being of exceedingly long duration, is the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*.[52] Significantly, *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 6.1, which repeatedly refers to the Kali age, and a few times to the increase or progress of the Kali age (*kaler vṛddhi*), never refers to its *end*.[53] This confirms our earlier impression that now the Kali-Yuga as such, and not its end, occupied the minds of the authors concerned. The brahmanical worries of the Kali-Yuga in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* concern, as once again pointed out by Eltschinger, heretical competitors rather than foreign invaders.[54]

Summing up this chapter, certain brahmanical texts give expression to the anxiety that those Brahmins felt who were most affected by the post-Maurya invasions. They were convinced that the end of the world was near. When subsequently the situation improved, they abandoned that conviction, and reinterpreted their earlier ideas about the end of time in such a manner that this event was no longer near.

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[49] The suggestion has been made that the story of Pramiti was a reflection of historical rulers "such as Candragupta II Vikramāditya (r. 375-415) or Yaśodharman of Malvā, who defeated the Hūṇas around 530" (Eltschinger 2012: 55, with references to further literature).

[50] Note that the Yugas are, also in the *Vāyu Purāṇa*, placed in a wider context of Manvantaras and Kalpas, periods of far greater length than the individual Yugas.

[51] The terms ‘heretic’ and ‘heretical’ are far from ideal in this context. For a discussion, see Doniger O’Flaherty 1983.

[52] *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 1.3.11 and 6.1.5 state in so many words that 12’000 *divine* years constitute a *caturyuga*. See in general Brinkhaus 2007.

[53] cp. Kirfel 1959, 11 ff.

[54] Eltschinger (2012) points out that the brahmanical Yugas did end up finding their way into certain buddhist texts. A particularly interesting example is the tenth chapter (*sagāthaka*) of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, which must have been added to the text between its first translation into Chinese in 443 and the second one in 513. Unfortunately the information about Yugas is full of contradictions: there are no Buddhas in the Kali-Yuga (v. 804); Śākyamuni lived in the Kali-Yuga (v. 794); long after Śākyamuni, the Kali-Yuga will begin (v. 784-786); Buddhism will disappear at the end of the Kali-Yuga (v. 786). V. 786 informs us that the Kali-Yuga will come after the Mauryas, the Nandas, the Guptas and then some unspecified foreigners (*mleccha*), i.e., presumably at the time these verses were added to the text. If that was the *beginning* of the Kali-Yuga, one wonders what would be its end. The text provides no answer.

I.1.3. Brahmins in Gandhāra

After all the catastrophes that had befallen northwestern Brahmins, did any remain in those regions? The question will here be taken up with special reference to Gandhāra. We will see that those researchers who maintain that there *were* Brahmins in Gandhāra during the early centuries of the Common Era base their opinions on a debatable interpretation of the evidence. There are, on the other hand, textual passages that indicate that Gandhāra was out of bounds for Brahmins.

Two recent publications by prominent scholars state in so many words that there were Brahmins in Gandhāra during that period, one by Giovanni Verardi, the other by Gérard Fussman.

Verardi's article (2011) deals specifically with northwestern India and eastern Afghanistan. Verardi argues in favour of reintroducing what he calls "the third actor of the play, i.e. Brahmanical power". He is of the opinion that there is a sufficient amount of evidence regarding a presence of Bhāgavatas and Pāśupatas in the Northwest to reappraise the history of the region, especially from the sixth century CE onward. This observation, as long as it concerns the period from the sixth century onward, is in conformity with our textual sources. Indeed, Kalhaṇa's *Rājataraṅgiṇī* (1.307), a text composed in the twelfth century, states in so many words that there are Brahmins in Gandhāra; it looks down upon them for accepting *agrahāra*s from a worthless king, but in so doing confirms their presence.[55] Most of Verardi's article concerns this more recent period.

However, Verardi also draws conclusions about an earlier time, so let us consider the evidence on which he bases these. About the Bhāgavatas he says (p. 149):

> For the Bhāgavatas, we go back as early as the images of Kṛṣṇa and Saṃkarṣa[ṇ]a on the drachm minted by Agathocles of Bactria, who also ruled on Gandhāra and Taxila,[56] and to the Indo-Greek king of Taxila Antialkidas, either a Bhāgavata himself or close to Bhāgavata circles.[57] Gandhāran images of Viṣṇu datable to the second or third century are rare,[58] but a seal of the fourth-fifth century AD executed according to the more Hellenised tendency of Gandhāran art shows a

[55] Evidence for a brahmanical presence in this later but still pre-Muslim period comes from statues and literary sources; Kuwayama 1976; 1999; see further Meister 2010. At the time of the Arab conquest there were also Brahmins in Sind. As Maclean (1989: 13) points out, a native of Brahmanābād stated the following at the time of the Arab conquest: "The prosperity of this country is due to the Brahmins (*barāhimah*). They are our scholars (*'ulamā'*) and sages (*ḥukamā'*). All our important rituals — from marriage to mourning — are performed through their mediation." Maclean (ibid.; with detailed references) further observes that "the *Chachnāmah* [refers] to Brahmin priestcraft, … the veneration of the cow, Brahmanical rituals such as cremation, and caste related concerns for purity and pollution."

[56] Footnote 10: See the find analysed by Filliozat (1973) and Guillaume (1991: 81 ff.).

[57] Footnote 11: See the famous inscription on the Besnagar Garuḍa pillar erected by his ambassador *Heliodoreṇa bhāgavatena* at the court of Vidiś[ā] (Sircar 1965: 88-89, v. 2-3).

[58] Footnote 12: See for instance the small Viṣṇu image seen at the Christie's Sale 2195 (Indian and Southeast Asian Art) of 16 September 2009, New York.

> four-armed Viṣṇu to whom a ruler in Central-Asian dress and half his size pays homage …[59]

About Śivaism he writes (p. 150-151):

> For what we call Sivaism, the evidence is more abundant. An early (1st-2nd century AD) object like the ritual vessel published by Giuseppe Tucci [1968] points to a still unexplored cultural and religious horizon and raises major questions … . There are the well-known Kuṣāṇa coins with Oešo/Śiva standing near the bull and bearing trident and lazo,[60] and the profession of faith of at least one Kuṣāṇa king,[61] as well as early Śiva icons.[62] We should also carefully consider the reason why in the Mahābhārata Śiva is called 'the God from Gandhāra'.[63] An early schist image of Mahiṣamardinī comes from the site of Muhammad Zai near Peshawar,[64] and Sivaite penetration goes as far as Surkh Kotal in Bactria/Tokhāristān.[65] The latter was a traditionally rich agricultural region and was, in my opinion, the ultimate target of Brahmanical expansion and the reason of Brahmanical pressure on K[ā]piś[ī]. … The relative invisibility of Bhāgavatas and Pāśupatas in early Gandhāra depends on their taking root in rural areas (especially the groups of Pāśupatas) and on the fact that the trading class — an object of scorn for the authors of the early Kali Age literature — did not find representation among them.

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[59] Footnote 13: Callieri (1997: Cat U 7.3, pp. 190-91 and pl. 57).

[60] The tendency to identify Kuṣāṇa deities with brahmanical deities is widespread. So in the following passage: "OHÞO is the only Brahmanic god occurring on Kaniṣka's coinage as frequently as Iranian deities." (Lo Muzio 1996: 163)

[61] Footnote 17: Oešo was particularly popular with Vima Kadphises, who declares himself a devotee of Sarvalokeśvara, and with Vāsudeva I, as appears from Göbl (1984: 72-74; pls. 28 ff.). In ibid.: 43-44, the reader will find the typology. On Oešo/Śiva see Cribb (1997: 17-18), Gail (1992) and Lo Muzio (1996); Pal (1988) has understood very well the need for the Kuṣāṇas to be legitimised in their Indian territories. An altogether different line of research is that of Tanabe (1992). On the extent of the involvement of the Kuṣāṇa dynasty with Sivaism, see the nature of the Māṭ sanctuary (Lüders 1961: 138 ff.) as well as the evidence from Surkh Kotal (Fussman in Schlumberger, Le Berre and Fussman 1983: 149-50, 152).

[62] Footnote 18: Marshall (1951, II: 723, no. 151); Härtel (1989); Taddei (2003a, 2003b).

[63] Footnote 19: Cf. Tucci (1963: esp. 159). [Observation added by JB: Note that Tucci refers here to the Śivasahasranāma that is not included in the critical edition of the *Mahābhārata*.]

[64] Footnote 20: M. A. Khan and A. Azeem (1999).

[65] Footnote 21: More than one hundred graffiti depicting the *triś[ū]la* are incised along the monumental access to the upper terrace of the sanctuary (on this and other evidence, see Fussman in Schlumberger, Le Berre and Fussman 1983: 149-50, 152), but an assessment of the evidence remains difficult because of the little stratigraphic attention paid to the late phases of the site and to the phases of abandonment … . Not all the evidence brought forward in Transoxiana points to a Kuṣāṇa or post-Kuṣāṇa horizon, as for instance the Umāmaheśvara painting from Dilberjin Tepe (Kruglikova 1974: 44 ff.), which can hardly be earlier than the sixth century. Images of Śiva and Pārvatī are known from relatively early times, but the iconography of Umāmaheśvara is post-Gupta (the earliest known example comes from Nepal; Pal 1974: pls. 128, 129). It is true that the Dilberjin specimen, displaying the divine couple seated on a huge Nandin, sets a model of its own.

Verardi's claims as to the presence of brahmanical power might not be controversial but for the fact that a number of our textual sources present an altogether different picture. Consider the following.[66]

Brahmanical texts from the period suggest the absence, or at best weak presence, of vedic Brahmanism in the Northwest. A number of these (Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 2.4.10, vol. I p. 475; on P. 6.3.109, vol. III p. 174, cp. Deshpande 1993: 96 ff.; *Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra* 1.2.9-17; *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* 1.8-16) describe the extent of the 'land of the Āryas' (*āryāvarta*). For its western limit they use a somewhat obscure expression, often translated as the place "where the Sarasvatī disappears".[67] This place is situated in the Thar Desert that today separates the territories of India and Pakistan. Patañjali adds an interesting remark. Composing his *Mahābhāṣya* toward the end of the second century BCE,[68] he specifies, in the midst of a technical grammatical discussion, that the Śakas and the Yavanas live outside this territory. Since Patañjali's Yavanas are the Indo-Greeks and his Śakas the Indo-Scythians, both of whom established themselves in succession in Gandhāra and Panjab roughly at his time (the Indo-Greeks certainly already before him), their mention confirms our suspicion that the western limit of Brahmanism at his time was perhaps situated somewhere near the present border between India and Pakistan, excluding Gandhāra from the territory that Patañjali had in mind. We should however not be hasty in concluding that all Brahmins at the time lived in the 'land of the Āryas' (*āryāvarta*). As a matter of fact, there are reasons to believe that Patañjali himself wrote his *Mahābhāṣya* in Kashmir.[69] This would mean that one of the most important texts of classical Brahmanism was composed outside the 'land of the Āryas'. Clearly there were Brahmins who lived outside this core region. The fact that the Śakas and the Yavanas lived outside this region does not therefore by itself exclude the possibility that there were Brahmins in their region.

However, both the *Anuśāsanaparvan* of the *Mahābhārata*[70] and the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*[71] state that no Brahmins are seen among the Yavanas, the Śakas and the Kāmbojas.

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[66] Cp. Bronkhorst *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism* p. 203-205; *Greater Magadha* p. 357 ff.

[67] For a discussion of the obscure reading *prāg ādarśāt*, see Olivelle 2000: 571, note 2.9. Manu's extension of brahmanical territory until the western sea does not necessarily include Gandhāra.

[68] For Patañjali's date, see § I.2.1, below.

[69] See § I.2.1, below.

[70] Mhbh 13.33.19-21: "Those various men of Kṣatriya birth — Śakas, Yavanas, and Kāmbojas — have reached the level of Śūdras because no Brahmins are seen among them. Those various men of Kṣatriya birth — Dramiḻas, Kaliṅgas, Pulindas, Uśīnaras, Kaulas, Sarpas, and Māhiṣakas — have reached the level of Śūdras because no Brahmins are seen among them." (*śakā yavanakāmbojās tās tāḥ kṣatriyajātayaḥ/ vṛṣalatvaṃ parigatā brāhmaṇānām adarśanāt// dramiḻāś ca kaliṅgāś ca pulindāś cāpy uśīnarāḥ/ kaulāḥ sarpā māhiṣakās tās tāḥ kṣatriyajātayaḥ// vṛṣalatvaṃ parigatā brāhmaṇānām adarśanāt/*. Similarly Mhbh 13.35.17-18: *mekalā dramiḍāḥ kāśāḥ pauṇḍrāḥ kollagirās tathā/ śauṇḍikā daradā darvāś caurāḥ śabarabarbarāḥ// kirātā yavanāś caiva tās tāḥ kṣatriyajātayaḥ/ vṛṣalatvam anuprāptā brāhmaṇānām adarśanāt//*.)

[71] Manu 10.43-44: "By neglecting rites and because no Brahmins are seen among them, these men of Kṣatriya birth have gradually reached in the world the level of Śūdras — Puṇḍrakas, Coḍas, Draviḍas, Kāmbojas, Yavanas, Śakas, Pāradas, Pahlavas, Cīnas, Kirātas, and Daradas." (*śanakais tu kriyālopād imāḥ kṣatriyajātayaḥ/ vṛṣalatvaṃ gatā loke brāhmaṇādarśanena ca// puṇḍrakāś coḍadraviḍāḥ kāmbojā yavanāḥ śakāḥ/ pāradāḥ pahvalāś cīnāḥ kirātā daradās tathā//*; tr. Olivelle, modified.)

Other texts must be considered as well. The *Assalāyana Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (MN II p. 149) states that the four *varṇa*s do not exist among the Yonas and the Kāmbojas; and an inscription of Aśoka claims that there are no Brahmins and Śramaṇas among the Yonas.[72] It is hard to determine whether these testimonies are relevant for Gandhāra. Under Maurya rule, there may have been few, if any, Greeks (Yonas) in Gandhāra, so that these testimonies may primarily concern regions like Bactria, where a strong Greek presence remained, and Kandahar, where the language of Aśoka's inscriptions is Greek, presumably because of a strong Greek presence there. After the collapse of the Maurya Empire, the Greeks were back in Gandhāra, but clearly Aśoka's inscription cannot refer to these. And the date of composition, or of the final redaction, of the *Assalāyana Sutta* is too uncertain to allow us to determine what exactly it is talking about.[73]

Then there are the following brahmanical texts. The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (9.3.1.24) speaks in very negative terms about the inhabitant of the region of the seven rivers that flow westward, i.e. the Panjab.[74] The *Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra* enumerates the names of tribes that a good Brahmin should not visit, among them the Āraṭṭas and the Gāndhāras in the Northwest.[75] It is not clear where exactly the Āraṭṭas lived;[76] the Gāndhāras, on the other hand, evidently lived in Gandhāra, a region that by this testimony was situated outside the realm where orthodox Brahmins lived at that time.[77] The correct understanding of these passages depends, once again, on chronological considerations that cannot be taken up here.

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[72] For a detailed discussion of this inscription, see Appendix I, below.

[73] The question whether this reference to the Yonas implies that this part of the Sutta was composed after Alexander divides scholars. *A priori* this seems plausible to me, but others disagree; see Analayo 2011: 551-552, with note 116 and references; 2012: 245-246.

[74] Cp. Witzel 1997: 302.

[75] BaudhŚS 18.13; cp. Witzel 1987: 202. The *Kevaddha Sutta* of the buddhist canon in Pali (DN I p. 213) speaks of a 'science from Gandhāra' (*gandhārī nāma vijjā*; cp. the *gāndhāri nāma vidyā* of Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 424 l. 18, under verse 7.47), which enables its possessors to multiply themselves, and other such things. Note that Tucci (1963: 147 f.) interprets *gāndhārī vidyā* differently: "a magical formula connected with or placed under the control of Gāndhārī [the Devī from Gandhāra]".

[76] BaudhŚS 18.44 suggests that Gandhāra and the land of the Ā/Araṭṭa were separate from each other. Witzel (1989: 235) translates this passage: "Ayu went eastward. His (people) are the Kuru-Pañcāla and the Kāśī-Videha. This is the Āyava migration. (His other people) stayed at home in the West. His people are the Gāndhāri, Parśu and Araṭṭa. This is the Amāvasava (group)." Cardona & Jain (2003: 33 sq.) propose a different translation: "Āyu went eastward. Of him there are these: the Kuru-Pañcālas, the Kāśi-Videhas. This is the going forth of Āyu. Amāvasu (went) westward. Of him there are these: the Gāndhāris, the Sparśa, and the Arāṭṭas. This is the (going forth) of Amāvasu." Similarly Brucker (1980: 92): "Nach Osten brach Āyu auf. Dessen (Nachkommen sind) diese (heutigen) Kuru-Pañcāla, Kāśi-Videha: das ist die Gruppe, die unter Āyu aufbrach. Nach Westen brach Amāvasu auf. Dessen (Nachkommen sind) diese (heutigen) Gāndhāri, Sparśu, Arāṭṭa: das ist die Gruppe, die unter Amāvasu aufbrach."

[77] Brucker (1980: 147) states: "mit Gandhāra [begegnet uns] ein Land, das sicher schon sehr früh Kontakt mit den in Nordindien eindringenden Indern hatte. Um so erstaunlicher ist es, dass dieses Gebiet, das am Oberlauf von Sindhu und Vitasta zu lokalisieren ist, selbst in der Sūtrazeit noch nicht in die arische Siedlungsgemeinschaft inkorporiert war." The 'noch nicht' of this passage suggests that Brucker believes that Gandhāra was subsequently incorporated in the area of Aryan colonization; he does not however provide any evidence to support this.

It appears that Brahmanism at the time of Patañjali and perhaps already before him spread mainly eastward and southward, starting from the 'land of the Āryas'.[78] This impression is confirmed by recent research about vedic schools.[79] These schools migrated toward the east and the south, or even the North (Kashmir,[80] Nepal), but it seems they never returned to the Northwest.[81] Several late-vedic texts know Gandhāra as a more or less remote region, and none of the vedic schools appear to be found there.[82] The regions to the west of those inhabited by vedic Brahmins are home to the despised Bāhīkas,[83] literally, outsiders. The term *bāhīka* is often confused with *bāhlīka* or *bālhīka*,[84] which designates the inhabitants of Bactria. The inhabitants of Gandhāra are depicted in the *Mahābhārata* as being beyond the system of *varṇa*s, like fishermen.[85]

The western boundary of India appears to have become, and remained for some time, the river Indus. And indeed, Arrian's *Indica* clearly distinguishes between regions east of the Indus and those to the west of it.[86]

Finally some observations — made by Witzel (2006: 485) — about the *Mahābhārata*:

> Especially the treatment of the northwest is very interesting. The 'bald' (clean-shaven) Greeks of the Bactrian and the Panjab Greek kingdoms are frequently combined with other barbarians (*mleccha*). On the other hand, they are somewhat surprisingly called 'all-knowing'. But, they do not have a 'proper' social order with four classes but only two, free men and slaves. They drink alcohol, eat, dress,

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[78] Bodewitz (2002: 222) speaks of the 'Veda Belt'.

[79] See, e.g., Witzel 1981 & 1982; 1985; 1987. Witzel (1990: 31) sums up the results of his earlier studies concerning ancient vedic dialects: "These post-Ṛgvedic dialects can first be noticed in Kurukṣetra and its surroundings and later on in all of Northern India, from the Beas in E. Panjab to the borders of Bengal." Cp. Witzel 1985: 45: "Für eine Beurteilung der Verbreitung des Einflusses von vedischen Brahmanen im Mittelalter ist zunächst von Bedeutung, dass sich hier eine ursprünglich auf das zentrale (und dann auch östliche und südwestliche) Nordindien begrenzte Tradition zu einem unbekannten Zeitpunkt (jedenfalls vor der Mitte des 1. Jtd.n.Chr.) nach Osten und vor allem über den Vindhya hinweg nach Südindien ausgebreitet hat." See further Witzel 1989: 103 n. 12.

[80] See Witzel 1994: esp. p. 259 ff., on the immigration of Brahmins into Kashmir, initially mainly from the centre of Manu's Āryadeśa. Patañjali himself may have been an immigrant in Kashmir; see § I.2.1, below.

[81] Witzel (1981: 116 n. 25) wonders, without proof, whether there have been 'missionaries' who travelled toward the Northwest to spread their ideas about ritual. The issue whether Brahmanism spread through missionaries who preached their views about ritual can be questioned.

[82] The *Yajurveda-Vṛkṣa* mentions several schools that were supposedly situated *yavanadeśe*. Witzel (1982: 192), who provides this information, points out that the dates of composition of the different versions of this text remain unknown. He suggests that the text here speaks of the Greek Panjab, or of regions in Sind, later also in Panjab, that were occupied at an early date by the Moslems.

[83] Witzel (1987: 202 n. 100) thinks that Bāhīka is a kind of nickname for peoples whose real names were Ārāṭṭa et Madra. See further Witzel 1989: 128, with notes 66 and 67.

[84] MW p. 730 s.v. *bāhīka*.

[85] E.g., Mhbh 12.65.13 ff.; 200.40-41.

[86] Wirth & Hinüber 1985: 614 ff.; Charvet 2002: 31, 33; Hammond 2013: 142. Cf. Thapliyal 1979: 4: "during the greater part of the centuries immediately preceding the Christian era the Indus appears to be the substantial western boundary of India."

> and marry in improper ways. They inhabit an area that one should not go to, which echoes Bodhāyana's and Manu's concerns … However, all of the Panjab was seen, already in the later Veda ([ŚPaBr] 9.3.1.24), as an area of ruffians and barbarians whom one should avoid.

The claimed absence of *varṇa*s or of Brahmins in the northwestern regions (those primarily inhabited by Yavanas [*yona*], Kāmbojas and Śakas) is significant; after all, the *varṇa* system of society can be looked upon as a core feature of Brahmanism. The absence of *varṇa*s in a region is almost by definition an indication that Brahmanism does not prevail there. It does not, of course, exclude the possibility that individual Brahmins live in that region, for the mere presence of Brahmins does not guarantee the prevalence of Brahmanism as a system. However, the negative remarks about Gandhāra in certain brahmanical texts, and the prohibition for good Brahmins to visit it, can be read as strong indicators of a weak presence, or even total absence, of Brahmins. All in all, our brahmanical textual sources allow us to believe that there were no, or only few, Brahmins in and around Gandhāra during the centuries just before and after the beginning of the Common Era. So how do we make sense of Verardi's evidence?

Before turning to this question, let us try to be clear what we are talking about. In the course of time Brahmanism came to absorb numerous religious cults, adopting in the process gods such as Kṛṣṇa and Śiva. These religious cults came to be added to a core ideology that could and also did exist without these cults. The core ideology of Brahmanism is of a socio-political nature; it is a vision in which Brahmins are at the apex of society, and society as a whole is primarily classified into four caste-classes, *varṇa*s. Details of this socio-political vision are presented in the classical treatises on Dharma. The worship of particular gods is not part of it. Indeed, certain Brahmins, though committed to Brahmanism as such, rejected the very existence of gods. Examples are classical Mīmāṃsā (of Śabara) and Lokāyata.[87]

It is true that specific religious cults did come to be incorporated into Brahmanism. But these cults were, more often than not, extraneous to its core ideology. Many of these existed before they became part of Brahmanism and independently of it. And once a limited number of deities had found entrance into Brahmanism (e.g. Śiva and Viṣṇu), subsequently encountered deities could be identified with them. To quote Axel Michaels (2004: 39): "Brahman priests explain the pastoral divinities of local cults as manifestations of their respective supreme deity and thus accept them into the Vedic-Brahmanic, and now Hindu pantheon." It is often difficult to find out details about these non-brahmanical cults, for most of our textual sources are brahmanical and loath to concede that they had taken over anything whatsoever from outside. But even without specific details, the general picture is beyond serious doubt.

In an important sense, Verardi is aware of the originally extraneous nature of several religious cults before their incorporation into Brahmanism. He expresses it clearly in another publication that came out in 2011, his book *Hardships and Downfall of Buddhism in India*. We read here, for example (2011a: 104): "The opponents of the Bhāgavatas pretended image-worshippers not to be brāhmaṇas and [to] be non-Vedic, and the conflict between the two parties was to be a long one. To the *vaidika*-s, the idea

[87] See *Greater Magadha* p. 137-160 (§ IIB)

that the divine could be expressed anthropomorphically was a Greek, *mleccha* idea."[88] About the Śaivas he says here (2011a: 105): "The Pāśupatas, or some of the groups which bore this name, were ostracised by the *vaidika* brāhmaṇas to an even greater extent than the Bhāgavatas … The uncritical endorsement of the majority of scholars of the alleged continuity of Śiva with Vedic Rudra, searched for and built up to obtain credit in orthodox circles, is an obstacle to understanding the upsetting rise of the God-ascetic …" And again (p. 141-142): "The Pāśupatas, or at least some of the groups known by this name, became part of the neo-Brahmanical synthesis in early Gupta time, and perhaps even before, after Lakulīśa's reform (Lakulīśa was a brāhmaṇa) …" On p. 107 he states: "why did the Buddhists continue to be branded as *pāṣaṇḍa*-s until the end, while the Bhāgavatas and Pāśupatas did not? The doctrines propounded by the theistic movements were as distant from Vedic orthodoxy as Buddhist doctrines. Could there be anything more extraneous to Vedic doctrine and praxis than the worship of the *liṅga*? Yet the Pāśupatas found their place in the Brahmanical system, ultimately governed by the *vaidika* brāhmaṇas …"

All this raises important questions. If we find evidence for the cult of Kṛṣṇa or Śiva in early Gandhāra, does this justify the conclusion that this region was brahmanized, or even that there were Brahmins in it? Even if we do not contest the interpretations given to coins and statues, it is vital to remember that proof of a Brahmanical presence passes, not through pictures of Kṛṣṇa and Śiva, but through the presence of the core vision of Brahmanism. Most centrally, absence of *varṇa*s means absence of Brahmanism, whatever the gods that were worshiped.[89]

A recent book by Richard D. Mann, called *The Rise of Mahāsena* (2012), constitutes a good point of departure for a discussion of the brahmanical adoption of originally non-brahmanical deities. Mann shows in detail how the god Mahāsena — also known by other names, such as Skanda and Kārttikeya — was brahmanized during the period from the Kuṣāṇas to the Guptas: from a popular and protective household deity he became a brahmanical heavenly god, son of Śiva and general of the gods.[90]

A recent article by Restelli (2012) focuses on the buffalo-killing goddess Mahiṣamardinī and observes (p. 21) that "the indigenous cult of this goddess, to whom sacrifices were supposedly dedicated, was originally to be found predominently at a popular level". She further shows that the iconography of this goddess underwent the impact of a goddess of Near Eastern origin, Nana.[91]

With regard to Śiva, I will merely cite Tucci (1963: 161; without the references): "Śiva, before becoming one of the foremost and then — at least in wide circles of believers — the foremost God, was one of the folk deities, *laukika devatā*, and a sect of

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[88] Image-worship enters into brahmanical orthodox literature with much hesitation; see Granoff 2004.

[89] For a short survey of "Hindu deities in Gandharan art", see Srinivasan 2008. Regarding the "Seals, Sealings and Tokens from Gandhāra" described by Rahman & Falk in their eponymous book (2011), the authors observe: "On the whole it is remarkable how few seal[s] from outside the Kashmir Smast display a *śaiva* background." and: "In the private context of personal seals, Viṣṇu is rather conspicuous by his absence." (p. 21)

[90] See further Ferrier 2014. On the fusion of 'local' and traditional vedic gods in Mathurā, see Schmid 2010, esp. chapter 3.

[91] Lubin (2005: 97) states quite generally: "brahmins were installed as priests in the new royal temples, where by composing *māhātmya*s and *sthala purāṇa*s they helped assimilate the local (often tribal) deity to pan-Indian Sanskrit mythological and cultic norms."

his devotees must have soon acquired a certain notoriety if Patañjali already mentions the Śivabhāgavata-s. One of his first and preeminent characters was his being a village deity …, the god of shepherds or cowherds: he is connected with cow, buffalo, sheep in the *Aṅgavijjā* which is, at least in its bulk, a very old book containing much which may go back to the Kushana times as the editors suggest; as a cowherds god Śiva is long-lived and as such he survives in mediaeval Bengal." Whatever the details,[92] we must agree that Śiva, too, was originally a non-brahmanical god who subsequently came to be brahmanized. In other words, identifiable depictions of Śiva are no guarantee for a presence of Brahmanism.[93]

It is also noteworthy that the putatively brahmanical god Śiva is referred to by the presumably non-brahmanical name of Oesho (OHÞO) on Kuṣāṇa coins.[94] Sanderson (2006: 1) points out that there is nothing in the early evidence that enables us to define the worshippers it indicates as belonging or not belonging to one or other of the traditions known from Śaiva scriptural and commentatorial sources. Sanderson further draws attention to the rivalry between Śaivism and Brahmanism, which "denied the validity of any religious practice that was undertaken on the authority of texts lying outside the brahmanical scriptural corpus … The Śaiva theoreticians, for their part, made no claim that their scriptures were valid by the criterion of Brahmanism. They insisted rather both on their independent validity and on their superiority to the scriptures to Brahmanism." (p. 6). Sanderson concludes: "It might appear, then, that Śaivism was as much distinct from, and opposed to, Brahmanism as Buddhism and Jainism were."[95] Elsewhere (2013: 221-222) he states: "it has been maintained that we have abundant proof of recognition of the importance of Śaivism from as early as the late second century BC on coin issues of the foreigners who ruled parts of northern India during this period, namely the Indo-Greeks, Indo-Scythians, Indo-Parthians, and Kushans. But it is clear that what we have here is an *interpretatio indica* of non-Indian deities, Hellenistic and Iranian, features of whose iconography were incorporated in the development of that of Śiva during this period."

With regard to Kṛṣṇa we can be brief. Herbert Härtel (1987) and Doris Srinivasan (1997) have proposed the thesis of "a 'gradual deification' of Kṛṣṇa from a clan hero to the god and then the 'highest god' that we find in the *Bhagavadgītā*". Indeed, Lamotte (1929) looks upon the *Bhagavadgītā* as a result of brahmanizing Kṛṣṇaism. Angelika

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[92] Tucci (1963: 163) concludes: "We can … safely assume that the Devī and Śiva in whatever shape and symbols were worshipped in Gandhāra and neighbouring countries, even if they had peculiar names; they might have been worshipped as Yakṣa, as naivāsika or laukika or grāma godlings and gods; but their presence there is certain." Note further that "Bhava, an alter ego of the Vedic Rudra, ... has been found as a venerated deity in Gandhara not too long after Alexander" (Falk 2013: 65, with a reference to Falk 2009).

[93] Cf. Zeymal 1997: 255-256: "one should bear in mind that the early iconographic symbolism of the Kushan period that is traceable in the medieval iconography of Shiva could have been fundamentally re-interpreted in the interim: when later religious schools of moderate Shaivites began to draw closer to Vedic Hinduism …, this process was accompanied not just by a smoothing over of the most acute contradictions, but also by a reinterpretation of many myths and iconographic characteristics of purely Shaivite origin."

[94] See, e.g., Pal 1988; Cribb 1997; Gail 1992; Lo Muzio 1996; Tanabe 1992; Schmid 2010: 483 ff.

[95] He then continues: "However, its approach to brahmanical authority was of a very different, more accommodating kind."

Malinar (2007: 252 ff.), moreover, presents evidence testifying to the worship of this god during the centuries preceding the Common Era.[96]

Note that the iconographic and epigraphical evidence indicates that the cult of those gods who became absorbed into Brahmanism was not strong at the time of the Kuṣāṇas, even though orthodox brahmanical institutions, most notably the vedic sacrifice, were popular.[97] Verardi, who tends to look upon those gods as evidence of a brahmanical presence, as we have seen, admits this in the following passage (2011a: 106-107):

> we see that in many Indian regions the rulers followed the same policy of the Śuṅgas and Kaṇvas, opposing both Buddhism and Kuṣāṇa rule, only occasionally supporting the theistic brāhmaṇas. The number of kings who performed the great Vedic rituals, including the horse sacrifice, is astonishing. The Bhāraśivas performed ten aśvamedha-s, Harītīputra Pravarasena I, in the Decccan, performed four, assuming the title of samrāj, and an aśvamedha was also performed in the third century by Cāṃṭamūla I of the Ikṣvāku dynasty, who claimed descent from the mythical Ikṣvākus of Ayodhyā. The lack of artistic patronage at the élite level with regard to the theistic movements in the territories controlled by these dynasties (an exception is Cāṃṭamūla I) indicates the strength of orthodox brāhmaṇas, who … drained all royal resources. Once the conditions created by Kuṣāṇa rule dissolved, and the imposing building activity and impressive amount of artistic output in key-cities like Mathurā and in Buddhist sanctuaries came to a halt, India, besides being de-urbanised, appeared as an iconic desert.

Verardi has the following to say about the time when theistic movements were adopted into Brahmanism (2011a: 157):

> [I]n the Mahābhārata, not only the Bhāgavatas, but also the Pāśupatas have become part of the new Brahmanical tradition born out of the compromise between the theistic movements and the orthodox. The caves of Udayagiri near Vidiśā, owing to the fact that they date to about AD 400 (the inscription of AD 401 is outside Cave 6), are even better evidence. … About the same time an image of Hari-Hara, also from central India, testifies to the compromise between the two great theistic systems. Thus the grafting of the theistic religions onto the Vedic tradition, besides producing works like the Rāmāyaṇa, a large part of the Mahābhārata and the early Purāṇas, was now able to create iconography of great emotional impact and the related rituals.

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[96] See further Schmid 2010; Hardy 1983: 29 ff.

[97] It is further "a well-known fact that the images of the divinity found in North West India differ from the contemporary depictions of Śiva from Mathurā or other sites in the subcontinent, and that one of the main reasons for such differences lies precisely in the presence or absence of the *triśūla*. This attribute, destined to become one of the essential features in depictions of the divinity and a symbol on which rest speculations of a philosophical and ritual nature elaborated in the Middle Ages, appears to have been an exclusive prerogative of the icons developing in the North West during the formative phase of Śaiva iconography. On the other hand in Mathurā, which could boast important Śaiva sculptural production, images of Śiva were never characterized by the *triśūla* before the Gupta period." Giuliano 2004: 52, with a reference to Kreisel 1986: 215-216, Abb. 70.

This and other passages in Verardi's book suggest that he looks upon the compromise between the two great theistic movements visible in art as evidence for their absorption into Brahmanism. If we accept this conclusion (I do not know how convincing it is), we have regional evidence dating from about 400 CE. The *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, too, provide at best evidence for the acceptance of the gods concerned by the Brahmins who composed these works, and no evidence whatsoever about the possible continued independent existence of these gods outside Brahmanism. In other words, the iconic representations of Viṣṇu or Śiva in certain regions during the rule of the Kuṣāṇas tell us little, if anything, about the presence of Brahmanism in those regions.

Recall at this point that we must distinguish between a presence of Brahmins and the prevalence of Brahmanism. Brahmins can be present in a region without succeeding in imposing their specific vision of society. An example is the region where the Buddha preached. According to the early buddhist texts, he met many Brahmins. However, the brahmanical vision of society did not prevail, and the four *varṇa*s come up almost exclusively in discussions with Brahmins. Our textual sources suggest that Brahmanism did not prevail in Gandhāra. These sources also discourage Brahmins from going there.

Verardi does not stand alone in believing that there was a brahmanical presence in Gandhāra during those early centuries. From among others who hold this position, I will consider one, Gérard Fussman, concentrating on the arguments he presents in two publications in particular.

In the more recent publication, Fussman (2012: 19-20) states the following about Gandhāra during the early centuries CE: "There was no clear-cut distinction nor avowed opposition, in the lay people at least, between Hinduism and Buddhism. Most Buddhists, even very devout ones building stūpa-s and monasteries, e.g. the rulers of Oḍi and Apraca, bore non-Buddhist names, most often Hindu (Fussman 1994, 41-42), which means that their *saṃskāra*-s (personal rites) were Hindu, be it only because there is no Buddhist *saṃskāra*. … Senavarma (a non-Buddhist Sanskrit name, probably coined by a Brahman) dedicates parts of the merits he acquired in re-building his ancestor's stūpa to 'Brahma Sahaṃpati, Śakra, the Indra of the Gods, the four Great Kings [of the directions], the twenty-eight generals of the yakṣa-s, Hārīti and their followers.' (Hinüber 2003, 46, 10c). These are the gods whose names appear often in the early Buddhist texts. They are staunch supporters of the Buddha. But they are Hindu, even if they do not bear the usual names of the corresponding deities (Brahma, Indra), even if — excepting Hārīti — they are not the gods most revered in Gandhāra in the early centuries A.D. (Viṣṇu, Śiva, Bhairava, Bhīmā, Śrī). A lay Buddhist (*upāsaka*) and probably many monks did not see any conflict in revering both the Buddha and Hindu gods."

The use of the term 'Hindu' in this passage should not disturb us, because it is sufficiently vague to allow of various interpretations. The claim that these inhabitants of Gandhāra followed Hindu, i.e. brahmanical, *saṃskāra*s, on the other hand, remains unsubstantiated. Basing this claim on the fact that they bore Hindu names is dubious, given that the brahmanical rules as to what name should be given to whom are in practice often ignored;[98] this suggests that 'Hindu' names do not prove that Brahmins were involved. Gods "whose names appear often in the early Buddhist texts" and who "are staunch supporters of the Buddha" cannot, of course, be adduced as evidence for a

[98] Hilka 1910: 29.

brahmanical presence. We must conclude that the arguments here presented are not compelling.

In an preceding publication Fussman gives a number of reasons for accepting a brahmanical presence in Gandhāra and Panjab during an earlier period, viz., the third century BCE: Indo-Aryan languages are used, the presence of Brahmins is attested by the historians of Alexander, the birth place of Pāṇini is in this region, Taxila is presented by buddhist texts as one of the great cultural centres of ancient India.[99]

This time we can agree with Fussman. We have already seen that Gandhāra was a centre of brahmanical culture when Alexander came to India. But clearly, the presence of Brahmins at the time of and before Alexander tells us little or nothing about their presence three hundred years later. And indeed, the evidence here considered suggests that most of these Brahmins may have left at that time, or perhaps given up their brahmanical status. Some may have become Buddhists. But one thing seems beyond question: The predominant position of Brahmins in Gandhāra had now been taken by Buddhists. More will be said about this in § III.2.1, below.

Questions remain. What do we make of the Brahmins depicted in Gandharan sculpture? Presumably there are plenty of them. Van Lohuizen-de Leeuw (1972: 32; with a reference to J.-J. Barthoux, *Les Fouilles de Haḍḍa*, vol. III, Pl. 63, a) makes the following observation: "Hermits and ascetics, whether young or old, are always represented as typical Indian Brahmins wearing the Indian dress or *dhoti* and shawl, while their hair is arranged in a *jaṭāmukuṭa* or topknot. They often carry a flask or waterpot and occasionally even their *upavīta* or ritual cord is indicated." Elsewhere in the same article she states (p. 33): "We can … draw some conclusions from the frescoes discovered in Central Asia and Afghanistan which have been preserved due to the dry climate of these areas. First of all there are the early wall paintings from Miran in which the Indian elements stand out clearly. In the later frescoes from Bamiyan, Kakrak, and Fondukistan these are still obvious, especially at the last site. … Mention may here be made only of the shading of the bodies producing plastic effects, the attitude of the female figures, and such details as the enormous ear-rings, the striped dresses and the *upavīta* running over the lower right arm, a mannerism which can also be found in Indian sculptures of about the same date."[100] Harrison & Luczanits (2011: 84), similarly, speak of a 'brāhmaṇa type' that "certainly derives from the iconography of Maitreya, the future Buddha, which was already established shortly after the first Buddha images were made. He is consistently represented with the loosely tied long hair and a flask, both signs of his last rebirth as a brāhmaṇa". On the same page they mention Maitreya, then add: "or

[99] Fussman 1994: 17-18: "Bien que l'orthodoxie brahmanique ait par la suite suspecté la pureté de l'appartenance à l'Inde du Gandhāra et du Panjāb, cette région avait en effet, au IIIe siècle avant n.è., beaucoup de titres à se prétendre indienne. Terre de langue indo-aryenne, séjour de nombreux brahmanes dont la présence est notée par les historiens d'Alexandre, lieu de naissance de Pāṇini, elle a pour métropole régionale Taxila que les textes bouddhiques nous présentent comme l'un des grands centres culturels de l'Inde antique."

[100] In a footnote Van Lohuizen-de Leeuw refers to J. Hackin, J. Carl and J. Meunié, *Diverses recherches archéologiques en Afghanistan* (1933-1940), M.D.A.F.A., vol. VIII, Paris, 1959, Figs. 198 and 200; and to Hallade, Pl. XVII on p. 153 and Bussagli, *Paintings of Central Asia*, p. 41. See further Taddei 1969: 374: "brahmans ... have a place of distinction among the characters that more frequently appear in Gandharan Buddhist reliefs".

perhaps we should say, the brāhmaṇa type", and: "or the brāhmaṇa-type bodhisattva".[101] On p. 85 they state: "triadic compositions in Gandhāra consistently balance the two bodhisattva types ... the brāhmaṇa- and kṣatriya-type bodhisattvas ..." The two types are contrasted on p. 83, where we learn that the brāhmaṇa type bodhisattva has loosely tied-up (but uncovered) hair, whereas a kṣatriya type bodhisattva wears a turban.

One might ask how one can be certain that Brahmins are depicted in these sculptures. For example, is the textual knowledge according to which Maitreya will be born as a Brahmin perhaps projected back so as to allow the conclusion that Maitreya must be depicted as a typical Brahmin, thus providing us with a depiction of a 'typical Brahmin' without any direct textual evidence to support it?[102] But how certain can we be that these sculptures represent 'typical Indian Brahmins'? The ritual cord (*upavīta*) may be a reason for distrust. Patrick Olivelle has pointed out in a recent article (2012) that the sacred thread makes its appearance very late in brahmanical literature. It is not yet known to the Gṛhyasūtras and the relatively early *Āpastamba* and *Gautama Dharmasūtra*s,[103] and is mentioned for the first time in the *Baudhāyana* and *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra*s, around the beginning of the Common Era.[104] Does it make sense to believe that this newly adopted brahmanical feature found artistic expression in regions as far removed from the brahmanical heartland as Central Asia and Afghanistan? Must we conclude that there was a brahmanical presence in those regions merely on the basis of this presumed sacred thread? Is it not possible that others wore a similar thread, and that Brahmins copied their example? Kreisel (1986: 104) draws attention to a sculpture of Rudra whose sacred thread is a snake.[105] Is it possible that the so-called Brahmin ascetics are really Śaiva ascetics who wear a real or symbolic snake over one shoulder?[106] It appears that Oesho is sometimes depicted with a sacred thread on Kuṣāṇa coins. What is more, Gandharan Bodhisattvas, too, can wear a single or multi-stranded amulet cord that resembles, or is, a sacred thread.[107] Since I am here out of my depth, I do not wish to push this point.

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[101] Note that the resemblance between Maitreya and the god Brahmā, supposing that this is more than coincidence (see Taddei 1969), does not automatically justify a connection between Maitreya and Brahmins. One might think of the god Brahmā as belonging to a religious substrate on which different religions in northern India, including Buddhism in various phases of its development, draw; if so, this god has no specific connection with Brahmanism. Brahmins, on the other hand, embody Brahmanism, a current that presumably was (originally) more restricted in its geographical distribution. As against this, Taddei (1969: 378) sees a "close link existing between Brahmā and the brahmanic caste, on one side, and the Buddha-to-be on the other".

[102] Maitreya's association with the sacrificial *yūpa* (Granoff 2014) might lend credence to this.

[103] Note however that *Gobhila Gṛhyasūtra* 1.2.1-4 and *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra* 2.4.21-22 mention a thread (*sūtra*) as a possible substitute for the upper garment; Scharfe 2002: 106-107. Olivelle (2012: 128) observes: "The term yajñopavīta … does occur in the early literature, but the term there simply means a special way of wearing the upper shawl around the neck and chest."

[104] Since the ritual cord is mention in the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* (2.1.1; Scharfe 2002: 106), this text too may date in its present form from the beginning of the Common Era, thus confirming Wilhelm Rau's suspicion: "Könnte es [i.e. the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*] erst nach dem 2. Jhr. v. Chr. bis zu seiner jetzigen Gestalt verwahrlost sein?" (cited *Greater Magadha* p. 350).

[105] Kreisel 1986: 104: "Als Initiationsschnur (*upavīta*) trägt der brüllende vierarmige Rudra aus Ahicchatra (Abb. A 28) eine Schlange mit geblähter Haube." P. 121: "In der Vorkuṣāṇazeit ist die Schnur nur selten anzutreffen …"

[106] Very few illustrations in Lyons 1957 are said to depict Brahmins, and only one of these (no. 429) is interpreted (by Harald Ingholt) to depict a Brahmin *with sacred cord* (p. 165).

[107] Siudmak 2013: 83.

However, it may be premature and hasty to draw conclusions from this uncertain evidence.[108]

Śiva is also known for his hair-bun (*kaparda*), like the so-called Brahmins. Moreover, even Bodhisattvas have a top hair knot, even though it is, according to Harry Falk (2012a: 496), hidden in a cloth. Are we sure that ascetics with a hair-bun have to be Brahmins?

Another point must be considered. The Buddha himself, according to the early buddhist scriptures, did frequently meet and discuss with Brahmins. One consequence of this is that, whether or not there were Brahmins in Gandhāra, Brahmins would figure in scenes from the life of the Buddha.[109] They do figure in scenes depicted in Central Asia in connection with the Buddha, as is a Jaina and even an Ājīvika who play roles in canonical stories.[110] In other words, a certain number of Brahmins is to be expected in Gandharan art even if there were no Brahmins there. Answering the question whether this accounts for all the Brahmins in Gandharan art of the period close to the beginning of the Common Era, is, once again, beyond my competence.

It is to be kept in mind, of course, that there had been Brahmins in Gandhāra, so the assumption that there were still some around the beginning of the Common Era cannot be totally discarded. It is however good to remember that the evidence in support of such a presence is debatable. But with or without a physical presence of Brahmins, Gandhāra was no longer the centre of brahmanical culture it had once been. Indeed, it had become a region that Brahmins avoided.

I.1.4. The vedic tradition reinterpreted

The preceding considerations have led us to believe that the centre of Brahmanism moved eastward, roughly between the time of the invasion of Alexander and the beginning of the Common Era. In concrete terms, this probably meant that Brahmins traveled, or rather fled, away from the western regions where their way of life, and presumably their life itself, was in danger. We will see (§ I.2.1) that this movement eastward was not without exceptions, and that some areas — most notably Kashmir — may have attracted new Brahmins at the time when other Brahmins were on their way eastward. But as a whole, the movement was eastward, and at the end of this turbulent period the centre of Brahmanism had moved several hundred kilometers. The question that must interest us is whether Brahmanism survived these difficult times without important changes. The answer that will be explored in this chapter is that the geographical shift went hand in hand with a renewed interpretation of the tradition, at

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[108] The situation becomes even more complicated if we take Nathan Michael McGovern's (2013) theory into consideration, according to which the term *brāhmaṇa* was not exclusively used for Brahmins in the vedic tradition.

[109] See, for example, the interpretation of the prince's horoscope, which is fig. 2 accompanying Kurita 2013: 337.

[110] This was pointed out by Satomi Hiyama in her presentation at the Workshop "Reading Outside the Lines", held in Munich, 13-15 September 2013. It is of course highly unlikely that there were Jainas or Ājīvikas in the Kucha region, in present-day China. On the Ājīvika depicted in Qizil, see Schmidt 2010: 853-854 (Bild 36). Canonical stories involving Jainas and Ājīvikas are also depicted in Ajanta; see Schlingloff 1994.

least in some respects. One feature will be studied in particular, trying to derive information from the Alexander historians.

When Alexander entered the Indian subcontinent with his army, the region of Gandhāra was heavily brahmanized. This point has already been repeatedly emphasized. Well, the city of Taxila (Takṣaśilā) was situated in Gandhāra. And near Taxila, Alexander met a number of naked ascetics, one of whom — Calanus (in Greek: Kalanos) — subsequently accompanied him back into Persia.

Given the strong brahmanical presence in the region of Taxila, it is *a priori* plausible that these ascetics were brahmanical ascetics. Let us therefore briefly recall what the surviving Indian sources tell us about these. Brahmanism developed a form of asceticism that was connected with its sacrificial rites. Large sacrifices required the sacrificer to be consecrated (*dīkṣita*), and this involved various forms of abstinence. Some householders took it upon themselves to live a consecrated life for long periods of time, sometimes even until the end of their days. This tendency crystallized into the *vānaprastha* (forest-dweller); some vedic and para-vedic texts depict this way of life as belonging to householders (who are then called *śālīna*, *yāyāvara*, or *cakracara*), not as yet as constituting a separate *āśrama*.

We know that beside *vānaprastha*s, brahmanical literature knows another type of ascetic, variously called *parivrāj*, *parivrājaka*, *saṃnyāsin* etc. Unlike the *vānaprastha*, the *parivrājaka* abandons his sacrificial fire, and thus renounces his sacrificial life. Historically the *parivrājaka* is not a vedic ascetic at all: his way of life was borrowed from the eastern region of Greater Magadha, and this ascetic pursued no goal that was in any way connected with the vedic sacrificial tradition, which rather centred around the sacrificial fire. The juxtaposition of these two kinds of brahmanical ascetics was the result of interaction between the two cultural regions concerned: Brahmanism in the northwestern parts of the Ganges valley, and the various religious currents aiming at liberation from karmic retribution in its eastern parts.[111]

Alexander only visited the northwestern parts of the subcontinent, and never reached the Ganges. He visited these northwestern parts at an early date, less than a century and perhaps barely more than fifty years after the death of the Buddha.[112] To the best of our knowledge, the spread of Buddhism seriously started under the Mauryas, that is, *after* Alexander. The same can probably be said about Jainism. It is therefore highly unlikely that there were Buddhists and Jainas in the regions visited by Alexander.

And yet, Alexander met ascetics, near Taxila.[113] The naked sages he met have become a topos in Western classical literature, so much so that it is probably impossible

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[111] See *Greater Magadha* p. 79 ff. (§ IIA); further § II.2.1, below.

[112] See now Cousins 2013: 93: "the Buddha's active teaching career must have taken place a century or more before the time of Alexander."

[113] Herodotus (*Histories* 3.100), writing c. 430-425 BCE and therefore a hundred years before Alexander, describes an Indian tribe in the following terms: "they will not take life in any form; they sow no seed, and have no houses and live on a vegetable diet" (Karttunen 1997a, citing the translation of A. de Sélincourt, revised by A. R. Burn). Witzel (2009: 302-303) concludes from this: "[Herodotus'] relatively early date presupposes a lively culture of ascetics, wandering all over northern India, before c. 430 BCE, and this agrees with the early experiences of the Buddha at age 30 (c. 430 BCE), when he joined other Eastern ascetics and with uncertain Jaina traditions about Pārśva, the supposed predecessor of Mahāvīra, at c. 750 BCE." Karttunen (1997a: 118) is of an altogether different opinion, considering "any link [of Herodotus' description] with Indian ascetics, be they Brahmans, Śaivas, or Jainas, ... to be so thin that it hardly deserves serious

to derive much detailed historical information about them from this literature.[114] However, one thing appears to be beyond reasonable doubt. One of the Indian ascetics, known by the name of Calanus (Kalanos), accompanied Alexander's army back into Iran. Having fallen ill, he then decided to take his own life by voluntarily entering into a fire. This event was witnessed by numerous soldiers from Alexander's army, and recorded by several Alexander historians.

Scholars have puzzled about this voluntary suicide, and have wondered what light it might shed on Calanus's sectarian affiliation. Religious suicide is well known and accepted in Jainism, and there are cases known in Buddhism.[115] But, as pointed out above, Buddhism and Jainism do not enter into the picture in the region of Taxila. Some scholars exclude Brahmanism, too, arguing that suicide in fire is not part of Brahmanism. They end up inventing otherwise unknown ascetic groups to explain the riddle.

I think it is worth our while to have a closer look at Brahmanism. After all, Brahmanism was deeply preoccupied with the vedic sacrificial fire, whose victim was often looked upon as a substitute for the sacrificer. "Le seul sacrifice authentique serait le suicide", Sylvain Lévi observed already in 1898 (p. 133). And Heesterman (1993: 173; with a reference to Heesterman 1987) stated: "self-sacrifice is an all-but-ubiquitous theme in the ritual brāhmaṇa texts, the victim as well as other offerings being regularly equated with the sacrificer". Biardeau (Biardeau & Malamoud 1976: 38) adds that "la crémation [of the body of the deceased sacrificer] elle-même est conçue comme un sacrifice où le *yajamāna* est devenu la victime".[116] In other words, the sacrificer is or can be the victim in his own sacrifice, with the proviso that most often he is replaced by a substitute; he is in any case himself sacrificed in his fire after his physical death. Clearly there is here, at least in theory, place for sacrificers who decide to forego substitutes or who refuse to wait until they die by natural causes.[117] Moreover, Hellenistic and Roman westerners had no difficulty believing that Indians had the custom of incineration themselves. Karttunen (1997: 64-65) draws attention to Zarmarus or Zarmanochegas, who was a member of the Indian embassy to Augustus at the end of the first century BCE and committed suicide by fire in Athens, and to the Greek Cynic philosopher Peregrinus

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consideration." Karttunen then continues: "A further ground for the rejection of this claim is that the description closely parallels the Herodotean description of other distant and primitive peoples." Witzel's statement also overlooks the fact that different kinds of ascetics existed, presumably living in different regions of India, who pursued altogether different purposes, so that any generalizing remark about "a lively culture of ascetics" runs the risk of seriously misrepresenting the historical situation; he justifies this by "leav[ing] aside the development of religious thought and philosophy, as such data are treacherous" (p. 303).

[114] See Karttunen 2012. About the late Hellenistic world, Hanegraaff (2012: 14) observes: “there are innumerable references to the ruling idea that the most ancient ‘barbarian’ [this includes Indian] peoples possessed a pure and superior science and wisdom, derived not from reason but from direct mystical access to the divine, and that all the important Greek philosophers up to and including Plato had received their ‘philosophy’ from these sources.” In spite of the difficulties, Beckwith (2015) tries to derive some daring conclusions from the literature.

[115] See most recently Halkias 2015.

[116] Further p. 38: "Les funérailles ont donc bien un rapport essentiel à l'activité sacrificielle préalable du mort, en même temps qu'elles en sont le dernier sacrifice, le seul où la victime ne soit plus son substitut."

[117] For an analysis of the sacrifice, in which the victim represents (or is) either the sacrificer or his enemy, see Bronkhorst 2012; further 2012a, 2012b, 2013. On suicide in India, see further Thakur 1963.

who imitated the Indian custom by ascending a pyre at Olympia in 167 CE. Karttunen remains unconvinced, stating (p. 65): "We need not make too much of those authors who claim that this kind of suicide was the rule among Indian philosophers. The case of Calanus soon became famous and was used as a literary topos. This was therefore not necessarily genuine information about an Indian custom, but merely abstracted from the tragic end of Calanus. Megasthenes knew better, though his criticism was probably excessive."[118] However, Megasthenes does not constitute a valid counter-argument, for he lived in and primarily described a part of India that was far from Taxila, where Brahmanism was not the dominant ideology.[119] To know whether self-immolation in fire existed as a recognized option in the area of Taxila, we should not listen to Megasthenes, or to the buddhist and jaina Scriptures, but to vedic and para-vedic literature. And here the following points deserve consideration:

(i) Karttunen himself, following Hillebrandt (1917) and others, draws attention to a passage from the *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* (29.4) that states that one reaches the world of Brahma by entering the fire (*agnipraveśād brahmalokaḥ*).

Furthermore,

(ii) Self-immolation in the sacrificial fire may have been part of the early Sattra sacrifice. This is the opinion of Harry Falk (1986: 36 ff.), who adds that this topic was as much as possible avoided, by introducing all manner of substitutes, by those who brought order in the classical sacrifice. The following passage from the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* (7.4.9) illustrates this:

> Those who perform a Sattra go to the heavenly world. With the sacrificial gifts they put fire to themselves, with the Upasad ceremonies they bake themselves, with two [days of the Sattra] they cut their hair, with two their skin, with two their blood, with two their flesh, with two their bones, with two the marrow. In the Sattra one is oneself the sacrificial gift. Presenting themselves as sacrificial gift, they go to the heavenly world.

The self-immolation is here described in symbolic terms, but the symbolism may be no more than a thin disguise to cover the fact that real self-immolation sometimes took place, or had taken place.[120]

(iii) An analysis of several Saṃnyāsa-Upaniṣads leads Olivelle (1978: § 12.1) to the conclusion that there existed such a thing as *ātura-saṃnyāsa*, renunciation for the sick, undertaken by people with the intention of taking their own life, by way of fire or some other means. Olivelle adds that at the time when most of the texts he studies were completed "[s]uicide at the conclusion of the rite of renunciation had become obsolete, a practice referred to in the older texts but no longer in vogue" (p. 223).

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[118] Similarly Sedlar 1980: 70: "Modern scholarship tends to agree with Megasthenes that suicide was never a recommended form of death for Brahmins."
[119] See *Greater Magadha*.
[120] Heesterman (1993: 176) accepts self-sacrifice in this case, but adds that "self-sacrifice is not the ultimate aim but a last resort".

(iv) There is, furthermore, a vedic sacrifice called Śunaskarṇa, in which the sacrificer takes his own life by throwing himself into the fire. This, at any rate, is the opinion of Śabara, the author of the classical commentary (*Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*) of Mīmāṃsā, the brahmanical school of thought that remained close to the vedic Ṣcriptures. According to Śabara, the Śunaskarṇa sacrifice is prescribed by the injunction: "Desiring one's own death one should perform this sacrifice, if he wishes that he should reach the Heavenly Region without any disease" (*maraṇakāmo hy etena yajeta, yaḥ kāmayetānāmayaḥ svargaṃ lokam iyām iti*). The crucial part of this sacrifice — the self-immolation of the sacrificer — is, again according to Śabara, also prescribed by an injunction: "Then again, there is the text — 'When the Ārbhava has begun, the Sacrificer, having covered the Udumbara post with a borderless piece of cloth, says — O Brāhmaṇas, please complete this Sacrifice for me, — and enters the Fire'" (*api cedam āmnāyate, ārbhave prastūyamāna audumbarīṃ parito 'daśena*[121] *vāsasā pariveṣṭya brāhmaṇāḥ parisamāpayata me yajñam iti saṃpreṣyāgniṃ viśatīti*).[122]

Śabara lived long after the vedic period, and perhaps some eight centuries after Alexander's visit to India. What is more, the vedic and para-vedic texts that deal with this sacrifice (the *Pañcaviṃśa* and *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*s, and the Śrautasūtras of Āpastamba, Baudhāyana, Hiraṇyakeśin, Kātyāyana and Lāṭyāyana; see Appendix II) never state explicitly (as does the text cited by Śabara) that the sacrificer enters the fire. It can yet be argued that Śabara preserves an old tradition. Consider the following.

All these vedic and para-vedic texts share the peculiarity that the sacrificer dies during the recitation of a certain vedic verse. None explains how he dies, and how he manages to die at the right moment. Most of the texts leave us with the impression that the sacrificer's death is not altogether natural, but there is no indication whatsoever how it is brought about.[123] One, and only one, text (the *Lāṭyāyana Śrautasūtra*[124]) adds that, according to a named authority, the dead body of the sacrificer is subsequently put into the sacrificial fire.

The textual situation is confusing to say the least. One way to make sense of it is that Śabara preserves in explicit terms a tradition that most vedic and para-vedic texts avoid being explicit about, perhaps for reasons of changed attitudes with regard to self-immolation. With this possibility in mind, let us return to Calanus.

About the manner of Calanus's death, the Greek sources contain two variants, which Bosworth (1998: 176-177) describes as follows: "In Arrian Calanus reclines on the pyre and remains immobile in the flames. This is part of the material extracted from Nearchus, and no variant is adduced from Arrian's other sources. It is Strabo who comments on the lack of agreement in the matter. He cites one tradition, essentially the same as Arrian's, according to which Calanus lies on a golden couch, covers himself and is burned. That is contrasted with another version, presented somewhat elliptically, in which the pyre is built upon 'a wooden house, filled with leaves' and Calanus flings

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[121] The edition has *sadaśena* for *parito 'daśena*.
[122] Śabara, *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* ad sūtras 10.2.57 and 58; tr. Ganganatha Jha, p. 1721.
[123] See however Heesterman 1987: 94: "the position of the sacrificer lying down on the place of the sacrifice between his fires with his head to the south and completely covered over strongly suggests the cremation ritual, which is, generally speaking, the sacrificer's last sacrifice". François Voegeli suggests, in a private communication, that the Śunaskarṇa sacrifice could be meant for a sacrificer who is terminally ill.
[124] And of course the parallel *Drāhyāyaṇa Śrautasūtra*.

himself ... to be consumed like a beam of timber along with the house. There are obscurities in the story, but it seems clear that it portrayed Calanus *throwing* himself into the flames, not waiting calmly to be consumed." Throwing oneself into the fire is close to Śabara's entering the fire, closer at any rate than patiently waiting to be burned.

(v) The different sources describing the Śunaskarṇa sacrifice suggest that vedic and especially para-vedic literature may sometimes present us with a bowdlerized version of sacrificial practice. With this in mind, look at *Mānava Śrautasūtra* (MŚS 8.25),[125] and especially at the following passage: "After having addressed his relatives, he makes the fires rise up in himself. 'For the fire is a comrade, an observer of joy and pain', thus it is said. With the verse: 'This is thy due place of birth, etc.' he shall set fire to himself in the three sacrificial fires." (*sakulyān āmantryātmany agnīn samāropayet sakhā hy agnir vai sākṣī sukṛtasya duṣkṛtasyety ayam arthaḥ/ ayaṃ te yonir ṛtviya ity āhavanīye gārhapatye dakṣiṇāgnau cātmānaṃ pratāpayet/* MŚS 8.25.6-7). This passage would appear to be about a sacrificer who takes his own life through self-incineration. The only reason to think otherwise is the following context, in which the sacrificer is depicted as still alive. Was this following context added later, in order to modify an earlier prescription of suicide, but without changing the wording?

(vi) Consider next the following passage from the *Kaṭhaśruti* (p. 31 l. 7 - p. 32 l. 3):[126]

> Having made the sacrificial priests place all the sacrificial utensils on the limbs of the sacrificer (i.e., of his own), he should place (his five breaths, viz.) *prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna* and *samāna,* that are in (the five sacrificial fires, viz.) *āhavanīya, gārhapatya, anvāhāryapacana, sabhya* and *āvasathya,* all [five of them], in all [of the five sacrificial fires].

Once again, the only reason for believing that this passage does not describe a real sacrifice — the self-immolation of the sacrificer — is the following context, in which, here too, the sacrificer is depicted as being still alive. Did it originally describe a real sacrifice?

Finally a word about the nakedness of Calanus and his fellow-ascetics. Bosworth (1998: 188 n. 70) makes the following observation: "Neither Calanus nor Dandamis can have been enjoining complete nakedness, for even the ascetics themselves retained a loin-cloth to preserve their modesty (cf. Chakraborti [1973] 113-15, 121-2)." The reference to Chakraborti's *Asceticism in Ancient India* is misleading, for this book points out that brahmanical ascetics *could* be completely naked, as is clear from the following passage (p. 113-114):

> [*Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*] (II.9.21.11-12) ordains that the ascetic "shall wear clothes thrown away by others as useless". He says again that "some declare that he

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[125] This passage has been studied by J. F. Sprockhoff (1987); see further Bronkhorst 1998: 23-24.

[126] *Kaṭhaśruti* p. 31 l. 7 - p. 32 l. 3: *yajamānasyāṅgān ṛtvijaḥ sarvaiḥ pātraiḥ samāropya yad āhavanīye gārhapatye 'nvāhāryapacane sabhyāvasathyayoś ca prāṇāpānavyānodānasamānān sarvān sarveṣu samāropayet.* Cf. Sprockhoff 1989: 147-148; Olivelle 1992: 129-130.

> shall go naked".[127] Bodhāyana [Dharmasūtra] (II.6.11.19 & 21) says that the ascetic "shall wear a cloth to cover his nakedness"[128] ... Vasiṣṭha [Dharmasūtra X.9-11] says that the ascetic should cover his body with one piece of cloth or deer-skin or grass cut by cows.[129] ... *It is interesting to note that Āpastamba's hint at nudity of ascetics indicates the possibility of its practice in some circle in his period even in the Brahmanical fold*. (emphasis added)

The Museo Nazionale d'Arte Orientale in Rome contains a relief (inv no. 427) that depicts Brahmins that are almost completely naked. Phyllis Granoff (2014), whose article has a photo of this relief, comments (p. 121): "The near nakedness of the Brahmins on the relief in the Museo Nazionale is entirely consistent with the way in which they are depicted at Dun Huang."

I do not know whether we can be sure that the sages met by Alexander were completely naked, but even if they were, this cannot be used as an argument against their brahmanical status.

Returning now to the self-incineration of Calanus, it seems safe to conclude that the classical sacrifice as we find it described in various vedic and para-vedic texts may be, to at least some extent, a 'cover-up' of sacrificial practices that occurred or had occurred.[130] Indeed, it makes sense that the para-vedic literature on sacrifice, like the literature on Dharma that arose along with it and continued until long after, was primarily a scholastic enterprise.[131] There is no reason to exaggerate this observation, but it does seem to apply to sacrificial self-immolation in fire. This appears to have been a more or less widespread, or at any rate tolerated, practice during some period of vedic religion.[132] The history of Alexander provides us with a very precise date, 325 BCE, at which it was in vogue. The examples collected by Hillebrandt and others, and the testimony of Śabara, suggest that the practice continued well into the classical period.[133]

I.2. New departures

After all the difficulties described above, the present chapter is meant to show that brahmanical experience in the Northwest during the centuries preceding the Common Era was not only negative. Life under the Śuṅga ruler Puṣyamitra, for example, was not bad for Brahmins, and he may not have been the only ruler of that kind. There are reasons to

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[127] Olivelle 2000: 104: *tasya muktam ācchādanaṃ vihitam/ sarvataḥ parimokṣam eke/.*
[128] Olivelle 2000: 280: *kaupīnācchādanaḥ/ .../ kāṣāyavāsāḥ/.*
[129] Olivelle 2000: 386: *ekaśāṭīparihitaḥ/ ajinena vā/ gopralūnais tṛṇair avastṛtaśarīraḥ .../* Olivelle translates the last part "cut *for* the cows".
[130] Interestingly, suicide is not altogether rejected in classical brahmanical literature, but fire is almost completely absent from the methods proposed; see Olivelle 1978.
[131] This is Rocher's central insight, emphasized in Davis 2012: 18-19; see also Davis 2010: 20 and Lubin forthcoming.
[132] Interestingly, Onesicritus as cited by Strabo associates widow-burning with the Kathaioi, i.e., the brahmanical Kaṭhas; see Garzilli 1997: 218 f.
[133] I learn from the doctoral dissertation (in preparation; University of Lausanne) of Marc Tiefenauer that according to the *Brahma Purāṇa* (214.118) those who have perished in fire (*agnau vipannā[ḥ]*) receive favorable treatment after death.

think that the centuries following the collapse of the Maurya Empire, in spite of the sufferings they brought to certain Brahmins, allowed others to work on a corpus of texts that was to be the basis for subsequent developments.

I.2.1. Patañjali and Kātyāyana

The central figure in this section will be the grammarian Patañjali, and to a lesser extent his predecessor Kātyāyana. Patañjali gets this attention for essentially two reasons. The first one is that we know more about his date and region than about any other authors of the period. And the second is that through his work we can draw conclusions about other works in the Sanskrit tradition. As a matter of fact, Patrick Olivelle (2012) has recently argued that most of the extant Dharmasūtras must belong to a period after Patañjali. We will return to this below.

Patañjali is the author of the *Great Grammatical Commentary* (*Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya*), which comments on Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. The influence of his work on subsequent thinkers of all sorts — grammatical, philosophical, astronomical, etc. — can hardly be overestimated, and we will repeatedly have occasion to return to it later on in this book. The present section will concentrate on his date and region.

Patañjali worked after the collapse of the Maurya Empire, and was aware of the political history of his time. He has information about the Mauryas: he mentions them in a passage in which he provides information about some of their activities.[134] Patañjali was alive when the Greeks made their inroads into the subcontinent, which was around the middle of the second century BCE.[135] He mentions the Śuṅga ruler Puṣyamitra, in whose sacrificial activities he was involved.[136] If it is true that he lived in Kashmir while composing his *Mahābhāṣya*, as will be argued below, we may then believe that Puṣyamitra, who conquered Kashmir, brought him there. Puṣyamitra may have died around the time of the Greek deep inroads into the subcontinent.

All this shows that Patañjali was alive around the middle of the second century BCE. It does not show that he finished the *Mahābhāṣya* at that time. If he was a young man then, and completed the *Mahābhāṣya* at a mature age, the completion of this work may have to be dated much later, at a date closer to 100 than to 150 BCE. There is some evidence to support this.

Patañjali mentions the Śakas. This confused both Louis de La Vallée-Poussin and Erich Frauwallner. La Vallée-Poussin (1930: 202) “voit mal que les Śakas, en 170 ou en 150 avant notre ère, aient pris une importance assez grande pour que cet exemple soit possible, pour qu'ils soient dès lors intimement associés, dans l'estime des brāhmanes, aux Yavanas”. Frauwallner (1960: 108-111 [300-303]) borrowed La Vallée-Poussin’s argument, adding that Patañjali had no reason to mention, beside remote but Indian populations, also a non-Indian population, the Śakas.[137] However, as we have seen, the fact that Patañjali was alive in the middle of the second century BCE, does not need to

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[134] Falk 1994: 325 ff.
[135] See, e.g., Narain 1957: 83.
[136] Cardona 1976: 263-266; Scharfe 1977: 153.
[137] Similarly Tarn (1951: 146). Frauwallner’s point about the opposition between Indian and non-Indian populations seems to make little sense if one considers it from the point of view of an inhabitant of the ‘land of the Āryas’.

imply that he completed his *Mahābhāṣya* at that time. And the Śakas may have made their first appearance in India earlier than La Vallée-Poussin and Frauwallner thought. A Śaka invasion into the south of Afghanistan appears to have taken place in or around 140 BCE (Witzel 2003: 95). Moreover, Taishan Yu (1998: 2; see further pp. 147-166) argues that "some of the Sakās who lived in the Pamir Region ... invaded Gandhāra and Taxila, driving away the Greek rulers and founding the state of Jibin ... as recorded in Hanshu, ch. 96. The date was not earlier than 129 B.C." Presumably it was not much later than 129 BCE either. Patañjali's enigmatic mention of the Śakas is solved if we accept that the *Mahābhāṣya* was completed after that date.

Some of the reasons for thinking that Patañjali lived in Kashmir when he composed the *Mahābhāṣya* are as follows. Somewhere in this text, while discussing a grammatical rule, Patañjali gives the following examples: "the part of this road traveled to Pāṭaliputra that is this side of Sāketa", "the part of the road to Pāṭaliputra to be traveled that is beyond Sāketa" and "the part of the measureless road to be traveled this side of Sāketa".[138] A look at the map[139] shows that the point of departure in these three examples must lie to the northwest of Sāketa, and far from it ('measureless road'). Based on this, the suggestion has been made that Patañjali may have lived in Mathurā, a big city in northwestern India, but this seems unlikely. Another look at the map shows that it is far from evident that one travels from Mathurā to Pāṭaliputra via Sāketa. Mathurā is on the river Yamunā, Sāketa on the Sarayū. Both rivers join the Gaṅgā, at different points and from different sides. If one were to travel from Mathurā to Sāketa, one would have to cross the Gaṅgā and some smaller rivers.[140] This trouble could be avoided by traveling to Pāṭaliputra, not via Sāketa, but via Kauśāmbī, simply following the Yamunā and subsequently the Gaṅgā.[141] Indeed, the ancient road from Mathurā to Pāṭaliputra passed through Kauśāmbī.[142] And the road that leads to Pāṭaliputra via Sāketa is the road that ultimately comes from Gandhāra.[143]

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[138] Mahā-bh II p. 162 l. 7-12 (on P. 3.3.136 vt. 3): *yo 'yam adhvā gata ā pāṭaliputrāt tasya yad avaraṃ sāketād iti … yo 'yam adhvā 'parimāṇo gantavyas tasya yad avaraṃ sāketād iti … yo 'yam adhvā pāṭaliputrād gantavyas tasya yat paraṃ sāketād iti*. On roads passing through Sāketa, see Chandra 1977: esp. pp. 17-18.

[139] In Schwartzberg 1978, for example.

[140] On crossing rivers in ancient India, see Deloche 1980: 124 ff. ("La traversée des rivières").

[141] This is Neelis's (2011: 198) 'more southerly route'. See further Bronkhorst 1983: 397, with note 32; Schwartzberg 1978: 19 Plate III.B.5 and 24 Plate III.C.5a; Kulke & Rothermund 1998: 364.

[142] Pliny the Elder mentions a number of stations on the main artery from Puṣkalāvatī (in Gandhāra) to Pāṭaliputra, among them (in this order) the rivers Yamuna and Ganges, the city of Kānyakubja (?), the confluence of Ganges and Yamuna, and Pāṭaliputra (Neelis 2011: 189-190). This suggests a route passing north of Mathurā and south of Sāketa, and confirms our impression that no one would travel from Mathurā to Pāṭaliputra through Sāketa.

[143] It corresponds more or less to what Neelis (2011: 197) calls the northermost route of the *Uttarāpatha*: it "followed the foothills of the Himalayas through ancient Hastināpura, Ahicchatra, Śrāvastī, and Vaiśālī to the ancient capital of Magadha at Rājagṛha". See also Dar 2007: 35 and 37: "From Mathurā … [t]he main road … continued eastward with a course that was parallel to the alignment of the Gaṅga and Jamuna rivers. After stopping over Kāśī, Vārāṇasī, and Sārnāth, it used to reach Pāṭaliputra …"

> A second reason is also based on an example. Patañjali states:[144]
>
> "The six *muhūrta*s are not fixed." These [*muhūrta*s] sometimes belong to day-time, [and] sometimes to night-time. This is expressed [in the words] *ahargatāḥ* 'belonging to day-time', *rātrigatāḥ* 'belonging to night-time'.

A *muhūrta* is a period of 48 minutes. This passage states that the same six *muhūrta*s that can be part of the day, presumably during the longest day of the year, can also be part of the night, no doubt during the shortest day of the year. There are not many places in India where the difference between the longest and the shortest day is as much as six *muhūrta*s, i.e. 6 x 48 = 288 minutes, or 4.8 hours. K. V. Abhyankar — in the Select Critical Notes that he added to the 3rd edition of Kielhorn's edition of the *Mahābhāṣya*, vol. I p. 571-572 — argued: "Such a phenomenon occurs in the districts situated at a latitude of 34° north i.e., as far as India is concerned, in a district, situated to the west of Shrinagar and to the north of Takṣaśilā which appears to be the place of residence of the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*." Abhyankar does not explain how he arrives at this latitude of 34° north, but this result is basically correct.[145] It seems yet unlikely that Patañjali's statement allows of so precise a localization as Abhyankar provides. However, it does suggest a place in the North.

Patañjali may have been the first to claim that the longest day has six *muhūrta*s more than the shortest one (18 *muhūrta*s against 12 *muhūrta*s), he was not the last. Both the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (2.8.33-36 [= 34-38 in Kirfel 1954: 59-60]) and the *Arthaśāstra* (2.20.37) make the same claim. The same is true of Sphujidhvaja's *Yavanajātaka* (79.31) and the *Vedāṅgajyotiṣa* (*Ṛgjyotiṣa* verse 7; *Yajurjyotiṣa* verse 8),[146] and of the jaina canonical *Sūrapaṇṇattī* (Skt. *Sūryaprajñapti* 1.13-14; p. 596-598).[147] None of these texts specify for which part of India this is supposed to be true. The *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* suggests that it is true for India as a whole. The *Arthaśāstra*, just a few lines after this claim (2.20.41), "records that the gnomon of a sundial casts no shadow during the lunar month of Āṣāḍha, which falls during the summer solstice", thus confusing the picture. McClish & Olivelle (2012: xix; see further Olivelle 2013: 37-38) rightly observe that "[i]t is only along the Tropic of Cancer that the sun is directly overhead at this time. If Kauṭilya's information was based on local conditions (which is not necessarily the case), this would place him somewhere in north-central India." These contradictory statements in one single passage suggest that the *Arthaśāstra* took the notion of a longest day of 18 and a shortest day of 12 *muhūrta*s from another source without fully understanding its implications; the same might then be true of the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* and of the other texts mentioned. As a result, we cannot be hundred percent sure that Patañjali's statement proves that the *Mahābhāṣya* was composed in Kashmir, but it is certainly in conformity with this presumed fact.

Aklujkar (2008) adds a number of further reasons, of varying strength, supporting Patañjali's connection with Kashmir. Among these, we may notice Patañjali's "greater familiarity with the geographical details of the Indian northwest, particularly with the

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[144] Mahā-bh I p. 384 l. 18-19 (on P. 2.1.29 vt. 2): *ṣaṇ muhūrtāś carācarāḥ/ te kadācid ahar gacchanti kadācid rātrim/ tad ucyate/ ahargatāḥ rātrigatā iti//*. Tr. Joshi 1969: 166.

[145] This can be verified with the help of the following site: http://culturesciencesphysique.ens-lyon.fr/XML/db/csphysique/metadata/LOM_CSP_QS_heure_coucher_soleil_Sol.xm.

[146] Mak 2013a: 74, 109-110; Pingree 1978a: II: 410; Mishra 2005: 104-105, 206, 214; Plofker 2009: 37; Cantor 1907: 39.

[147] See also Thibaut 1899: 22.

geographical details of the relatively eastern regions of that northwest (namely, Madra, Vāhīka) down to the level of villages" (p. 178-179), and "the fact that, apart from the ruler of Magadha …, the only other rulers mentioned by [Patañjali] are those of Madra and Kaśmīra" (p. 193). However, the perhaps strongest ground for accepting such a connection is the influence on Patañjali from Buddhism in general, and from the new scholastic developments in northwestern India in particular. We will discuss these in a later chapter (§ III.3).

We cannot leave Patañjali without looking at Kātyāyana, considered the author of the *vārttika*s (short nominal sentences) included in the *Mahābhāṣya*. Scholars nowadays agree that the *vārttika*s, though included in the *Mahābhāṣya*, were not composed by Patañjali. The most widely held view is that they, or most of them, have a single author named Kātyāyana.[148] However, grammarians have not always thought so. Bhartṛhari and his contemporaries divided the *Mahābhāṣya* into portions of separate authorship quite different from those that have become customary.[149] Where *we* see in the short sentences that are commented upon in the *Mahābhāṣya* (the '*vārttika*s') the work of one author (or perhaps several of them) and in the Bhāṣya the work of another, Bhartṛhari's idea on this matter was different. He too distinguished between at least two authors, but he drew the boundaries differently. We may not be able to say regarding each portion of the *Mahābhāṣya* to which author Bhartṛhari ascribed it. It seems however clear that in his opinion many Bhāṣya portions and many, or most, *vārttika*s belonged together and had one single author. These parts of the *Mahābhāṣya* he called *vārttika*.[150]

Subsequent authors in the grammatical tradition came to attribute most of the *vārttika*s (i.e., the short nominal phrases) to Kātyāyana. This attribution is clearly in place in Kaiyaṭa's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, which often says in so many words that certain lines from the *Mahābhāṣya* are *vārttika*s. Kaiyaṭa also distinguishes between the three munis of Sanskrit grammar, and lays down the henceforth well-know maxim *yathottaraṃ munitrayasya prāmāṇyam* "the later the Muni, the greater his authority".[151] Kielhorn (1876) has argued for the separate authorship of those *vārttika*s, and drawn attention to the one passage in the *Mahābhāṣya* where the name Kātyāyana is actually mentioned in connection with a *vārttika*. It was also Kielhorn (1876) who formulated a criterion for identifying *vārttika*s in Patañjali's text, and who applied this criterion systematically in his edition of the *Mahābhāṣya*. Kielhorn argued for the single authorship, by Kātyāyana, of most of the *vārttika*s. This position has been strengthened in subsequent years. Indeed, there are reasons to think that the *vārttika*s together constitute a single work that has been preserved in its entirety inside the *Mahābhāṣya*.[152] Scharfe (1977: 135) presents the following arguments:

> We have reason to believe that no *vārttika* has been left out: in the sometimes lengthy discussions ... we see a logical development of the argument. When

[148] An exception is made for the so-called *ślokavārttika*s; this issue will not be considered here.
[149] Interestingly, a passage that occurs in some Upaniṣads appears to show awareness of the real nature of the *vārttika*s; the fact that it seems to have reached us in a corrupted form may be due to the subsequent misunderstanding. See § I.2.4, below, for details.
[150] Bronkhorst 1990: 139.
[151] Kielhorn 1876: 53 n. *, referring to Kaiyaṭa on P. 1.1.29 (I p. 293).
[152] There is occasional disagreement whether a line has to be considered a *vārttika* or not; see, e.g., Bronkhorst 1987e.

> Kātyāyana refers about a hundred times to another *vārttika* with *uktam* "It has been said" this reference can be found ...; all eight adhyāya-s conclude with the auspicious word *siddham* "it is correct".

Granting, then, that the *vārttika*s owe their collective existence to someone called Kātyāyana, what can we say about the date and region of this person? About his date, Scharfe (1977: 138) states the following:

> To determine when ... Kātyāyana lived we depend on incidental references. On Pāṇini VI 3 21 *ṣaṣṭhyā ākrośe* "[Before the second word of a compound there is non-disappearance of] the genitive ending if [the compound] expresses an insult" Kātyāyana's *vārttika* 3 demands an exception — *devānāṃpriya*, the title of the Maurya kings. The elliptical expression *śāka-pārthiva* 'vegetable [eating] king,' i.e. 'vegetarian king' in *vārttika* 8 on Pāṇini II 1 69, can hardly refer to anybody but Priyadarśin Aśoka and suggests thus a date after 250 B.C. On the other hand, Kātyāyana cannot have lived much later than that because of the large derived literature (variant readings of the *vārttika*-s, polemics against them, etc.) quoted by Patañjali (c. 150 B.C.)[153] in his *Mahābhāṣya*.

It will be clear that these arguments primarily provide a date *post quem* for Kātyāyana. While there can be no doubt that he must have composed his *vārttika*s before Patañjali, the distance in time that separates him from the latter can hardly be specified on the basis of the fact that variant readings of *vārttika*s and polemics against them were known to Patañjali. If we imagine that Patañjali lived in an intellectually active age (after all, Brahmanism may have been awakening from a long slumber), many opinions may have been expressed within a short or even very short span of time. It is moreover open to question whether and to what extent Patañjali drew upon a 'derived literature' (whether oral or written); opinions may have been known to him that had not crystallised into texts. The fact that Kātyāyana knows something about the Maurya emperor Aśoka cannot be taken as proof that he lived under the Mauryas, for also Patañjali, as we have seen, preserves memories of that dynasty. It seems *a priori* likely that Kātyāyana, like Patañjali, lived under a ruler who was sympathetic toward Brahmanism. This may exclude the Mauryas, and would take us, as in the case of Patañjali, to a pro-brahmanical successor kingdom, presumably that of the Śuṅgas. If we date Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* in the last quarter of the second century BCE, as proposed above, this leaves plenty of time (from 185 to, say, 125 BCE) to accommodate Kātyāyana.

What we learn about Kātyāyana's region fits in with our guess that he was a subject of the Śuṅga rulers, or at the very least it does not contradict it. Scharfe observes (p. 139):

> Scholars have long assumed that Kātyāyana lived in the South, i.e. the Dekkhan, because of a statement of Patañjali. At the end of his very first *vārttika* Kātyāyana offers a parallel: *yathā laukika-vaidikeṣu* "... as in secular and Vedic [affairs]." On

[153] Let us not forget that we only know that Patañjali was alive during the events that took place around 150 BCE (when Indo-Greeks invaded the Indian mainland), not that he composed his *Mahābhāṣya* at that time. If Patañjali was young in 150 BCE, and old when who composed the *Mahābhāṣya*, the date of composition could be c. 110 or even c. 100 BCE.

> the question why Kātyāyana did not simply say: *yathā loke vede ca* "... as in the world[ly life] and in the Veda," Patañjali suggests a) that Southerners are overly fond of secondary suffixes or b) that perhaps there is a special meaning to the longer formulation. Patañjali's suggestion has been taken by modern scholars as a statement that Kātyāyana was a Southerner but no such statement is implied; all we may conclude is that Patañjali thought it possible that Kātyāyana was a Southerner and that this may explain the unusual formulation.

Scharfe does not deny that Kātyāyana may have been a southerner — indeed, he provides some arguments that may support this idea — he merely states that Patañjali appears to have thought so. This perhaps excessive skepticism is explained by the Scharfe's wish to bring in other arguments; we will consider them below.

What did Patañjali mean by the expression 'southerner' (*dākṣiṇātya*)? The word *dākṣiṇātya* — which, if Vishva Bandhu's *Vedic Word Concordance* (VWC) is to be believed, is unknown to vedic literature — is derived from the indeclinable *dakṣiṇā* by P. 4.2.98 **dakṣiṇāpaścātpurasas tyak**. The indeclinable *dakṣiṇā* is formed by P. 5.3.36 **dakṣiṇād āc**, in the interpretation of which the word *adūre* from the preceding rule 35 (which will be cancelled by *dūre* in rule 37) has to be taken into consideration. *Dakṣiṇā* therefore means 'nearby towards the south', and *dākṣiṇātya* 'someone who lives nearby towards the south'. It is hard to believe that Patañjali, whose acquaintance with Pāṇini's grammar is beyond suspicion, used the word in any other meaning than this. We must conclude that it is difficult to accept that Kātyāyana lived in the Dekkhan. If we accept that Patañjali lived in Kashmir, as I argued above, the term *dākṣiṇātya* indicates that he lived not far from there toward the south, conceivably in a part of the Ganges plane that was ruled by the Śuṅgas. Unlike Scharfe, I like to think that if Patañjali thought it likely that Kātyāyana was from the near south, we have good reasons to accept that he was indeed from the near south.

None of the other potential indicators of Kātyāyana's region are as important as the one just discussed (around *dākṣiṇātya*). Scharfe draws attention to the fact that Kātyāyana allows negated verb forms in Sanskrit (such as *apacasi*, *akaroṣi*) and points out that such forms are strange to Sanskrit and the Indo-European languages in general, but are a common feature of the Dravidian languages. This makes it likely, he thinks, that Kātyāyana did indeed live in the South. However, taken by itself this feature has little probative force. I therefore now turn to Scharfe's most definite statement:

> One thing is certain: Kātyāyana neither belongs to the West nor to the North of India because of his links with the White Yajurveda which was not represented in these areas; nor was he an Easterner because in his *vārttika* 8 on Pāṇini VII 3 45, he postulates the bird name *vartaka* 'quail' for the 'eastern' dialect while he apparently used *vartika* — as does the Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā XXIV 30.

If Kātyāyana did neither belong to the West nor to the North or the East of India, one may be tempted to conclude that he belonged to the South. All these exclusions are based on one single argument: Kātyāyana's presumed links with the White Yajurveda. In support of this Scharfe refers to a short article by B. A. van Nooten called "The grammarian Kātyāyana and the White Yajurveda school" (1968). Van Nooten cites with approval Thieme's observation to the extent that the *Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā*, i.e. the Saṃhitā of the White Yajurveda, belongs to an eastern part of India.

A closer inspection of the evidence does not confirm Scharfe's conclusions. Van Nooten's evidence for a link between Kātyāyana and the White Yajurveda is far from compelling. It is based on a vedic quotation in the *Mahābhāṣya* that van Nooten assumes could have originated with Kātyāyana. The link with Kātyāyana is no more than hypothetical. But the link with the White Yajurveda is no less hypothetical. The vedic quotation concerned cannot be found in vedic literature, and the resemblance with passages in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* postulated by van Nooten is not close. The closest resemblance is with a line in the *Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra*, but even here there are important differences. As a whole, the White Yajurveda receives little attention in the *Mahābhāṣya* (which includes, as we know, Kātyāyana's *vārttika*s); this is Wilhelm 's conclusion at the end of an exhaustive study and identification of all vedic quotations in that text.[154]

There is however another factor that might be considered to plead in favour of a link between Kātyāyana and the White Yajurveda.[155] A *vārttika* on P. 4.3.105 **purāṇaprokteṣu brāhmaṇakalpeṣu** shows that Kātyāyana was acquainted with what Patañjali calls *yājñavalkāni brāhmaṇāni*; it also appears that he considered these statements as having been uttered more or less at the same time as Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. These *yājñavalkāni brāhmaṇāni* will probably have to be identified with statements (called *brāhmaṇa*s in the text) attributed to Yājñavalkya that have been preserved in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3-4, and therefore in a part of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, the Brāhmaṇa of the White Yajurveda. This part of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa is associated with the more eastern region of northern India: The court of King Janaka, closely linked to the Upaniṣadic Yājñavalkya, was situated in Videha. Kātyāyana's acquaintance with these relatively new texts supports the idea that he may have had special links with the White Yajurveda, or with that region of the subcontinent.[156]

Scharfe accepts the position — first formulated by Max Müller (1860: 138) and Theodor Goldstücker (1861/1965: 204 ff.), and subsequently defended by Paul Thieme (1935: 96 ff.; 1937; 1958: 41 [749] ff.) and taken over by Louis Renou (1938: 173 ff.) — according to which Kātyāyana the grammarian, author of the *vārttika*s, and Kātyāyana the author of the *Vājasaneyi Prātiśākhya* of the White Yajurveda are one and the same person. This, if true, might confirm the former's links with the White Yajurveda. I am not sure whether and to what extent we can derive certain knowledge about Kātyāyana's whereabouts from this fact, if it is one.

We know more nowadays about the regional links of the White Yajurveda than at the time Scharfe wrote the above passage. Since the *Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā* may have been extracted from the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, we can concentrate on the latter. While books 1-5 of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (Mādhyandina) are acquainted with more eastern regions, books 6-10 had their origin in a northwestern location. Books 11-14 frequently mention not only eastern areas (Kosala, Videha) but also more western ones; the final collection and edition of this text portion was made in the east.[157] Subsequently the Mādhyandina school may have moved from the Prayāga-Kāśī area towards the west, and have reached

[154] Rau 1985: 103: “Dem Weissen Yajurveda wird verhältnismässig geringe Beachtung zuteil.”
[155] Cf. *Greater Magadha* p. 237 ff.
[156] See *Greater Magadha* p. 219-240.
[157] Witzel 1987: 197 ff.; cp. Mylius 1965; 1972.

Gujarat at some point of time, in any case before 650 CE. Since the middle ages the Vājasaneyins have occupied all of northern India.[158]

Taking into consideration all these points, we must conclude that the surest evidence regarding Kātyāyana's region remains Patañjali's remark that he was a southerner. It is hard if not impossible to derive precise information from his special links with the White Yajurveda (if he had any).

To sum up. We must remember that Brahmin-friendly rule was re-established in parts of northern India after the collapse of the Maurya Empire.[159] Patañjali profited from the rule of Puṣyamitra and succeeding Śuṅgas, and it is tempting to believe that Kātyāyana, too, had political support. This, if true, makes it unlikely that he worked under the Mauryas, who did not have much sympathy for Brahmanism. Since we cannot place Kātyāyana in a time preceding the Maurya Empire (this would bring him too close to Pāṇini, who worked just before, during, or even after Alexander's invasion), it is most probable that Kātyāyana, too, lived and worked under a successor kingdom of the Mauryas, perhaps Puṣyamitra. The latter's rule was not confined to Kashmir, so that Kātyāyana could in that case have worked south of, but not far from, Kashmir, in agreement with Patañjali's remarks. Kātyāyana's date would then have to be later than 185 BCE, the year of the collapse of the Maurya Empire. Since Patañjali may have composed his *Mahābhāṣya* as late as the last quarter of the second century BCE, this would leave plenty of time.

I.2.2. Manu and his predecessors

Attention was drawn above to Olivelle's (2012) claim that most if not all of the extant Dharmasūtras were composed after the time of Patañjali. Olivelle's main arguments are (p. 118-119):

1) "Patañjali, and possibly even Kātyāyana if we are to trust the interpretation of Patañjali, considered *dharma* and *dharmaśāstra* as falling within the category of *laukika*, worldly, as opposed to the *vaidika*, the sphere of vedic discourse. This is in total contradiction to the theology and epistemology of *dharma* articulated in the Dharmasūtras."[160]

2) "The term and concept *dvija*, twice-born, is of recent origin. In all likelihood it was a theological innovation created sometime after Patañjali. Yet, in most of the Dharmasūtras, ... with the notable exception of Āpastamba, the twice-born is a central category in their theology and in their articulation of the *varṇa* ideology."[161]

If we conclude from these arguments (and from some others that Olivelle proposes to support his view that these texts are relatively young) that the surviving Dharmasūtras were composed after Patañjali, we should not rush to the conclusion that all these texts were composed under the Śuṅgas. The situation in northern India after the collapse of the Maurya Empire may have been confused, and the importance of Śuṅga

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[158] Witzel 1987: 201; 1985.

[159] Deshpande's (2006: 217) question "Kātyāyana: responding to the heterodoxy of the Mauryas?" is not necessarily in conflict with this. Olivelle (2010: 38) draws a different conclusion: "the first half of the third century [BCE] appears reasonable".

[160] See also Olivelle 2010: 34 ff.

[161] Note that Nāsik Cave Inscription no. 2 of the Sātavāhanas refers to twice-borns (*dija*, Skt. *dvija*); see *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism* p. 65.

rule has sometimes been exaggerated in historical research. Criticizing this tendency, Sudhakar Chattopadhyaya (1958: 22) observed, perhaps rightly, "that there was no empire of the Śuṅgas after the death of Puṣyamitra and it is, therefore, *a misnomer to think of a Śuṅga age in ancient Indian history*" (quoted in Michon 2007: 175).[162] This does not change the fact that an important body of texts such as the Dharmasūtras could hardly be produced without support. And support for Brahmanism, unlike support for currents such as Buddhism and Jainism, had to come primarily, if not exclusively, from rulers, not, for example, from the merchant class. And yet, there are reasons to think that the production of Dharma literature had begun before Kātyāyana, and therefore presumably before the collapse of the Maurya Empire. In what follows we will consider some of the evidence.[163]

Both Kātyāyana and Patañjali refer to *dharmaśāstra*, and Patañjali cites specific rules from Dharma literature, none of them belonging to surviving texts. On one occasion we are in a position to determine with a degree of certainty what text Patañjali was referring to. It turns out that Patañjali knew a text on Dharma that belonged to the Mānava school of the Yajurveda. We will consider this case in some detail.

The first Āhnika of Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya*, called *Paspaśā*, contains the following illustration (1.5.14-16):

> *bhakṣyaniyamenābhakṣyapratiṣedho gamyate/ pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā ity ukte gamyata etad ato 'nye 'bhakṣyā iti/*
> By restricting things that are to be eaten a prohibition of what is not to be eaten is understood. In the statement 'five five-nailed [animals] are to be eaten', it is understood that [animals] different from these are not to be eaten.

The phrase *pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ* looks like a quotation, and indeed it is found in at least three early works. *Rāmāyaṇa* 4.17.34 reads:

> *pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā brahmakṣatreṇa rāghava/*
> *śalyakaḥ śvāvidho godhā śaśaḥ kūrmaś ca pañcamaḥ//*

Mahābhārata 12.139.66 has:

> *pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā brahmakṣatrasya vai viśaḥ/*
> *yadi śāstraṃ pramāṇaṃ te mābhakṣye mānasaṃ kṛthāḥ//*

Finally, the buddhist *Mahāsutasomajātaka* (537) contains the following *gāthā* (no. 58/425):

> *pañca pañcanakhā bhakkhā khattiyena pajānatā/*
> *abhakkhaṃ rāja bhakkhesi tasmā adhammiko tuvaṃ//*

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[162] See also Bhandare 2006 and Malinar 2007: 250 n. 6, which refers to Härtel 1977: 82, inaccessible to me (see however Härtel 1993: 86: "the disintegration of the Śuṅga Kingdom ... began most probably in the last third of the second century BC").

[163] Olivelle (2010: 38 f. with note 24) enumerates the authorities that are cited or referred to in the extant Dharmasūtras and concludes: "Clearly we have here a vibrant scholarly debate on a variety of issues, very different from the later tradition which sought to present a singular point of view, eliminating or interpreting away divergent voices."

None of the surviving Dharmasūtras contains the phrase *pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ*, as far as I am aware.[164] Nevertheless it seems unlikely that Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* quoted this phrase from any of the three sources listed above. One is tempted to suspect that both Patañjali and these other three works drew upon an early work on Dharma which has not survived. This agrees with the fact that all these works unmistakably refer to a known and pre-existing rule rather than prescribing a new one. *Mahābhārata* 12.139.66 goes to the extent of referring to a *śāstra* that is to be taken as authoritative.

This suspicion is strengthened by Bhartṛhari's remarks in his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, edited by the Bhandarkar Oriental Researchs Institute under the name *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*. Bhartṛhari states (Ms 5d1-2; Sw 19.24; AL 15.19-20; CE I p. 13 l. 18-19):

> *bhakṣyābhakṣyaprakaraṇa idaṃ śrūyate pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā iti/*
> In the section on what should and what should not be eaten it is heard that "five five-nailed [animals] are to be eaten."

So Bhartṛhari appears to have known the phrase *pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ* as part of a work that contained a section (*prakaraṇa*) on what should and what should not be eaten, i.e., presumably a work on Dharma. This work apparently listed the five five-nailed animals concerned, for Bhartṛhari refers to them a few lines later as 'the porcupine etc.' (*śalyakādi*; Ms 5d4; Sw 19.28; AL 15.23; CE I p. 13 l. 22). This information is not contained in the *Mahābhāṣya*.

What work could Bhartṛhari refer to in this manner? He merely mentions the section (*prakaraṇa*) without bothering to name the work itself. In order to answer this question we may first recall that Bhartṛhari appears to have been a Maitrāyaṇīya. (1980)[165] has shown that most of his vedic quotations can be traced to the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā*, *Mānava Śrautasūtra* and *Mānava Gṛhyasūtra*. It seems therefore likely that Bhartṛhari refers here too to a text belonging to this school.

This impression is strengthened and further specified by the fact that Bhartṛhari refers on two other occasions to a 'section' (*prakaraṇa*) of an unnamed work; both times the reference can be traced in the *Mānava Śrautasūtra*. Both of these references are to 'the section on modification' (*ūhaprakaraṇa*). Once Bhartṛhari states (Ms 2d10-11; Sw 8.11-12; AL 7.5-6; CE I p. 6 l. 6-7):

> *aghasad aghastām aghasann agrabhīṣur akṣann ity ūhaprakaraṇe paṭhyate/*

This corresponds to *Mānava Śrautasūtra* 5.2.9.6:

> *haviṣi praiṣe sūktavāke ca adat adatām adan, ghasat ghasatām ghasan, aghasat aghastām aghasan, karat karatām karan, agrabhīt agrabhīṣṭām agrabhīṣuḥ akṣan/*

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[164] Roodbergen (2008: 255) calls it "the *Mīmāṃsā* stock-example for *parisaṃkhyā*", and refers (on p. 266, s.v. *parisaṃkhyā*) to Āpadeva's *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* (Edgerton 1929: 245 § 244) and, mistakenly, to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's *Tantravārttika* 10.7.28; in reality the phrase occurs in Śabara's *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* under sutra 10.7.28.

[165] See also Bronkhorst 1981a; 1987d.

The second time his commentary reads (Ms 3a8-9; Sw 9.3-4; AL 7.20-21; CE I p. 6 l. 21-22):

> *tatrohaprakaraṇa evaiṣāṃ mātā pitā bhrātā sanābhisaṃsargiśabdā ity evamādīny anūhānīti paṭhyate/*

This reflects *Mānava Śrautasūtra* 5.2.9.7:

> *mātā pitā bhrātā sagarbhyo ('nu) sakhā nābhirūpam āsaṃsargi śabdāś cakṣuḥ śrotraṃ vāṅ manas tvaṅ medo havir barhiḥ śyenaṃ vakṣa ity anūhyam/*

It is true that Bhartṛhari's quoted words do not coincide fully with those of the *Mānava Śrautasūtra*, but then he quotes only the parts that he considered relevant in his discussion. The circumstance that he quoted from memory[166] may be held responsible for certain other deviations. No other Śrautasūtra or similar work comes as close in its wording to Bhartṛhari's above quotations as does the *Mānava Śrautasūtra*.

The above justifies the probable conclusion that Patañjali cites the words *pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ* from a text on Dharma belonging to the Mānava school.

This at first sight innocent conclusion lands us in the midst of an old scholarly debate. There is a text called *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, also known by the name *Manusmṛti*, but this surviving text is more recent than Patañjali. Moreover, the phrase *pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ* does not occur in it.

Scholars in the nineteenth century wondered whether the present *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* had a predecessor, presumably a *Mānava Dharmasūtra*. Georg Bühler argued[167] (1886: xxi f.; 1882: xviii f.) that such a *Mānava Dharmasūtra* had actually existed, but is now lost. His strongest argument was based on *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* 4.5-8, which reads:[168]

> *pitṛdevatātithipūjāyām apy eva paśuṃ hiṃsyād iti mānavam //5//*
> *madhuparke ca yajñe ca pitṛdaivatakarmaṇi/*
> *atraiva paśuṃ hiṃsyān nānyathety abravīn manuḥ //6//*
> *nākṛtvā prāṇināṃ hiṃsāṃ māṃsam utpadyate kvacit/*
> *na ca prāṇivadhaḥ svargyas tasmād yāge vadho 'vadhaḥ //7//*
> *athāpi brāhmaṇāya vā rājanyāya vābhāgatāya mahokṣāṇaṃ vā/*
> *mahājaṃ vā paced evam asmā ātithyaṃ kurvantīti //8//*

Bühler (1882: 26-27; with slight variations 1886: xxxi) translates:

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[166] This must account for certain otherwise inexplicable differences between original and quoted versions of the same text. Most notable is Bhartṛhari's description of different names for the same colours in horses and oxen (Ms 1c6-7; Sw 3.14-15; AL 3.7-8; CE I p. 2 l. 26-27):
aśvaḥ karkaḥ śoṇo hema ity ucyate gaus tu śuklo rakto nīla iti/
This is a muddled version of Mahā-bh 1.251.5-7 (on P. 1.2.71 vt. 4):
samāne rakte varṇe gaur lohita iti bhavaty aśvaḥ śoṇa iti/ samāne ca kāle varṇe gauḥ kṛṣṇa iti bhavaty aśvo hema iti/ samāne ce śukle varṇe gauḥ śveta iti bhavaty aśvaḥ karka iti/

[167] For a survey of opinions on this matter before Bühler, see Beaman 1895: 2-4.

[168] These verses will be again discussed below.

5. The Mānava (Sūtra states), "Only when he worships the manes and the gods, or honours guests, he may certainly do injury to animals."
6. On offering a Madhuparka (to a guest), at a sacrifice, and at the rites in honour of the manes, but on these occasions only, may an animal be slain; that (rule) Manu proclaimed.
7. Meat can never be obtained without injuring living beings, and to injure living beings does not procure heavenly bliss; therefore the (sages declare) the slaughter (of beasts) at a sacrifice not to be slaughter (in the ordinary sense of the word).
8. Now he may also cook a full-grown ox or a full-grown he-goat for a Brāhmaṇa or Kṣatriya guest; in this manner they offer hospitality to such (a man).

Bühler was of the opinion (1882: xviii) that "the prose passage from the Mānava, given IV,5, furnishes the proof that the author of the Vāsishṭha Dharmaśāstra quotes from a Dharma-sūtra attributed to Manu." Bühler further argued that the particle *iti* at the end of sūtra 8 shows that the quotation from the Mānava extends up to that point. And indeed, sūtra 6 is a verse that again occurs in the surviving *Manusmṛti* 5.41, while the verse that constitutes sūtra 7 occurs in a modified form at *Manusmṛti* 5.48.[169] This modification was not without interest for Bühler, because it had been effected "in such a manner that the permission to slaughter animals at sacrifices has been converted into an absolute prohibition to take animal life." Regarding sūtra 8, which is again in prose, Bühler conjectured that "it is quite possible that, though belonging to the passage from the Mānava-sūtra, it contains a Vedic text, taken from some hitherto unknown Brāhmaṇa which Manu adduced in support of this opinion". Summing up, Bühler (1882: xix-xx) stated:

> Sūtra 5 would give the original rule of the author of the Mānava in an aphoristic form; Sūtras 6-7 would repeat the same opinion in verse, the latter being probably Ślokas current among the Brāhmanical community; and Sūtra 8 would give the Vedic authority for the preceding sentences. This arrangement would be in strict conformity with the plan usually followed by the authors of Dharma-sūtras. But whether Sūtra 8 contains a second original aphorism of the Mānava Dharma-Sūtra or a Vedic passage, it seems indisputable that the author of the Vāsiṣṭha Dharma-sūtra knew a treatise attributed to a teacher called Manu, which, like all other Dharma-sūtras, was partly written in aphoristic prose and partly in verse.

Bühler further maintained (1882: xviii) that "other quotations [from Manu in the *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra*] show that the Mānava Dharma-sūtra contained, also, verses, some of which, e.g. [*Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra*] XIX,37, were Trishṭubhs, and that a large proportion of these verses has been embodied in Bhṛgu's version of the Manusmṛti."

These arguments were subsequently challenged by P. V. Kane (HistDh I/I p. 101 f., 146 f.), who was followed by Derrett (1973: 31). Kane thought that there "is hardly anything to show that [*Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* 4.5] is a direct quotation from Manu and not a summary of Manu's views" (p. 102). Regarding *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* 4.8 Kane

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[169] *nākṛtvā prāṇināṃ hiṃsāṃ māṃsam utpadyate kvacit/ na ca prāṇivadhaḥ svargyas tasmān māṃsaṃ vivarjayet//*

observed: "There is nothing to show that it is … taken [from the *Mānava Dharmasūtra*]." Kane further points out that there "are only two places in Vasiṣṭha where the name of Manu occurs for which it is not possible to point out a corresponding verse in the Manusmṛti. They are Vas. 12.16 and 19.37. … Besides these two … there are about forty verses that are common to the Vas. Dh. S. and the Manusmṛti and about a dozen verses which, though not strictly identical, are more or less similar. There are several prose sūtras of Vas. which correspond to the verses of Manu almost word for word." (p. 102-03). Kane concluded (p. 103): "The hypothesis that commends itself to me is that Vas. contains borrowings from the Manusmṛti *or its purer ancient original in verse*." (emphasis added)

It can be seen from the above that not even Kane denied the existence of a predecessor of the *Manusmṛti*. Indeed, he concluded his exposition of this matter with the words (p. 149): "the theory that the Mānavadharmasūtra once existed and that the extant Manusmṛti is a recast of that sūtra must be held not proved." His arguments show that in particular *the presence of prose sūtras* in the predecessor of the *Manusmṛti* is considered 'not proved'.[170] What is more, Kane himself (HistDh I/I p. 311) "hazard[s] the conjecture that the author of the Manusmṛti, whoever he might have been, combined in his work the information contained in … two [earlier] works on *dharma* and *arthaśāstra* and supplanted both the earlier works." And on p. 344 Kane finds reason to think that it "is not unlikely that instead of there being two works there was one comprehensive work embodying rules on *dharma* as well as on politics [which was] finally recast probably by Bhṛgu."

Whether we were to agree with Bühler in thinking that the predecessor of the *Manusmṛti* consisted of both prose and verse[171] or with Kane that it contained only verse,[172] either way there would be reason to assume that the phrase *pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ* was part of it. This phrase fits well in an *anuṣṭubh* metre, as its inclusion in the ślokas of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* (cited above) shows. As a matter of fact it is far from improbable that the verse contained in the *Rāmāyaṇa* remained very close to its original in the Mānava work on Dharma. Bhartṛhari specifies the animals concerned, as we have seen, as 'the porcupine etc.' (*śalyakādi*), where only the *Rāmāyaṇa* puts the *śalyaka* first in its enumeration, unlike the other texts cited in Appendix IV, below. The question to which we have to return below is whether this original Mānava work on Dharma was a predecessor of the surviving *Manusmṛti*. One reason supporting the view that the verse *Rāmāyaṇa* 4.17.34 was almost verbatim taken from a predecessor of the

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[170] Kane's idea that only the southern Sūtracaraṇa of Baudhāyana, Āpastamba and Hiraṇyakeśin originally felt the need for composing Dharmasūtras has been disputed by Ram Gopal (1983: 51-52).

[171] Towards the end of the surviving portion of the Bhartṛhari's commentary there is a remark which creates the impression that Bhartṛhari was familiar with a *Mānava Dharmasūtra*. It reads (Ms 98b2-3; AL 281.13-15; CE VII p. 12 l. 15-16):
īśvaravacanaṃ dṛṣṭam evārthaṃ vadhādim uddiśyānutiṣṭhati dharmasūtrakārāṇāṃ tv adṛṣṭam artham idaṃ bhakṣyam idam abhakṣyam/
However, the fact that the passage of the Bhāṣya commented upon (Mahā-bh I p. 115 l. 1, on P. 1.1.47 vt. 1) contains the word *dharmasūtrakārāḥ* prevents us from drawing conclusions from Bhartṛhari's use of this word rather than *dharmaśāstrakāra* or the like.

[172] If there was more than one predecessor, the one which concerned Dharma is of course only relevant here.

Manusmṛti is as follows. The two chapters *Rāmāyaṇa* 4.17-18[173] belong together and embody an accusation and subsequent defence of Rāma's killing of the monkey Vālin, brother of the monkey-king Sugrīva. The defence contains a verse (Rām 4.18.30) that is identical with Manu 8.318,[174] so that the suspicion arises that both these chapters drew upon the teachings of the the hypothetical predecessor of the *Manusmṛti*.

The above considerations justify the tentative conclusion that the phrase *pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ* occurred originally in a work on Dharma belonging to the Mānavas, and that this work was still known to Bhartṛhari (5th century A.D.).[175] This Mānava work on Dharma was not necessarily a predecessor of the *Manusmṛti*, a question to which we will return below. Nor does the fact that Bhartṛhari still know this Mānava work on Dharma imply that our *Manusmṛti* did not yet exist at Bhartṛhari's time. The *Manusmṛti* in its present shape is known to be a work not confined to one vedic school,[176] which may have made it somewhat suspicious to the true Mānavas who preferred to use their old and more sectarian treatise instead. The disappearance of the *Mānavacaraṇa*[177] may have brought about the loss of this old Mānava text on Dharma. Note in this connection that a number of later authors still quote verses of 'the old Manu' (*vṛddha manu*) and 'the great Manu' (*bṛhan manu*) (Kane, HistDh I/I p. 345, 349), which are not found in our *Manusmṛti* and which may have belonged to the older Mānava text.[178]

All questions pertaining to the text of the extant *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* (i.e., *Manusmṛti*) and its origin have to be confronted with some recent observations made by Patrick Olivelle. He and his wife, Suman Olivelle, have prepared a critical edition and translation of this text (Olivelle 2005), which also contains a long introduction, with various valuable observations on its authorship and historical position.[179] Olivelle argues, for example, that the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* has essentially one single author, whom he calls Manu for convenience. The reason for assuming unitary authorship is the structure of the text as a whole, a structure which so far has gone unnoticed. The presence of this

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[173] Jacobi (1893: 128) and Hopkins (1901: 19 fn. 1) considered these chapters a later interpolation. Srinivasan (1984: 1: 129 f.) argues that they are not, but tends to think that Rām 4.17.33-35 (which includes our verse 34) are 'growth' (p. 148-49) without giving decisive arguments. Hopkins argued that chapters 17 and 18 were inserted in order to defend the actions of the in the meantime divinized hero, assuming that Rāma was not divine in the original *Rāmāyaṇa*. But Pollock (1984) has now defended the opposite point of view, that Rāma was divine already in the original version of that epic.

[174] Also with VasDhS 19.45, but this must be later than the Mānava work on Dharma; see above. Note that a number of Mss of the *Rāmāyaṇa* have this verse followed by another one also found in Manu (8.316) and calls these two verses *manunā gītau ślokau*.

[175] Also Jamison (2000) presents an argument in favour of an early text on Dharma belonging to the Mānava school of the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā*.

[176] In point of fact, there are a number of disagreements between our *Manusmṛti* and the *Mānava Gṛhyasūtra*. See Jolly 1879: 81-82; 1885: 36-37; Kane, HistDh I/I p. 310 f.

[177] Kane (HistDh I/I p. 149) states: "Viśvarūpa who is generally identified with Sureśvara, the pupil of Śaṅkara, remarks that the Mānavacaraṇa is not existent (or found). … '*na ca mānavādicaraṇopalabdhir asti*' p. 18 of Viśvarūpa's comment on *Ācāra* section [of the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*]."

[178] Lingat (1967: 108) tends to think that these quotations belong to amplified versions of our *Manusmṛti.*

[179] An in many respects similar, but shorter, introduction occurs in Olivelle 2004. Some of the same arguments had already been presented in Olivelle 2003.

structure in the text is convincingly demonstrated.[180]

Olivelle admits that this single author is not responsible for the whole of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*. A number of portions are, as he puts it, the work of redactors. These can be identified by using the overall organizational plan as criterion. Sections that do not fit into this scheme can be recognized as additions inserted between the time of the composition of the text and the earliest manuscripts and other evidence we possess. Olivelle indicates such added passages as 'Excursus' in his translation.

Olivelle's procedure is plausible, and it seems likely that he has identified a number of passages that were indeed not part of the original text composed by 'Manu'. It is less certain that this procedure is capable of identifying *all* later additions. Additions that *do* fit into the overall scheme of the work can evidently not be discovered with the help of a criterion that looks for ill-fitting passages. There is no *a priori* certainty that redactors should *only* add ill-fitting passages. On the contrary, one may assume that, given a choice, they would rather add passages that fit in the places assigned to them. This implies that it is possible to follow Olivelle in considering his 'Excursus' passages as additions and interpolations, but less easy to conclude from this that what remains, all of it, constitutes the text originally composed by 'Manu'.[181]

However this may be, Olivelle adds a number of interesting and valuable reflections on the date and circumstances of the original *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* (i.e., the original text composed by 'Manu'). Pointing out that Manu, according to at least one tradition, was considered the first king, he states (p. 20; 2004: xxi): "Historically, the rise of the Maurya empire and the overwhelming presence of Aśoka and his imperial reforms must have loomed large. That a treatise on dharma with universal application should be ascribed not just to any king but to the first king, therefore, should come as no surprise." After considering a number of chronologically relevant factors, Olivelle proposes a lower limit of the 1st century BCE for the text (p. 22). For fixing its upper date, Olivelle starts from the observation that the parallel passages in the *Mahābhārata* "make a compelling case that the author(s) of the epic knew of and drew upon material from the [*Mānava Dharmaśāstra*]" (p. 23).[182] The reference in some passages of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* to gold coins, combined with the scholarly consensus that the minting of gold currency did not take place until the Kuṣaṇas, leads Olivelle to pushing forward the date of his text to the 2nd-3rd centuries CE (p. 24-25).[183]

Olivelle's proposals create a dilemma, which he does not further discuss. The gold currency suggests a relatively late date for the extant *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, its relationship to the *Mahābhārata* an earlier one. With regard to the date of the latter, Olivelle (p. 23) cites Hiltebeitel (2001: 18): "I suggest, then, that the Mahābhārata was composed between the mid-second century BCE and the year zero."[184] If the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* was composed before the *Mahābhārata*, as Olivelle maintains, and if we

[180] See however Fitzgerald 2014 for some hesitations.
[181] The question whether the final chapter of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* (no. 12) is a later addition is discussed in Appendix III.
[182] The introduction to Olivelle 2004, which is more condensed than the introduction to Olivelle 2005, does not discuss the relationship between *Mahābhārata* and *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*. Note in this connection that Bühler (1886: lxxx) has "succeeded in identifying upwards of 260 verses or portions of verses, not attributed to Manu, with ślokas of the Manu-smṛti. This number ... corresponds to about one-tenth of the bulk of the latter work ..."
[183] Cf. Sharma 1980: 330.
[184] Strictly speaking, there is of course no 'year zero'; Richards 1998: 10.

accept Hiltebeitel's view, it cannot be dated to the 2nd-3rd centuries CE, as is suggested by the references to gold coins.[185]

Hiltebeitel's dating of the *Mahābhārata* is linked to his understanding of this text (i.e., the archetype underlying the Critical Edition) as having been composed (*written*) by a 'committee' or 'team', at most through a couple of generations (2001: 20). Given that the Critical Edition establishes a written archetype, he does not think that we need to assume prior written redactions. The established archetype of the *Mahābhārata*, in his opinion, should include most of the passages and features of the established text, and indeed, may have included the epic's design of eighteen parvans and a hundred 'little books' or *upaparvan*s (2001: 24-26).[186]

Hiltebeitel's understanding of the composition of the *Mahābhārata* is not without appeal, but is not the only possible one. The *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, as understood by Olivelle, provides us with an alternative model. Here, as we have seen, a single text subsequently suffered additions and insertions which yet found their way into all surviving manuscripts.[187] How could this come about? Olivelle gives the following explanation (2005: 51; cp. 2003: 559-560):

> I agree with Lariviere's (1989: xii) hypothesis that the Dharmaśāstras continued to expand with the addition of new materials "until a commentary on the collection was composed. A commentary would have served to fix the text, and the expansion of the text would have been more difficult after that." Because I consider the [*Mānava Dharmaśāstra*] to have a single author, I take these emendations as produced by redactors working on the original text. Such activities were made more difficult after the text was 'fixed' by early commentators such as Bhāruci and Medhātithi, but they did not cease completely. Changes after that period, however, were limited to the addition of individual verses and minor changes in the wording of verses detectable through 'lower criticism'.

The composition of a first commentary is an obvious way in which a text may be fixed in a shape different from its earliest written form. It is not necessarily the only possible one. With regard to the *Mahābhārata*, another explanation for presumably the same (or a closely similar) phenomenon has been suggested, most notably by James Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald (2002: 89 n. 1) states: "By 'the epic as we have it' and 'text of the Mahābhārata' I mean the written redaction of a Sanskrit text of the [*Mahābhārata*] that was composed and promulgated sometime around the time of the Gupta empire.[188] This text was approximately recovered in the unsuccessful effort to arrive at a critical edition."

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[185] Hiltebeitel himself (2006: 231) "leans toward the epic being likely earlier [than Manu]".
[186] For a fuller discussion of this position, see § I.2.5, below.
[187] Hiltebeitel (2006: 231), perhaps not surprisingly, is of the opinion that some of Olivelle's "interpolations" "could be seriously challenged".
[188] As justification for a completed text around the time of the Gupta empire, a reference is often made to the characterization of the *Mahābhārata* as containing 100'000 verses in a copper-plate inscription from 532-533 or 533-534 (so, e.g., Fitzgerald 2006: 259), which corresponds approximately to the text of the Critical Edition. See further below, § I.2.5. It is not usually added that the inscription concerned, having indicated the length of the *Mahābhārata*, then attributes to it a number of verses that are *not* found in the Critical Edition (or its notes). See Fleet 1887: 135-139, and below.

In other words, not a first commentary, but some initiative (perhaps political)[189] 'fixed' the text of the *Mahābhārata* which has been recovered, with an unknown degree of success, in its Critical Edition. This 'Gupta version', to be sure, was not the first written version of the *Mahābhārata*.[190] About the first written version Fitzgerald has a number of things to say; we will turn to these below.[191]

Olivelle knows this alternative way of understanding the textual history of the *Mahābhārata* (2005: 24): "Fitzgerald offers a more conservative view, acknowledging several redactions, the last taking place during the Gupta period." Fitzgerald's position is more to the liking of Olivelle, for it allows him to maintain his relatively late date for the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*: "If we accept that the [*Mānava Dharmaśāstra*] was known to the writers of the Mahābhārata, then, even with a more conservative dating than Hiltebeitel's, the [*Mānava Dharmaśāstra*] must have been in existence by about the 2nd century CE." This is a great deal closer in time to the date suggested by the references to gold coins.

It is clear that Olivelle implicitly opts for Fitzgerald's dating of the *Mahābhārata*, against Hiltebeitel's, but he does not say so.[192] In Fitzgerald's opinion, the first major written Sanskrit redaction of the *Mahābhārata* does not cover the whole of the surviving *Mahābhārata*, nor for that matter the whole of the version constituted in its Critical Edition. Indeed, Fitzgerald, as we have seen, is of the opinion that a second redaction took place many centuries later (resulting in the 'Gupta text'). As a matter of fact, Fitzgerald (2006) dates the first written redaction of the *Mahābhārata* to "sometime between 200 B.C. and 0 A.D.", but also allows for "its continued growth and development until the written Sanskrit text was more or less fixed sometime shortly before or during the Gupta era".[193]

If we now return to the question raised by Olivelle, it will be clear that a statement to the extent that the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* was known to the writers of the

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[189] Cp. Fitzgerald 2001: 69: "The production and promulgation of this text would have required a major effort and significant expense, so we must imagine the support and financial backing of some prince or princes, or direct imperial support. It is conceivable that this postulated second major redaction of a written Sanskrit Mahābhārata was a response to the turmoil, invasions, and foreign imperial control of northwest and north central India in the early centuries of the Christian era." It is not clear whether this theory of a "major effort and significant expense" lives up to its task, for it sheds no light on the question why the 'Gupta version' should have become the archetype of all surviving versions. This fact is due to subsequent events, whose nature remains unknown so far. See further § I.2.5, below.

[190] Fitzgerald (2001: 68 n. 16) is aware of the speculative aspect of his reconstruction: "Those who would argue that this Gupta text pointed to by the Pune edition is the only written Sanskrit [*Mahābhārata*] text for which we have firm evidence would be correct. My argument for a Śuṅga or post-Śuṅga written redaction of the text is based on an interpretive reading of the [*Mahābhārata*] against the historical record. It is speculative, though it is, at the very least, plausible. My speculative sketch of a history of the written Sanskrit Mahābhārata tradition provides a reasonable way to account for systematic artistic changes that seem apparent to me between the postulated early text of the [*Mahābhārata*] and the approximately known Gupta text."

[191] Note that the first written version, seen in this way, is not identical with the normative redaction proposed by Bigger (2002).

[192] We, too, must accept that the *Mahābhārata* in its Critical Edition contains at least some late passages, in view of the late date of the discussion between King Yudhiṣṭhira and the sage Mārkaṇḍeya, discussed above (§ I.1.2).

[193] Fitzgerald (2014: 491) yet considers a date of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* in the 2nd to 3rd centuries CE "as good as our current knowledge allows".

Mahābhārata is in need of specification if it is to make sense. Was this text known to the writers of the 'main *Mahābhārata*', i.e., its first written redaction, or rather to those responsible for the 'Gupta text', or perhaps to those who, in the intervening period, added material to the text? Judging by his chronological conclusions, Olivelle meant to say that the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* was known to those responsible for the Gupta text. However, he does not clearly say so. What he does say rather suggests that he believes that all writers of the *Mahābhārata*, both early and late, knew the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*. These are his words (2005: 23):

> The relationship between the [*Mānava Dharmaśāstra*] and the *Mahābhārata* has been a topic of discussion ever since Hopkins's (1885) study. Hopkins (1885: 268) concluded that the [*Mānava Dharmaśāstra*] was put together "between the time when the bulk of the epic was composed and its final completion." Bühler, after a lengthy discussion of the parallel passages in the two works, concluded that the [*Mānava Dharmaśāstra*] has not drawn on the *Mahābhārata* and that both drew on the same stock of 'floating proverbial wisdom'. The references and citations collected by Hopkins, I think, make a compelling case that the author(s) of the epic knew of and drew upon material from the [*Mānava Dharmaśāstra*]. It is more likely, I think, that a narrative epic would draw on expert *śāstras* for its discussions of legal matters than the other way round.

Unfortunately Olivelle does not discuss in any detail the "references and citations collected by Hopkins", and indeed, he draws a different conclusion from them than Hopkins himself. Hopkins, as we can learn from the above citation, put the composition (he speaks rather of collation) of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* "between the time when the bulk of the epic was composed and its final completion". In terms of Fitzgerald's understanding, this can be interpreted to mean "between the first written version (the 'main *Mahābhārata*'), and the 'Gupta version'". As a matter of fact, Hopkins's evidence does *not* make a compelling case that all the authors of the epic knew the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, but *can* be interpreted to mean that later contributors to the epic knew it. As Hopkins observed (1885: 268): "Not more than half the remarks ascribed to Manu are found in the present Mānava-treatise which the Hindus call the Manu-treatise; but, the further on we come toward modern times, the more often the quotations from Manu fit to our present Mānava-text."

It will be interesting to consider the three passages which do not just mention Manu, but seem to actually refer to his treatise. One reference to the Śāstra of Manu occurs in the *Anuśāsanaparvan* (Mhbh 13.47.35: *manunābhihitaṃ śāstraṃ* ...); the following verse "is clearly a paraphrase of Manu IX, 87, and reproduces its second line to the letter" (Bühler 1886: lxxvi; Mhbh 13.47.36cd = Manu 9.87cd). The *Anuśāsanaparvan* may be a later accretion to the text of the *Mahābhārata*.[194] The two other passages are of more interest, because they occur in the *Rājadharmaparvan*, some of which must have already been part of the 'main *Mahābhārata*'. Indeed, they occur in chapters (*adhyāya*) 56 and 57 respectively, part of the portion 56-58 which Tokunaga (2005) considers to be "the original lecture of Rājadharma that Bhīṣma delivered as *śokāpanodana*" and as belonging "to the period earlier than the Manusmṛti" (p. 200). Chapter 56, which is the very first chapter of the *Rājadharmaparvan*, contains a reference to two verses sung by

[194] See § I.2.5, below.

Manu in his Laws (Mhbh 12.56.23: *manunā ... gītau ślokau ... dharmeṣu sveṣu ...*). The first of these two has a verse corresponding to it in the surviving *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* (Mhbh 12.56.24 = Manu 9.321), the second does not. There is another reference to two verses pronounced by Manu in the immediately following *adhyāya* 57 (Mhbh 12.57 43: *prācetasena manunā ślokau cemāv udāhṛtau rājadharmeṣu ... t[au] ... śṛṇu*); the two cited verses in this case (44-45) have no parallel in the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* (Bühler 1886: lxxvii). Most of these verses, then, cannot be found in the present text of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*.[195] All in all there remains little reason to think that the 'main *Mahābhārata*' was acquainted with the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* as we know it.

Further caution is called for on account of some passages in the *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra*. According to Olivelle (2005: 22), the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* "is clearly posterior to [...] Vasiṣṭha". However, the *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* refers to the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, and cites two identifiable verses from it. The reference occurs VasDhS 4.5, which may be translated: "The treatise of Manu states that an animal may be killed only on the occasion of paying homage to ancestors, gods, or guests."[196] Immediately after this remark two ślokas follow (VasDhS 4.6-7) which are almost identical with Manu 5.41 and 5.48. Olivelle (2000: 646) considers the authenticity of these two ślokas somewhat doubtful,[197] but admits that "they are found in all mss., including Ka, Kb, and Cal. ed., which represent somewhat independent manuscript traditions".[198] At four other occasions the *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* cites a verse it calls a *mānava śloka*. Twice this cited śloka is identical, or almost identical, with a verse from the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*. *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* 20.18 announces a *mānava śloka*, then cites a verse that is almost identical with Manu 11.152. *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* 3.2 does the same, and then cites Manu 2.168.

Olivelle's logic would compel him to conclude that the *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* is posterior rather than anterior to the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*. He admits to being "inclined to place Vasiṣṭha closer to the beginning of the common era, or even in the first century CE close to the beginning of the Smṛti era. In the later chapters (25.1, 10; 28.10), for example, Vasiṣṭha uses the pronoun 'I', a practice unknown to the earlier writers and common in the later Smṛtis, which are presented as the personal teaching of a god or sage. In Vasiṣṭha (16.10, 14) we also encounter for the first time the use of written evidence in judicial proceedings." We should expect him to date Manu prior to this date. Yet we have seen that he believes Manu to be posterior to the *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra*.[199]

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[195] Fitzgerald has argued that *adhyāya*s 56-60 must be looked upon as an accretion to the original core of the *Rājadharma* (this core presumably *follows* the accretion in the present text).

[196] VasDhS 4.5: *pitṛdevatātithipūjāyām eva paśuṃ hiṃsyād iti mānavam*. Olivelle assumes that this phrase contains a literal quotation, for he translates (2000: 371): "The treatise of Manu states: 'An animal may be killed only on the occasion of paying homage to ancestors, gods, or guests.'" However, the 'quoted' passage does not occur in the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*.

[197] Cp. also the following: "Vasiṣṭha has been less faithfully preserved than the other Dharmasūtras, probably because it lacked an early commentary." (Olivelle 2000: 632)

[198] Recall that Bühler (cited above) quoted these same verses as evidence for the existence of an earlier *Mānava Dharmasūtra*.

[199] In a more recent publication Olivelle (2010: 40) states: "Vasiṣṭha's text … has been badly transmitted and appears to have undergone repeated redactions. It is clearly the latest of the early *dharmasūtra*s, composed at a time not too distant from Manu."

Manu 5.41 also occurs in the *Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtra* (2.16.1),[200] as do close parallels to Manu 3.100 (ŚāṅGS 2.17.1) and 3.103 (ŚāṅGS 2.16.3). Must we conclude from this that the *Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtra* is posterior to the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*? Or are these verses later additions to the *Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtra*, as Gonda (1977: 607) thought?

The situation is further complicated by other facts. Whatever the precise date of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, we may be sure that it existed in the sixth century CE. Yet there are numerous inscriptions from that and the following centuries that explicitly ascribe a number of verses to a *Mānava Dharma* or *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* that do not occur in it. These are several or all of the following four verses, very frequent in inscriptions:[201]

> *uktañ ca* ***Mānave dharmaśāstre****:*
> *bahubhir vasudhā dattā bahubhiś cānupālitā/*
> *yasya yasya yadā bhūmis tasya tasya tadā phalam//*
> *mā bhūvad aphalaśaṅkā vaḥ paradatteti pārthivāḥ/*
> *svadānāt phalam ānantyaṃ paradattānupālane//*
> *svadattāṃ paradattāṃ vā yo hareta vasundharāṃ/*
> *sa viṣṭhāyāṃ kṛmir bhūtvā pitṛbhiḥ saha pacyate//*
> *ṣaṣṭiṃ varṣa-sahasrāṇi svarge modati bhūmidaḥ/*
> *ākṣeptā cānumantā ca tāny eva narake vaset//*

A South Indian inscription from the eighth century ascribes some of these verses to a 'Vaiṣṇava Dharma'.[202] Interestingly, several of these verses are in other inscriptions ascribed to the Ṛṣis,[203] to Brahman,[204] or to the *Mahābhārata*, in one inscription from the first half of the sixth century CE even to "the *Mahābhārata* that consists of a hundred thousand verses" (*Mahābhārate śatasahasryāṃ saṃhitāyāṃ*).[205] To top it all, these verses are not found in the extant *Mahābhārata* either.[206]

What do we conclude from all this? Are the *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* and the *Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtra* more recent than the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*? Or do we have to be more circumspect in drawing chronological conclusions from references to Manu or his work that can actually be identified in the surviving *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*? We may not be in a position to choose between these two options at the present state of our knowledge. One thing is certain. If it can be maintained that, in spite of the evidence just considered, the *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* is older than the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, the same

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[200] Manu 5.41: *madhuparke ca yajñe ca pitṛdaivatakarmaṇi/ atraiva paśavo hiṃsyā nānyatrety abravīn manuḥ//.* ŚāṅGS 2.16.1 has *some* for *yajñe*.
[201] Basak 1940: 129 lines 36-41; Tripathy 1997: 96, 221, 225, 229, 261 and *passim*.
[202] Krishna Sastri 1924: 304.
[203] Tripathy 1997: 213; Mahalingam 1988: 69 ff. (fifth century).
[204] Mahalingam 1988: 63 f. (sixth century).
[205] Fleet 1887: 135-139.
[206] This last inscription is sometimes invoked by modern scholars to prove that the *Mahābhārata* had approximately its present size in the first half of the sixth century CE; the unreliability of the ascription of verses to that text in this inscription may conceivably put the information about the epic's length in doubt as well. Note further that some of these verses are ascribed to a 'Dharmānuśāsana' in a ninth century inscription of a buddhist (!) king; Kielhorn 1892; Barnett 1926.

can then be maintained with regard to at least some of the passages of the *Mahābhārata* that yet refer to identifiable verses of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*.

In a more recent publication Olivelle (2007) draws attention to the at times close similarity between the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* and the *Gautama Dharmasūtra*. The *Gautama Dharmasūtra*, unlike the *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra*, does not by name refer to the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*. Nothing therefore prevents Olivelle from concluding that "the author of *Manu* used *Gautama* as one of his primary sources" (p. 681). The borrowing that took place amounts "in several instances to the versification of the sūtras of Gautama" (ibid.). However, Olivelle also argues that "the prose of Gautama is probably dependent on verse originals" (p. 689). The Sūtra style of the *Gautama Dharmasūtra* was, according to Olivelle (2007: 689; 2000: 8), due to "the author's deliberate attempt to produce an ideal sūtra work". This, if true, leads to the following remarkable situation: an original verse text was, probably in part, made into a Sūtra work (the *Gautama Dharmasūtra*), which (or part of which) in its turn became the basis of a verse text (the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*). Continuing this line of speculation, one is free to ask what name the original verse text had: might it have been the original Mānava text on Dharma? Is it possible that some, or all, of the untraceable verses that are attributed to Manu originally belonged to this verse text that has now disappeared? I am not willing to make any pronouncements on this matter, but the question is worth our attention.[207]

In an even more recent publication Olivelle (2008: xix f.) believes he has found similarities between the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* and the work of Aśvaghoṣa. Here too, there is no question of Aśvaghoṣa referring to the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*. He does refer to Manu in a general way, but we have seen that no conclusions can be drawn from this. Nor can conclusions be drawn from the supposed technical meaning given to the word *mokṣa* both by Aśvaghoṣa and by Manu; Appendix V, below, will show that the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* does not use this word in the technical meaning assigned to it by Olivelle. The one remaining argument is Aśvaghoṣa's use of the theology of debt to defend the position that a man should take to asceticism only in old age, also found in the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*. I am not sure, however, whether this single argument can bear the weight of drawing chronological conclusions (Aśvaghoṣa more recent than Manu), as proposed by Olivelle.

Summing up our reflections so far, it can be said that there is evidence to believe that there once was a Mānava work on Dharma. This work was known to Patañjali, and was therefore composed before him. It was still known to Bhartṛhari some 500 or 600 years later. It is much less certain whether this Mānava work on Dharma was a predecessor of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, also called *Manusmṛti*, which survives until today. We cannot even say with certainty that there was any connection whatsoever between the two works — the original Mānava work on Dharma and the *Manusmṛti* — this in spite of the potentially misleading similarity of names.

The investigation of possible connections also led us to some more or less plausible conclusions regarding the dates of composition of the extant *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* and the *Mahābhārata*. The *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* (i.e. the *Manusmṛti*) *may* have been composed during the early centuries of the Common Era, and Olivelle's

[207] The question of a Mānava predecessor of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* (see above) presents itself here again.

suggested date (2nd-3rd centuries CE) is conceivable, though not certain.[208] Regarding the *Mahābhārata*, Olivelle's reflections add, perhaps unintentionally, an argument in support of Fitzgerald's understanding of the text history of this text. Moreover, they allow us to think of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* as a text whose core (i.e., all but the later additions) was composed at a time when the 'main *Mahābhārata*' existed already, but the archetype underlying its Critical Edition not yet. In a certain way the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* is therefore contemporaneous with the *Mahābhārata*, in the sense specified.

The geographical horizons of the two texts — *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* and *Mahābhārata* — appear to support this relationship. With regard to the *Mahābhārata*, Brockington (1998: 199) points out, "it is very noticeable that the whole of [Central and Eastern India] is seen as menacing and also as peripheral to the real action of the basic epic. By contrast, in some of the expansions to the basic narrative and in the didactic portions, definite efforts are being made to include the whole of India within the ambit of the epic." The *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* may situate itself between these two extremes by expanding the definition of Āryāvarta so as to cover the land between the Himalaya and Vindhya ranges and "extending from the eastern to the western sea" (Manu 2.22).[209]

It is also interesting to observe that a portion of the *Mahābhārata* that must have been part of the 'main *Mahābhārata*' shows a rather superficial acquaintance with the ideologies of Greater Magadha, and criticizes them.[210] Later parts of the *Mahābhārata* incorporated into the 'Gupta text', starting with the *Mokṣadharmaparvan*, have absorbed a substantial part of these ideologies and present them as brahmanical thought. If, as seems possible, the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* must be situated between the 'main *Mahābhārata*' and the 'Gupta text', it will be interesting to find out how much understanding of the alternative ideologies it contains. Here it must suffice to note that the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* as a whole shows acquaintance with these ideologies, most notably the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution.

I.2.3. Literature on statecraft

An important expression of brahmanical thought is the literature on statecraft. The most important text that has survived is the *Arthaśāstra*, whose author Kauṭilya has at some point in time been identified with Cāṇakya, a minister of Candragupta the creator of the Maurya Empire. Research has shown that the extant text is a composite text that is far

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[208] In a presentation ("Cosmogony in the transition from Epic to Purāṇic literature") at the Fifth Dubrovnik International Conference on the Sanskrit Epics and Purāṇas (August 2008), Horst Brinkhaus has argued that the cosmogonic account in Manu 1 (including verses 5-31 which are original according to Olivelle) has borrowed from *Harivaṃśa* 1, which is presumably younger than the *Mahābhārata*. He adds in this way a further difficult piece to an already complicated puzzle.

[209] Earlier sources (Baudhāyana, Vasiṣṭha, the grammarian Patañjali) defined Āryāvarta as extending eastward until a mysterious *kālakavana*, which may have been near Prayāga, at the confluence of the Ganges and the Yamunā; see Olivelle 2000: 10. It is tempting to see Manu's expanded definition as embodying the new claim that the eastern Ganges valley was brahmanical territory.

[210] See *Greater Magadha* chapter IIA.2.

younger than that, dating perhaps from the beginning of the Common Era.[211] The question to be considered here is whether there were texts on statecraft during the centuries preceding the Common Era, i.e., during or preceding the centuries in which texts such as Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, the extant Dharmasūtras, and the *Mahābhārata* were composed. It appears that texts on statecraft did indeed exist well before the extant *Arthaśāstra*, and that some of these texts were referred to as Bhāṣyas in subsequent literature. This term does not yet occur in this sense in vedic literature.

Not all early Bhāṣyas deal with statecraft. The earliest Bhāṣya we can date with any precision is the grammatical *Mahābhāṣya* ("Great Bhāṣya"), composed by Patañjali after the middle of the second century BCE.[212] It accompanies the Sūtra of Pāṇini. The *Mahābhāṣya* itself refers to a Bhāṣya on two occasions, both times to another portion of the *Mahābhāṣya* itself.[213] Though this does not prove anything, it allows for the possibility that the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* was not acquainted with any other Bhāṣya(s) than his own work.

There is an earlier text that is regularly referred to as Bhāṣya by its commentators: Yāska's *Nirukta*. The commentator Durga, for example, states right at the beginning that the *Nighaṇṭu*, whose words the *Nirukta* explains, is a *sūtrasaṃgraha*, and that the *Nirukta* itself is its *bhāṣyavistara*.[214] However, there is no indication whatsoever that the *Nirukta* looked upon itself as a Bhāṣya: it does not use this expression.

The extant *Arthaśāstra* describes itself as a combination of a Sūtra and a Bhāṣya, and refers to earlier Bhāṣyas. It concludes with the following statement:

> *dṛṣṭvā vipratipattiṃ bahudhā śāstreṣu bhāṣyakārāṇām/*
> *svayam eva viṣṇuguptaś cakāra sūtraṃ ca bhāṣyaṃ ca//*
> Seeing the manifold errors of the writers of commentaries (*bhāṣyakāra*) on scientific treatises, Viṣṇugupta himself composed the Sūtra as well as the Bhāṣya.[215]

The conclusion that the *Arthaśāstra* refers to earlier works is confirmed by its initial statement:

> (…) *yāvanty arthaśāstrāṇi pūrvācāryaiḥ prasthāpitāni prāyaśas tāni saṃhṛtyaikam idam arthaśāstraṃ kṛtam*
> This single treatise on statecraft (*arthaśāstra*) has mainly been prepared by bringing together all treatises on statecraft composed by earlier teachers.

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[211] First or perhaps second century CE, according to Scharfe (1993: 293), 100 BCE-100 CE according to McClish & Olivelle (2012: xx-xxi). See further Olivelle 2013: 25 ff. Olivelle (2013: 14) also points out that the text may originally have been called *Daṇḍanīti* rather than *Arthaśāstra*.

[212] See § I.2.1, above.

[213] Both Mahā-bh II p. 145 l. 17-18 (on P. 3.3.19 vt. 1) and Mahā-bh II p. 177 l. 21 (on P. 3.4.67 vt. 1) use the words *ukto bhāvabhedo bhāṣye* in order to refer to Mahā-bh II p. 57 l. 7-8 (on P. 3.1.67, before vt. 1) *asti khalv api viśeṣaḥ kṛdabhihitasya bhāvasya tiṅabhihitasya ca*, as pointed out by the editor Kielhorn in a footnote (II p. 177 n. 4).

[214] Durga: *Nirukta-vṛtti*, vol. I p. 4 l. 20 & p. 5 l. 15.

[215] KAŚ p. 283; tr. Kangle. Olivelle (2013: 699) comments: "This verse coming at the very end was probably inserted into the text during the time when the ascription of the text to a definite author was still under review."

It seems likely, then, that there were Bhāṣyas, several of them, in the realm of statecraft already before Viṣṇugupta, and therefore before the composition of the *Arthasāstra* as we know it.

We will discuss the occurrence of *bhāṣya* in some Gṛhyasūtras in § I.2.4, below. We will see that it is possible that these texts were acquainted with one or more Bhāṣyas on statecraft, but more likely that they refer here to Patañjali's grammatical *Mahābhāṣya*. The *Nirukta*, not being a Bhāṣya until later, was probably not referred to by this term.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that later grammarians (and Patañjali himself, as we have seen) sometimes use the singular *bhāṣya* to refer to a portion of the *Mahābhāṣya*, so that the *Mahābhāṣya* as a whole then becomes a collection of *bhāṣya*s, in the plural. This is probably illustrated in the following verse from Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (Vkp 1.23):

> *nityāḥ śabdārthasambandhāḥ tatra āmnātāḥ maharṣibhiḥ/*
> *sūtrāṇām sānutantrāṇām bhāṣyāṇām ca praṇetṛbhiḥ//*

The oldest commentary on the *Vākyapadīya*, the *Vṛtti*, appears to take it for granted that the Bhāṣyas here referred to all designate the *Mahābhāṣya*.[216] Even the plural use of the word *bhāṣya* may therefore conceivably refer to just one text, preferably Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*.

The *Mahābhārata* refers to Bhāṣyas, sometimes clearly in the plural, on a number of occasions. It never makes clear what kind of Bhāṣyas are meant, but one passage suggests that, here at least, no grammatical Bhāṣya can be meant. In an enumeration of learned people it includes (Mhbh 13.90.26cd):

> *ye ca bhāṣyavidaḥ ke cid ye ca vyākaraṇe ratāḥ*
> Those who know the Bhāṣya(s) and those who are devoted to grammar

This line suggests that "those who are devoted to grammar" are different from "those who know the Bhāṣya(s)". The immediately following line mentions those who study the treatises on Dharma (*ye dharmaśāstrāṇi [adhīyate]*; 13.90.27ab).

Consider next *Mahābhārata* 12.311.23. It speaks of Vyāsa's son Śuka as "knowing the Veda(s), the Vedāṅga(s) and the Bhāṣya(s)" (*vedavedāṅgabhāṣyavid*). The proposal to interpret this in such a way that the Bhāṣya(s) cover (also) what we call statecraft is confirmed by the next verse, which enumerates "the complete Vedas, along with their secret parts and summeries, *itihāsa* in its entirety, and the sciences relating to the king (*rājaśāstra*)".[217] Both enumerations presumably cover all that it is worth knowing, and this includes the "sciences relating to the king", i.e., statecraft. Since this category is not covered by *veda* or *vedāṅga*, it is covered by *bhāṣya*.

*Rājaśāstra*s are mentioned a number of times in the twelfth book of the *Mahābhārata* (I counted five), and once in the first (1.108.16). References to Bhāṣyas (in the sense of literary texts) are also centered in book twelf (three occurences), with one

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[216] The *Vṛtti* (ed. Iyer, p. 62 f.) gives only examples from the *Mahābhāṣya*, and may indeed have used the plural *bhāṣyeṣu* (this is the reading recorded by Vṛṣabhadeva, the surviving mss of the Vṛtti have *bhāṣye*; see Iyer 1966: 62 n. 25).

[217] Mhbh 12.311.24: *so 'dhītya vedān akhilān sarahasyān sasaṃgrahān/ itihāsaṃ ca kārtsnyena rājaśāstrāṇi cābhibho//*

further occurrence in books two and thirteen each.[218] *Mahābhārata* 12.308.15 describes King Janaka as "surrounded by ministers and in the midst of those who know all Bhāṣyas" (*mantribhir vṛtam/ sarvabhāṣyavidāṃ madhye ca*); this suggests once again that all these Bhāṣya had something to do with statecraft. *Mahābhārata* 12.104.43 counsels the king on how to proceed with regard to his vanquished enemies, in the following words:

> Consider what things must be done with regard to your enemies in consultation with others who are experts in the Learned Teachings (*śāstra*), who are well prepared and understand the ordinances of those Teachings, who have been well instructed, who are well versed in what the commentaries (*bhāṣya*) have to say.[219]

Once again, the Bhāṣyas referred to here can hardly be anything but texts dealing with statecraft.[220] It seems safe to conclude that the *Mahābhārata* (or at least the passages we have considered) knew texts on statecraft, which it usually refers to as Bhāṣyas. The plural *rājaśāstrāṇi* in verse 12.311.24 suggests that there were a number of treatises on statecraft, presumably Bhāṣyas, in existence at the time of composition of the *Mahābhārata*. About their contents, unfortunately, we have no information, apart from the fact that the composer of the extant *Arthaśāstra* may have used some or all of them.

I.2.4. Literature on domestic ritual

It is possible that the surviving Gṛhyasūtras are no older than the surviving Dharmasūtras, and belong to the period under consideration, i.e., more recent than Patañjali the author of *Mahābhāṣya*, with perhaps predecessors that preceded him. To find out, three similar enumerations that occur in three different Gṛhyasūtras must be our point of departure.

Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra 3.4.4 has: *sumantu-jaimini-vaiśampāyana-paila-sūtra-bhāṣya-bhārata-mahābhārata-dharmācāryā jānanti-bāhavi-gārgya-gautama-śākalya-bābhravya-māṇḍavya-māṇḍūkeyā gārgī vācaknavī vaḍavā prātītheyī sulabhā maitreyī kaholaṃ kauṣītakaṃ mahākauṣītakaṃ paiṅgyaṃ mahāpaiṅgyaṃ suyajnaṃ śāṃkhāyanam aitareyaṃ mahaitareyaṃ śākalaṃ bāṣkalaṃ sujātavaktram audavāhiṃ mahaudavāhiṃ saujāmiṃ śaunakam āśvalāyanaṃ ye cānye ācāryās te sarve tṛpyantv iti/.* An almost identical enumeration occurs at *Kauṣītaka Gṛhyasūtra* 2.5.3. Here the list begins: *sumantu-jaimini-vaiśampāyana-paila-sūtra-bhāṣya-mahābhārata-dharmācāryāḥ jānanti-bāhavi-gārgya-gautama-śākalya-bābhravya-māṇḍavya-māṇḍūkeyāḥ* … The corresponding passage in the *Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtra* (4.10.3) has *sumantuḥ jaimini-vaiśampāyana-paila-sūtra-bhāṣya-gārgya-bibhru-bābhravya-maṇḍu-māṇḍavyāḥ* …,

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[218] Mhbh 2.11.26, which mentions Bhāṣyas in a long and somewhat incoherent enumeration, does not allow us to make any plausible guesses as to their contents.

[219] Mhbh 12.104.43: *tathaiva cānyair atiśāstravedibhiḥ, svalaṃkṛtaiḥ śāstravidhānadṛṣṭibhiḥ/ suśikṣitair bhāṣyakathāviśāradaiḥ, pareṣu kṛtyān upadhārayasva//*. Tr. Fitzgerald.

[220] This last passage also suggests that the term *śāstra* in the *Mahābhārata* may be primarily (if not exclusively) used to refer to texts of Political Science.

without Bhārata and Mahābhārata, but with (Mahā-)Kauṣītaki, (Mahā-)Aitareya, (Mahā-)Paiṅgya, (Mahā-)Audavāhi.[221]

Three items in particular merit our attention: the words *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* occur in all three enumerations, the word *mahābhārata* in two of them. What do they refer to?

Since the above three enumerations occur in texts that call themselves Sūtras — Gṛhyasūtras to be precise — the presence of *sūtra* evokes fewer questions than *bhāṣya*. There are many Bhāṣyas in classical Sanskrit literature; they usually accompany Sūtras. The combination *sūtra* + *bhāṣya* would not therefore attract attention in a classical text. But these Gṛhyasūtras are para-vedic texts, composed, we normally believe, before most Bhāṣyas. We must assume that at least one Bhāṣya existed at the time of the *Āśvalāyana*, *Kauṣītaka*, and *Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtras*. Which one or which ones?

It seems reasonable to narrow down the conceivable possibilities to three: (i) these three Gṛhyasūtras knew the Bhāṣyas on statecraft (or some of them) discussed in the preceding section, (ii) they knew Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, or (iii) they knew both of these. There are no *a priori* reasons to exclude the possibility that these Gṛhyasūtras knew Bhaṣyas on statecraft, but there is weak circumstancial evidence that they rather refer to the grammatical work.[222] The most important reason to exclude Bhāṣyas on statecraft is that the subject matter of the Gṛhyasūtras (unlike that of the *Mahābhārata*) does not overlap with the concerns of statecraft. The Gṛhyasūtras — unlike the *Mahābhārata* and texts on statecraft — are primarily if not exclusively destined for internal consumption among Brahmins. There is, on the other hand, a certain overlap with linguistic concerns, both in the Gṛhyasūtras and in late-vedic literature in general. Let us begin with the latter.

Late-vedic literature contains the following strange enumeration, which occurs altogether four times in exactly the same form: three times in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, once in the *Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad*:[223]

> *ṛgvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo 'tharvāṅgirasa itihāsaḥ purāṇaṃ vidyā upaniṣadaḥ ślokāḥ sūtrāṇy anuvyākhyānāni vyākhyānāni*

Elsewhere (*Greater Magadha* p. 240 f.) I have discussed the sequence *sūtrāṇy anuvyākhyānāni vyākhyānāni* in this enumeration, and proposed that the expression *anuvyākhyāna*, which it is impossible to interpret, is the result of an early error of transmission; the term that it replaces may have been *anvākhyāna*. Once this emendation in place, the new sequence *sūtrāṇy anvākhyāni vyākhyānāni* can then be argued to refer to the *sūtra*s of Pāṇini, the *vārttika*s of Kātyāyana and the explanations contained in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, respectively. The uncertain and to some extent speculative nature of this interpretation cannot be denied, yet there is one relatively strong argument in its favour: it has no creditable competitor. And if a line from the early Upaniṣads may refer to Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, we cannot a priori exclude that some Gṛhyasūtras do the same. Let us therefore see whether the combination *sūtra-bhāṣya* in the three Gṛhyasūtras

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[221] Hopkins (1901: 390) concludes that "when the words [Bhārata and Mahābhārata] do actually occur [in the Gṛhyasūtras] they are plainly additions to the earlier list".

[222] This would correct Deshpande's (2001: 38) claim to the extent that the list of Ācāryas in the *Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra* — though including names like Aitareya, Kauṣītaki and Śākalya — does not as yet include Pāṇini.

[223] BĀrUp 2.4.10, 4.1.2, 4.5.11 (= ŚPaBr 14.5.4.10, 14.6.10.6, 14.7.3.11) and MaitUp 6.32.

under consideration can be interpreted as referring to the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, presumably along with the Sūtra of Pāṇini?

A striking factor in its favour is that certain Gṛhyasūtras — among them Śāṅkhāyana and Kauṣītaka — are acquainted with technical grammatical terms. Most notably, some of them use the expressions *kṛt* and *taddhita* to designate primary and secondary suffixes: Śāṅkhāyana (1.24.4), Kauṣītaka (1.16.12-13), Pāraskara (1.17.2-3), Vārāha (3.1), and Gobhila (2.8.14-15).[224] These terms do not occur in the Śrautasūtras, nor anywhere in vedic literature. Acquaintance with grammatical literature is also suggested by the reference to the six *aṅga*s of the Veda in *Pāraskara Gṛhyasūtra* 2.6.6. These are traditionally *śikṣā*, *chandas*, *vyākaraṇa*, *nirukta*, *jyotiṣa* and *kalpa*; among these, *vyākaraṇa* is grammar. *Pāraskara Gṛhyasūtra* 3.16, moreover, distinguishes between various kinds of sounds: guttural (*kaṇṭhya*), pectoral (*aurasa*), dental (*dantya*) and labial (*oṣṭhya*). All this suggests that a number of Gṛhyasūtras were acquainted with linguistic literature. In combination with the explicit mention of *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* in some of them, we may consider that the suggestion that some of them knew Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* is a possibility to be taken seriously.

If this suggestion is correct, the three Gṛhyasūtras considered were composed (or reached their final form) after Patañjali, and therefore after the second half of the second century BCE, say during the first century BCE or later. This would seem to agree with the mention of *mahābhārata* in two of them. However, there is a difficulty that may stand in the way.

The enumeration in *Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra* 3.4.4 consists of two parts, the first one containing nominatives, the second accusatives. Oldenberg (1886: 220 n. 4) explained this in a footnote, following the commentator Nārāyaṇa: "The names from Kahola Kauṣītak[a] down to Āśvalāyana stand in the accusative; *tarpayāmi*, 'I satiate N. N.' is to be supplied." The sūtra ends with the words: *ye cānye ācāryās te sarve tṛpyantv iti* "and whatsoever other teachers there are, may they all satiate themselves" (tr. Oldenberg). This concluding phrase suggests that the enumeration only contains the names of teachers. The vast majority of the names are indeed names of teachers, or can at any rate be understood that way. Oldenberg, in his translation, yet identifies six of them as being names of texts: "the Sūtras, the Bhāṣyas, the Bhārata, the Mahābhārata, … the Śākala (text), the Bāṣkala (text)". He is no doubt right in the case of Sūtra and Bhāṣya (even though grammar does not garantee that the plural translation Sūtras and Bhāṣyas is justified: the words occur in the middle of a compound …*sūtrabhāṣya*…). The remaining four words, however, — Bhārata, Mahābhārata, Śākala, Bāṣkala — can be used both for persons and for texts.[225] This is even true of Mahābhārata, for the enumeration prefixes *mahā-* to a number of personal names: Mahākauṣītaka, Mahāpaiṅgya, Mahaitareya, Mahaudavāhi. It follows that it is possible to raise doubts with regard to Oldenberg's interpretation of these four names, especially in view of the context.

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[224] These passages are about giving names to children, and have the following words in common: *dvyakṣaraṃ caturakṣaraṃ vā ghoṣavadādy antarantasthaṃ kṛtaṃ kuryān na taddhitam*.

[225] For Śākala as the name for a person see, e.g., *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* (ed. Müller 1869) 76 (p. XXV): *ukāraś cetikaraṇena yukto rakto 'pṛkto drāghitaḥ śākalena* "Und das u, wenn es mit iti verbunden, nasalisirt, ohne Consonanten, und vom Śākala verlängert ist, ist ebenfalls pragṛhya"; further Bronkhorst 1982: 89 n. 15.

[The context admittedly contains some other elements which seem to point in the opposite direction: Sumantu, Jaimini, Vaiśampāyana and Paila are names known from the *Mahābhārata*: they are the names of four pupils of Vyāsa, the 'author' of the epic.][226]

Remember in this context that the grammarian Pāṇini has a rule about the accentuation of the compound *mahā-bhārata*. This rule is P. 6.2.38 (*mahān vrīhyaparāhṇagṛṣṭīṣvāsajābālabhārabhāratahailihilarauravapravṛddheṣu*). It is briefly discussed in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, who does not however mention the compound *mahā-bhārata*. Since the form *bhārata* does not figure at the beginning of the rule, and manuscripts of the *Mahābhāṣya* often cite only the beginnings of rules, it is conceivable that at the time of Patañjali this rule did not yet account for the accent of *mahā-bhārata*.[227] *A priori* this seems unlikely, because it is hard to believe that someone more recent, who presumably lived at a time when accents had disappeared, would be concerned about the accent of this compound. It seems therefore reasonable to suppose that Patañjali, and presumably Pāṇini, knew the word *mahā-bhārata*.

Scholars have concluded that Pāṇini knew the (or an) epic that carries that name. A recent example is Asko Parpola, who concludes from this and other facts that "the war was over and the epic in existence by c. 400-350 B.C."[228] Alf Hiltebeitel (2011a: 113 n. 28) finds Pāṇini's reference to *mahā-bhārata* 'baffling', and wonders whether "he refers to some prewritten conceptualization — unless we have an older *Mahābhārata* text than most have thought …". Fitzgerald (2010; 2010a: 72) conjectures that there were "oral traditions of a Pāṇḍava *Bhārata* epic that circulated in ancient North India between approximately 350 BCE and 50 CE".

However, none of these assumptions are certain. Pāṇini's rule leaves us in doubt whether the compound *mahā-bhārata* refers to the (or an) epic of that name, or to something else. This rule informs us about the accent of this compound, not about its reference. The word Bhārata can refer to various things, as any dictionary will tell. It can, for example, refer to the author of two Ṛgvedic hymns. Mahā-Bhārata might then conceivably be a designation of the 'great Bhārata', a eulogistic expression for this Ṛṣi.[229] The passage from the *Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra* just studied might be interpreted along these lines. If so, it does not refer to the *Mahābhārata* epic.

There is another aspect of the question that must be considered. Pāṇini's rule 6.2.38 determines the accent of the compound *mahā-bhārata*. This is not surprising if this expression concerns a vedic seer, but somewhat harder to understand if it is the name of the Sanskrit epic. Let us see what authorities have to say about the disappearance of Vedic accents.

First Pierre-Sylvain Filliozat (1992: 31-32):

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[226] See, e.g., Tsuchida 2008: 13 n. 24.

[227] So Simson 2011: 646-647.

[228] Parpola 2002: 361; cited in Witzel 2005: 69 n. 168. Witzel adds that "exactly what kind of (Mahā)Bhārata may have been in existence in Pāṇini's time is very much open to debate."

[229] This was indeed Albrecht Weber's opinion: "In Páṇini the word 'Mahá-Bhárata' does indeed occur; not, however, as denoting the epic of this name, but as an appellative to designate any individual of special distinction among the Bháratas, like Mahá-Jábála, -Hailihila …" (Weber 1878: 185). Weber is careful to add: "Still, we do find names mentioned in Páṇini which belong specially to the story of the Mahá-Bhárata — namely, Yudhishṭhira, Hástinapura, Vásudeva, Arjuna, Andhaka-Vṛishṇayas, Droṇa (?); so that the legend must in any case have been current in his day, possibly even in a poetical shape".

> [Le sanskrit] perd un trait important, le ton, encore enseigné pour la langue parlée par Patañjali et encore prononcé par lui (pour les règles de ton il donne ses exemples en prononçant les mots accentués). Après lui le ton ne subsistera que pour les textes védiques appris par coeur selon les antiques méthodes de récitation. Cette perte est peut-être la marque d'un changement de statut du sanskrit. C'est la perte d'un trait particulièrement vivant de la langue et le signe de son passage à l'état de langue seconde, fruit d'une éducation spécifique, non résultat de la naissance. En effet dans l'apprentissage d'une seconde langue la prononciation est la chose la plus difficile à acquérir à la perfection, précisément parce qu'il est malaisé de se débarrasser de traits de prononciation de sa langue maternelle. … Une altération de la prononciation aussi grave que la perte du ton chez les lettrés qui en connaissent l'existence et les règles par la grammaire de Pāṇini ne peut s'expliquer que par l'influence d'une langue première ne comportant pas de tonalité, et donc le passage du sanskrit à l'état de langue seconde. Quand ce changement s'est-il produit? Il n'y a pas de date ponctuelle pour cela, mais la transformation a dû se faire progressivement dans les premiers siècles après l'ère chrétienne.

Burrow (1973: 115) has similar ideas:

> When exactly the accent died out in ordinary spoken use it is impossible to say with certainty. It was certainly a living thing in the time of Patañjali and even later than Patañjali, Śāntanava treated of the subject in his *Phiṭsūtra*. According to the author of the Kāśikā commentary (c. A.D. 700) the use of accentuation was optional in the spoken language, which probably means that in practice it was no longer used at this time. On the whole it is unlikely that the use of accentuation survived long after the Christian era.

To sum up: No one knows for sure when the Vedic accent stopped being used in Sanskrit (and we are entitled to have doubts as to how 'living' the Vedic accent was at the time of Patañjali).[230]

However, we do know that the *Mahābhārata* was not recited with accent. Indeed, the text itself describes the "recitation of Vedic texts with the accents taught by the Śikṣās (*svaraḥ śaikṣaḥ*, 9.35[!].35b …)" (Brockington 1998: 10), indicating thereby that non-vedic texts — including the *Mahābhārata* itself — were *not* recited in this manner. It is somewhat difficult to believe that a text in Sanskrit without accent had an accented name. We are of course free to speculate that there had been an earlier *Mahābhārata* in accented Sanskrit, with an accented name. Such speculation is not based on any evidence known to me, and is indeed unnecessary, given that the compound Mahā-Bhārata may refer to a vedic seer.

There is no reason to insist that Pāṇini did not yet know the *Mahābhārata* in some form or other, but this is not certain. It seems however clear that the text as we now know it, or a text sufficiently similar to it, did not come into existence until the second or first century BCE.

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[230] Contrary to a widespread misunderstanding, Patañjali *did* recite the *Aṣṭādhyāyī with* accents; see Appendix VII.

Since, then, the mention of *mahābhārata* in some Gṛhyasūtras does not clinch the issue of a relatively recent date for these texts, let us consider some other passages, these ones in the *Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtra*. This Sūtra recognizes four Vedas.[231] It concludes the description of the Sandhyā oblation with the remark (2.10.8): "He who approaches the fire after having sacrificed thus, studies of these Vedas one, two, three, or all."[232] It follows that *all* the Vedas are four in number. In other words, there are four and only four Vedas. This may not look surprising to a modern reader who has been trained to think that there are four Vedas: the *Ṛg-*, *Yajur-*, *Sāma-* and *Atharva-Veda*s. Early Indian literature, on the other hand, regularly speaks of three or five Vedas, and number four is more often than not different from the *Atharva-Veda*.[233] In vedic literature itself, the *Atharva-Veda* is primarily mentioned in texts belonging to that Veda itself (see below). Since the *Śaṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtra* belongs to the *Ṛg-Veda*, we would not here expect an enumeration of Vedas that includes the *Atharva-Veda*.

The name that this Gṛhyasūtra gives to the *Atharva-Veda* is *Brahma-Veda*.[234] This means that it looks upon the *Atharva-Veda* as the Veda of the priest called Brahman. Once again, this attribution is not very old. Various vedic passages associate the Brahman-priest, not with the *Atharva-Veda*, but rather with the three earlier ones, or with the three kinds of formulas (Ṛc, Yajus, Sāman) that came to be collected in those other Vedas.[235] There are even reasons to think that initially the Vedas claimed the position of Brahman each for itself.[236] All this is understandable, for the Brahman supervises the Śrauta ritual, and is the only officiating priest (even though his part in the ceremony is not obligatory) in the Gṛhya ritual.[237] He has a special claim to being the Purohita of the king.[238]

For understandable reasons, the expression *Brahma-Veda* is one that, in vedic and auxiliary literature, is virtually confined to texts of the *Atharva-Veda*, the *Śāṅkhāyana* and *Kauṣītaka Gṛhyaūtra*s being the only exceptions to this rule. It occurs a number of times in the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*[239] and is common in the Pariśiṣṭas of this Veda.[240] The *Vaitāna Sūtra* (1.1) speaks of the Brahman-priest as someone who knows the *Brahma-Veda* (*brahmā … brahmavedavid*). The link between the Brahman-priest and the *Atharva-Veda* finds further expression in the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* (1.2.18) and in the

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[231] So does the *Pāraskara Gṛhyasūtra* (2.5.13). PārGS 2.10.4-7 mentions the *Ṛg-*, *Yajur-*, *Sāma-* and *Atharva-Veda*s.

[232] *Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtra* 2.10.8: *sa eteṣāṃ vedānām ekaṃ dvau trīn sarvān vā 'dhīte ya evaṃ hutvāgnim upatiṣṭhate*. Tr. Oldenberg.

[233] See Bronkhorst 1989.

[234] *Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtra* 1.16.3. The same passage, including the word *brahmaveda*, occurs in the *Kauṣītaka Gṛhyasūtra* (1.10.1). This text, which professes to belong to the same Ṛgvedic tradition (Gonda 1977: 606-07), follows the *Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtra*, "during the greater part of the work, nearly word for word" (Oldenberg 1886: 6).

[235] Bloomfield 1899: 31. See, e.g., AitBr 5.33 (25.8); JaimBr 1.358; ŚPaBr 11.5.8.4; discussed in Bronkhorst 1989. Further ĀpŚS 24.16-19.

[236] See Inden 1992: 560, with a reference to KauṣBr 6.11.

[237] Gonda 1980: 194.

[238] Here and in what follows I draw inspiration from Inden 1992.

[239] The *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* appears to be "a secondary treatise in the style of such a work" and is, moreover, more recent than the Śrautasūtra of that Veda (i.e., the *Vaitāna Sūtra*; see Gonda 1975: 355-356), which in its turn presupposes its Gṛhyasūtra (the *Kauśika Sūtra*; see Oldenberg 1892: xxx-xxxi, with p. xxxi n. 1; Gonda 1977: 545, 614).

[240] Bloomfield 1899: 10.

Kauśika Sūtra (94.2-4), which characterize him as *bhṛgvaṅgirovid* 'knower of the Atharva-Veda'.[241] The obvious conclusion is that the *Śāṅkhāyana* and *Kauṣītaka Gṛhyasūtra*s accept that there is a special connection between the Brahman-priest and the *Atharva-Veda*.

We will return to the increased important of the *Atharva-Veda* and of the Brahmins associated with it in § IIB.2. Here I will merely draw attention to a further passage from a Gṛhyasūtra that appears to highlight the link between the *Atharva-Veda* and worldly power. The *Pāraskara Gṛhyasūtra* (3.13.2; this Sūtra belongs to the White Yajurveda) describes a court of justice (*sabhā*) as *āṅgirasī* 'related to Aṅgiras or to the Aṅgirases'. The link between the two is far from evident, unless we assume that the author of this Sūtra assumed that Atharvan priests had somehow a closer connection with the court than others. This, in its turn, may find its explanation in the fact that Brahman-priest came to be looked upon as particulary apt to play the role of royal Purohita.

We had already occasion (§ I.2.2, above) to draw attention to the parallels between *Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtra* and *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, and wonder whether these parallels indicate that the two texts are close to each other in time.

The Gṛhyasūtras contain very few indications that might help us to date them. In spite of that, the ones we have considered, though sometimes weak on their own, jointly point to a relatively recent date for these texts, and a date of composition after the collapse of the Maurya Empire must be considered possible or even likely for the forms in which they have reached us.

One might be tempted to go further. If, for example, the mention of *mahābhārata* can be taken to be a reference to the Sanskrit epic of that name, we might conclude that the Gṛhyasūtras concerned were composed (or reached their present shape) after the time when the epic, or a major part of it, was composed and written down. We might be tempted to draw conclusions from the fact that the enumerations in the three Gṛhyasūtras considered differ from each other: Śāṅkhāyana has only *sūtra-bhāṣya*, Kauṣītaka has *sūtra-bhāṣya-mahābhārata*, while Āśvalāyana has *sūtra-bhāṣya-bhārata-mahābhārata*. This might then lead us to believe that the *Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtra* did not (yet?) know the *Mahābhārata*, that the *Kauṣītaka Gṛhyasūtra* knew the *Mahābhārata*, and that the *Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra* knew the *Mahābhārata* and a text called *Bhārata* (which may or may not have been an earlier version of the *Mahābhārata*). This might then provide some reason to think that there was a time when Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* existed, but not yet the *Mahābhārata*. I will resist this temptation, for it is beset by too many uncertainties. To begin with, the text-critical status of the Gṛhyasūtra editions leaves doubts as to the correct reading of the enumeration in the different texts. And even if the readings we have correspond to those of the 'original' Gṛhyasūtras concerned, it is hasardous to conclude from the non-mention of the *Mahābhārata* that that epic did not yet exist at that time; this conclusion is all the more shaky in view of the fact that there is no obvious reason why a Gṛhyasūtra should mention the *Mahābhārata*. And let us not forget that there is no absolute certainty that the word *mahābhārata* in these Sūtras refers to the eponymous epic; it may refer to a person.

But even if the Gṛhyasūtras in the form in which they have reached us date from a time after the collapse of the Maurya Empire, this does not need to mean that this category of texts, and therefore the concerns to which they give expression, are as recent as that. Some remarks in Aśoka's edicts suggest that he (or his helpers) may have been

[241] *bhṛgvaṅgiras* is another special term of the Atharvan tradition; see Bloomfield 1899: 10.

acquainted with texts dealing with the domestic issues that are central to the Gṛhyasūtras. This issue has recently been studied by Timothy Lubin (2013), who points out (forthcoming c) that in Rock Edict IX, Aśoka "mocks domestic rites of the type canonized in the Vedic Gṛhyasūtras — 'good-luck rites' (*maṅgala*s) associated with marriage and childbirth, and for warding off misfortune in illness and travel — as 'numerous, diverse, vulgar, and pointless ceremonies' propagated by women". Lubin continues: "It is precisely such rites that the Gṛhya codes (sometimes in similar terms)[242] seek to legitimize as a form of Vedic praxis. Where Aśoka criticizes rites of this type as the superstitions of women and other common folk, the Gṛhya codes explicitly validate the authority of women and lower classes in such matters.[243] The late Vedic ritual codes thus elevated the very householder piety that an asctic-inspired worldview tended to denigrate."

I.2.5. The *Mahābhārata*

The *Mahābhārata* has been mentioned a number of times in the above discussion. We have seen that scholars tend to assign its first written version to the last two centuries preceding the Common Era, but that there is disagreement as to the portions of this huge text to which this applies. For this reason the present section is dedicated to a survey and analysis of the chronological position of this text. Since this discussion will take the Critical Edition as its point of departure, which supposedly reconstructs the archetype of this text, we begin with a general interrogation of what constitutes an archetype, followed by a discussion of what the archetype of the *Mahābhārata* may have looked like.[244]

Archetypes and autographs

Most Sanskrit texts reach us in the form of manuscripts. These manuscripts are more or less remote descendants of presumably one earliest manuscript, written by the original author or redactor of the text concerned. This earliest manuscript is called the *autograph*. It is only in exceptional cases that we possess autographs of Sanskrit texts, i.e., the original manuscript written by the original author or redactor himself. In the vast majority of cases all we have are copies of copies of copies … of the original autograph. This is especially true of ancient texts, texts whose date of composition is too far removed from the present for manuscripts from that period to have survived.

Philologists have developed methods to get as close as possible to the lost autograph of texts with the help of the manuscripts that *have* survived.[245] In order to do so they make intelligent use of the variants that always pop up in lineages of manuscripts. Each time a text is copied, the new manuscript will contain some mistakes, usually small ones, but also sometimes additions or modifications which the copying scribes knowingly

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[242] Lubin adds in a note: "Such rites are likewise called *maṅgalāni* at *Āpastamba Gṛhyasūtra* 1.2.14-15; *Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra* 1.7.1-2, though dignifying them with the label 'rules' (*dharma*s), calls them 'motley' (*uccāvaca*), as does Aśoka."

[243] See Lubin 2013: 37-38 for references from the *Āpastamba Gṛhya-* and *Dharmasūtra* supporting this claim.

[244] See also Fitzgerald 2010a: 74 ff.

[245] For a recent survey, see Witzel 2014.

and willingly introduced. Over the centuries this can lead to separate branches of manuscripts. A careful consideration of these branches, and of the ways in which they differ from each other, makes it sometimes possible to reconstruct the common ancestor of all surviving manuscripts. This common ancestor of all surviving manuscripts (or of all manuscripts used for a certain edition) is called their archetype.

Only in the case of a limited number of Sanskrit texts has it been possible to reconstruct the archetype of all or of a substantial number of surviving manuscripts. To some extent this is due to the fact that there are not sufficient scholars. Making a so-called critical edition — preferably with a 'stemma' (genealogical tree) of manuscripts and a reconstructed archetype — requires great skill and a substantial amount of work. Adds to the difficulties that many texts do not allow of such a reconstruction: their manuscripts do not belong to clearly separable lineages. This is most often due to the fact that an important number of scribes did not use just one manuscript each to copy from, but several. The surviving manuscripts are then 'contaminated' and disentanglement of their different strands is almost impossible.

In what follows we will concentrate on a few texts whose manuscripts *do* allow us to say something about the archetype from which they are descended. It will be shown that the archetype is often different from the autograph. Furthermore, the distance in time between autograph and archetype of surviving manuscripts *can* be considerable, centuries or more.[246]

Vākyapadīya

Consider first a text from the fifth century CE, the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari. This text has been admirably edited by the German scholar Wilhelm (1977). even succeeded in establishing a stemma relating the manuscripts used. This stemma is almost too neat to be true, and certainly has few if any parallels in editions of other Indian texts. At present we are interested in the archetype it reconstructs. This, it turns out, is not the original text written down by Bhartṛhari, but rather a mixture of Bhartṛhari's original text and some portions from an early commentary. As a matter of fact, the concluding verses of the second chapter in 's edition are in reality the concluding verses of the commentary known by the name *Vṛtti*, probably composed by someone else, perhaps a student of Bhartṛhari. Here, then, we see that the archetype of the surviving manuscripts is not identical with Bhartṛhari's autograph of the *Vākyapadīya*.[247]

Mahābhāṣya

Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* is another example. This text dates from the second half of the second century BCE, as we have seen (§ I.2.1, above). There is no real critical edition of this text, and no stemma of manuscripts, but we do have an edition (by Kielhorn) that is based a fair number of manuscripts. It has been possible to show that all these

[246] Some of the following examples and others are referred to in Witzel 2014: 41, with references. See also Witzel 2014: 54: "It is my well-founded suspicion that many if not most of our 'Classical' Indian texts go back to late manuscript archetypes of ca. 1000 CE, that is to MSS written after the emergence of the various (sub)regional scripts around that time. Earlier (post-)Gupta MSS must have been copied and rewritten ... (sooner or later) in the new type(s) of script."
[247] Bronkhorst 1988: 111.

manuscripts share some mistakes in vedic quotations which can only have come about around the year 1000 CE, in northern India. It follows that these mistakes must belong to the archetype underlying all these manuscripts. This archetype can therefore be dated around the year 1000 CE at the earliest. It is separated from the autograph by a period of some eleven centuries![248]

In this case, too, there is an explanation. As in the case of the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari, a commentary appears to play a crucial role. Around the year 1000 CE, in northern India, a commentary was composed on the *Mahābhāṣya* by someone called Kaiyaṭa, which was to become the most popular and the most widely studied commentary on this text. Along with this commentary, subsequent scribes apparently adopted the *Mahābhāṣya* readings it accepted. Other lineages of manuscripts were henceforth neglected, so much so that, so far as we know, not a trace of them has survived.[249]

In both these examples it is possible to think in terms of a bottleneck: of all the manuscripts that existed only one became the ancestor of all those that have survived (or have been taken into consideration). However, neither in the case of the *Vākyapadīya* nor in that of the *Mahābhāṣya* do we have reason to think that only few manuscripts *existed* at the time of the archetype. Quite the contrary, there may have been many manuscripts in existence when the one manuscript was created which was to become the archetype of all manuscripts extant today. Seen this way, there may have been no *real* bottleneck.

Paippalāda Saṃhitā

Some texts may have gone through a *real* bottleneck, in the sense that only few manuscripts remained at a certain point of its history. An example may be the *Paippalāda Saṃhitā* of the *Atharva-Veda*. The manuscripts of this text, preserved both in Kashmir and in Orissa, go back to one written archetype from around 800-1000 CE in Gujarat.[250] This, at any rate, is the theory presented by Michael Witzel (1985a), who offers the following explanatory hypothesis: Brahmins of the *Atharva-Veda* were for many centuries centered in Gujarat, from where some were invited from time to time by kings in other parts of India. They arrived with their texts, i.e., the version of the *Paippalāda Saṃhitā* current in Gujarat. Other traditions of that text either did not exist or were overshadowed by the originally Gujarati tradition. In other words, it is possible that there were only few manuscripts of the *Paippalāda Saṃhitā* in existence in that period, so that we can then speak of a real bottleneck.

Mānava Dharmaśāstra

In order to illustrate another point, I wish to once again consider the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, a text about which a great deal has already been said in § I.2.2, above. It may be recalled that a critical edition of this text has recently been prepared, which does not however include a stemma showing the relationship between the manuscripts. The editor, Patrick Olivelle, could however present arguments to show that this work is essentially a unitary composition, created by one single author. That is to say, there was

[248] Witzel 1986.
[249] Bronkhorst 1987a.
[250] Witzel (2014: 54 n. 274) speaks of "the written Paippalāda Atharvaveda archetype in Gujarat, c. 800 CE ..., from which even the current *recitation* in Orissa has been derived".

once an autograph of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*. However, this autograph is not identical with the archetype of all presently available manuscripts, for Olivelle shows that a number of passages in the text are clearly later additions, added some time after the autograph and before the archetype. The *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* is in this way similar to the texts we discussed earlier — the *Vākyapadīya*, the *Mahābhāṣya*, the *Paippalāda Saṃhitā*: in all these cases archetype and autograph are separated from each other by some interval of time, in some cases a considerable interval of time.

However, the case of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* is different in another respect. Unlike the other texts, this one was added to regularly. This is probably explained by the type of text it is. Being a Dharmaśāstra, a Lawbook of sorts, it almost invited accretions, new portions dealing with rules that are applicable in specific situations not, or not sufficiently, dealt with in the original text. This process of accretions continued even after the time of the archetype, as is clear from the addition of individual verses and minor changes in the wording of verses detectable through 'lower criticism'.[251]

Remember that the conclusion that autograph and archetype of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* are different is based on an assessment of the relative coherence or lack of it of portions of the text. This is obviously a dangerous argument. We know that Christians over the ages have succeeded in finding coherence against all odds between the books of the Bible, both the Old and the New Testament; this seems to be a good illustration of the danger of assessing coherence and incoherence. In spite of this, we often depend upon such assessments, and it appears that Olivelle has by and large done a good job.

One more remark before we leave Manu. There is no compelling reason to assume that the accretions added to this text during the period between autograph and archetype have all been added in one go. It is easy to imagine that subsequent generations of scribes added bits to one lineage of manuscripts. This process might have gone on until today, had it not been for the fact that a certain manuscript of that lineage happened to become the archetype of the now surviving manuscripts. The production of the archetype should not then be thought of as a special event at which a new edition of the text was consciously created. It is much more likely that the scribe who wrote the archetype had no idea that he was engaged in such a momentous enterprise. We may compare the situation with that of mitochondrial Eve, according to biologists the maternal ancestor of all women alive today. This woman was not aware of her role in history, and none of her contemporaries saw anything distinctive in her. The archetype of all surviving manuscripts of a text may be similar: just a manuscript whose special status was to be assigned to it by subsequent history.[252]

Archetype and autograph in the case of the Mahābhārata

These preliminary remarks have prepared us for an inspection of the *Mahābhārata*. This text, like the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* and even more so, is susceptible to accretions. This is evident from the fact that this epic survives in different versions in different parts of India: these versions differ from each other primarily in the portions that have been

[251] Olivelle 2005: 51.

[252] This is a reason to feel hesitant about the idea of a 'normative redaction', presumably compiled by redactors who knew what they were doing (Bigger 2002). See however further below.

added to an original kernel.

The Critical Edition of the *Mahābhārata* is in the first place the edition of the parts that these different *Mahābhārata*s have in common. That is to say, an important aspect of the preparation of this critical edition was the removal of those extras. What remains is the text that underlay these different versions, and that presumably corresponds to the archetype of the surviving manuscripts of the *Mahābhārata*.

The question which has now to be addressed is: is this archetype identical with the autograph, or are the two different from each other? *Autograph* is a dubious term to use in connection with a text like the *Mahābhārata*. Scholars tend to agree that some form of the *Mahābhārata* was committed to writing during the last one or two centuries preceding the Common Era, but this earliest written form of the *Mahābhārata* may have been based on earlier material (an issue that does not interest us at present).[253] It suffices to agree, if only for argument's sake, that there was a first written version of the *Mahābhārata*, whether of parts or of the whole. I call this first written version its *autograph*, so as to facilitate comparison with the other texts we have considered. We wish to know whether this autograph and the archetype of the surviving manuscripts were identical or not.

Since the *Mahābhārata* is susceptible to accretions, the answer to this question is not without consequences. If time elapsed between autograph and archetype, the archetype is likely to contain passages that were not present in the autograph.

We know already that scholars tend to agree that the autograph of the *Mahābhārata* (in the sense just explained) belongs the last one or two centuries preceding the Common Era. One reason is a study of the datable events which the *Mahābhārata* is acquainted with. A survey leads Witzel (2005: 53-54) to "a post-Alexandrian, pre-Kṣatrapa, and pre-Kuṣāṇa focus of the compilation of the bulk of the epic, perhaps … c. 100 BCE."[254]

Both possible answers to our question (autograph and archetype are identical or different) are represented in contemporary scholarship. Some maintain that the autograph of the *Mahābhārata* is also the archetype of the surviving manuscripts, others that the two are different. The arguments of those who claim that they are different are based, not surprisingly, on the further claim that the *Mahābhārata* is no homogeneous text, that it contains portions that just do not fit in with the rest. Those who think that the two are identical are attracted by claims that the whole text constitutes a coherent whole. How do we choose between these two positions?

Claims about the inner coherence or incoherence of a huge text are notoriously dependent upon personal judgments. Personal judgments can and do vary from one

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[253] Wynne's remark (2009: xxxvii) to the extent that "[a]t the current state of research … a critical edition of the *Mokṣadharma* [portion of the *Mahābhārata*] is probably not possible, since the period of thought in which its individual texts were composed remains obscure" must therefore be based on a completely different notion of what constitutes a critical edition. This does not change the fact that the continued independent existence of oral traditions (if there were any) that may have influenced subsequent written versions of the text may make the reconstruction of an archetype wellnigh impossible; cp. Witzel 2014: 33-34.

[254] See further Fitzgerald 2010: 109: "The commitment of the new *Bhārata* to writing and its becoming the *Great Bhārata* may have occurred under [the Brahmin Śuṅgas and their brahmin Kāṇva successors in north-central and northeastern India], or one or both of these accomplishments may have been the work of Śātavāhana kings or even their eastern counterparts the Cedis of Kaliṅga".

person to the next. Where one scholar sees coherence, another sees the opposite, and vice versa. To resolve this issue we need more than personal impressions.

External indications are not as helpful as one might wish. A copper-plate inscription from the first half of the sixth century mentions the *Mahābhārata* and calls it the collection (*saṃhitā*) of a hundred thousand [verses].[255] Since the text of the Critical Edition contains somewhat less than a hundred thousand verses,[256] scholars have concluded that the archetype of the surviving manuscripts existed before that time. This is long after the probable date of the autograph. It leaves open the possibility of a long temporal distance between autograph and archetype, but does not prove it.

More promising is the study of the relationship between the *Mahābhārata* and the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, which we carried out in § I.2.2, above. It led us to the conclusion that some parts of the *Mahābhārata* appear to be older that the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, whereas others are younger. This implies that the autograph of the *Mahābhārata* dates from before the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, its archetype from a later date. Since the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* mentions gold coins, which did not gain currency until the 2nd century of the Common Era, the autograph of the *Mahābhārata* may have existed before this date (a conclusion supported by the consensus of scholarly opinion), while its archetype is more recent.

Archetype and hyparchetype

The above amounts to an argument in favor of separating autograph and archetype of the *Mahābhārata*. It depends in part on certain assumptions about the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*. There is a further argument in support of such a separation, presented some forty years ago by the German scholar Dieter Schlingloff (1969a) and based on his study of fragments of the so-called Spitzer Manuscript. Carbon-dating places this manuscript in the second to third century CE, which means that the text it contains dates from that period at the latest.[257] It contains an enumeration of *parvan*s ('books') of the *Mahābhārata*. A comparison of this list (or what is left of it) with the current list of *parvan*s and sub-*parvan*s led Schlingloff to the following results:[258] "The first two *parvan*s in the older list are *Ādi* and *Pauloma*, the latter is now a sub-*parvan* of the former. *Āraṇyaka* and *Āraṇeya* were the seventh and eighth *parvan*s respectively; the former is now the third *parvan* and the latter its sub-*parvan* (no. 44). *Niryāṇa* and *Bhagavadyāna* were the ninth and tenth *parvan*s, they are now the fifty-sixth and fifty-fourth sub-*parvan*s respectively. The *Bhīṣmaparvan* was the eleventh parvan and is now the sixth, *Śāntiparvan* was the fifteenth *parvan* and is now the twelfth; the *Āśvamedhika* was the sixteenth *parvan* and is now the fourteenth. The *Anuśāsanaparvan* is missing in the list and was probably not yet part of the epic. The *Virāṭaparvan* is also most probably a later interpolation."

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[255] Fleet 1887: 135-139: "Khoh copper-plate inscription of the Maharaja Sarvanatha." Date 533-34 CE. As in the other Sarvanatha inscription, but beginning: *uktaṃ ca* ***Mahābhārate śatasahasryāṃ saṃhitāyāṃ*** *paramarṣiṇā veda-vyāsena Vyāsena: pūrvadattāṃ dvijātibhyo* etc. "... in the Śatasāhasrī-Saṃhitā ..." See § I.2.2, above.

[256] "over 160,000 lines of verse and more than 1,100 lines of prose" (Fitzgerald 2010a: 78, with a reference to Fitzgerald 2009[: 106]).

[257] Franco 2005; Brockington 2010: 76.

[258] As presented by Franco (2004: 9-10).

Schlingloff's conclusions have been criticized by Alf Hiltebeitel in a passage that I will quote in full (2005: 459 n. 15):

> Schlingloff's … claims (1969) about the *Mahābhārata*'s "oldest extant parvan-list" based on the Kuṣāṇa period "Spitzer manuscript" found in east Turkestan have been revived by Franco (2004), with some additional information and suggestions: that it may have come from "the Great Gandhara area" and been written using a broad-nibbed copper pen (vol. 1, 11); that it is probably a Sarvāstivādin text (19) from "around the second half of the third century" (33); that it included a refutation of God in one fragment (18–19); and that its reference to some *Mahābhārata* units and brief encapsulation of the *Rāmāyaṇa* "may have been occasioned by a discussion of the Buddha's omniscience" (17). If the last two things are true, it hardly seems that the Buddha's omniscience was directed toward the 'extant' totality of either epic. Indeed, not knowing the context, we cannot know what the units were listed for, why both parvans and subparvans were selected, why in some cases they are apparently listed out of sequence and in others with one inclusive of another, why the *Mahābhārata* is digested by (selected) components and the *Rāmāyaṇa* as a (minimalist) consecutive narrative, or even that the four fragments mentioning these features were all on the same page. No *Mahābhārata* scholar using the find as evidence of a once-shorter text … has tried to explain what kind of '*Bhārata*' it would have been with the odd assortment of units mentioned. With such uncertainties, notions that the *Virāṭa-* and *Anuśāsana-Parvan*s would not yet have been extant … must be taken cum grano salis. Regarding Book 4, the only evidence is that no *Virāṭaparvan* is mentioned between a unit beginning with *a* or *ā*, for which Schlinghoff (338) proposes *ā(raṇeyaṃ)* "or perhaps *ā(jagara)*" — both subparvans of Book 3 — and *(ni)ryyāṇaṃ* for the *Abhiniryāṇa* subparvan of Book 5. But *a* could provide *a(jñātavāsa)*, the 'residence incognito' widely used to describe the *Virāṭaparvan* …, or *a(bhimanyu-vivāha)*, the main *adhyāya* name (4.66–67) in Book 4's concluding subparvan.

Let us grant that it is risky to derive detailed information from a lacunary manuscript, barely more than a collection of fragments.[259] However, one argument cannot be easily dismissed. Fragment 66a in Franco's edition (2004: 85) has

> *(śā)nt[i]parvvaṃ 15 āśvamedhikam 1(6)*

It is hard to deny that here two consecutive parvans of the *Mahābhārata* are enumerated. In the extant *Mahābhārata* these two are not consecutive: the *Anuśāsanaparvan* has its place between the *Śāntiparvan* and the *Āśvamedhikaparvan*. That is to say, whatever the worth of Schlingloff's other arguments, the Spitzer manuscript does suggest that the *Anuśāsanaparvan* was not yet part of the *Mahābhārata* in its time. Not even Hiltebeitel can think of a way to invalidate this particular (tentative) conclusion. The fact that the *Anuśāsanaparvan* does not figure in the list of *parvan*s contained in the *Harivaṃśa* further strengthens this impression.[260]

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[259] For a detailed discussion of Hiltebeitel's arguments, see Brockington 2010.
[260] See Brockington 2010: 76, 82 f.

This tentative conclusion is, at first sight, supported by another factor that has not so far been considered. In order to appreciate it, a few words must be said about the way the Critical Edition of the *Mahābhārata* has been prepared.

The 'purest' version of the *Mahābhārata* — according to its chief-editor, V. S. Sukthankar — is found in manuscripts from Kashmir, in the Śāradā script. Dunham (1991: 3-4) says the following about them: "There is evidence … that the copyists of these Śāradā manuscripts were, on the whole, conservative in regard to additional passages and readings from non-Śāradā sources. While it is difficult to make precise comparisons it is nonetheless generally true that the Śāradā manuscripts present shorter versions of all the *parvan*s for which they are extant. It was this characteristic of the manuscripts above any other which encouraged V. S. Sukthankar to declare the Śāradā version the *textus simplicior* in the [Critical Edition], and to regard it as 'the best Northern version, and probably, taken as a whole, the best extant version' (*Ādiparvan*, pp. xlviii, lvi)."

It is true that Sukthankar subsequently obtained and described (1938) a manuscript from Nepal covering (only) the *Ādiparvan* that presents an even shorter version of that portion of the *Mahābhārata*. It is equally true that Grünendahl (1993) has criticized Sukthankar's editorial principles, most notably his attempt to associate a number of manuscripts (those covered by the letter **K**) with the Śāradā manuscripts. It is, finally, also true that recent investigations based on the cladistic analysis of parts of the *Mahābhārata* have raised doubts whether it will ever be possible to reconstruct a rooted cladistic tree, and with it an archetype.[261] All this does not necessarily reduce the likelihood that the available Śāradā manuscripts themselves constitute the only surviving testimony of an early state of the *Mahābhārata* as a whole.[262]

Śāradā manuscripts are rare. "There were only six located for use in the Critical Edition. These six do not provide a complete coverage of the *Mahābhārata*, as no Śāradā manuscripts of the *Anuśāsanaparvan*, *Mausalaparvan*, *Mahāprasthānikaparvan*, and *Svargārohaṇaparvan* have been found to date."[263] Three of these four books are small and unimportant. The *Anuśāsanaparvan*, on the other hand, is big (6536 stanzas according to Reich 1998) and constitutes all by itself almost a tenth of the whole epic. Its complete absence in the available Śāradā manuscripts requires an explanation.

A conceivable explanation might be that this book of the *Mahābhārata* was no longer copied in Kashmir out of lack of interest for its contents. This explanation is not very plausible in view of the fact that the *Anuśāsanaparvan* has undergone massive expansion, more than any other *parvan* of the *Mahābhārata*. The sometimes long additions, moreover, widely differ from each other. Indeed, as Tamar Reich points out in her dissertation (a part of which she kindly made available to me), the branching out of the recensions of the *Anuśāsanaparvan* was a very intense process in itself which took place *after* the establishment of a single common archetype. In other words, the

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[261] Phillips-Rodriguez 2005; 2007; 2012.

[262] It is in this context of some interest to note that Vergiani (2009: 247) identifies "a well-defined family of mss [of the *Kāśikāvṛtti*], all of them in Śāradā except [one manuscript] that seems to be a recent copy of the Śāradā original". Vergiani continues: "This suggests that for centuries Kashmiri scholars handed down the text in a situation of relative isolation, which accounts for its relatively low amount of contamination with other lines of transmission." He further refers to the work of Wendy J. Phillips-Rodriguez, who has come to a similar conclusion with regard to the manuscripts of the *Dyūtaparvan* of the *Mahābhārata*.

[263] Dunham 1991: 2-3.

Anuśāsanaparvan drew more attention to itself than any other *parvan* during the period following its archetype. The question is therefore, once again: why is there no Kashmirian version of this *parvan*?

I propose to combine the absence of Śāradā manuscripts of the *Anuśāsanaparvan* with the surprising jump in the Spitzer Manuscript, which skips that *parvan*.[264] Both the Spitzer Manuscript and the early *Mahābhārata* belonged to northern India, so that it is at least possible that the author of that manuscript knew the *Mahābhārata* in a form close to the one preserved in Kashmir, i.e., without *Anuśāsanaparvan*.[265]

With few exceptions, most *Mahābhārata* scholars will accept the conclusion that the *Anuśāsanaparvan* is a later addition. Many had reached this conclusion on the basis of its contents.[266] I will merely cite a passage from Winternitz's *A History of Indian Literature*, already cited by Schlingloff (1969a: 338): "While Book XII [the *Śāntiparvan*], even though it did not belong to the original epic, yet was probably inserted at a comparatively early date, there can be no doubt with regard to Book XIII [the *Anuśāsanaparvan*], that it was made a component part of the *Mahābhārata* at a still later time. It bears all the marks of a later fabrication. Nowhere in the *Mahābhārata*, to mention only one thing, are the claims of the Brahmans to supremacy over all other strata of society vindicated in such an arrogant and exaggerated manner as in Book XIII."

If we accept the combined evidence of Spitzer Manuscript and Śāradā manuscripts as interpreted here, would it follow that autograph and archetype of the *Mahābhārata* must necessarily be different from each other? It would not. It would merely allow us to think that the *Anuśāsanaparvan* was not part of the archetype, and that its inclusion in the Critical Edition of the *Mahābhārata* was strictly speaking not justified. It would also support Sukthankar's editorial decision to pay special attention to the Śāradā manuscripts. It would further suggest that the archetype of the *Mahābhārata* (which did not include the *Anuśāsanaparvan*, and perhaps much else) is older than the Spitzer Manuscript, and would therefore presumably date from before the second or third century, say from before 200 CE.

I am aware of the somewhat shaky nature of these conclusions.[267] What, for example, if the author of the Spitzer Manuscript knew only the regional variant of the *Mahābhārata* from Kashmir, which never added the *Anuśāsanaparvan*, as we have come

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[264] The absence of the *Anuśāsanaparvan* from the list of *parvan*s given in the *Harivaṃśa* should also be kept in mind; see above.

[265] Cp. Fitzgerald 2006: 270 n. 15: "The Kushana-period Spitzer manuscript's partially legible list of *Mahābhārata parvans* is strong evidence that there did exist written versions of the *[Mahābhārata]* quite different from the one uncovered in the course of the critical Pune edition of the *[Mahābhārata]*. Evidently the tradition uncovered by Sukthankar and his colleagues eclipsed fairly thoroughly the version of the epic known to the Spitzer manuscript."

[266] Brockington (2010: 83) makes the following specification: "The absence of the *Anuśāsanaparvan* in both lists [i.e., in the Spitzer Manuscript and in the list of *parvan*s in the *Harivaṃśa*, JB] is fully in accord with what I consider to be its late inclusion within the *Mahābhārata* on grounds of both language and subject matter. I would not, however, exclude the possibility that the substance of the final two *adhyāyas* of the present *Anuśāsanaparvan* … formed the conclusion of an originally much shorter *Śāntiparvan*, to which the first few verses of *[Mahābhārata]* 12.47 could once have provided a lead-in."

[267] It may be relevant in this connection to point out that there is a Kashmir recension of the *Bhagavadgītā* that at least in certain respects appears to be superior to its vulgate recension. See Katō 2014: 1144, with a reference to van Buitenen 1965.

to suspect? And what if, contrary to our hypothesis, the Śāradā version of the *Mahābhārata* once did contain the *Anuśāsanaparvan*, a portion which then for reasons unknown to us did not survive? *A priori* we cannot exclude these possibilities, but I would argue that they are improbable, so much so that it is worth our while to further explore the idea that the archetype of the *Mahābhārata* did *not* contain the *Anuśāsanaparvan*. In that case we would wish to know what the real archetype of the surviving manuscripts looked like. But it would then also be clear that every attempt to reconstrue this earlier archetype would confront us with major difficulties. The Śāradā manuscripts would inevitably play a major role in such a construction. These manuscripts, as we saw, do not contain three further books — the *Mausalaparvan*, *Mahāprasthānikaparvan*, and *Svargārohaṇaparvan* — but would this really justify us to exclude these books from the critical text? The limited number of Śāradā manuscripts, and the absence of corroborative evidence, would make this a difficult and risky decision.[268] We also saw that "it is … generally true that the Śāradā manuscripts present shorter versions of all the *parvan*s for which they are extant". The implications of this would have to be investigated in detail for all the books of the *Mahābhārata*.

This task would no doubt be time-consuming, but its results could turn out to be rewarding. However, even before, and without, carrying out this task, some further tentative conclusion may be drawn from our reflections so far. It would seem that, in rough approximation, we can usefully speak of an archetype and a hyparchetype of the text. Assuming that the editors of the Critical Edition did a good job by and large, most of the manuscripts derive from a hyparchetype that contained the *Anuśāsanaparvan* and much else that had no place in the earlier archetype. This earlier archetype is known to us from only a handful of manuscripts, mainly or exclusively in the Śāradā script. The hyparchetype, on the other hand, underlies virtually all manuscripts with the exception of this handful.

Whatever the position we take with regard to the archetype, we are still confronted with the extraordinary success of the hyparchetype. How did this hyparchetype, to which the *Anuśāsanaparvan* and much else had been added, succeed in imposing itself on the manuscript traditions to the extent that only a handful of Śāradā manuscripts reveal to us that there was an earlier archetype?

Once again, I am not in a position to propose a certain or even very likely answer to this question. We saw that archetypes can owe their success to various causes, the composition of a popular commentary being prominent among them. Among other explanations that have been proposed, one is the intervention of a centralized political power, and it is true that the Gupta empire would conceivably fit the bill in the case of the *Mahābhārata*. The Gupta empire united much of northern India during the fourth and fifth centuries CE. This is later than our postulated archetype, as it should be. The question as to how the Gupta rulers went about imposing one particular version of the *Mahābhārata* at the expense of others remains however open.[269] This imposition must

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[268] It may yet be significant that the *Mausalaparvan*, the *Mahāprasthānikaparvan* and the *Svargārohaṇaparvan* are the final books of the *Mahābhārata*, and that Brockington (1998: 155) says the following about them: "The remaining three books are all generally regarded as being late and in any case are extremely short, all containing less than ten *adhyāya*s; indeed, it is most likely that they have been treated as separate books only at a very late date, in order to produce the significant number 18 for the total of the books."

[269] An example of a text that was reworked several times and tells us so is the *Carakasaṃhitā*, a medical text: an original work by Agniveśa was revised by Caraka, and to the result Dṛḍhabala

have been so successful that even future copyists would no longer copy other versions than this one, which is a major feat indeed.[270]

Autograph and archetype

At this point we have to confront the crucial question: Is it possible that the archetype of the *Mahābhārata* (to be distinguished from the hyparchetype, as explained above) is identical with its autograph, i.e. with its earliest written version? This reconstructed archetype will obviously be a much leaner text than the one reconstructed in the Critical Edition, being without *Anuśāsanaparvan* and much else. But would it be identical with the autograph?

At this point we must consider a piece of evidence that may have a bearing both on the question whether autograph and archetype of the *Mahābhārata* were identical, and on the one that concerns the extent to which the hyparchetype had been able to replace competitors in the fifth century CE. This piece of evidence has been brought to light by Ashok Aklujkar and presented in a lecture ("Language philosophy in the Mahābhārata") at the Brown Conference on Early Indian Philosophy in the Mahābhārata (April 2010). Briefly, Aklujkar shows that the ancient *Vṛtti* on Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* — both of which appear to belong to the fifth century CE — quotes, under Vkp 1.159-179,[271] a passage from the *Āśvamedhikaparvan* of the *Mahābhārata* (14.21) in a form that appears to be older and more original than what we find in the Critical Edition (and in all the mss used for this edition, which includes one Śāradā ms from Kashmir). This suggests that in the fifth century there was at least one version of the *Mahābhārata* in circulation that was not derived from the hyparchetype, nor indeed from the archetype. If so, this version must be a descendant of a manuscript that was closer to the autograph than the archetype, which would then prove that autograph and archetype were indeed different from each other.[272]

We are still left with many uncertainties. However, hopefully some elements have been added to the ongoing discussion whether the autograph and the archetype of the *Mahābhārata* were identical. One of these new elements is the notion of a double archetype; more precisely of an archetype without and a hyparchetype with the *Anuśāsanaparvan*. The second new element is a piece of evidence that might be used as an argument to show that the archetype and the autograph were not identical.

These proposals have, admittedly, a somewhat speculative character. They are not, however, mere imagination run wild. Both of them may be susceptible to further confirmation, or indeed refutation. This, however, is a challenge for future research.

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subsequently added a number of chapters. Unlike the compositions considered in our main text, all surviving manuscripts of the *Carakasaṃhitā* go back to an archetype that was close to Dṛḍhabala's autograph (Maas 2010). The texts of Agniveśa and Caraka have left no traces except through the intermediary of Dṛḍhabala's version.

[270] One might in this case think of a 'normative redaction' (Bigger 2002), but reserve this expression not for the archetype but rather for the hyparchetype including the *Anuśāsanaparvan*.

[271] Ed. Iyer 1966: 217-218.

[272] Fitzgerald's observation to the extent that "the tradition uncovered by Sukthankar and his colleagues eclipsed fairly thoroughly the version of the epic known to the Spitzer manuscript" (quoted above) would in this case be even more applicable with regard to the version of the *Mahābhārata* known to the author of the *Vṛtti*.

Pāṇini and the Mahābhārata

There is a growing consensus that the *Mahābhārata* — i.e. presumably that what we have called its 'autograph' — was composed after the collapse of the Maurya Empire and before the year zero.[273] This is in agreement with the date that Witzel (2005: esp. p. 54) arrives at on the basis of the combined evidence dealing with foreigners and that of foreign loanwords in the text: around 100 BCE. The one argument that could be raised against it is that Pāṇini knows the expression *mahābhārata*. However, it is far from certain that we can conclude from this that Pāṇini knew a text called *Mahābhārata*, and even less certain that this was the text we know under this name. This we have seen in § I.2.4. Without further evidence, there is therefore no need to modify our estimate of the date of the *Mahābhārata*'s 'autograph'.

I.2.6. Literature on phonology

One of the most striking features of Brahmanism is that it maintained a tradition of oral recitation able to preserve vedic texts from time immemorial. This tradition, we must assume, was in place and had been in place for a long time during the period that we are considering. It seems, however, that something changed during that period. Concern to preserve the texts in their phonologically correct form gave rise to treatises on phonology. By and large they fall into two categories: Prātiśākhyas and Śikṣās. The former of these two — as their name indicates: *pratiśākham* means "for every *śākhā* 'branch' of the Veda" — are closely associated with specific vedic texts. By and large the (surviving) Prātiśākhyas are older than the (surviving) Śikṣās, so for our chronological claim it suffices to consider the Prātiśākhyas.

Prātiśākhyas are not just phonological treatises. Apart from concern with phonology in the narrow sense, they specify how separate words of the vedic text they deal with are joined in sandhi. In other words, they show how a word-text (Padapāṭha) becomes a joined text (Saṃhitāpāṭha). They presuppose these two versions of the text. We must briefly consider these versions, and in particular the oldest Padapātha, that of the *Ṛgveda*. This is perhaps the earliest 'linguistic' text that has survived; it was already known to Pāṇini. Old as it may be, it is a complete riddle why someone created this version of the *Ṛgveda*. In itself, it does not help the preservation of the text. It can of course be used to reconstruct the text-with-sandhi by applying appropriate rules, but what purpose could that serve? Vedic texts are not preserved through reconstruction, but through memorization. At first sight this version of the *Ṛgveda* strikes one as serving no purpose whatsoever.

The very existence of the Padapāṭha is therefore a puzzle. Attempts have been made to solve it, but with few definite results. One of the solutions proposed sees in the Padapāṭha the *Ṛgveda* in written form; words are regularly separated in writing, whereas they are not in oral presentations. Another suggestion is that the Padapāṭha was not

[273] So Fitzgerald 2006; Hiltebeitel 2001: 18.

originally written down, but composed *under the influence of written texts*.[274] A third suggestion is that the Saṃhitāpāṭha and the Padapāṭha "could go back to a sort of didactic game"; the two subsequently drifted apart and were finally reunited again.[275] One might add a fourth conjecture: the importance attributed to vedic words (see § IIA.4.3, below) created the need to know which words actually occur in the Veda; without dissolving the sandhi this was not obvious.

I myself have long ago made the proposition that the Padapāṭha was the *Ṛgveda* in written form. I have subsequently realized that this suggestion is confronted with difficulties for which I have no answer at present, most notably the evidence that seems to suggest that there was no writing in India before the time of Pāṇini.[276] I no longer insist on this particular solution for the puzzle that the Padapāṭha presents, but do not withdraw it altogether: it remains a possibility to be kept in mind in future research.

Quite independently of the question whether the Padapāṭha was originally the written version of the *Ṛgveda*, the comparison of Padapāṭha and Saṃhitāpāṭha brings to light some interesting differences. It appears that the Padapāṭha (as we have it) is older than the Saṃhitāpāṭha (as described in the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*).[277] Pāṇini fits somewhere in between: he knew the Padapāṭha, but applying his rules of sandhi leads in certain cases to a text that is older than the Saṃhitāpāṭha.[278]

We learn from Yāska's *Nirukta* (6.28) that the Padapāṭha of the *Ṛgveda* was composed by Śākalya. On the basis of the Padapāṭha alone, it is difficult if not impossible to determine exactly what form the *Ṛgveda* had at his time. Fortunately, Pāṇini preserves on some occasions Śākalya's opinion as to what sandhi should be applied.[279] The following case is particularly revealing. It has long been known that RV 1.164.8 Sp. *dhīty agre* and RV 1.20.4 Sp. *viṣṭy akrata* replace original *dhīti agre* and *viṣṭi akrata*; see, e.g., Wackernagel 1896: 322; Kuiper 1955: 256. The Padapāṭha has *dhītī / agre/* and *viṣṭī / akrata /*, and is therefore wrong in that is does not represent the original form of the text.

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[274] Witzel 2011; see esp. p. 506: "the canonization of the Vedas (e.g., involving the first formation of *pada* texts ...) ... can ... be pictured as *secondary effects* of the initial introduction of literacy into India via Gandhāra during the early Persian era." Houben & Rath 2012: 31: "Could it … be that the idea for the creation of an oral word-for-word version of the Ṛg-veda in order to appropriate some features of writing and to improve the quality of the transmission of the Ṛg-veda was born in 6th cent. BCE Gandhāra, two centuries before Pāṇini could write his grammar in the same region? Could the 'Padapāṭha-like form of the Avesta' be due, not to the influence of Indian grammatical thought as Scharfe 2009 suggested, but to the influence of the same script (or scripts, old-Persian cuneiform and/or Aramaic) on the transmitters of the Avesta …?"

[275] Falk 2001a, esp. p. 198-199.

[276] See however § IIA.3, below. Note here that I do no longer insist that the Padapāṭha must have been written in Brāhmī script; Scharfe's (2002: 10-11) attempts to show that this script was not created for writing vedic texts are therefore irrelevant in this context.

[277] Strictly speaking, the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* does not describe 'our' *Ṛgveda*, but the version of the Śaiśirīya Śākhā; see Appendix VI.

[278] Apart from the arguments below, see also *Greater Magadha* Part V, Appendix IV.

[279] Pāṇini also sometimes differs from Śākalya in his analysis; see Cardona 2012: 58: "[Pāṇini] considered critically the work of his predecessors in the light of his own system as reflected in the Aṣṭādhyāyī." Cardona states elsewhere (2007: 705): "I think anyone who considers seriously Pāṇini in relation to his predecessors would have to conclude that he did much more than merely reorganize and make systematic the work which he inherited from these predecessors, that he rethought much of what had been done and in several major aspects departed from this earlier work in a manner which is little short of revolutionary."

This does not, however, mean that the text which Śākalya had before him was wrong. A lucky coincidence enables us to reconstruct that text. Pāṇini's grammar preserves a rule which says: "[In the opinion] of Śākalya, in connected speech (*saṃhitā*), no single [substitute] of what precedes and what follows [comes] in the place of [the vowels] *i*, *ī*, *u*, *ū*, *ṛ*, *ṝ*, *ḷ*, when a dissimilar vowel follows; and [if the earlier vowel is long,] a short [vowel comes in its place]" (P. 6.1.127: *iko 'savarṇe śākalyasya hrasvaś ca [saṃhitāyām (72), ekaḥ pūrvaparayoḥ (84), na (115), aci (125)]*; cf. *Greater Magadha* p. 335-336). With the help of this rule it becomes clear that the text of the *Ṛgveda* known to Śākalya read *dhīti agre* and *viṣṭi akrata* at the places indicated above. This shows that Śākalya, *even where he wrongly analyzed the text*, knew this text in a form that was in many points more archaic than the surviving Saṃhitāpāṭha.

We get immediate information about the text of the *Ṛgveda* known to Śākalya where the Padapāṭha does *not* give an analysis. This happens in the case of reduplicated verbs and certain compounds (as shown below). It appears that Śākalya's text showed no retroflexion of *n* and *s* where the conditioning sound occurs in the reduplication of a verb or in the earlier member of a compound. The surviving Saṃhitāpāṭha has almost throughout retroflexion in such cases. Examples illustrating the above are: Pp. *sosavīti*, Sp. *soṣavīti* (RV 3.56.7); Pp. *sisakti*, Sp. *siṣakti* (RV 1.56.4 etc.); Pp. *tustuvuḥ*, Sp. *tuṣṭuvuḥ* (RV 8.6.12 etc.); Pp. *tisthipat*, Sp. *tiṣṭhipat* (RV 1.162.20);[280] further Pp. *madhusut'tama*, Sp. *madhuṣuttama* (RV 3.58.9); Pp. *nisikta'pā*, Sp. *niṣiktapā* (RV 7.36.9); Pp. *dustara*, Sp. *duṣṭara* (RV 3.24.1 etc.): Pp. *traistubha*, Sp. *traiṣṭubha* (RV 1.164.23 etc.); Pp. *varṣa'nirnij*, Sp. *varṣanirṇij* (RV 5.57.4); and many others.

As is well known, the Padapāṭha gives an analysis of the text of the *Ṛgveda* where this is indicated with the help of a *daṇḍa* (*/*) or an *avagraha* ('). I shall argue that the Padapāṭha analyzes *only* here, and *not* where this is *not* indicated by a *daṇḍa* or *avagraha*.

For this purpose we look at Sp. *nirṇij*. This is analyzed as Pp. *niḥ'nij* (RV 5.62.4 etc.). This same word often occurs in larger compounds. Since the Padapāṭha never uses more than one *avagraha* in the analysis of one compound, this word is now given as *-nirnij*, without *avagraha*, and also without retroflex *ṇ*! Instances are: RV 1.167.3 Sp. *hiraṇyanirṇij*, Pp. *hiraṇya'nirnij*; RV 8.8.11 Sp. *sahasranirṇij*, Pp. *sahasra'nirnij*; RV 5.57.4 Sp. *varṣanirṇij*, Pp. *varṣa'nirnij*; etc. There can be no doubt that *-nirnij* is the result of applying sandhi to *niḥ'nij*, and cannot be looked upon as an analyzed form. Applying sandhi to *niḥ'nij* did not, apparently, lead to retroflexion of the second *n*!

There is another group of cases that support the view that the above examples are not to be considered the result of analysis. The locative plural ending *su* is as a rule separated from its stem by an *avagraha* in the Padapāṭha: Pp. *karma'su*, Sp. *karmasu* (RV 8.38.1 etc.); Pp. *mahat'su*, Sp. *mahatsu* (RV 1.81.1 etc.). Where, however, *s* is replaced by retroflex *ṣ*, no *avagraha* separates this ending from the stem, and retroflex *ṣ* appears also in the Padapāṭha: Pp. *śmaśruṣu* (RV 2.11.17); *śatruṣu* (RV 9.19.6); *vikṣu* (stem *viś*; RV 1.45.6 etc.); *raśmiṣu* (RV 1.134.4).[281] The author of the Padapāṭha considered it apparently necessary to indicate the retroflexion of *s* in cases like *śatruṣu*, and in order to achieve this he went to the extent of deviating from his procedure of separating *-su* from its stem by an *avagraha*. In cases like *sisakti* he could have given retroflex *ṣ* without

[280] See Abhyankar 1972: 214 n. 1.

[281] The only exception may be RV 1.100.16 Pp. *dhūḥ'su*, Sp. *dhūrṣu*. Did Śākalya have *dhūḥsu* in his *Ṛgveda*?

having to deviate from any procedure. That he did not do so makes it very probable that in his text these forms had no retroflex *ṣ*.

More widespread retroflexion came to be introduced in the text, but this appears to have sometimes given rise to differences of opinion. *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* 3.2.6 and *Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka* 8.11 state that if one is in doubt whether or not *ṇ* must be used, then *ṇ* must indeed be used; if one is in doubt whether or not *ṣ* must be used, then *ṣ* must indeed be used.[282] In the same chapters these two books speak about Śākalya, which shows that they are younger than the Padapāṭha of the *Ṛgveda*.

Widespread retroflexion is a characteristic that distinguishes Sanskrit from Iranian and other Indo-European languages (see, e.g., Renou 1956: 9, 16; Burrow 1955: 95; 1971). The above evidence suggests that at as late a date as the composition of the *Ṛgveda Padapāṭha*, retroflexion as a result of sandhi did not yet, so to say, cross certain boundaries: the boundary between the reduplication and the stem of a verb, and the boundary between the members of a compound. Retroflexion as a result of internal sandhi — as in *śatruṣu*, see above — existed in Śākalya's time and was known to him.[283]

The *Ṛgveda Padapāṭha* contains a small number of troubling cases, which belong together. They are: Pp. *duḥ'dabha*, Sp. *dūḻabha* (RV 2.28.8 etc.); Pp. *duḥ'dhī*, Sp. *dūḍhī* (RV 1.94.8 etc.; only declined forms occur, wherein *ḍh* is followed by *y*, so that *ḍh* is not replaced by *ḻh*); Pp. *duḥ'naśa*, Sp. *dūṇaśa* (RV 3.56.8) and *dūṇāśa* (RV 7.32.7 etc.). Let us look at the first case. It is clear that the form corresponding to Pp. *duḥ'dabha* should be expected to be **durdabha* (cf. Pp. *niḥ'nij*, Sp. *nirnij*). The relation between **durdabha* and *dūḻabha* must then be considered to be one of development in time, from **durdabha* to *dūḻabha*. A development of this type has been claimed for *cakravāḍa* (besides *cakravāla*, Pāli *cakkavāḷa*) from **cakravarta* (Mayrhofer 1951: 55; the related form *cakravartin* survived in Classical Sanskrit). However, such a development is not unproblematic. Forms like *dūḻabha* are generally held to have developed directly out of **duźdabha*, without the intervention of **durdabha*. This tempts us to believe that **durdabha* had come into the *Ṛgveda* known to Śākalya as a result of a "puristic countermovement" (cf. Kuiper 1968: 87-88). It would in this case be remarkable that such puristic forms existed already at such an early date. Another possibility would be to assume that Śākalya analyzed *dūḻabha* into *duḥ'dabha*. This I consider the least acceptable alternative of all. The Padapāṭha of the *Ṛgveda* never gives anything but analyses that can be undone by simple rules of sandhi.[284] And where no such simple rules should be used, *iti* is added as an indication to that effect (cf. Jha 1975). It seems hard to believe that Śākalya should deviate from his procedure in the above three cases, where he could have easily left them unanalyzed.

It should be clear from the above that the Padapāṭha of the *Ṛgveda* preserves some archaic features that have not been preserved in its Saṃhitāpāṭha. This agrees with our earlier observation that the Padapāṭha is older than the Saṃhitāpāṭha. Pāṇini has to be

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[282] Cf. *Greater Magadha*, Appendix IV.

[283] All retroflex consonants are represented in the Padapāṭha: apart from *ṣ*, we find *ṭ* (e.g. *kāṭe*, RV 1.106.6), *ṭh* (e.g. *jaṭhara*, RV 5.34.2), *ḍ* (e.g. *āṃḍa*, RV 1.104.8), *ḍh* (e.g. *viviḍḍhi*, RV 1.27.10), *ṇ* (e.g. *kāṇe*, RV 10.155.1), and of course *ḻ* and *ḻh*, which replace *ḍ* and *ḍh* (see Appendix VI, below).

[284] Most of these cases are accounted for by *vārttika* 5 on P. 6.3.109: *duro dāśanāśadabhadhyeṣu*. But this is clearly an *ad hoc* rule made for these few cases. The *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* deals with these forms in sūtra V.55 (371).

situated between these two, because on one hand he knows the Padapāṭha, and on the other applying his rules of sandhi leads to a text-with-sandhi that is metrically closer to the original.

Something must be said about the Kramapāṭha of the *Ṛgveda*. The Kramapāṭha is a special combination of Padapāṭha and Saṃhitāpāṭha. If the Kramapāṭha is based on the Saṃhitāpāṭha codified in the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*, it must be younger than that Saṃhitāpāṭha, and therefore younger than Pāṇini. Some further evidence supports this conclusion, but Pāṇini's grammar contains a puzzling rule that suggests the opposite. Let us look at both.

The Kramapāṭha of the *Ṛgveda* is described in chapters 10 and 11 of the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*. These chapters indicate how to arrive at the Kramapāṭha on the basis of the Padapāṭha and the Saṃhitāpāṭha. The relationship between chapters 10 and 11 is peculiar. Chapter 11 restates much that is said in chapter 10 and adds explanations as well as alternatives proposed by others.[285] Already Müller (1869: CCXLVI; cf. Shastri 1959: 76) concluded from this that chapter 11 is a supplement to chapter 10, the main aim being to give reasons for the rules of chapter 10. But the search for reasons, Müller observes, led to something else. Where the presumed rationale of certain rules was not fully attained by these rules, new rules were added or modifications proposed. It is yet clear that the author of chapter 11 knew a traditionally handed down Kramapāṭha. Certain sūtras indicate this. Sūtra 11.8 (620) questions the rationality of some features of the Kramapāṭha, thus indicating that the Kramapāṭha existed in a fixed form even where this was considered irrational. Sūtras 11.63-65 (675-76) are quite explicit on this point: "But one should not go beyond what is customary. While saying that both tradition and reasoning are the way of the Kramapāṭha, one should praise other [rules regarding the formation of the Kramapāṭha only in as far as they are] in agreement with its (i.e., of the Kramapāṭha) completion. The rules of the Kramapāṭha are correct as they were taught in the beginning, but not with all kinds of deviations [therefrom]. Thus Bābhravya, the propounder of the Kramapāṭha, propounded and praised the Kramapāṭha." (*ācaritaṃ tu notkramet/ kramasya vartma smṛtisaṃbhavau bruvan samādhim asyānv itarāṇi kīrtayet// yathopadiṣṭaṃ kramaśāstram āditaḥ punaḥ pṛthaktvair*[286] *vividhair na sādhuvat/ iti pra bābhravya uvāca ca kramaṃ kramapravaktā prathamaṃ śaśaṃsa ca//* RPr 11.63-65.) We may conclude that chapter 10 of the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* describes the Kramapāṭha as it was traditionally handed down and, perhaps, as it was at the time of its composition.

Some features of the Kramapāṭha as described in chapter 10 of the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* allow us to gain knowledge about the stage of retroflexion in the Saṃhitāpāṭha. Sūtra 10.3 (592) tells us that "they finish [a group of words joined in the Kramapāṭha] having passed over ... *su* and *sma* when retroflexed and followed by *naḥ*" (*nate susmeti naḥpare ... atītyaitāny avasyanti*). In these cases the Kramapāṭha contains groups of three rather than two words.[287] The examples given by the commentator Uvaṭa are: *mo ṣu ṇaḥ* (RV 1.38.6); *āsu ṣmā ṇaḥ* (RV 6.44.18). For *sma* there are no further examples; for *su* there are, such as: *ū ṣu ṇaḥ* (RV 1.36.13); *o ṣū ṇaḥ* (RV 1.138.7); *te ṣu ṇaḥ* (RV 1.169.5); *mo ṣū ṇaḥ* (RV 1.173.12); etc. It is clear why in these cases three rather than two words form a group. Retroflexion of *s* in the second word is conditioned

[285] Cf. Devasthali 1981.
[286] Müller's edition has *pṛthaktair*.
[287] In fact, the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* offers three options: a group of three, four or five words in the Kramapāṭha. See Appendix VI, below.

by the first word, the second word — thus modified — causes in its turn retroflexion of *n* in *ṇaḥ*. Retroflexion in the third word is therefore (indirectly) conditioned by the first word. Groups of two words at a time would not show the Saṃhitā-form *ṇaḥ*,[288] contrary to what the Kramapāṭha intends to accomplish. This shows that at the time of composition of the Kramapāṭha, the Saṃhitāpāṭha read *mo ṣu ṇaḥ*, *āsu ṣmā ṇaḥ*,[289] with retroflex *ṣ* and *ṇ*. In this respect the Kramapāṭha agrees with the *Ṛgveda* as described in the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*.

Pāṇini, as we have seen, is to be dated after the Padapāṭha and before the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*. Indeed, Pāṇini did not yet know the *Ṛgveda* in the form in which the Prātiśākhya describes it. It will be worth our while to see what Pāṇini has to say about the cases of retroflexion just considered.

P. 8.4.27 reads: *naś ca dhātusthoruṣubhyaḥ [chandasi (26), raṣābhyāṃ no ṇaḥ (1)]* "In Sacred Literature, *ṇ* [comes] in the place of *n* of *nas* after *r* or *ṣ* when part of a root, *uru*, or *ṣu*." This sūtra accounts for *mo ṣu ṇaḥ* and the other phrases containing *ṣu ṇaḥ*. However, this sūtra does not account for *āsu ṣmā ṇaḥ*; nor does any other sūtra in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* do so. If the *Ṛgveda* had read *āsu ṣmā ṇaḥ* at the time of Pāṇini, the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* should have accounted for it. If Pāṇini had known the Kramapāṭha and its peculiar shape in this particular place, he could not possibly have failed to account for it. This agrees with our earlier statement that Pāṇini preceded the Kramapāṭha.

There is nothing implausible in the assumption that initial *n* of *naḥ* became retroflex *ṇ* following *ṣmā* at a later time than *ṣu ṇaḥ*. The cases described in Pāṇini's rule have none but vowels intervening between the conditioning *ṣ* or *r* and *naḥ*. The *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* (5.58; 374), on the other hand, prescribes retroflexion in *naḥ* also after *purupriyā*, *brahma*, *aryamā*, and of course *ṣmā*. Intervention of a non-vowel without prevention of retroflexion may not have taken place until after Pāṇini.

The use of *padaka* "one who studies or knows the Pada"[290] in the Pāli buddhist scriptures provides some evidence in support of the view that the Kramapāṭha did not yet exist about Pāṇini's time. This word is used as an attribute of Brahmins who excel in learning. If the Kramapāṭha had existed when *padaka* made its appearance in buddhist literature, a term might have been used that shows the Brahmin's familiarity with the Kramapāṭha,[291] such as *kramaka*; but such terms are unknown to the buddhist canon. Buddhist literature originated after the Buddha. Whatever the precise dates of the Buddha's death and of Pāṇini,[292] the two were not far apart. It seems likely that the earliest parts of surviving buddhist literature may go back to a time contemporaneous with Pāṇini. So far so good.

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[288] The reason is that retroflexion of *s* in the second word is not allowed when the cause of this retroflexion is not present; see *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* 10.5 (594). *mo ṣu ṇaḥ*, e.g., would be *mo ṣu / su naḥ*.

[289] To be exact: *āsu ṣmā ṇo*, due to following *maghavan*.

[290] See below.

[291] Similarly today a learned Brahman is called 'Ghanapāṭhin' after the last and most complicated *vikṛti* he masters. (See Abhyankar and Devasthali, 1978: XVII-IL for a discussion of the eleven modes of vedic recitation: three *prakṛti*, eight *vikṛti*.)

[292] See § I.1.1, above.

There is a complication. P. 4.2.61 reads: *kramādibhyo vun* "After *krama* etc. [comes the suffix] *vuN* (= *aka*)." This sūtra accounts for the formation of *kramaka*.[293] The sense to be assigned to *kramaka* must be "one who studies or knows the Krama", in view of P. 4.2.59 *tad adhīte tad veda*. At first sight, P. 4.2.61 seems a clear indication that Pāṇini knew the Kramapāṭha of the *Ṛgveda*. That is to say, once we accept that P. 4.2.61 was part of the original *Aṣṭādhyāyī* we are almost compelled to believe that Pāṇini knew the Kramapāṭha.

There is however room for doubt. I shall show (i) that there is no evidence *against* the assumptions that P. 4.2.61 is a later interpolation in the text of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, and (ii) that there is some evidence *in support of* this assumption.

(i) P. 4.2.61 is not commented upon nor in any other way used in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* (Lahiri 1935: 44; Birwé 1966: 205). It can moreover be removed from its context without difficulty. The rule might therefore have been added in the time separating Patañjali from Candra.[294] It is known that much grammatical activity characterized this period, resulting in various additions and modifications in Pāṇini's grammar (Bronkhorst 1983).

(ii) Some supportive evidence may be seen in the fact that the word *krama* occurs in the *gaṇa* accompanying the preceding sūtra P. 4.2.60 *kratūkthādisūtrāntāṭ ṭhak*; this sūtra is thus made to teach the formation of *krāmika* in the sense "one who studies or knows the Krama". The occurrence of *krama* in the *gaṇa* accompanying P. 4.2.60 does not in any way prove that Pāṇini knew the Kramapāṭha. The *gaṇa*s are known to have undergone modifications and additions. There are even some indications that *gaṇa*s were not originally part of Pāṇini's grammar (Scharfe 1977: 102-04). If, then, we assume that someone added *krama* to the *gaṇa* accompanying P. 4.2.60, a grammarian who did not approve of the form *krāmika* and preferred *kramaka* instead may have added P. 4.2.61 to justify his preferred form. Note here that neither the word *krāmika* nor *kramaka* seem to occur in the ancient Sanskrit literature in the sense here required.

Some further, be it negative, evidence for the late origin of P. 4.2.61 is as follows. P. 4.2.61, together with the accompanying *gaṇa*, accounts for the words *kramaka*, *padaka*, *śikṣaka*, *mīmāṃsaka*, and *sāmaka*. All these words are of extremely rare occurrence in ancient literature, and a grammatical derivation is never given. There is one exception. The jaina *Tattvārthādhigama Bhāṣya*, which may date from the fourth century CE (Bronkhorst 1985a), paraphrases the word *śaikṣaka* in *Tattvārtha Sūtra* 9.24 as *śikṣaka* (II, p. 256). It explains (p. 257):

> *acirapravrajitaḥ śikṣayitavyaḥ śikṣaḥ śikṣām arhatīti śaikṣo vā*
> One who has recently renounced is someone who must be instructed (*śikṣayitavya*) [and is called] *śikṣa* because 'he deserves instruction' (*śikṣām arhati*), or [he is called] *śaikṣa*.

[293] It also accounts for *padaka*. This word does not occur in early Sanskrit literature (it does occur in Pāli and the buddhist *Divyāvadāna*, see above) so that it does not affect the argument which follows.

[294] The rule occurs in Candra's grammar (3.1.40).

Some passages of the *Tattvārthādhigama Bhāṣya* show that its author was acquainted with Pāṇini's grammar.[295] There can therefore be no doubt that his remark "he deserves instruction" (*śikṣām arhati*) is a reference to P. 5.1.63: *tad arhati*. His word *śikṣaka* is therefore derived, through *śikṣa*, with the help of P. 5.1.63. (A *svārthika* suffix *-ka* or *-aka* is added after *śikṣa/śaikṣa*; cf. P. 5.3.70 f.) The alternative derivation with P. 4.2.61 from *śikṣām adhīte* "who studies the precepts"— the only derivation in the grammar which is explicitly meant to produce *śikṣaka* — would also yield an acceptable meaning,[296] yet this derivation is not mentioned. This striking absence may indicate that P. 4.2.61 was not yet part of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* at the time when the *Tattvārthādhigama Bhāṣya* was composed.

It seems safe to conclude that Pāṇini preceded the Kramapāṭha of the *Ṛgveda*. Let us briefly consider a consequence of this conclusion. *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* 3.1.3 speaks of *nirbhuja*, *pratṛṇṇa* and *ubhayamantara*. These terms find their explanation in the statement: "For when he unites the words, that is the Nirbhuja form. When he pronounces the two syllables pure, that is the Pratṛṇṇa form. This is the first. By the Ubhayamantara both are fulfilled." (cf. Keith 1909: 241, 128: *yad dhi saṃdhiṃ vivartayati tan nirbhujasya rūpam atha yac chuddhe akṣare abhivyāharati tat pratṛṇṇasyāgra u evobhayamantareṇobhayaṃ vyāptaṃ bhavati.*) It seems clear that the three terms refer to the Saṃhitāpāṭha, Padapāṭha and Kramapāṭha respectively.[297] If now we accept that Pāṇini preceded the Kramapāṭha of the *Ṛgveda*, we must also accept that he preceded the portion of the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* that refers to it. This is hardly surprising, given that the language of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* is close to Pāṇini.[298]

It seems clear from the above that the following texts related to the *Ṛgveda* were produced (or given their present shape) after Pāṇini: Saṃhitāpāṭha, Kramapāṭha, Prātiśākhya. It is impossible to say on the basis of the available evidence how far these texts were removed from Pāṇini in time. Recalling that Pāṇini may have lived a short time before Alexander, one cannot be far wrong in assuming that these texts belong to a time after Alexander, and therefore to the period when Brahmanism went through its major transformation. We will see in Part II (§ IIA.4) that during this period the attitude with regard to Sanskrit and the Veda underwent major changes.

I.3. Conclusions

Grave events afflicted the northwestern Brahmins between the time of Alexander and the early centuries of the Common Era, so serious indeed that many left or lost their brahmanical status. But while some regions, most notably Gandhāra, was virtually lost to

[295] A full sūtra (P. 5.2.93) is quoted under *Tattvārtha Sūtra* 2.16 (I, p. 162). A full entry from the *Dhātupāṭha* (X.300) is cited under 1.5 (I, p. 44). Oblique references occur repeatedly.
[296] The derivation of *śaikṣaka* from *śikṣaka* with a *svārthika* suffix, e.g. *aṆ*, could not be a problem. Note the meaning assigned to *śikṣā* in the *Tattvārthādhigama Bhāṣya* on sūtra 1.3 (I, p. 35): *adhigamaḥ adhigama āgamo nimittaṃ śravaṇaṃ śikṣā upadeśa ity anarthāntaram.*
[297] A closely similar description of the terms is found in the introductory stanzas of the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*, vv. 3 and 4.
[298] Bronkhorst 1982: 275 ff.; *Greater Magadha* § III.1; Cardona 1999: 215-216. Note in this connection that the Gṛhyasūtras look upon the authors of Brāhmaṇas, such as Aitareya, as Ācāryas, not Ṛṣis (Deshpande 2001: 38); see further § I.2.4, above.

Brahmanism, others, such as Kashmir, received Brahmins when circumstances became again favorable. What is more, Brahmanism did not disappear from India during this period. Quite the contrary, it appears that these turbulent centuries induced it to produce the tools that allowed it to initiate its victorious spread over South and Southeast Asia in following centuries.

The data considered in Part I suggest that during this period Brahmanism revised and reinterpreted some of its traditions, furthermore introducing new elements that found expression in forms of literature that had not hitherto existed. Grammar had existed before Alexander, and received a new impetus from Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* after the collapse of the Maurya empire. Given the political role that Brahmins appear to have played in the regions conquered by Alexander, it is plausible to think that treatises on statecraft may already have existed at that time. Apart from some hints in the *Mahābhārata*, however, these treatises have not survived. The tradition of Cāṇakya, the minister who helped establish the Maurya empire, may yet be based on a tradition of statecraft that existed in the Northwest.

Our limited evidence allows us to surmise that the literature on domestic ritual and on Dharma, as well as epic literature, may have come into existence rather late, perhaps under the Mauryas or even later. Brahmanism, it appears, made a major effort to present itself in a new light, by introducing a number of new elements. It is time to turn to these new elements and see how they fitted into the overall vision of Brahmanism that was being created.

II. BRAHMANISM

IIA. THE CORE VISION

Brahmanism came out of its turbulent period a conservative ideology. It preserved forever the memory of the good old days when its services were part of the structure of the state. This had changed, and the Brahmins did not like it. We return to this side of brahmanical ideology below.

There is a further aspect of this movement that we need to be aware of. Brahmanism had gone through a period with little or no political support. It had survived because it had turned inward. We saw in Part I that an extensive literature had begun to be created during or soon after the difficult period. The emphasis in much of this literature, directly or indirectly, is on Brahmins and their way of life, real or imagined. Concern about the rest of society was peripheral, even though it became stronger with the subsequent growth of influence outside the own circles. Brahmanism, as a result, is primarily an ideology that pertains to Brahmins;[299] secondarily it extends beyond Brahmins to other members of society, and indeed to society as a whole. In different words, Brahmanism has both an inward-looking and an outward-looking side, and of these two the inward-looking aspect is primary, both historically and formally. The distinction between these two sides is reflected in surviving brahmanical literature. Most if not all of this literature has been composed by Brahmins. Many of its texts texts address themselves, exclusively or almost exclusively, to other Brahmins. They contain the rules by which Brahmins must live, and their intellectual and ritual concerns. Among these texts we must count the manuals for domestic ritual and proper behaviour in general (Gṛhyasūtras and Dharmasūtras),[300] and all of vedic auxiliary literature, including the numerous and sometimes voluminous texts that deal with language and its primary expression, the Veda. On the other hand, there are the texts that deal with issues that do not exclusively concern Brahmins but include and may even primarily target others. This becomes increasingly true over time with respect to the more recent literature on Dharma (which has more and more to say about the behaviour of those who are not Brahmins),[301] and applies to texts on statecraft and, of course, the Sanskrit epics (*Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa*) and Purāṇas. I will argue that the inward-looking aspect of Brahmanism is central, and that its outward-looking aspect is best seen as a spillover. This appears to correspond to the historical situation in which, during the difficult centuries discussed in Part I, Brahmanism was thrown back onto itself, with little external support. Once external circumstances changed and became more favorable, Brahmanism could

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[299] Lubin (forthcoming b) puts it as follows: "The suasive force of Smārta Brahminism lay in its public face: the degree to which Brahmins, individually and as a caste, effectively projected an image of themselves as a sacred order whose discipline could be lived out in the householder life — and in the royal household of the court — and not merely in the cloister. Their version of *dharma* was centered in an idealized vision of society, rather than in an otherworldly transcendence."

[300] With regard to the Dharmasūtras, Olivelle (2000: 11) observes: "The principal audience of these texts was undoubtedly Brahmin males, who were also the principal creators and consumers of all the literature produced in the vedic branches. The Brahmin is the *implied* subject of most rules in the Dharmasūtras."

[301] Cf. Lingat 1967: 231: "La théorie de la fonction royale, absente dans les dharmasūtra qui n'en mentionnent que quelques éléments, prend une place importante dans les dharmaśāstra ...". About these more recent Dharmaśāstras, Winternitz (1920: 486) observes: "Diese metrischen Dharmaśāstras ... beschäftigen ... sich weit mehr mit den Rechten und Pflichten des Königs ..."

increasingly emphasize its outward-looking aspect, based on its meanwhile solidly established inward-looking core vision.

Part IIA will concentrate on this inward-looking and self-centered core vision. This core vision has one overriding concern: to separate Brahmins from everyone else. Brahmins are completely different from others, but not only that. To the extent possible they keep themselves aloof from others, by living on their own and avoiding contact. Ironically, it appears that in due time this emphasis on looking inward allowed Brahmanism to start exerting influence on others.

Brahmanism was not only inward-looking but also extremely conservative. Brahmins did not like the new political structures they encountered, nor the new phenomena that accompanied these. The Maurya Empire had been centred in Magadha, right in the middle of the region where South Asia's second urbanisation was taking place. The Maurya capital, Pāṭaliputra, was a large city, according to some the world's largest city at its time.[302] Brahmins detested towns and cities. They said so explicitly when obliged to talk about them. More often, they adopted a different strategy: they did ignored their existence.[303] Where possible, they depicted themselves in a world that was no longer there. In this respect (and to avoid misunderstanding, let me add: only in this respect), their behaviour was not dissimilar to that of another group that was obsessed with the past: the National-Socialists of the Third Reich. In the House of German Art in Munich, opened by Hitler in 1937, there were hundreds of paintings; not one depicted urban and industrial life.[304]

Brahmanical literature of the period concerned presents an image of an ideal world that no longer existed and may never, in fact, have existed. The presentation of this imaginary world was not only meant to preserve the memory of an idealized past; its other, equally important, purpose was to shape the future in accordance with brahmanical wishes. It is in this period of transition that a new notion appears in brahmanical literature, that of the brahmanical hermitage (*āśrama*). Wise Brahmins are depicted as living in these simple yet idyllic places, dedicating themselves to their vedic ritual duties, reciting mantras in the process. These hermitages appear in the literature at the same time that also gifts of land to Brahmins — the so-called *agrahāra*s — begin to appear in literature and in the epigraphic record. The two institutions are clearly connected: The literary *āśrama*s functioned as examples and encouragement for rulers and others close to the centres of political power to provide Brahmins with *agrahāra*s, an encouragement that became extraordinarily successful in subsequent centuries.[305] Of course, brahmanical literature never suggests that *āśrama*s were an innovation. On the contrary, the literature presents us with the idea that *āśrama*s had always been there. This illustrates — and it is but one illustration among many — that Brahmanism, even where it innovates, never admits that it does so. Brahmanism projects the image of preserving the past. Historical scholarship shows that it does not always do so.

This, I repeat, is the idealized picture that much of brahmanical literature projects. It follows that this literature is a rather poor source of information for those who wish to

[302] Schlingloff 1969: 29 f.; 2013: 32 f.
[303] *Greater Magadha* p. 251 f.
[304] Watson 2004: 311-312.
[305] *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism* § 2.4

study ancient India's city life, or the languages spoken, or indeed the use of writing.[306] If we can derive information about these matters from brahmanical literature at all, then it is in spite of the efforts made by its authors to hide them.

Early brahmanical literature, then, is not the most reliable source of information with regard to such matters, and the conclusion that there were no cities when one text was composed, or no writing at the time of composition of another, simply because neither cities nor writing are mentioned in those texts, is based on very shaky foundations indeed. It would be comparable to the conclusion, based on the absence of depictions of urban and industrial life in the House of German Art in Munich in 1937, that there were no cities or industrial life in Germany, one of the most urbanized and industrialized countries at that time. Let me emphasize once again that this absence is, in both cases, based on ideology, not necessarily on historical fact.

It is in the light of these considerations that we must study early brahmanical literature. We know, for example, that Pāṇini was acquainted with the existence of writing (he mentions it). We also know that not long after him Aśoka left numerous inscriptions all over the Indian subcontinent. If we add to this the brahmanical disinclination to refer to writing, all conclusions about the oral nature of extensive brahmanical texts from the succeeding period (such as the *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Mahābhārata*, both longer than the *Ṛgveda*) must be considered shaky and are probably based on preconceived ideas about the supposedly miraculous mnemonic skills of the Indians of yore (for which no parallels can be cited from the Indian present or from other cultures).[307] Moreover, it means falling in the trap laid by the brahmanical tradition itself.

Doris Meth Srinivasan (1997: 314), in a chapter that emphasizes the strong brahmanical presence in Mathurā during the Kuṣāṇas, draws attention to "the great imbalance between the number of Buddhist and Jain inscription and those having some kind of Brahmanic or Hindu content". Indeed, "[o]ut of the total Kuṣāṇa inscriptions from Mathurā which number about 240 ..., three, possibly four, have some kind of Brahmanic or Hindu content. In fact, out of the slightly less than 300 total number of Mathurā inscriptions falling between the Mauryan and Kuṣāṇa ages, only nine (or ten) record some Brahmanic or Hindu content." Srinivasan then rightly observes: "The point is that this imbalance is not because Brahmanism and Hinduism had nothing to transmit. It is the long arm of the vedic tradition with its preference, indeed insistence, on the oral transmission of sacred knowledge (*śruti*), that could well be instrumental in the rather remarkable imbalance. ... The lesson to be learned ... is that oral transmission has higher cultural prestige than written communication, and that lesson could well be a reason why Brahmanic and Hindu images so seldom carry inscriptions." Indeed, no historically responsible understanding of Brahmanism is possible without taking into consideration its extreme conservatism, which may often mislead us.

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[306] Houben (2009: 82 n. 9) states: "Falk (1993: 255) cite un texte qui montre de façon incontestable que le prêtre n'emploie aucun texte écrit comme 'secours': selon B[audhāyana] Dh[arma] S[ūtra] 3.9.8-9, quelqu'un qui a oublié un passage de la Saṃhitā (et le mot *apratibhāyām* veut vraiment dire que le passage ne vient pas à l'esprit) doit réciter un [autre] texte sacré …" This passage reveals nothing about the use of writing at the time of its composition; it is, on the other hand, in perfect agreement with our observation that authors made an effort not to refer to writing.

[307] For a concise history of the Oral-Formulaic Theory, a theory that cannot be applied to vedic memorization, see Foley 1988. See further § IIA.3.2, below.

The following chapters will take up in further detail some of these features of Brahmanism.[308] The fundamental conservatism of this movement will be evident. This conservatism did not only oppose all change, but went to the extent of denying that the past had been different from the present in any essential manner. In this way, Brahmins presented themselves not only as preservers of the past but also as guardians of an eternal present. They were the only ones entitled to appropriate this role, a fact they did not forget to emphasize on every opportunity.

IIA.1. Purity of descent

IIA.1.1. The rules

One is born a Brahmin; one cannot become a Brahmin in any other way than through birth.[309] This is a fundamental rule of Brahmanism, at least in theory.[310] The *Anuśāsanaparvan* of the *Mahābhārata* discusses the issue. This is how Brockington (1998: 209; slightly adjusted) sums up this discussion:

> Yudhiṣṭhira asks whether a *kṣatriya*, *vaiśya* or *śūdra* can gain the status of the Brahmin (13.28.2-3) and Bhīṣma's reply is to narrate the story of Mataṅga (13.28.4 – 30.16). Mataṅga was brought up as a Brahmin but one day his true status as a *caṇḍāla*, because of his mother's adultery with one, is betrayed by his conduct; he spends the rest of his life in austerities in a vain attempt to gain Brahminhood and finally settles for the power to move at will in the sky.

The *Suttanipāta* of the Pali buddhist canon puts the following words in the mouth of a Brahmin called Bhāradvāja who is asked how one becomes a Brahmin:[311] "When one is well-born on both the mother's and the father's side, and is of pure descent for seven generations, uncriticised and irreproachable with reference to birth, to such an extent one becomes a Brahmin."[312] And the self-proclaimed and proud Brahmin Ambaṭṭha is

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[308] The following enumeration of features is by no means exhaustive. Some are only exterior, including the different ways in which Brahmins keep their hair, or the sacrifical thread. The latter, incidentally, appears to have been introduced at a date near the beginning of the Common Era; so Olivelle 2012. See also § I.1.3, above.

[309] Occasionally texts add that one can become a Brahmin through rebirth; cp. ĀpDhS 2.11.10: "By following the righteous path people belonging to a lower caste-class (*varṇa*) advance in their subsequent birth to the next higher caste-class" (Olivelle 2000: 89, modified). However, as indicated in Appendix III, not all texts are open to this. Early buddhist texts, on the other hand, emphasize karmic rather than physical descent, and call someone a Brahmin on the basis of his karmic genealogy; see Appleton 2011. It is, incidentally, a lot easier to loose the brahmanical status than to gain it. Many brahmanical texts, and some buddhist ones, specify the circumstances that lead to such loss; see Eltschinger 2000: 55-60 (= 2012a: 49-55).

[310] This was not yet the case in vedic times; see Rau 1957: 62 ff., Basu 1969: 29 ff.

[311] Sn p. 115. Tr. Norman 1984: 103.

[312] The idea that seven generations are required to guarantee the purity a person's descent recalls GautDhS 4.22: "By successively marrying persons of the higher or the lower caste-class (*utkarṣa-apakarṣa*), in the seventh generation the offspring moves to the one or the other caste-class" (tr. Olivelle, modified). Kane (HistDh II/I p. 62 ff.) discusses the phenomenon of *jātyutkarṣa*, also in other texts; seven generations often play a role here.

humbled when the Buddha reveals to him that he is not well-born, being the descendent of a slave girl.[313] Birth is not the only factor that plays a role in the appreciation of a Brahmin: asceticism and learning add to his glory, but they do not replace the requirement of birth.[314]

What, then, are the requirements for being well-born? In order to be born a Brahmin, one's father has to be a Brahmin. Many texts agree that one's mother has to be a Brahmin too. This is what P. V. Kane, the author of the voluminous *History of Dharmaśāstra*, says about it:[315] "There is a … proposition advanced by many writers that a man belongs to a particular *varṇa* or *jāti* by birth only i.e. if born in lawful wedlock of parents both of whom belong to that *varṇa* or *jāti*. This is the view held by all medieval writers and digests and it is expressly said that a man belongs to a caste by birth and no actions of his can alter that fact, that several castes are like the species of animals and that caste attaches to the body and not to the soul …" However, there are exceptions. According to a number of relatively early brahmanical texts, the child of a Brahmin father and a Kṣatriya mother, too, is a Brahmin.[316]

Consider the *Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra*. Having asserted that a Brahmin can have wives of all four caste-classes, a Kṣatriya three (all except Brahmins), and so on, it states:[317]

> Sons born from wives of the same caste-class [as the husband's] or the caste-class immediately below his are of the same caste-class [as the husband's].
> Sons born from wives two or three caste-classes below the husband are Ambaṣṭhas, Ugras, and Niṣādas.

And again:[318]

> [A child born] from a Brahmin father in a Kṣatriya [mother] is a Brahmin.

The *Gautama Dharmasūtra* takes the same position:[319]

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[313] DN I p. 87 ff. The outcome of this debate must have been predictable for any informed listener, for Ambaṣṭha is a frequently used term in brahmanical literature to designate a descendant of a Brahmin father and a mother from a lower caste-class; see *Greater Magadha* p. 354 ff.
[314] So the grammarian Patañjali (second half of second century BCE); Mahā-bh I p. 411 l. 16-17 (on P. 2.2.6): *tapaḥ śrutaṃ ca yoniś cety etad brāhmaṇakārakam/ tapaḥśrutābhyāṃ yo hīno jātibrāhmaṇa eva saḥ//* "Asceticism, learning and descent make a Brahmin; without asceticism and learning he is nothing but a Brahmin by birth."
[315] Kane, HistDh II/I p. 51 f.; Lingat 1967: 58 f.
[316] The most important exception is Āpastamba, whose Dharmasūtra forbids all mixed marriages; see Jha 1970: 273.
[317] BaudhDhS 1.16.6: *tāsu putrāḥ savarṇānantarāsu savarṇāḥ/ ekāntaradvyantarāmbaṣṭhograniṣādāḥ/.* Tr. Olivelle, modified.
[318] BaudhDhS 1.17.3: *brāhmaṇāt kṣatriyāyāṃ brāhmaṇ[aḥ]* …. Brinkhaus (1978: 138, 169) draws attention to similar passages attributed to Uśanas and Devala.
[319] GautDhS 4.16: *anulomā anantaraikāntaradvyantarāsu jātāḥ savarṇāmbaṣṭhograniṣādadauṣyantapāraśavāḥ*. I have modified Olivelle's translation in the light of the parallel passage in the *Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra* discussed above. Brinkhaus (1978: 99 f.) believes that the Dauṣyantas and Pāraśavas have been added later to the text.

> Children born in keeping with the natural order of caste-classes from women of the caste-class immediately below the man's are of the same caste-class [as the father]; from women two and three caste-classes below the man's, Ambaṣṭhas, Ugras, Niṣādas, Dauṣyantas and Pāraśavas.

So does the *Arthaśāstra*:[320]

> The sons of a Brahmin and a Kṣatriya born of a wife belonging to the immediately next *varṇa* are of the same *varṇa* [as the father].

The same idea finds expression in the *Anuśāsanaparvan* of the *Mahābhārata*:[321]

> A Brahmin [can] have four wives, [viz. a Brahmin, a Kṣatriyā, a Vaiśyā, and a Śūdrā]; in two of these [viz. the Brahmin and the Kṣatriyā] his self is [re-]born, in the two following ones [i.e. the Vaiśyā and the Śūdrā] lower children are produced, of the same caste as their mother.

The *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* expresses the idea in the following verse:[322]

> As from two of the three caste-classes is born a child that is one's own self — being born from a woman of his own caste-class because of the contiguity — so the same process applies to excluded men.

Elsewhere, however, the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* remains lukewarm with regard to the idea of Brahmins born from a Kṣatriya mother, as is clear from the following:[323]

> Sons fathered by twice-born men on wives of the caste-class immediately below theirs are considered only 'similar', disdained as they are due to their mother's defect.

Even stronger is this verse:[324]

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[320] KAŚ 3.7.20: *brāhmaṇakṣatriyayor anantarāputrāḥ savarṇāḥ.* Tr. Kangle. Cf. Olivelle 2013: 194.

[321] Mhbh 13.48.4: *bhāryāś catasro viprasya dvayor ātmāsya jāyate/ ānupūrvyād dvayor hīnau mātṛjātyau prasūyataḥ//.* Cf. Brinkhaus 1978: 25-26. See also Mhbh 13.48.15: *yathā caturṣu varṇeṣu dvayor ātmāsya jāyate ānantaryāt tu jāyante tathā bāhyāḥ pradhānataḥ.*

[322] Manu 10.28: *yathā trayāṇāṃ varṇānāṃ dvayor ātmāsya jāyate/ ānantaryāt svayonyāṃ tu tathā bāhyeṣv api kramaḥ//.* Tr. Olivelle 2005: 209, modified. On p. 335-36 Olivelle adds the following explanatory note: "The meaning appears to be this. From a woman of two of the three upper classes (that is, from a Brahmin and a Kṣatriya woman), a Brahmin begets a son that is his own self. The phrase *ānantaryāt svayonyāṃ* is elliptical containing an argument supporting the above claim. The meaning is that even a Kṣatriya woman can be counted as 'a woman of his own class' because of her contiguity."

[323] Manu 10.6: *strīṣv anantarajātāsu dvijair utpāditān sutān/ sadṛśān eva tān āhur mātṛdoṣavigarhitān//.* Tr. Olivelle, modified.

[324] Manu 10.10: *viprasya triṣu varṇeṣu nṛpater varṇayor dvayoḥ/ vaiśyasya varṇe caikasmin ṣaḍ ete 'pasadāḥ smṛtāḥ//.* Tr. Olivelle, modified.

> A Brahmin's children by the three lower caste-classes, a Kṣatriya's by the two lower caste-classes, and a Vaiśya's by the one lower caste-class — tradition calls these six 'low-born'.

It is clear from these passages that, beside the position that both the father and the mother of a Brahmin have to be Brahmins, another position is fairly strongly represented in the literature, viz., that also the offspring of a Brahmin father and a Kṣatriya mother is a Brahmin.

Before we turn to discussing this, let us briefly consider some verses that take a more indulgent position. Some verses from the *Anuśāsanaparvan* of the *Mahābhārata*, to begin with, state that also the offspring of a Brahmin father and a Vaiśya mother is a Brahmin:[325]

> A Brahmin [can] have three wives, [viz. a Brahmin, a Kṣatriyā, and a Vaiśyā], a Kṣatriya [can] have two wives, a Vaiśya should seek [a wife] of his own caste-class; the offspring in these wives will be the same [in rank as the father].

And again:[326]

> He who is born from a Brahmin [father] in [a mother who belongs to] the three [superior] caste-classes is a Brahmin.

And once more:[327]

> Someone born from a Brahmin [father] in a Brahmin [mother] is a Brahmin, there is no doubt about this. The same applies to someone born [from a Brahmin father] in a Kṣatriyā [mother], or in a Vaiśyā [mother].

Two verses from the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* go even further, introducing the possibility for a Śūdra to become a Brahmin:[328]

> If an offspring of a Brahmin man from a Śūdra woman were to bear children from a superior partner, within seven generations the inferior attains the superior caste; a Śūdra thus attains the rank of a Brahmin, and so does a Brahmin the rank of a Śūdra.

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[325] Mhbh 13.44.10: *tisro bhāryā brāhmaṇasya dve bhārye kṣatriyasya tu/ vaiśyaḥ svajātiṃ vindeta tāsv apatyaṃ samaṃ bhavet//.*

[326] Mhbh 13.47.17cd: *triṣu varṇeṣu jāto hi brāhmaṇād brāhmaṇo bhavet*. This "comes amid discussion of the different amounts to be inherited by sons of a Brahmin born from wives of the four classes. Sons born from wives of the three twice-born classes inherit amounts that decline according to the wife's rank, even though all three types of sons would have the Brahmin's status" (Hiltebeitel 2011: 215).

[327] Mhbh 13.47.28: *brāhmaṇyāṃ brāhmaṇāj jāto brāhmaṇaḥ syān na saṃśayaḥ/ kṣatriyāyāṃ tathaiva syād vaiśyāyām api caiva hi//.*

[328] Manu 10.64-65ab: *śūdrāyāṃ brāhmaṇāj jātaḥ śreyasā cet prajāyate/ aśreyāñ chreyasīṃ jātiṃ gacchaty ā saptamād yugāt// śūdro brāhmaṇatām eti brāhmaṇaś caiti śūdratām/* Tr. Olivelle.

Kosambi (1975: 319) suggests that these verses reflect a situation in which Brahmins immigrated into territories without their womenfolk, which resulted in intermarriage with local inhabitants. Kane (HistDh II/I p. 65) points out that rules like the one here expressed, including the counting of generations, would have been impossible to enforce in actual life. This is no doubt true, but is a criticism that could be directed to many of the rules of descent we have considered. These verses do however show that there were exceptions to the strict rules governing the brahmanical status of children whose mother was not a Brahmin.

The *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* (1.96) presumably refers to the same as Manu, but adds a new and interesting dimension: a person can after a number of generations rise to a higher caste as a result of his *livelihood*:[329]

> It should be understood that there is rise in caste in the seventh or even in the fifth generation; if there is inversion as to the avocations, then there is corresponding similarity (of *varṇa* in the seventh or even fifth generation).

We will return to the effect of one's avocation on one's status below. Here we continue our analysis of the passages that deal with descent and ancestry. We may sum up what we have found so far by stating that, for some time, the belief that a Brahmin father and a Kṣatriyā mother produce brahmanical offspring was relatively wide-spread. The idea that the offspring of a brahmanical father and a Vaiśyā mother is a Brahmin is, to the best of my knowledge, exceptional, and the notion that a Śūdra mother may, in certain circumstances, become the ancestor of the Brahmin descendant is grudgingly accepted by some authors of work on Dharma.

In studying passages about the rankings of mixed offspring, it is important to keep in mind that most of what they say is largely without connection with lived reality. However, one important exception must be made. We do not know who cared about the speculative schemes about mixed castes invented by Brahmins. Perhaps nobody cared, with the notable exception of the Brahmins themselves. And their main concern was to secure the purity of their own caste-class. So if brahmanical texts say that a Brahmin father and a Kṣatriya mother produce brahmanical offspring, this implies that at least certain Brahmins were willing to accept such offspring in their midst.

It is not difficult to see why certain Brahmins would be willing to accept this particular kind of mixed offspring. Brahmins — or at least some of them — aspired to positions at or around the royal court, and brahmanical literature emphasizes the respected positions they claimed for themselves. Marriages between highly placed Brahmins and princesses may therefore have occurred, and we know that such marriages were common in Southeast Asia.[330] We may assume that such marriages, or the

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[329] *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.96: *jātyutkarṣo yuge jñeyaḥ saptame pañcame 'pi vā/ vyatyaye karmaṇāṃ sāmyaṃ pūrvavac cādharottaram//* Tr. Kane, HistDh II/I p. 64.

[330] Cf. Quaritch Wales 1931: 59: "One very remarkable sign of the power of the Brahmans during the Aṅkor period is that, contrary to the modern custom, by which princesses of the royal blood rarely marry, formerly alliances were common with the Brahmans; and up to the present day there is a tradition amongst the Bakus, who are the descendants of the ancient Brahmans, that in the event of the royal family failing, a successor would be chosen from amongst them." Coedès 1964: 219: "Jayavarman V [Cambodia, 10th century] maria sa soeur Indralakshmī au brahmane hindou Divākarabhaṭṭa, né dans l'Inde sur les bords de la Yamunā, auteur de diverses fondations çivaïtes"; p. 223: "Les familles brahmaniques s'alliaient souvent avec la famille royale: les

possibility that they might occur, are behind the rules that acknowledge the children of such couples as fully brahmanical. This assumption also supports the view that such marriages were as a whole rare, and out of reach for the majority of Brahmins.[331] However, they may at times have played a role in the spread of brahmanical ideology.

The rule allowing a Brahmin man to marry a woman from a *varṇa* one degree lower (i.e., a Kṣatriyā) and to have children that are still brahmanical has been dropped long since, as we have seen. Something similar survives among subgroups whose members are all Brahmins. Consider the following:[332]

> The Brahmins [in the North of India] are generally roughly divided into (1) those who do not have to earn their living by officiating at domestic ritual and (2) those who do it for a living. The former generally own land and engage in literary studies. The latter are family priests, or priests officiating at holy places. The priests who officiate at holy places when people take their baths in the holy rivers or offer worship, are held to be rather lower in status than the family priests. Among the priests at holy places … those who officiate at funerary rites hold again a position lower than those who officiate at auspicious ceremonies. In Banaras, Mathura, Ayodhya, Gaya, Nasik, Rameshwar and all over India in the sacred places there are these Brahmins who are generally well off but are held to belong to a very low status among Brahmins. The Brahmins of each of these divisions marry only among themselves, but may sometimes receive a bride from a slightly lower division but not from a division many steps lower than their own. Thus a Brahmin of the first class i.e. belonging to a learned family will never marry the daughter of a Mahābrāhmaṇa who officiates at funerary rites. [According to custom] a man marries a girl belonging to the same division or to one which is only of a slightly lower status …

The general rule is as follows (Trautmann 1993: 88-89): "Marriage by gift begins by presuming the superiority of the groom's people vis-à-vis de bride's people. … *kanyādāna* [the giving of a daughter in marriage, JB] ends by perpetuating the asymmetry between two parties to the transaction, for after marriage hospitality, gifts and deference must flow always and only from the bride's people to the groom's people. … Givers must not be takers in the transcendental commerce; and, we may add, takers being by

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mariages entre brahmanes et kshatriyas semblent avoir été fréquents, ces deux castes constituant, au-dessus de la masse, une classe à part, représentant l'élément intellectuel et la culture hindoue, sans qu'il faille en conclure que, du point de vue racial, cette aristocratie ait été très différente du reste de la population".

[331] Note that rulers frequently took Brahmin wives, especially if they belonged to indigenous dynasties during the period 'between the empires': "The Śuṅgas start to mention the gotra of their mothers, as if a ruler without a Brahmin mother were substandard. Inside India, the Sātavāhanas and many other dynasties take over the idea and stress their pure descent this way. A Brahmin first queen started to become indispensible even for non-Brahmin kings." (Falk 2006a: 152). In Kālidāsa's play, on the other hand, Śakuntalā, who lives in a brahmanical hermitage, is only a suitable wife for King Duṣyanta because she turns out to be a daughter of the Kṣatriya sage Viśvāmitra; this, at any rate, is Kumārila's understanding of the passage. See Davis 2007: 288-289.

[332] Karwe 1993: 52-53. Cf. Kane, HistDh II/I p. 103.

definition the superiors of givers, the *kanyādāna* complex carries with it a tendency to hypergamy."

There are, finally, also brahmanical communities that do not intermary. An important example is the regional divide between Gauḍa and Drāviḍa Brahmins. Between these two there is a general prohibition on ritual and marital cross-over. But even among the Drāviḍa groups, "generally there is no intermarriage among the Brahmins from Tamilnadu, Āndhra, Karnataka, and Maharashtra *due to differences of region and language, in spite of the fact that the Dharmaśāstra allows such marriages*" (Deshpande 2012: 358).

IIA.1.2. Brahmins of foreign origin: the Magas[333]

The exigency of pure descent confronted Brahmanism with a challenge in the form of certain immigrants who ended up being recognized as Brahmins. The most striking case is that of the Magas who appear to have immigrated into India from Persia. This, at any rate, is the historical reconstruction that modern scholarship provides. Seen from the brahmanical point of view, the situation was altogether different. This will be shown in the present chapter.

According to certain Purāṇas, the Magas are Brahmins who came from another continent, the continent called Śākadvīpa, and settled in India. A number of terminological similarities with Iranian words have convinced modern scholars that these Magas were originally Magi from Persia, or from a region in which Persian culture had been established; they had moved into India and succeeded in being recognized as Brahmins.[334]

As a general rule, brahmanical texts are critical about foreigners. The fact — if it is one — that certain foreigners succeeded in attaining brahmanical status without hiding their foreign origins is therefore remarkable and invites suspicion. Let us therefore look more closely into the matter.

Presumably the earliest surviving text providing us with information about the arrival of the Magas is the *Sāmba Purāṇa*. It links the arrival of these Brahmins to the introduction of images in sun-worship.[335] It is the first sun-image that is presented as speaking the following words:[336]

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[333] The Magas may not be the only Brahmins of foreign origin. The Chitpavan Brahmins of Maharashtra are sometimes believed to be in origin foreigners who were turned into Brahmins. See Patterson 1968; Lele 2010.

[334] For a brief overview of the history of this research, see Rocher 1986: 217 ff., with notes; cp. Stietencron 1966: 13 f., Humbach 1978. Francis Wilford (1809) was perhaps the first to state that these Bramins had entered India from the Northwest; see Leask 2000, esp. p. 214. Thapar (1971: 434 f.) speaks of 'the gradual evolution in status' of the Maga Brahmins, who were "at first looked down upon and not admitted to all the *śrāddha* ceremonies"; however, "gradually their position improved". It is not clear on what evidence this is based.

[335] They were presumably first active in the sun-temple in Multan, in Sindh; see Maclean 1989: 18-20. Jettmar (1997) finds evidence in the form of petroglyphs for a solar cult in the upper Indus valley, which he associates with the sun worship in Multan.

[336] *na yogyaḥ paricaryāyāṃ jaṃbūdvīpe mamānagha/ mama pūjākarān gatvā śākadvīpād ihānaya// 27 // lavaṇodāt pare pāre kṣīrodena samāvṛtaḥ/ jaṃbūdvīpāt paras tasmāc chākadvīpa iti śrutaḥ// 28 // tatra puṇyā janapadāś cāturvarṇyasamāśritāḥ/ magāś ca maśakāś caiva mānasā maṃdagās*

> There is no one in Jambūdvīpa who is suitable to serve me. Go and bring worshippers for me from Śākadvīpa. It lies at the other shore of the salt-ocean and is surrounded by the milk-ocean. It lies beyond Jambūdvīpa and is therefore known as Śākadvīpa.[337] In that [continent] there are the following populations, holding on to the hierarchy of the four caste-classes (*varṇa*): the Magas, the Maśakas, the Mānasas and the Mandagas. The Magas are primarily Brahmins, the Maśakas are said to be Kṣatriyas, the Mānasas are to be thought of as Vaiśyas, the Mandagas among them are Śūdras. Among them there is no commingling of caste-classes or episodes of life (*āśrama*) whatsoever. The inhabitants, because they do not deviate from Dharma, are completely happy.

Details of the manner in which a number of Maga Brahmins travelled from Śākadvīpa to Jambūdvīpa concern us to the extent that they needed divine help: these Magas travelled on the back of the divine bird Garuḍa. It is equally interesting to note that these Magas were already Brahmins in their original continent, and that this was a recognized fact, also in India.

As stated earlier, most modern scholars believe that the myth of the Magas who came from Śākadvīpa corresponds to a historical reality in which Magi came from Iran or from a region strongly influenced by Persian religion.[338] To quote Stietencron (1966: 13):[339]

> Was an dieser Legende so bedeutsam schien, war der Name der Sonnenpriester, welcher sogleich an die medischen Magier, die Magoi Herodots erinnerte, sowie vor allem drei weitere Worte iranischen Ursprungs, die mit dem Bericht über diese Priester verbunden sind. Das erste, *avyaṅga*, bezeichnet den Gürtel der Sonnenpriester und kann mit av. *aiwyāŋhana* gleichgesetzt werden. Das zweite, *patidāna*, entspricht av. *paiti.dāna*, dem Mundtuch der Zarathustrier und das dritte, *varśman*, ist av. *barəsman*, das kultische Zweigbündel.

It is not our aim to discuss the different views that have been presented as to the time and region of origin of the migrating Magi; according to certain scholars there may have been

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tathā// 29 // magā brāhmaṇabhūyiṣṭhā maśakāḥ kṣatriyāḥ smṛtāḥ/ vaiśyās tu mānasā jñeyāḥ śūdrās teṣāṃ tu maṃdagāḥ// 30 // na teṣāṃ saṃkaraḥ kaścid varṇāśramakṛtaḥ kvacit/ dharmasyāvyabhicāritvād ekāntasukhitāḥ prajāḥ// 31 //. Sāmba Purāṇa 26.27-31, as constituted in Stietencron 1966: 46. The names of the four populations in this constitution of the text have been influenced by a *Mahābhārata* passage to be considered below. Hazra (1958: 41 n. 22) enumerates the different forms these names have in different textual traditions.

[337] This can hardly be an etymological explanation of the name Śākadvīpa, and is rather an attempt to emphasize that Śākadvīpa is a different continent (*dvīpa*) from Jambūdvīpa.

[338] Not all! Éric Pirart writes to me (7.10.2011): "Le fait que les quatre castes du Śākadvīpa portent toutes un nom commençant par *ma-* attire mon attention et me fait douter de l'origine *magu-* de *maga-*: le hasard aurait-il trop bien fait les choses? En effet, ne faudrait-il pas reconnaître dans *ma+* le préfixe iranien ancien *hma+* (= védique *smat+*) et donner par exemple au nom de *maśaka-* que reçoivent les kshatriya du Śākadvīpa le sens de 'dotés de force' (**hma+saka-* **smat+śaka-*)? Autrement dit: une origine iranienne, oui; une étymologie de *maga-* par l'iranien *magu-*, non."

[339] See also Scheftelowitz 1933.

several migrations, at more than one time and from more than one region of origin.[340] Other sources beside the *Sāmba Purāṇa* confirm that there were (and are) in India Brahmins who claimed to have come from Śākadvīpa and who were known by the names Magas, sometimes Bhojakas, or just Śākadvīpīya Brahmins.

In what follows, I take it for established that there were at some time, and presumably still are, in India Brahmins of foreign origin, whose ancestors had migrated to India from a region in which Iranian religious notions prevailed. I also assume that the story in the *Sāmba Purāṇa* — and in the *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa*, which borrowed this passage from the *Sāmba Purāṇa*[341] — refers back to this event (or these events), though in a heavily reworked manner. Our question is now: Why should immigrants from the Northwest be accepted as Brahmins?

Recall at this point that brahmanical literature, and Indian literature in general, doesn't have the slightest tendency to believe that the brahmanical order of society prevailed outside India, least of all in the regions to the Northwest.[342] Al-Biruni, a visitor from Persia, and therefore from a region to which the Magas may conceivably have once belonged, said in around 1030 CE the following about the Indians:[343]

> all their fanaticism is directed against those who do not belong to them — against all foreigners. They call them *mleccha*, i.e. impure, and forbid having any connection with them, be it by intermarriage or any other kind of relationship, or by sitting, eating, and drinking with them, because thereby, they think, they would be polluted. They consider as impure anything which touches the fire and the water of a foreigner; and no household can exist without these two elements. Besides, they never desire that a thing which once has been polluted should be purified and thus recovered, as, under ordinary circumstances, if anybody or anything has become unclean, he or it would strive to regain the state of purity. They are not allowed to receive anybody who does not belong to them, even if he wished it, or was inclined to their religion.

Mlecchas are often referred to in the most disagreeable terms.[344] The *Mahābhārata*, for example, states:[345] "The Mlecchas are the dirt of mankind." For good measure the same

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[340] See Stietencron 1966: 235 ff.; Humbach 1969; Srivastava 1988; Panaino 1996. Some reject foreign influence and claim an Indian origin for the sun worship of the Magas; so e.g. Pandey 1971: 177 ff. Chattopadhyaya (1970: 173 ff.) discusses the possibility that there was already a sun temple in India at the time of Alexander.

[341] See Hazra 1952. A list of all the verses and chapters of the *Sāmba Purāṇa* that also occur in the *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa* can be found in Hazra 1958: 57-59. For a comparative study of the relevant portions of the two texts, see Stietencron 1966: 29 ff. Also the *Brahma Purāṇa* refers to these events; Srivastava 1972: 241 n. 265.

[342] Cf. Neelis 2011: 195-196.

[343] Sachau 1888: I: 19-20. A. Sharma (1983: 118 f.) tries to demonstrate that this statement is exaggerated.

[344] See in general Parasher 1991. According to the *Vaiṣṇava Dharmaśāstra* (84.4), in the lands of the Mlecchas the four *varṇa*s do not exist (*cāturvarṇyavyavasthānaṃ yasmin deśe na vidyate/ taṃ mlecchadeśaṃ jānīyād āryāvartam ataḥ param//*). Occasionally Sanskrit literature contains also less negative, even positive, remarks about Mlecchas, as in Śabara's *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* on [MīmSū] 1.3.10: "Mlecchas are more skilled [than Brahmins] in rearing and catching birds."

[345] Mhbh 8.30.70: *mānuṣāṇāṃ malaṃ mlecchā[ḥ]*.

passage adds that the Bāhlīkas, i.e. the inhabitants of Bactria, are the dirt of the earth.[346] Elsewhere the *Mahābhārata* explains that Mlecchas are lower even than the Śūdras, in a passage summed up by Brockington (1998: 208) as follows:

> originally Brahmā created just Brahmins but those who were short-tempered and violent left their *varṇa*, turned red and became *kṣatriyas*, those who took to cattle-rearing and agriculture turned yellow and became *vaiśyas*, and those who in their delusion took to injury and untruth turned black and became *śūdras* …; those who diverged still further from the proper norms and did not recognise them became Piśācas, Rākṣasas, Pretas and various sorts of Mlecchas.[347]

Other passages specify which foreigners are meant. In the *Anuśāsanaparvan* of the *Mahābhārata*, for example, we find the following:[348]

> Those various men of Kṣatriya birth — Śakas, Yavanas, and Kāmbojas — have reached the level of Śūdras because no Brahmins are seen among them. Those various men of Kṣatriya birth — Dramiḻas, Kaliṅgas, Pulindas, Uśīnaras, Kaulas, Sarpas, and Māhiṣakas — have reached the level of Śūdras because no Brahmins are seen among them.

A similar passage occurs in the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*:[349]

> By neglecting rites and because no Brahmins are seen among them, these men of Kṣatriya birth have gradually reached in the world the level of Śūdras — Puṇḍrakas, Coḍas, Draviḍas, Kāmbojas, Yavanas, Śakas, Pāradas, Pahlavas, Cīnas, Kirātas, and Daradas.

Several of the populations enumerated in these two passages can be identified, and some of these were situated in the northwest or further to the west: the Śakas, Yavanas (= Greeks) and Kāmbojas lived in the northwestern parts of the Indian subcontinent during the centuries around the beginning of the Common Era. The Pahlavas and Pāradas were Persians. According to these passages, there were no Brahmins among them.

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[346] Mhbh 8.30.68: *malaṃ pṛthivyā bāhlīkāḥ.*

[347] Mhbh 12.181.10-18. This passage is remarkable in that it attributes the existence of the caste-classes (*varṇa*) to the effects of karma; it begins with the observation that there is, at bottom, no difference between the caste-classes (*na viśeṣo 'sti varṇānāṃ sarvaṃ brāhmam idaṃ jagat/ brahmaṇā pūrvasṛṣṭaṃ hi karmabhir varṇatāṃ gatam//*). For a different position, see Appendix III.

[348] Mhbh 13.33.19-21: *śakā yavanakāmbojās tās tāḥ kṣatriyajātayaḥ/ vṛṣalatvaṃ parigatā brāhmaṇānām adarśanāt// dramiḻāś ca kaliṅgāś ca pulindāś cāpy uśīnarāḥ/ kaulāḥ sarpā māhiṣakās tās tāḥ kṣatriyajātayaḥ// vṛṣalatvaṃ parigatā brāhmaṇānām adarśanāt/*. Similarly Mhbh 13.35.17-18: *mekalā dramiḍāḥ kāśāḥ pauṇḍrāḥ kollagirās tathā/ śauṇḍikā daradā darvāś caurāḥ śabarabarbarāḥ// kirātā yavanāś caiva tās tāḥ kṣatriyajātayaḥ/ vṛṣalatvam anuprāptā brāhmaṇānām adarśanāt//.*

[349] Manu 10.43-44: *śanakais tu kriyālopād imāḥ kṣatriyajātayaḥ/ vṛṣalatvaṃ gatā loke brāhmaṇādarśanena ca// puṇḍrakāś coḍadraviḍāḥ kāmbojā yavanāḥ śakāḥ/ pāradāḥ pahvalāś cīnāḥ kirātā daradās tathā//*; tr. Olivelle, modified.

We have already seen (in § I.1.3) that the *Assalāyana Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (MN II p. 149) makes a similar observation, stating that the four caste-classes (*varṇa*) do not exist among the Yonas (= Yavanas, Greeks) and the Kāmbojas. Aśoka's thirteenth Rock Edict claims that there are no Brahmins and Śramaṇas among the Yonas.

Some relatively early buddhist texts speak explicitly and specifically about the Magas. One of these is the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, a buddhist compendium from Kashmir that presumably dates from the second century CE.[350] Interestingly, it speaks of barbarians (*mleccha*) in the West who are called Magas.[351] It does *not* call them Brahmins, and ascribes to them the view that "there is absolutely no sin in behaving lustily with one's mother, daughter, elder or younger sister, daughter-in-law, or the like", hardly a view Indian Brahmins would like to be identified with.[352] Bhavya's more recent *Tarkajvālā*, too, refers to the Magas, in the following words:[353] "Magas and so on are the followers of a perverted belief (*vrata*), i.e. Persians and others who live in the land of barbarians (*mleccha*). … The doctrines of the Magas … have many points fairly common to the teachings of the Vedas. … The Vedas are not a proper means for knowing the Dharma. As they teach the illicit sexual relation (*agamyā-gamana*), they are like the books of the Nāstikas and of the Persians." Here the teachings of the Magas are compared with those of the Veda, but the comparison itself shows the difference: the Magas are not Brahmins, and their texts are not the Vedas.

Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* does not mention the Magas by name, but ascribes the same immoral custom to Persians; it does *not* suggest that these Persians are Brahmins.[354] The same can be said about Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*.[355] References of this kind to the Persians do not stop here. Silk (2009: 85 f.) observes: "Similar references are repeated in later Buddhist philosophical literature as examples of archetypical immoral behavior. Parallel references also appear in Xuanzang's seventh-century record of his travels to India, *Datang Xiyuji* (Great Tang Records of the Western Regions), and in the *Wang Och'ŏnjuguk chŏn* (Account of Travels to the Five Countries of India) by the eighth-century Korean Buddhist monk-traveler Hyech'o, both of whom refer to the Persians as those who practice incestuous marriages between mothers and sons. Nearly identical references occur in classical (Greek and Roman), non-Buddhist Indian, Arabic, and Chinese sources, all of which view Persians as those who engage in such immoral unions. The Indian Buddhist sources thus share in a judgment widespread among Persia's neighbors across the ancient world."[356] None of these texts identify those Persians with Brahmins.

There is one exception. The *Karmaprajñapti*, an early Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma text, ascribes this same immoral behaviour to what it calls Maga-Brahmins, who live in

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[350] It refers to the "former king, Kaniṣka, of Gandhāra" (Willemen, Dessein & Cox 1998: 232; Dessein 2009: 44); Kaniṣka may have started his realm in 127 CE (Falk 2001; Golzio 2008)

[351] Silk 2008: 438; 2009: 85.

[352] An exception has to be made for the *godharma* or *govrata*; see Acharya 2013. Perhaps this explains the critical remarks of the *Tarkajvālā.* As Acharya (2013: 118-119) points out, Bhavya is aware of the immoral behavior of the Pāśupatas.

[353] Tr. Kawasaki 1975: 1103 ff. Cp. Lindtner 1988, esp. p. 439.

[354] Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 241 l. 9.

[355] Eltschinger 2007: 312 (with note 377); Krasser 2012: 538 f.; Eltschinger, Krasser & Taber 2012: 53.

[356] For further details, see Silk 2008. For the situation in Persia, see Macuch 1991; Herrenschmidt 1994.

the West.[357] This might suggest that the Magas of Persia were looked upon as Brahmins, at least by the author of the *Karmaprajñapti* and presumably by some of his contemporaries. In view of the evidence considered so far, this is hard to believe. The most probable explanation for this strange characterization of the Magas as Maga-Brahmins is as follows. The *Karmaprajñapti* has only been preserved in a late (8-9th cent. CE) Tibetan translation,[358] and it is conceivable that the Tibetan translators added the word Brahmin on the basis of their 'knowledge' that Magas are Brahmins, which they were at that time in India.[359] The expression *maga-brāhmaṇa* may be late: it appears for the first time in an inscription in 861 CE.[360] Alternatively, it should not be forgotten that the *Karmaprajñapti* is a buddhist text, and that the Buddhists had a tendency to compare Magas and Brahmins, both of whom indulged, in their opinion, in immoral practices; this we know from the *Tarkajvālā* passage considered above. But whatever the correct explanation of the expression Maga-Brahmin in the surviving translation of the *Karmaprajñapti*, it seems clear that the buddhist texts considered inform us about Magas who lived in the West (and not therefore in India) and who were not considered Brahmins.

It is safe to conclude from what precedes that no Brahmin would believe that the brahmanical order of society prevailed in Iran.[361] And the foreign priests who had settled in India could not possibly base their demand to be accepted as Brahmins on the claim that they came from a region in the Northwest that had adopted this order of society.

And they didn't. Modern scholars may be tempted to identify Śākadvīpa with the territory of the Śakas, who ruled in India's northwest and had adopted many features of Iranian culture, or with Iran proper including greater Iran,[362] but there is no Indian text I know of that does so. Śākadvīpa is a continent far away, separated from Jambūdvīpa by an ocean, and it is totally unwarranted to believe that any of the classical authors who wrote about it would have had the slightest sympathy for these modern ideas.[363]

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[357] Silk 2008: 436; 2009: 84: "In the West there are those called Maga-Brahmins".
[358] Cp. Willemen, Dessein & Cox 1998: 189 ff.; Dietz 1997.
[359] Silk (2008: 436 n. 6) dedicates a footnote to the Tibetan term *bram ze mchu skyes*, which stands for Maga-Brahmin.
[360] Cp. Chenet 1993: 385: "De ces résistances auxquelles se heurtèrent les Magas témoigne sans doute le fait qu'il faille attendre relativement tard pour voir mentionner pour la première fois *expressis verbis* un *Maga brāhmaṇa* du nom de Mātṛravi dans une inscription de Ghaṭiyāl de Kakkarka au Rājputana datant de 861 de notre ère."
[361] Gail's (1978: 343) remark to the extent that "die Inder die sozialen Schichtungen anderer Völker nur von ihrer eigenen Klassifizierung her zu verstehen vermochten" should not be interpreted to mean that priests elsewhere where automatically promoted to brahmanical status.
[362] So Arora 1971: 54; 1972: 30 f. Arora refers to different tentative identifications in modern scholarly literature. See further Gail 1978: 342 f.; Shrava 1981: 5 f.; Srivastava 1969: 253-254. Vassilkov (1998: 143) is more careful when he calls Śākadvīpa "a mythical place-name which disguised the name of historical Saka/Śaka people, the Scythians or north-eastern Iranians". It is of course not impossible that the *name* Śākadvīpa was once inspired by the Śakas (Bailey 1970: 69), but this tells us nothing about the position of this continent in mythical geography.
[363] Cp. Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya* on sūtra 2.1.52: *svargaḥ apsarasaḥ uttarāḥ kuravaḥ sapta dvīpāḥ samudro lokasaṃniveśa ity evamāder apratyakṣasyārthasya na śabdamātrāt pratyayaḥ, kiṃ tarhi? āptair ayam uktaḥ śabda ity ataḥ saṃpratyayaḥ, viparyayeṇa saṃpratyayābhāvāt/* "It is not because of words on their own that one believes in the existence of imperceptible objects such as 'heaven', 'the Apsaras', 'the Northern Kurus', 'the seven continents', 'the ocean', or 'the shape of the world'; rather, one believes [in their existence] because they have been spoken of by

This modifies our question to a considerable extent. No longer do we need to find out why Indian Brahmins, contrary to their habits, were willing to accept in their midst immigrants from a neighbouring country in the Northwest. The fact is that they didn't, or if they did, not knowingly. They did not accept immigrants from a neighbouring country in the Northwest as Brahmins, but rather immigrants from a remote continent, not reachable by ordinary travel. And these immigrants had always been Brahmins, for unlike the countries in the Northwest, society in the remote continent of Śākadvīpa was organized according to brahmanical principles.

But why should immigrants from Śākadvīpa be granted privileges that were not granted to visitors from neighbouring countries? The answer is simple and straightforward: Because quite independently of the arrival of the Magas, and presumably already before this event, there was a brahmanical tradition that maintained that the remote continent of Śākadvīpa was inhabited by people who followed the brahmanical order of society. This is clear from a passage in the *Bhīṣmaparvan* of the *Mahābhārata*, which says a great deal about Śākadvīpa and its inhabitants, but nothing whatsoever about migrating Magas. Here it is:[364]

> In that [continent] there are four meritorious countries, esteemed by the people: Maga, Maśaka, Mānasa and Mandaga. Maga is mainly inhabited by Brahmins who love their tasks. In Maśaka there are virtuous Kṣatriyas who are generous in accordance with the wishes of all. In Mānasa the Vaiśyas survive by their tasks; they are brave, devoted to the wishes of all, bent on *dharma* and *artha*. The Śūdras in Mandaga, for their part, are men constantly pious. There is there neither king nor punishment, whether big or small. The [people] preserve *dharma* with regard to each other by [sticking to] their own *dharma*. This much can be said about that continent. This much you should hear about Śākadvīpa, full of splendor.

The author of this passage clearly thought of the continent of Śākadvīpa as exemplifying the brahmanical social order, in the sense that its inhabitants included Brahmins, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras, and presumably no others.[365] It also seems clear that the

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trustworthy people. Otherwise one would not believe in them." Note further that in Śākadvīpa, according to *Matsya Purāṇa* 122.40, the Tretāyuga is permanent. (According to various Purāṇas, the four yugas only occur in Bhāratavarṣa; see Kirfel 1931: 24, 29, 49, 62-63.)

[364] Mhbh 6.12.33-37: *tatra puṇyā janapadāś catvāro lokasaṃmatāḥ/ magāś ca maśakāś caiva mānasā mandagās tathā// 33 // magā brāhmaṇabhūyiṣṭhāḥ svakarmaniratā nṛpa/ maśakeṣu tu rājanyā dhārmikāḥ sarvakāmadāḥ// 34 // mānaseṣu mahārāja vaiśyāḥ karmopajīvinaḥ/ sarvakāmasamāyuktāḥ śūrā dharmārthaniścitāḥ/ śūdrās tu mandage nityaṃ puruṣā dharmaśīlinaḥ// 35 // na tatra rājā rājendra na daṇḍo na ca daṇḍikā/ svadharmeṇaiva dharmaṃ ca te rakṣanti parasparam// 36 // etāvad eva śakyaṃ tu tasmin dvīpe prabhāṣitum/ etāvad eva śrotavyaṃ śākadvīpe mahaujasi// 37 //*. Note that in this passage the four names Maga, Maśaka, Mānasa and Mandaga designate countries — usually through the plural (cf. Renou 1984: 275: "Le pluriel s'emploie dans diverses catégories de noms à valeur collective, … noms de pays désignés par le peuple qui l'occupe (*aṅgāḥ*)"), once through the singular (*mandage*, v. 35) — not social classes. In other words, in this passage the Magas are not all Brahmins, the Maśakas not all Kṣatriyas, etc. See in this connection Pirart's observation cited above.

[365] This passage does *not* justify Scheftelowitz's following remark (1933: 316): "Zur Zeit der Entstehung des Mahābh. hatten die Indoskythen unter Einfluss der brahmanischen Kultur die Form des indischen Kastenwesens schon längst übernommen …"

Sāmba Purāṇa has either directly undergone the influence of this passage, or of a similar passage that also influenced the *Mahābhārata*.[366]

The *Mahābhārata* itself does not identify Śākadvīpa with Persia or with any other region near India, nor do other ancient Indian texts that I know of. Śākadvīpa is a remote continent. Earlier in the same chapter, the *Bhīṣmaparvan* tells us that Śākadvīpa is twice as large as Jambūdvīpa and is on all sides surrounded by a sea of milk.[367]

Of particular interest in the present discussion is that the *Bhīṣmaparvan* says nothing about a possible link of the Magas of Śākadvīpa with sun-worship.[368] In the *Sāmba Purāṇa* it is the sun who provides information about Śākadvīpa, and who adds that he has created the inhabitants of that continent and given them the four Vedas.[369] This confirms our impression that an independent mythico-geographical notion that found expression in the *Mahābhārata* was subsequently put to use in a context to which it originally did not belong.

Theoretically one might speculate that the original account of Śākadvīpa included already an account of Maga Brahmins settling in Jambūdvīpa, but there is no evidence to support this. The position that the Purāṇic account is older than the one found in the *Mahābhārata* has been defended by Hilgenberg (1934: XLIV) but was subsequently rejected in a detailed rejoinder by Belvalkar (1939). This position has indeed little to recommend itself. And the view that Śākadvīpa has been provided with a brahmanically organized society for no other reason than to justify the brahmanical claim of certain sun-priests in India seems implausible.

Our reflections appear to justify the following picture. For some reason so far unknown there was a belief in brahmanical circles that there was a remote continent called Śākadvīpa whose population consisted of Brahmins, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras. Independently of this tradition, and presumably at some later date, sun-priests from Persia settled in India. In order to be recognized as Brahmins in their new surroundings, they or their descendents made the claim that *they* were the Magas of Śākadvīpa, who had been called hither.

It is not impossible that the myth of Śākadvīpa and its Magas had originally been created under the influence of bits of information that had reached India from Persia.[370] In

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[366] For further similar Purāṇic passages, see Kirfel 1920: 119 ff.; 122 f.; 126 f.; Hilgenberg 1934: XLIII.

[367] Mhbh 6.12.8-9: *śākadvīpaṃ ca vakṣyāmi yathāvad iha pārthiva/ śṛṇu me tvaṃ yathānyāyaṃ bruvataḥ kurunandana// 8 // jambūdvīpapramāṇena dviguṇaḥ sa narādhipa/ viṣkambheṇa mahārāja sāgaro 'pi vibhāgaśaḥ/ kṣīrodo bharataśreṣṭha yena saṃparivāritaḥ// 9 //*. The last line does *not* state "that the Kshīroda Sāgara or the Caspian Sea was encircled in parts by the Śakadvīpa", as claimed by Shrava (1981: 7). Parasher (1991: 248), basing herself on Shrava, claims that the epics and Purāṇas "inform us that among the Śakas, the Magas were the *brāhmaṇas*, the Māgadhas were the *kṣatriyas*, the Mānasas were the *vaiśyas* and the Mandagas were the *śūdras*"; this is of course incorrect.

[368] Cp. Srivastava 1972: 242.

[369] *Sāmba Purāṇa* 26.32-33 (Stietencron 1966: 47): *tejasaś ca madīyasya nirmitā vai purā mayā// tebhyo vedāś ca catvāraḥ sarahasyā mayeritāḥ/ vedoktair vividhaiḥ stotraiḥ parair guhyair mayā kṛtaiḥ//*

[370] Timothy Lubin (forthcoming b), in the paper he read at the 224th meeting of the American Oriental Society, Phoenix 2014, wonders whether the story of Śākadvīpa with its ideal brahmanical society is the result of claims by the Śakas of belonging to the local brahmanical elite, and therefore of being legitimate rulers.

that sense it may be maintained that the claim of the immigrant Magas was correct, but only in this artificial sense. The Magas of India did not base their claim to social status on history in our sense of the term, but on mythology. Had they based their claim on the fact that their ancestors had arrived from Persia (a fact presumably unknown to them), they would not have been accepted as Brahmins in India. Had they known that their ancestors had come from Persia, there would have been ways to say so, and say so clearly. But the Magas said no such thing: they did not claim to come from Persia, they claimed to come from Śākadvīpa. And Śākadvīpa was not situated to the west or northwest of India: it was a continent very far removed from the continent called Jambūdvīpa in which India had its place.

Inscriptional and textual evidence indicates that there were indeed priests called Magas in India associated with the sun-cult. Varāhamihira's *Bṛhatsaṃhitā* (59.19 [ed. Tripāṭhī], 60.19 [ed. Bhat]) mentions them, and indeed, Varāhamihira himself may have been a Maga.[371] It is even possible that Sphujidhvaja's *Yavanajātaka* was composed by a Maga.[372]

"There is an Inscription at Govindapur in the Gayā District dated Śaka 1059, corresponding to 1137-38 A.D., in the opening stanza of which the Magas, who sprang from the sun, are represented to have been brought into the country by Sāmba.[373] … There are traces of Magas elsewhere, and there are Brāhmaṇas of that name in Rajputana and some other provinces of Northern India."[374] The *Bṛhaddharma Purāṇa* (3.13.52) has a "reference to [a] *devala*, who was brought from Śākadvīpī by Suparṇa (Garuḍa) and called *śākadvīpī vipra* (brāhmaṇa)" (Furui 2013: 205). It reminds us that these Brahmins, being temple priests (*devala[ka]*), commanded less respect than other Brahmins.[375]

Among the earliest references to the Magas in India we must count the *Brakhmanai Magoi* in Ptolemy's *Geography* (ca. 150 CE).[376] This agrees with the

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[371] Biswas 1949. In spite of this, "Varāhamihira ignores the fabulous continents (*dvīpa*) lying outside of Bhāratavarṣa … And the margins remain realms of teratology, inhabited by 'Dog-Faced', 'Horse-Faced', and 'Tiger-Faced' peoples." (Pollock 2006: 196). "[T]he Dog-heads … clearly belong to Northwest India." (Karttunen 1989: 185). According to *Bṛhatsaṃhitā* 14.24-25, Dog-Faced (*śvamukha*) and Horse-Faced (*turagānana*) peoples belong to the North, and according to verse 14.5, the Tigre-Faced (*vyāghramukha*) people belongs to the East.

[372] Its author attained a "vision of truth [that] came from the grace of the Sun", and if Mak's recent study is to be trusted, the text was originally written in a language different from Sanskrit, but also different from Greek (Mak 2013: 12 f.). Indeed, "It appears that the *Yavanajātaka* is an original amalgamation of Greek and Indian astral sciences" (p. 13); "the text Sphujidhvaja composed appears to be original, based on an indigenous tradition where elements of Greek and Indian astral sciences were thoroughly amalgamated" (p. 16). See further Mak 2013a; 2014.

[373] See Kielhorn 1894: 333/338: "Hail to that gem of the three worlds, the divine Aruṇa, whose presence sanctifies the milk-ocean-encircled Śākadvīpa where the Brahmins are named Magas! There a race of twice-born [sprang] from the sun's own body, grazed by the lathe, whom Śāmba himself brought hither."

[374] R. D. Bhandarkar 1913/1982: 219. An inscription from Ghaṭiyālā, twenty-two miles west-northwest of Jôdhpur, dated saṃvat 918, was written by a Maga (D. R. Bhandarkar 1907-08: 279, 281). There are also Śākadvīpīya Brahmins in modern India; see, e.g., Risley 1891: 159 f.; Mitra 1953: 238 ("Sakadwipi").

[375] See § IIA.1.3, below.

[376] Gail 1978: 344; MacCrindle 1884: 167, 170.

hypothesis that these priests and their sun-cult may have found their way into the subcontinent at the time of the Kuṣāṇas or slightly before them, under the Śakas.[377]

IIA.1.3. Temple priests and other Bramins of debatable origin

D. R. Bhandarkar made the following remark about the main deities of Hinduism (1981: 123):

> It is very doubtful whether Śiva, Vishṇu, the Sun and Mahāsena can be considered to be Brāhmanic deities even in the Gupta period. In modern times there is hardly any important shrine of Vishṇu, Śiva or Ambikā which is not in charge of a Brāhmaṇa priest who alone has the right to show the god or goddess to the devotees on payment of money, or the making of offerings, or both, which is a source of income to the priest. But there is no inscription of the Gupta period to show that the deities noted above came down to the Gupta period from the Ṛigvedic times, with the Brahmanical or original character stamped upon them.

The infiltration of non-brahmanical deities into Hinduism has been considered in § I.1.3, and we cannot but agree with Bhandarkar. Temple worship,[378] too, is a relatively recent phenomenon, which does not gain importance until after the period we are considering.[379] Moreover, within brahmanical circles there has been relatively little esteem for Brahmins who offered their services to temples.[380] Traditional brahmanical religious practice, it may be recalled, had no place for temple worship, nor indeed for images of gods. The transition to a time in which there were Brahmins connected with temple and image worship appears to have been difficult, with internal divisions among Brahmins as to the suitability for Brahmins to perform such functions. Literary evidence shows that Brahmins involved in temple and image worship (sometimes called *devalaka*)[381] were despised by their more orthodox confreres; sometimes their very brahmanical status was

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[377] Al-Biruni's remarks about the Magians in India "where they are called Maga" (Sachau 1888: I: 21) no doubt concern the Parsis, who maintained their Persian identity and had reached India some time before him, but many centuries after the Maga Brahmins.

[378] See on this Olivelle 2009a.

[379] Pilgrimage is important from the time of the *Mahābhārata* onward, but is slow in finding its way into brahmanical law books. Cf. Jacobsen 2013: 12-13: "It is … noteworthy that no formal treatment of pilgrimage is found in any of the law books and that the texts on *dharma* usually did not include sections on *tīrtha*s and *tīrthayātrā*. In law books like *Manusmṛti* and *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*, *tīrtha* and *tīrthayātrā* have an unimportant position and are not a topic of discussion. In *Manusmṛti*, it is mentioned in an example as something one does not need to do (*Manusmṛti* 8.92). *Viṣṇusmṛti* devotes one whole chapter, Chapter 85, to a description of the *tīrtha*s which are recommended for performance of *śrāddha*, but the *Viṣṇusmṛti* was probably a late work and, according to Patrick Olivelle …, composed between 700 CE and 1000 CE." See also Jacobsen 2013: 53: "Traditions of sacred sites have probably existed outside of Brahmanical ritual tradition before their inclusion in the *Mahābhārata*."

[380] See, e.g., Stietencron 1977; Appadurai 1983. Already Śabara, the famous Mīmāṃsaka (fifth/sixth century CE), expresses his lack of esteem; see § IIA.4.3, below.

[381] See Colas 1996: 133-140.

doubted.[382] The Pāñcarātrins are an interesting example: faced with scepticism from orthodox Brahmins, they attempted to prove their brahmanical status, and along with it the orthodox status of their rituals and texts. But the criticism by orthodox Brahmins was severe:[383]

> [The Pāñcarātrin:] How can you say that Brahmins, the foremost of those belonging to the three upper caste-classes, are not educated?
> [The critic responds:] That is incorrect. Those [Pāñcarātrins] do not belong to the three upper caste-classes, and they are even less Brahmins. For we do not perceive, once our sense-organs have come into contact with them, a specific species called Brahmin-hood, that is supposedly present in only some specific bodies and absent in others, and that is different from man-hood. Features such as a tuft of hair on the head, a sacrificial thread and so on, which are prescribed for Brahmins etc., cannot confer Brahmin-hood, nor do they make it known, because these features can also be observed in the case of certain vile Śūdras and so on. If follows that the basis for knowing a Brahmin is the established and uncontested usage of the elderly, and nothing else. What is more, people in the world do not use the word Brahmin without hesitation to refer to the Bhāgavatas. On the contrary, they speak about the two in different terms: "Here there are Brahmins, there there are Bhāgavatas."

Marion Rastelli draws my attention to a passage in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Āgamaḍambara*, where an orthodox Brahmin expresses his annoyance about the fact "that these Pāñcarātrika Bhāgavatas should adopt brahminical manners. They mix with brahmins and have no scruples about using the form of greeting that only we may use to our equals. They recite the Pāñcarātra scriptures with a special pattern of accented syllables, as if

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[382] See Njammasch 2001: XIX-XX: "Neben den Brahmanen, fast unmerklich zunächst, entwickelte sich die Schicht der Tempelpriester mit Bilderkult. Ihre Herkunft geht weit in die indische Gesellschaft hinein. Zur Guptazeit werden sie in den Quellen deutlicher sichtbar. … Sie propagierten den Bilderkult und stellten die Anfänge der späteren mittelalterlichen hinduistischen Tempelkulte dar. Ihre Götter und vor allem zunächst Göttinnen kamen aus den Volkskulten, ihre Riten und Kulte waren stark von den existierenden Volkskulten beeinflusst. Die Tempelpriester bemühten sich, diese Kulte mit vedischen Kulten zu verbinden, um ihnen auf diese Weise Prestige und altertümliche Tradition zu verleihen. … In der frühen Phase des Mittelalters, bis etwa ins 8. Jh. hinein, blickten die Brahmanen der vedischen Schulen mit einiger Verachtung auf die hinduistiscen Tempelpriester hinab, deren Herkunft oft genauso obskur war wie die der frühmittelalterlichen Dynasten in den Stammesgebieten. Im frühen Mittelalter werden die Tempelpriester in den Inschriften nicht als Brahmanen bezeichnet. Die Situation änderte sich aber ab etwa dem 10. Jh. n. Chr. Dann versuchten die Brahmanen der vedischen Schulen mit den erfolgreichen hinduistischen Tempelpriestern eine Allianz einzugehen bzw. diese zu ersetzen, wo sie es konnten." The same old attitude survives today; see Sarma 2007.

[383] Yāmunācārya: *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 11-12: *nanu te katham aśiṣṭā ye traivarṇikāgraṇyo brāhmaṇāḥ? tan na/ teṣāṃ traivarṇikatvam eva nāsti/ dūre brāhmaṇabhāvaḥ/ na hi indriyasaṃprayogasamanantaraṃ keṣucid eva dehaviśeṣeṣu anuvartamānam, anyato vyāvartamānaṃ naratvātirekiṇaṃ brāhmaṇyaṃ nāma jātiviśeṣam aparokṣayāmaḥ/ śikhāyajñopavītādayas tu brāhmaṇādīnāṃ vidhīyamānā na tadbhāvam āpādayituṃ kṣamante, nāpy avagamayanti; duṣṭaśūdrādiṣu vyabhicāradarśanāt/ ato nirvivādasiddhavṛddhavyavahāra evātrāvagamanidānam/ na ca bhāgavateṣu brāhmaṇapadam aviśaṅkaṃ laukikāḥ prayuñjate/ bhavati ca bhedena vyapadeśaḥ: 'ito brāhmaṇā ito bhāgavatā' iti/.* See Rastelli 2008: 271 ff.

they were taking the text of Veda as their example. 'We are brahmins', they say of themselves, and demand that others speak of them in the same way. Take the Śaivas and their ilk: they are not part of the system of the four social estates, they reject the life-periods determined by the Veda and the Smṛtis and they set themselves apart by adopting a differing doctrine. But these fellows say that 'We have been truly brahmins ever since our birth, for a long succesion of ancestors', and in the same way the imitate the system of the four life-periods: this is a great torment."[384] Original Brahmin-hood is crucial because, as the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila points out, "the 'dharmic character' (*dharmatva*) of the rites performed in the temples of deities is, like several other practices, approved *because those who perform them are the same as the performers of 'Vedic sacrifices'*" (TanVār on sūtra 1.3.7, p. 126: *vaidikaiḥ kartṛsāmānyāt*; Colas 2004: 155).

The question cannot be avoided whether the temple priests concerned were originally Brahmins who had decided to take up this new profession, or rather non-Brahmins engaged in temple service who subsequently claimed brahmanical status.[385] In other words: Were these people first Brahmins and only later temple priests, or were they first temple priests and only later Brahmins? It is in this context important to remember that temples came to play important roles also in non-religious realms. Veluthat (2009: 78), for example, argues "that the temple played a role in medieval south India going far beyond a mere 'religious institution'. It had functions of a social, economic, political and cultural nature and they were interrelated in a most complex way. It is only when one is able to appreciate it in its entirety that one will be able to grasp the complexity and also to see how there was a rush to patronize the temple, which has to be understood as prompted by more than piety. And, naturally, the patronage was more than reciprocated." There were therefore plenty of reasons, on the one hand, for Brahmins to claim a role of eminence in temple worship, and, on the other, for temple priests to claim a position of eminence in society, and therefore brahmanical status.

Temple and image worship was probably in the hands of non-Brahmins before Brahmins turned to this activity.[386] The *Matsya Purāṇa* speaks in this connection of heretics (*pāṣaṇḍin*) (267: 32).[387] This suggests that non-brahmanical temple priests came to be replaced by brahmanical ones in a number of temples. It seems in any case safe to follow Granoff (2006: 390) in speaking of "efforts to impose on a large scale Brahmanic

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[384] Text and translation in Dezső 2005: 194-197 (transliteration normalized).

[385] Brahmanical fear about Śūdras usurping the avocations of Brahmins finds expression in descriptions of the shortcomings of the Kali-Yuga (R. S. Sharma 2001: 54), and may, at least in part, be inspired by the existence of non-brahmanical temple priests. Recall at this point that temples were sometimes the way through which kings reasserted their superiority vis-à-vis Brahmins (Francis 2013: 13 f.).

[386] Not everyone shares this opinion. "Heinrich von Stietencron has suggested that we view the rise of image worship in terms of a schism within the Brahmin class. 'It was not merely a question of defence of Brahmanic privileges against a new group of religious specialists rising from the lower strata of society,' he writes. 'The texts rather suggest that the conflict was mainly within the Brahman class' (1977: 126 [52]). The shift from vedic altar to Hindu temple, from invisible celestials to divine icons, he argues, 'was accompanied by bitter feuds between traditionalists and innovators.'" (Davis 2001: 115). However, "Stietencron argues that the custodians of images, the *devalaka*s, were *śūdra*s but that some Brahmans started to perform services for the shrines (Stietencron 1977)." (Jacobsen 2013: 68)

[387] Granoff 2006: 391.

rituals on an originally non-Brahmanic public cult of images".[388] But were these rites carried out by 'fallen Brahmins', Brahmins who reduced their status by abandoning the old vedic rites in favour of new temple rites? Or rather by temple priest who successfully claimed brahmanical status and therefore rather rose in rank?[389]

Stories in the Purāṇas favour the former alternative. Consider the following:[390]

> … the *Śiva Purāṇa* includes a story about the origin of the priests who worship the *liṅga*. They are called *baṭukas* and the lineage is traced back to a Brahmin who had violated the rules of ritual purity by having sexual intercourse and not bathing before he worshipped Śiva on the night of Śivarātri. Eventually Gaurī takes pity on him and adopts him as her son. Śiva decrees that the descendants of this fallen Brahmin are to worship the *liṅga*.

Another story occurs in the *Skanda Purāṇa*:[391]

> The sage Durvāsas had asked the Brahmin community for land to build a Śiva temple, but the Brahmins were too busy with their Vedic study to take much notice of his request. He curses them and one Brahmin attempts to placate the sage, offering him the land he desired. In turn this Brahmin, 'Suśīla', "of irreproachable conduct" is cursed by the others to be called 'Duḥśīla', "of wicked conduct". He must move outside the city and he is not permitted to take part in any of the ritual activities of the other Brahmins.

Also Michael Willis, in his book *The Archaeology of Hindu Ritual* (2009), appears to think that Brahmins, i.e. real original Brahmins, consciously decided to become temple priests. To cite his own words (p. 122): "The new relationship between *pūjā*, priest, image, patron, and land was a powerful synergism that produced temple-based Hinduism. This world — in part Vedic but radically different from what went before — did not emerge in an organic, subconscious, or accidental fashion from some sort of socio-religious plasma; it was consciously created by members of the priesthood — an intellectual and religious elite with clear aims and certain purposes."[392] This formulation

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[388] See also Granoff 1997. Elsewhere Granoff (2004) points out that there may have been "more than a slight hesitation about the status of images and their worship among the orthodox circles of all of India's classical religions" (p. 21). Granoff continues (p. 23): "images were not at home in the world of Brahminic ritual, that is, in the world of ritual controlled by Brahmin priests, and it is that world that is reflected in many of the rituals of the *purāṇas*. That images do not necessarily play a role in such rituals is not surprising." Colas (2004) documents the increasing acceptance of image worship in a number of brahmanical texts from, roughly, the second half of the first millennium CE; see further Colas 2012a.

[389] Kulke (1997: 96) states: "An important characteristic of the courtly cults of [the] early local nuclear areas was … the incorporation of mighty local cults and the (temporary) integration of their non-Brāhmaṇa priests into the courtly circle."

[390] Granoff 2006: 392, with reference to *Śiva Purāṇa*, *koṭirudrasaṃhitā*, chapter 13.

[391] Granoff 2006: 392, with reference to the *Nāgarakāṇḍa*, one of the later sections of the *Skanda Purāṇa*.

[392] Cf. Willis 2009: 111: "priests were directing the offerings from the domestic environment to the temple and attracted funding to support these rites in the new location". This is referred back to in the index as "brāhmaṇas as agents in creation of temple religion".

is admittedly somewhat ambiguous, because the expression 'members of the priesthood' might include 'new Brahmins', perhaps originally non-brahmanical priests, who joined in the creation of this new world, meanwhile claiming brahmanical status.

It is perhaps not surprising that brahmanical literature — virtually the only surviving literature that provides us with information about Brahmins — avoids casting doubt on the purity of brahmanical descent.[393] In spite of this, some passages in brahmanical literature suggest that irregularities have taken place. The story of the Magas, told and analyzed above, illustrates this: the Magas were not originally Brahmins, yet succeeded in becoming accepted as Brahmins. And the Magas may not be the only example of this kind.

Remember at this point that a passage of the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*, which we studied above, opens up a theoretical possibility for non-Brahmins to become Brahmins by doing the job of Brahmins. The sūtra concerned speaks about a rise in status — *jātyutkarṣa* is the term — and there is no reason to doubt that the obtainment of brahmanical status, too, is part of the subject talked about.

Some modern scholars do not hesitate to state that such changes of status may in fact have been widespread.[394] Consider the following observation by A. L. Basham:[395]

> For all the rigidity of the class system the brāhmaṇs soon lost their racial purity, and it has even been suggested that, as Āryan culture expanded, schools of aboriginal sorcerers and medicine men managed to obtain a footing in the brāhmaṇic order …

M. N. Srinivas states, similarly:[396]

> A potent source of social mobility in pre-British India was the fluidity of the political system. Such fluidity was not limited to any particular part of India, but characterized the system everywhere. It constituted an important, though not the only, avenue to social mobility. In order to capture political power, however, a caste or its local section had to have a martial tradition, numerical strength, and preferably also ownership of a large quantity of arable land. Once it had captured political power it had to Sanskritize its ritual and style of life and lay claim to being Kshatriya. It had to patronize (*or even create*) Brahmins who would minister to it on ritual occasions, and produce an appropriate myth supporting the group's claim to Kshatriya status. The establishment of *Pax Britannica* resulted in freezing the political system and blocked this avenue to mobility.

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[393] There are, on the other hand, texts that claim brahmanical status for people whose status is in doubt. The Vaidyas of Bengal are an example, studied in Haag 2012. Even Brahmins who accept each other's status can be critical of each other: "When the Śākhās criticize each other, they call each other liars and followers of untruth and irrational practices. This made the relations between Brahmins belonging to different Vedas and different Śākhās very complex, and they were fraught with issues very difficult to resolve." (Deshpande 2012: 345). Deshpande presents some documented cases of ritual conflicts between different Vedas and Śākhās on pp. 346-348.

[394] Brunner (1964) suggested a Śūdra origin for certain Brahmins; Colas (1996: 152) shows that her arguments are not valid for Vaikhānasa Brahmins.

[395] Basham 1967: 140.

[396] Srinivas 1966: 31; emphasis added.

And Vijay Nath observes:[397]

> That the vastly inflated brāhmaṇa class, spread all over the country, could have comprehended brāhmaṇas of only pure descent belonging to the middle country alone seems hardly credible.

Nath (2001: 25; 2001a: 56-59) presents a number of stories from a variety of texts that suggest that this or that group of Brahmins is not of 'pure' descent, but consists rather of descendants of originally non-Brahmin ancestors. He concludes (2001a: 59):

> There is, thus, enough evidence to suggest that the brāhmaṇa caste stratum by early medieval times also comprehended elements other than those of strictly pure and mid-landic origin. Large number of tribal and aboriginal priestly groups appear to have gained entry into its fold as low-grade brāhmaṇas.

Kosambi (1975: 134-135) thinks that Brahmins were already genetically mixed during the centuries preceding the Common Era:

> The Brahmins were … genetically mixed at the time, as follows from Patañjali's comment on [Pāṇini] 2.2.6:[398] "When one has seen a certain black (person), the colour of a heap of black beans, seated in the marketplace, one definitely concludes (without inquiry) that that is not a Brahmin; one is (intuitively) convinced thereof." As against this, there is a clear formula in [*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*] 6.4.16 for the birth of a black son to a Brahmin:[399] "Now in case one wishes that a swarthy (*śyāmo*) son with red eyes be born to me, that he be able to repeat the three vedas, that he attain the full length of life! They two (the parents) should have rice boiled with water and should eat it prepared with ghee. They two are likely to beget (such a son)."

These quotations remind us that textual sources do little beyond providing suggestions. They do not help us to assess the full extent to which 'irregularities' have tainted the claimed purity of brahmanical descent. A more accurate assessment of the way in which Brahmanism spread and, in doing so, remained (or did not remain) faithful to its own principles may only be attained through the analysis of the genetic proximity of Brahmins in different parts of India, keeping in mind that Brahmins may not have been a homogeneous group even at the beginning of their spread. Such an analysis has never been undertaken, and constitutes a challenge for the future.[400]

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[397] Nath 2001a: 57.

[398] This translates Mahā-bh I p. 411 l. 29 – p. 412 l. 412: *na hy ayaṃ kālaṃ māṣarāśivarṇam āpaṇa āsīnaṃ dṛṣṭvādhyavasyati brāhmaṇo 'yam iti/ nirjñātaṃ tasya bhavati/.*

[399] This translates BĀrUp 6.4.16 (p. 158): *atha ya icchet putro me śyāmo lohitākṣo jāyeta trīn vedān anubruvīta sarvam āyur iyād ity udaudanaṃ pācayitvā sarpiṣmantam aśnīyātām/ īśvarau janayitavai/.*

[400] It seems therefore premature to assume that Brahmins at the time of Patañjali had the same physical attributes as today. Yet this is what Aklujkar (2008: 184) does when discussing the adjectives that Patañjali uses in connection with Brahmins. Three of these — *gaura* 'fair-skinned, one having a light complexion', *piṅgalākṣa* 'cat-eyed or brown-eyed' and *kapila-keśa* 'one with tawny hair' — refer to physical appearance. Aklujkar concludes: "All three apply to Kashmirian

IIA.2. Admittance

The requirement of pure descent, as we saw in § IIA.1.2-3, did not suffice to prevent outsiders from claiming, and sometimes obtaining, brahmanical status. And yet, the brahmanical theoreticians had done what they could to avoid this. The mere claim of pure descent was not enough to be recognized as a Brahmin. Every (male) Brahmin had to go through a number of 'sacraments' (*saṃskāra*), rituals (*rites of passage*) that marked different transitions in his life.

It appears that these sacraments did not go back to ancient times. There are indeed reasons to think that they were created during the formative centuries we have been studying, i.e. the last centuries preceding the Common Era.

IIA.2.1. Vedic initiation (*upanayana*) and other sacraments (*saṃskāra*)

The most important of these sacraments is the one known by the name *upanayana*. In classical Brahmanism this is the rite of initiation *par excellence* and counts as a 'second birth' for the candidates, who are henceforth 'twice-born' (*dvija* or *dvijāti*). Only those who have undergone this second birth are entitled to learn to recite the Veda, and the *upanayana* can be looked upon as a barrier that prevents outsiders from acquiring this secret knowledge. The *upanayana* leaves a visible trace, which will for ever after identify the initiate as a Brahmin: the *yajñopavīta* or 'sacred thread', which the Brahmin is henceforth expected to wear at all times. This, at any rate, is the situation that supposedly has prevailed since time immemorial.

In reality the situation may have been more complex. As we saw in § I.1.3 above, Patrick Olivelle (2012) has drawn attention to the fact that the *yajñopavīta*, 'sacred thread', is a relatively recent feature in the rite of vedic initiation (*upanayana*). To quote his own words (Olivelle 2012: 119):

> The *yajñopavīta* (or *brahmasūtra*), the sacrificial cord commonly called the 'sacred thread', is such a central feature of the ceremony of Vedic initiation (*upanayana*) that in modern parlance it is often referred to as the 'thread ceremony'. In the classical period, Brahmanical identity was often based on the constant and uninterrupted wearing of the sacrificial cord. Yet, the ancient rite of *upanayana* given in the Gṛhyasūtras and the Dharmasūtras make no mention of the sacrificial cord. Its compulsory wearing by those who have undergone Vedic initiation is found for the first time in the Dharmasūtras of Baudhāyana and Vasiṣṭha, thus providing us a chronological boundary between these two later texts and the earlier ones of Āpastamba and Gautama.

Brahmins, and are unlikely to be thought of as germane or widely applicable in the case of Brahmins from other parts of India." We cannot exclude the possibilty that at the time of Patañjali these three qualities *were* thought of as applicable to all or most Brahmins.

This means that one important feature of the rite of vedic initiation, and the most visible at that, turns out to be of relatively recent origin, and may not date back further than the last centuries preceding the Common Era.

In the same article, Olivelle undermines the ancient origin of the notion of a twice-born (2012: 119):

> The term and concept *dvija*, twice-born, is of recent origin. In all likelihood it was a theological innovation created sometime after Patañjali. Yet, in most of the Dharmasūtras, ... with the notable exception of Āpastamba, the twice-born is a central category in their theology and in their articulation of the *varṇa* ideology.

All this raises the question how old the rite of vedic initiation (*upanayana*) itself really is, and whether this rite, too, was perhaps introduced during the last few centuries preceding the Common Era, perhaps with the purpose of preventing outsiders from successfully claiming brahmanical status.

In order to pursue this question, we have to distinguish between customs and rites. There can be no doubt that vedic recitation was already old at the time we are considering, and this means that young boys were taken to (*upa-nī*) teachers who taught them this. This custom, and the form it may have taken in ancient times, is not relevant to the present discussion. This custom was however replaced by a rite of initiation, a *saṃskāra*, and we wish to know when this happened.

The claim that the *upanayana* was 'ritualized' at some point of time was already made in 1941 by Pandurang Vaman Kane, in the first edition of his *History of Dharmaśāstra* (HistDh II/I p. 268-269):

> The word '*upanayana*' can be derived and explained in two ways: (1) taking (the boy) near the *ācārya*, (2) that rite by which the boy is taken to the *ācārya*. The first sense appears to have been the original one and when an extensive ritual came to be associated with *upanayana* the second came to be the sense of the word. Such an ancient work as the [*Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*] I.1.1. 19 says that *upanayana* is a *saṃskāra* (purificatory rite) ...

Having subsequently discussed various passages from vedic literature that deal with *brahmacārin*s, Kane observed (p. 273):

> It appears from the above and from the Upaniṣad passages set out immediately below that originally Upanayana was a very simple matter. The would-be student came to the teacher with a *samidh* in his hand and told the teacher that he desired to enter the stage of studenthood and begged to be allowed to be a brahmacārī living with the teacher. There were no elaborate ceremonies like those described in the gṛhya sūtras.

All this changed. From a 'very simple matter', the *upanayana* became a complicated ritual. By way of example, Kane sets out in full its presentation in the *Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra* (Kane 1941: 281-283; same page numbering in the second edition):[401]

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[401] This is a free rendering of *Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra* 1.19.8 - 1.22.9 (ed. Gokhale; tr. Oldenberg 1.19.10 - 1.22.11): *alaṃkṛtaṃ kumāraṃ kuśalīkṛtaśirasam ahatena vāsasā saṃvītam aiṇeyena*

Let him initiate the boy who is decked, whose hair (on the head) is shaved (and arranged), who wears a new garment or an antelope skin if a brāhmaṇa, ruru skin if a kṣatriya, goat's skin if a vaiśya; if they put on garments they should put on dyed ones, reddish-yellow, red and yellow (for a brāhmaṇa, kṣatriya, vaiśya respectively), they should have girdles and staffs [in accordance with certain specifications]. While the boy takes hold of (the hand of) his teacher, the latter offers (a homa of clarified butter oblations) in the fire [following certain specifications] and seats himself to the north of the fire with his face turned to the east, while the other one (the boy) stations himself in front (of the teacher) with his face turned to the west. The teacher then fills the folded hands of both himself and of the boy with water and with the verse "we choose that of Savitṛ" ([*Ṛgveda*] V. 82. 1) the teacher drops down the water in his own folded hands on to the water in the folded hands of the boy; having thus poured the water, he should seize with his own hand the boy's hand together with the thumb (of the boy) with the formula "by the urge (or order) of the god Savitṛ, with the arms of the two Aśvins, with the ands of Pūṣan, I seize thy hand, oh so and so"; with the words "Savitṛ has seized thy hand, oh so and so" a second time (the teacher seizes the boy's hand); with the words "Agni is thy teacher, oh so and so" a third time. The teacher should cause

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vājinena brāhmaṇaṃ rauraveṇa kṣatriyam ājena vaiśyam // 8 // yadi vāsāṃsi vasīran raktāni vasīran kāṣāyaṃ brāhmaṇo māñjiṣṭham kṣatriyo hāridraṃ vaiśyaḥ // 9 // teṣāṃ mekhalāḥ // 10 // mauñjī brāhmaṇasya dhanur jyā kṣatriyasya āvī vaiśyasya // 11 // teṣāṃ daṇḍāḥ // 12 // pālāśo brāhmaṇasya audumbaraḥ kṣatriyasya bailvo vaiśyasya keśasaṃmito brāhmaṇasya lalāṭasaṃmitaḥ kṣatriyasya prāṇasaṃmito vaiśyasya // 13 //
sarve vā sarveṣām // 1 // samanvārabdhe hutvottarato 'agneḥ prāṅmukha ācāryo 'vatiṣṭhate// 2 // purastāt pratyaṅmukha itaraḥ // 3 // apām añjalī pūrayitvā tat savitur vṛṇīmaha iti pūrṇenāsya pūrṇam avakṣārayaty āsicya devasya tvā savituḥ prasave 'śvinor bāhubhyām pūṣṇo hastābhyāṃ hastaṃ gṛhṇāmy asāv iti tasya pāṇinā pāṇiṃ sāṅguṣṭhaṃ gṛhṇīyāt // 4 // savitā te hastam agrabhīd asāv iti dvitīyam / agnir ācāryas tavāsāv iti tṛtīyam // 5 // ādityam īkṣayet / deva savitar eva te brahmacārī taṃ gopāya sa māmṛtety ācāryaḥ // 6 // kasya brahmacāry asi prāṇasya brahmacāry asi kas tvā kam upanayate kāya tvā paridadāmīti // 7 // yuvā suvāsāḥ parivīta āgād ity ardharcenainaṃ pradakṣiṇam āvartayet // 8 // tasyādhyaṃsau pāṇī kṛtvā hṛdayadeśam ālabhetottareṇa // 9 // agniṃ parisamuhya brahmacārī tūṣṇīṃ samidham ādadhyāt tūṣṇīṃ vai prājāpatyaṃ prājāpatyo brahmacārī bhavatīti vijñāyate // 10 //
mantreṇa haike 'gnaye samidham āhārṣaṃ bṛhate jātavedase / tayā tvam agne vardhasva samidhā brahmaṇā vayaṃ svāheti // 1 // sa samidham ādhāyāgnim upaspṛśya mukhaṃ nimārṣṭi tris tejasā mā samanajmīti // 2 // tejasā hy evātmānaṃ samanaktīti vijñāyate // 3 // mayi medhāṃ mayi prajāṃ mayy agnis tejo dadhātu / mayi medhāṃ mayi prajāṃ mayīndra indriyaṃ dadhātu / mayi medhāṃ mayi prajāṃ mayi sūryo bhrājo dadhātu / yat te agne tejas tenāhaṃ tejasvī bhūyāsam / yat te agne varcas tenāhaṃ varcasvī bhūyāsam / yat te agne haras tenāhaṃ harasvī bhūyāsam / ity upasthāya jānvācyopasaṃgṛhya brūyād adhīhi bhoḥ sāvitrīṃ bho3 anubrū3hīti // 4 // tasya vāsasā pāṇibhyāṃ ca pāṇī saṃgṛhya sāvitrīm anvāha paccho 'rdharcaśaḥ sarvām // 5 // yathāśakti vācayīta // 6 // hṛdayadeśe 'syordhvāṅguliṃ pāṇim upadadhāti / mama vrate hṛdayaṃ te dadhāmi mama cittam anu cittaṃ te astu / mama vācam ekavrato juṣasva bṛhaspatiṣ ṭvā niyunaktu mahyam iti // 7 //
mekhalām ābadhya daṇḍaṃ pradāya brahmacaryam ādiśet // 1 // brahmacāry asy apo 'śāna karma kuru divā mā svāpsīr ācāryādhīno vedam adhīṣveti // 2 // dvādaśa varṣāṇi vedabrahmacaryam // 3 // grahaṇāntaṃ vā // 4 // sāyaṃ prātar bhikṣeta // 5 // sāyaṃ prātaḥ samidham ādadhyāt // 6 // apratyākhyāyinam agre bhikṣetāpratyākhyāyinīṃ vā // 7 // bhavān bhikṣāṃ dadātv iti, anupravacanīyām iti vā // 8 // tad ācāryāya vedayīta tiṣṭhed ahaḥśeṣam // 9 //

> (the boy) to look at the sun, while the teacher repeats "God Savitṛ! this is thy brahmacārī, protect him, may he not die" and (the teacher should further say "Whose brahmacārī art thou? thou art the brahmacārī of Prāṇa. Who does initiate thee and whom (does he initiate)? I give thee to Ka (to Prajāpati)". With the half verse ([*Ṛgveda*] III. 8. 4) "the young man, well attired and dressed, came hither" he (the teacher) should cause him to turn round to the right and with his two hands placed over (the boy's) shoulders he should touch the place of the boy's heart repeating the latter half (of [*Ṛgveda*] III. 8. 4). Having wiped the ground round the fire the brahmacārī should put (on the fire) a fuel stick silently, since it is known (from śruti) "what belongs to Prajāpati is silently (done)", and the brahmacārī belongs to Prajāpati. Some do this (offering of a fuel stick) with a mantra "to Agni I have brought a fuel stick, to the great Jātavedas; by the fuel stick mayst thou increase, Oh Agni and may we (increase) through *brahman* (prayer or spiritual lore), svāhā". Having put the fuel stick (on the fire) and having touched the fire, he (the student) thrice wipes off his face with the words "I anoint myself with lustre"; it is known (from śruti) "for he does anoint himself with lustre". "May Agni bestow on me insight, offspring and lustre; on me may Indra bestow insight, offspring and vigour (indriya); on me may the sun bestow insight, offspring and radiance; what thy lustre is, Oh Agni, may I thereby become lustrous; what thy strength is, Agni, may I thereby become strong; what thy consuming power is, Agni, may I thereby acquire consuming power". Having waited upon (worshipped) Agni with these formulas, (the student) should bend his knees, embrace (the teacher's feet) and say to him "recite, Sir, recite, Sir, the Sāvitrī". Seizing the student's hand with the upper garment (of the student) and his own hands the teacher recites the Sāvitrī, first pāda by pāda, then hemistich by hemistich (and lastly) the whole verse. He (the teacher) should make him (the student) recite (the Sāvitrī) as much as he is able. On the place of the student's heart the teacher lays his hand with the fingers upturned with the formula "I place thy heart unto duty to me; may thy mind follow my mind; may you attend on my words single-minded; may Bṛhaspati appoint thee unto me". Having tied the girdle round him (the boy) and having given him the staff, the teacher should instruct him in the observances of a brahmacārī with the words "a brahmacārī art thou, sip water, do service, do not sleep by day, depending (completely) on the teacher learn the Veda". He (the student) should beg (food) in the evening and the morning; he should put a fuel stick (on fire) in the evening and the morning. That (which he has received by begging) he should announce to the teacher; he should not sit down (but should be standing) the rest of the day.

The lines preceding this passage remind the reader that this rite of initiation is not optional. Those who fail to undergo it before the stipulated deadline, will for all practical purposes be expelled from brahmanical company:[402] "After that [deadline], they will be *patitasāvitrika* ‘deprived of the Sāvitrī’. One should not initiate them, nor teach them, nor use them as sacrificial priests, nor indeed have intercourse with them." Not all texts are so severe. The *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra* (1.1.28-36), for example, reserves such

[402] ĀśvGS 1.19.6-7 (ed. Gokhale): *ata ūrdhvaṃ patitasāvitrikā bhavanti // 6 // nainān upanayen nādhyāpayen na yājayen naibhir vyavahareyuḥ // 7 //*

exclusion for those whose father *and* grandfather have not been initiated, and proposes even for those penances that will allow them to be initiated after all.

It appears, then, that an *upanayana* rite was created at the time of the Gṛhyasūtras. It is also described in the early Dharmasūtras, including the presumably oldest extant one, the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*. Some elements were added later on, most notably the *yajñopavīta* 'sacred thread' and the notion of the 'twice-born'.

In order to appreciate what has been said so far, it is important to emphasize the distinction between a rite and a custom. While it may at times be difficult to draw a precise line, so that there may be cases where it is difficult to determine whether we are dealing with a rite or with a custom, by and large the difference is clear. Ritual behaviour is behaviour that is anchored in a higher reality, with the result that it adds a solemn, or sacred, character to what is done. A ritual initiation to vedic studies is more than just the beginning of vedic studies, whether or not certain customs are observed. By anchoring the event in a higher reality, it transforms it into something irreversible: after the initiation, the vedic student has become a different person, perhaps we should say: a true Brahmin. Initiations are often thought of as new births, all over the world, and the notion of a 'twice-born' could in due time easily attach itself to this initiation.[403] The connection with the higher reality is, in the examples considered, established by the holistic character of the procedure, the use of sacred formulas, etc.[404]

About the earlier, i.e. pre-ritual, history of the *upanayana* there are some misunderstandings that it will be useful to discuss here. We begin with some observations that Boris Oguibénine makes in his book *Three Studies in Vedic and Indo-European Religion and Linguistics* (1990: 1 f.):

> The Upanishads mention some undoubtedly very ancient forms of the *upanayana* which are most bare as they are deprived of any solemnity and bear no traces of ritual ceremonies. They strikingly ignore any involvement of the gods during the young man's investiture. [The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*] and [the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*] which are the oldest sources available after the Saṃhitā period hint at the *upanayana* being limited to the approaching a teacher by a future brahmacārin only with words: [*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*] VI.2.7 reports that Gautama (alias Uddālaka Āruṇi, famous for his philosophical dialogues in [*Chāndogya Upaniṣad*] VI.2), although having a son Śvetaketu, approaches Pravāhaṇa Jaivali with a simple announcement: "I am coming to you". This statement apparently sufficed to a[s]certain his intention to become the latter's pupil. The comments incorporated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* itself are most eloquent: we learn that in the ancient times those who were to become brahmacārins used to say just these words: VI.2.7 *sa hopāyanakīrtyovāsa* "having mentioned his coming to him (as a pupil), he (Gautama) stayed (with him)".

The simplicity of procedure does not surprise us after our earlier reflections. The incorporated comments to the extent that this was the procedure in ancient times need special attention, and we will return to them below.

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[403] Lubin (2010), in a section called "Consecration as rebirth", draws attention to a passage from the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (11.5) that present the student as newly born. Contentwise this passage does not reveal whether it dates from a time before or after the introduction of a rite of initiation.
[404] On the distinctive nature of ritual, see Bronkhorst 2012, esp. § III; 2012c: § I 3

On p. 2 of the same publication Oguibénine states:

> It is easy to infer thus that, at the early stage at least, the *brahmacārin*'s education remained a matter of learned discussions between the father and the son or else, if ever these were deemed insufficient, between a teacher and a young man.

This inference is based on three Upaniṣadic passages that will be discussed below.

Similar observations are made by P. V. Kane (HistDh II/I p. 273):

> ... in the [*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*] VI.2.7 it is said that former students (i.e. students in former ages) approached the teacher (for brahmacarya) only in words (i.e. without any further solemn rite or ceremony). In the most ancient times it is probable that the father himself always taught his son.

And by Raj Bali Pandey (1969: 125):

> In early times, in the Brahman families, it was the father who taught the boy.

In what follows I will first analyze some passages (including *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 6.2.7) that supposedly inform about the procedure of becoming a vedic student. Next we will consider the evidence underlying the claim that originally fathers always taught their sons. And finally we will look at the implications of the incorporated comments that attribute this particular procedure to ancient times.

Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 6.2 tells the story of the encounter between Śvetaketu and King Jaivali Pravāhaṇa of the Pañcālas. The king asks Śvetaketu a number of questions, which the latter is unable to answer. Obviously embarrassed, Śvetaketu returns to his father, who had also been his teacher, and reports what has happened. The father, who too must admit his inability to answer these questions, decides to become pupil of Pravāhaṇa Jaivali; the term used for studenthood is *brahmacarya* (BĀrUp 6.2.4). The king accepts the father, here called Gautama, as pupil on condition that he "seek in the usual manner".[405] Then the Upaniṣad continues:[406]

> "I come to you, sir, as a pupil!" — only by means of words, verily,[407] men of yore came as pupils. — So with the acknowledgment of coming as a pupil he remained.

The phrase "only by means of words, verily, men of yore came as pupils" shows that this custom existed no longer at the time of redaction of this passage.[408] Why was it inserted?

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[405] BĀrUp 6.2.7: *sa vai gautama tīrthenecchāsā iti*; tr. Hume.

[406] BĀrUp 6.2.7: *upaimy ahaṃ bhavantam iti/ vācā ha smaiva pūrva upayanti/ sa hopāyanakīrtyovāsa*. Tr. Hume, modified.

[407] This translation for *vācā ha smaiva* is in agreement with the use of these particles; see Hartman 1966: 82: "This position [of *ha*] near the opening of a new passage is likely to draw attention to the first word of a paragraph or sentence". ChānUp 4.10.1 *taṃ ha smaiva na samāvartayati* has the same particles in the same order, and must be translated: "only him, verily, he did not allow to return".

[408] Söhnen (1981: 195) states, with regard to this phrase: "vermutlich als Gloss eines späteren Überlieferers anzusehen". It seems safer to speak here rather of the work of the/a redactor.

Did its author really know what had been customary in the past? Or did he perhaps have other reasons for believing that men of yore became pupils by means of words only?

A comparison with the parallel passage in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (5.3 f.) shows that he may very well have had such other reasons.[409] This passage tells essentially the same story as *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 6.2, with the same characters playing the same roles. But here, unlike in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 6.2, Śvetaketu's father does not become a pupil of Pravāhaṇa Jaivali in the technical sens of the term. He just asks the king to explain the questions he had asked Śvetaketu, and the king, after some hesitation, complies.[410]

There is a third Upaniṣadic story about Śvetaketu and his father, this one occurring in the *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* (1.1 f.). This story has a number of features in common with the story of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 6.2 and *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 5.3 f. This time it is Citra Gārgyāyaṇi / Gāṅgyāyani who poses an embarrassing question to Śvetaketu, with the ultimate result that Śvetaketu's father enters upon a course of study (*svādhyāya*) in the house of Citra. In this case, however, Śvetaketu's father approaches his future teacher "with fuel in his hand" (*samitpāṇi*). This expression is common in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads to describe the process by which someone becomes someone else's pupil.[411] The fact that it occurs in connection with Śvetaketu's father contradicts the idea that in his days this kind of approach of a teacher was as yet unknown, purportedly because pupils approached their teachers by means of words only. (I shall argue below that it is in any case not justified to read these stories as accounts of historical events.) If R. Söhnen (1981: 199, 212) is right in believing that the *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* version of the story, at least as far as the introductory narrative is concerned "must have been the oldest one and probably the source of the two other versions",[412] obviously any conclusion as to an early *upanayana* by words alone is deprived of its basis.

Let us pay some more attention to the two versions of the above story in the *Chāndogya* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*s. Since they are two versions of one and the same story, there must have been an earlier version from which both were derived.[413]

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[409] This is by no means the only instance of a Sanskrit text wrongly attributing some custom or practice to the past. For another instance see Schmidt 1987: 25 f. (*upanayana* for girls). See also the next note.

[410] A similar editorial observation about earlier customs is found at ŚPaBr 11.4.1.1: "for in the time of our forefathers a prize used to be offered by chosen priests when driving about, for the sake of calling out the timid to a disputation" (*[e]tad dha sma vai tat pūrveṣāṃ vṛtānān dhāvayatām ekadhanam upāhitam bhavaty upavalhāya bibhyatā[m]*; tr. Witzel 1987a: 371). No such remark occurs in the parallel passage GPaBr 1.3.6. The editorial remark finds its explanation in the fact that here one gold coin plays the role which elsewhere in vedic literature is played by large numbers of cows, horses, etc.; see Witzel 1987a: 366 n. 11, and recall the remarks about gold coins made in § I.2.2, above.

[411] See Kane, HistDh II/I p. 273. Examples: ŚPaBr 11.4.1.9; 11.5.3.13; but GPaBr 1.3.14: *[u]payāmi tv eva bhavantam* (Witzel 1987a: 368); BĀrUp 2.1.14. Note that the KauṣUp version allows of an interpretation in which Citra does not insist that Śvetaketu's father become his pupil; see Söhnen 1981: 183 n. 19; Renou 1978: 15 n. 22.

[412] See however the next note.

[413] In view of the fact that the story may have been handed down orally before (and perhaps after) it became incorporated in the two Upaniṣads, I will not address the question whether perhaps either of the two surviving versions is the direct source of the other one. Even if we accept Söhnen's position that the story in the *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* may have been the source of the two other versions, the many close similarities between *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and *Chāndogya*

There is reason to believe that this earlier version made no explicit mention of Śvetaketu's father becoming pupil of Jaivali Pravāhaṇa 'in the usual manner', just as we find it in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. Had it been different, it would be hard to explain how this important feature could have been lost in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. If, on the other hand, we assume that in the earlier version Śvetaketu's father did not become pupil of the king, the remarks we find in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 6.2.7 become understandable, too. The redactor of this passage, we are then led to believe, was puzzled by the lack of appropriate ritual ceremonies in a situation which he interpreted as a form of *upanayana*. He 'explained' this puzzling state of affairs by stating that *in former times* no such ceremonies were performed.

There are other reasons, too, for assuming that the *Chāndogya* version is, in at least certain respects, closer to the original. Both surviving versions begin with a number of questions, the questions namely which Śvetaketu is unable to answer. But only in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* the instruction by Pravāhaṇa Jaivali is more or less directly connected with these initial questions. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* the link is no longer obvious, so that we are led to believe that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* version has lost some of the original coherence.

Also the mention of Gautama's studentship in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* version does not fit easily, for the king had offered him a boon. In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* version the situation is straightforward: Gautama asks as boon to hear the words which Pravāhaṇa had spoken to his son, and receives it, be it after some hesitation on the part of the king.[414] In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, on the other hand, the boon is subjected to the subsequent condition that Gautama accept the status of pupil. But normally no special boon is necessary for becoming someone's pupil. If we assume that the original story made only mention of a boon, as indeed the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* version does, this peculiarity is solved, too.[415]

If, then, we accept that the redactor of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 6.2.7 thought that something was missing in the text he received, what exactly was it? We have seen that in parallel passages in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads aspiring students are normally depicted as bringing *samidh* 'fuel' for the sacred fire. But Gautama approached King Pravāhaṇa without bringing fuel; here the two versions of the story agree. For the redactor of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 6.2.7 this was, as it appears, incongruous, so that he added the remark that in former times one could become student by means of words only, i.e., without bringing fuel for the sacred fire.

The redactor of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* version, on the other hand, does not appear to have taken offence at the fact that Gautama interrogated the king without becoming his student. This finds unexpected confirmation in the immediately following story in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (5.11 ff.). There we read how six Brahmins — one of

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Upaniṣad show that there must have been a common ancestor of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Chāndogya* versions which was already quite different from the *Kauṣītaki* version. Söhnen (1981: 200) is of the opinion that "[d]er Verfasser der [*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*]-Fassung ... offenbar die [*Chāndogya Upaniṣad*]-Fassung als Vorlage benutzt ... hat". Here, as in her view as to the position of the *Kauṣītaki* version, she may not sufficiently take into account that these stories may have been handed down orally, and that the composers of our texts did not necessarily base themselves on written or otherwise fixed texts.

[414] Interestingly, both passages confuse, or identify, the words spoken to Śvetaketu, i.e., the questions asked, and the answers to those questions.

[415] See also Söhnen 1981: 200.

them being Uddālaka Āruṇi, presumably the same as Gautama, the father of Śvetaketu — approached King Aśvapati Kaikeya "with fuel in their hands" (*samitpāṇi*), apparently with the desire to become his students. The king, however, starts his teaching without having accepted them as students (*anupanīya*; ChānUp 5.11.7).[416] One is tempted to believe that, in the opinion of the redactor of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 5 (supposing there was only one for these two stories), there was no problem connected with an instruction by a Kṣatriya of Brahmins in which the latter do not formally become pupils of the former.

The exact significance of the expression *anupanīya* "without having accepted them as students" becomes clear by comparing *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 5.11 ff. with the alternative version of this story at *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 10.6.1. There Aśvapati Kaikeya *does* accept the Brahmins as pupils. This is described in the following terms:[417]

> ... they came again to him, with fuel in their hands, saying: "We want to become thy pupils." ... He said: "... put your fuel on [the fire], ye are become my pupils."

This simple ceremony was apparently denied the Brahmins in the *Chāndogya* version of the story.

What these stories suggest is that there was no formal procedure for becoming someone's pupil. However, the redactor of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* found this surprising, and this is most easily explained by assuming that he lived at a time when the *upanayana* had been formalized, that is to say, when it had become a ritual.

We can formulate this the other way round. The *upanayana* rite was created before the editorial addition in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 6.2.7, i.e., before the final redaction of that text. I have argued elsewhere that Patañjali still knew a portion of that Upaniṣad as an independent text.[418] The final redaction may therefore be more recent than Patañjali and therefore belong to the first century BCE at the earliest.

Given that crucial notions such as *yajñopavīta* and *dvija* are still unknown to Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*, it seems only reasonable to think that this ritual was created late, not long before these texts.

We still have to deal with the other claim of Oguibénine and Kane, viz., that originally "the *brahmacārin*'s education remained a matter of learned discussions between the father and the son".

All the three passages considered above admittedly mention a pupil who has been initially instructed by his father. But in all three cases the pupil is the same person, viz., Śvetaketu, the son of Gautama. Together they constitute, at most, one single case. And the value of this single case depends, again, on the amount of information the authors of these passages can be believed to have possessed about "the time of Śvetaketu".

Another passage in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* shows that the authors of the early Upaniṣads were not all that well informed about the time of Śvetaketu. Or rather, it

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[416] Kane (HistDh II/I p. 273) translates *anupanīya* as "without submitting them to the rites of Upanayana". This is an interpretation based on the retro-projection of more recent ideas. See below.

[417] ŚPaBr 10.6.1.2-3: *... te ha ... samitpāṇayaḥ praticakramira upa tvāyāmeti/ ... sa hovāca ... [a]bhyādhatta samidha upetā stheti/*. Tr. Eggeling.

[418] *Greater Magadha* § III.4 (*The Yājñavalkya-Kāṇḍa*)

provides completely different information about this person. It tells us that Śvetaketu was initially **not** educated by his father:[419]

> Now, there was Śvetaketu Āruṇeya. To him his father said: "Śvetaketu, live the life of a student of sacred knowledge (*brahmacarya*). Verily, my dear, from our family there is no one unlearned [in the Vedas], a Brahmin by connection, as it were." He, then, having become a pupil at the age of twelve, having studied all the Vedas, returned at the age of twenty-four, conceited, thinking himself learned, proud. Then his father said to him: "Śvetaketu, my dear, since now you are conceited, think yourself learned, and are proud, did you also ask for that teaching whereby what has not been heard of becomes heard of, what has not been thought of becomes thought of, what has not been understood becomes understood?" "How, pray, sir, is that teaching?"

According to this passage, Śvetaketu received first twelve years of education from someone different from his father. During these twelve years he studied "all the Vedas", which is certainly not the same as engaging in learned discussions. His father does not come into the picture as a teacher until after the completion of these twelve years, and that because Śvetaketu is still not able to answer some important questions.

It would be a mistake to try to read the above four passages about Śvetaketu and his father as descriptions of historical events.[420] It is more promising to notice that they share an important feature. In each of them Śvetaketu is presented as someone who has received an excellent education but is, in spite of this, not able to answer some essential questions. That is to say, all of them ridicule, in the figure of Śvetaketu, the claims of traditional learning.

But why is Śvetaketu's father, in three of the four passages considered, presented as his son's first teacher? Here it is first to be noted that in all these three passages

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[419] ChānUp 6.1.1-3: *śvetaketur hā''ruṇeya āsa/ taṃ ha pitovāca: śvetaketo vasa brahmacaryam/ na vai somyāsmatkulīno 'nanūcya brahmabandhur iva bhavatīti// sa ha dvādaśavarṣa upetya caturviṃśativarṣaḥ sarvān vedān adhītya mahāmanā anūcānamānī stabdha eyāya/ taṃ ha pitovāca// śvetaketo yan nu somyedaṃ mahāmanā anūcānamānī stabdho 'si/ uta tam ādeśam aprākṣyaḥ, yenāśrutaṃ śrutaṃ bhavaty amataṃ matam avijñātaṃ vijñātam iti/ kathaṃ nu bhagavaḥ sa ādeśo bhavatīti//* Tr. Hume, modified.

[420] So Söhnen 1981: 179. Oguibénine (190: 2) remarks: "It is noticeable that after Śvetaketu's twelve years' studying with Pravāhaṇa, it is again his father who has to perfect his son's science about the nature of the ātman (Ch. Up. VI. 1-16)." This is pure fantasy. Not only does ChānUp 6.1-16 not mention the name of Pravāhaṇa, there is no indication anywhere in vedic literature that Śvetaketu **ever** was Pravāhaṇa's pupil. In the passages studied above it was Śvetaketu's father who became Pravāhaṇa's pupil. Oguibénine (l.c.) states, with reference to BĀrUp 6.2: "... as soon as Uddālaka realizes that no one of the five questions asked by Pravāhaṇa have been fitly answered by Śvetaketu, it is decided that both the father and the son will stay as brahmacārins with Pravāhaṇa." This is incorrect. BĀrUp 6.2.4 leaves no doubt that only the father takes up studentship: "[Gautama, i.e., the father,] said: '... But come! Let us go there and take studentship.' 'Go yourself, sir.' So Gautama went forth to where [the place] of Pravāhaṇa Jaivali was." (*sa hovāca: ... prehi tu tatra pratītya brahmacaryaṃ vatsyāva iti/ bhavān eva gacchatv iti/ sa ājagāma gautamo yatra pravāhaṇasya jaivaler āsa/*; tr. Hume.) Also the *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects* contains the same mistake, stating (Macdonell and Keith 1912: II: 409 s.v. Śvetaketu Āruṇeya): "He (i.e. Śvetaketu, JB) was a contemporary of, and was instructed by the Pañcāla king Pravāhaṇa Jaivala (sic)".

Śvetaketu's father, too, is presented as someone incapable of answering the questions that puzzle his son. In fact, it is the father who is going to receive instruction, twice from Jaivali Pravāhaṇa, once from Citra Gārgyāyaṇi. If, therefore, these passages ridicule Śvetaketu, they also ridicule his father.[421]

It seems clear, then, that Śvetaketu was remembered, at the time of composition of these stories, as an exponent of vedic learning, and was used as target by those who felt critical towards this type of learning. It seems ill-advised to look upon these tendentious stories as true descriptions of historical events.

Śvetaketu's renown as a Veda scholar is confirmed by other texts, which, unlike the above Upaniṣadic passages, do not ridicule him for this reason. The *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra* mentions him twice. The first passage reads:[422]

> Seers (*ṛṣi*) are not born among the modern people (*avara*), because the rules of restraint are transgressed. Some, however, become seers on account of their knowledge of the scriptures (*śrutarṣi*) in a new birth, due to a residue of the fruits of their [former] actions; an example is Śvetaketu.

The second passage is the following:[423]

> Śvetaketu says: "one who wishes to study more scriptures after he has founded a household should live with devoted [mind] in the family of a teacher for two months every year; for in this way I studied more of the scriptures than in the preceding time".

Śvetaketu's opinions, mainly on details of ritual and its interpretation, are also recorded in a number of vedic passages: KauṣBr 26.4; ŚPaBr 3.4.3.13; 4.2.5.15; 11.2.7.12; 5.4.18; ŚPaBrK 4.4.3.11; 5.3.1.12. He is here described as the son of Uddālaka (*auddālaki*; ŚPaBr 3.4.3.13; 4.2.5.15; ŚPaBrK 4.4.3.11; 5.3.1.12), or as the grandson of Aruṇa (*āruṇeya*; ŚPaBr 11.2.7.12; 5.4.18).

It seems safe to conclude that Śvetaketu was remembered for his vedic learning. When later the need was felt, within the brahmanical tradition, to criticize vedic learning, or to point to its limitations, this was done in the form of stories in which Śvetaketu was unable to answer some important questions.

There is no reason to doubt (nor proof, to be sure) that the opinions and quotations directly ascribed to Śvetaketu did indeed, in this or similar form, belong to a historical person of that name. This raises the question whether the texts that mention these

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[421] Uddālaka appears to be ridiculed in his own right at ChānUp 5.11 ff.; cp. also Witzel 1987a: 368 n. 14. (Not in the parallel version ŚPaBr 10.6.1, where Uddālaka's father, Aruṇa Aupaveśi, figures, but is not singled out for ridicule.) Note that the same characters are made fun of outside brahmanical literature, too. Śvetaketu (Pāli Setaketu) is ridiculed in the buddhist *Setaketu Jātaka* (no. 377), Uddālaka in the *Uddālaka Jātaka* (no. 487), the gāthās of which may be non-buddhistic (Lüders 1914).

[422] ĀpDhS 1.2.5.4-5: *... ṛṣayo 'vareṣu na jāyante niyamātikramāt/ śrutarṣayas tu bhavanti kecit karmaphalaśeṣeṇa punaḥsaṃbhave; yathā śvetaketuḥ/*

[423] ĀpDhS 1.4.13.19-20: *niveśe vṛtte saṃvatsare saṃvatsare dvau dvau māsau samāhita ācāryakule vased bhūyaḥ śrutam icchan iti śvetaketuḥ/ etena hy ahaṃ yogena bhūyaḥ pūrvasmāt kālāc chrutam akurvīti/*

opinions or contain such quotations, are for that reason closer in time to Śvetaketu, and therefore older, than the texts that tell the stories in which Śvetaketu is embarrassed.

This is not necessarily always the case. It is conceivable that the words and opinions of Śvetaketu were still faithfully preserved by some at a time when he had become a legendary figure for others. It is none-the-less noteworthy that the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*, in the first passage cited above, explicitly calls Śvetaketu a modern (*avara*) seer. This is all the more noteworthy in that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, as we have seen, considered him one of the people of yore (*pūrva*).

The characterization of Śvetaketu as 'modern' in the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra* has puzzled scholars for more than a century. Eggeling (1882: xli) commented that "Āpastamba, by this remark, pays no very great compliment to the inspired texts of his own school, since Aruṇa Aupaveśi, the grandfather of Śvetaketu Āruṇeya, is twice referred to in the Taittirīya-saṃhitā". What Eggeling fails to say, is that Aruṇa Aupaveśi is twice referred to in a *brāhmaṇa* portion of the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* (6.1.9.2; 4.5.1). Yet these *brāhmaṇa* portions, as I have argued elsewhere, may be considerably younger than the *mantra*s, and may not yet have been known to Pāṇini.[424]

It follows from the above that the Upaniṣad passages considered do not support the view that at any period of time the father always taught the son. At best they show that there was a time when it was customary for a pupil to approach his future teacher "with fuel in his hand" (*samitpāṇi*).

But approaching a teacher is not the same as undergoing an initiation! And showing that vedic instruction has roots that go back to a remote past is not the same as showing that one could only gain entrance to this instruction by means of a ritual. Indeed, initiation is a rite, a *saṃskāra*, whereas approaching a teacher is not.[425] And as we have seen, the rite of initiation was a relatively new invention, introduced, it would seem, during the final centuries preceding the Common Era.

There is no need to say much about the other sacraments. They have been sufficiently studied by others,[426] and merely confirm the great concern of Brahmins to live sacred lives, different from all others. Time and again it becomes clear that in most if not all of these case we witness a custom that becomes a rite, either in the Gṛhyasūtras or even later. That is to say, we witness the creation of rites during the period that occupies us, the final centuries preceding the Common Era.

By way of example we may consider what Raj Bali Pandey says about the rite of name-giving (Pandey 1969: 79):

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[424] *Greater Magadha* p. 193. Note further that both the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (2.23.1) and the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*, and no other texts, present the same fourfold classification of virtuous ways of life. This identical classification —studied elsewhere (Bronkhorst 1993b: 11-16) — suggests once more that these two texts, or portions of texts, were not far removed from each other in time. See further Bronkhorst 1989d.

[425] Cp. Kane (HistDh II/I p. 268-269): "The word '*upanayana*' can be derived and explained in two ways: (1) taking (the boy) near the *ācārya*, (2) that rite by which the boy is taken to the *ācārya*. The first sense appears to have been the original one and when an extensive ritual came to be associated with *upanayana* the second came to be the sense of the word. Such an ancient work as the [*Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*] I.1.1.19 says that *upanayana* is a *saṃskāra* (purificatory rite) ..."

[426] Here we can mention Kane's *History of Dharmaśāstra* (1968-1977; esp. vol. II/I p. 188 ff.); Pandey 1969; further Kapani 1992-1993: I: 81-166.

> From the study of the Brāhmaṇas it is evident that there was a system of naming in the pre-Sūtra period. But we do not precisely know what ceremonies were associated with it. Even the Gṛhyasūtras, except the Gobhila, do not quote Vedic verses to be recited on this occasion, though they lay down rues for the composition of the name. It seems that the Nāmakaraṇa was more a custom than a ceremony in the beginning. But being the occasion of a great social importance, it was later on included in the Saṃskāras.

Here, as elsewhere, the sacraments appear to be relatively late creations, dating at the earliest to the period in which Brahmanism was reinventing itself.

IIA.2.2. Vedic knowledge

Our discussion of the *upanayana* has already made clear that knowledge of the Veda was of central importance for Brahmins. Vedic learning, for at least certain Brahmins, went well beyond the recitation of the Sāvitrī mantra that we encountered in connection with the *upanayana*. Reciting whole Vedas — or at least major chunks of it — goes back to early times, and we owe it no doubt to this custom that so much of vedic literature has been preserved. This tradition of recitation is unique and, as long as it functions well, not in need of written texts. Indeed, the vedic tradition has always looked down upon written texts, especially written versions of the Veda. There are good reasons to believe that the oral preservation of at least certain vedic text has been perfect. This applies most particularly to the *Ṛgveda*.

It is yet clear that during the final centuries preceding the Common Era extra efforts were made to secure the correct transmission of the vedic texts. This found expression in the composition of texts that concentrate on phonology, in the first place Prātiśākhyas and Śikṣās. There is no need to say more about these here (see § I.2.6, above), even though they play some role in our discussion of brahmanical ideas about language in Part IIB, below.

Vedic knowledge was and remained central to Brahmanism. Dharma came to be looked upon as based upon the Veda — an idea shared by all surviving texts on Dharma with the possible exception of the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*. Olivelle (2012) has argued that this idea must have gained currency after Kātyāyana and Patañjali. There is no need to go into details here.

Vedic knowledge came to play a central role in certain theoretical developments linked to Brahmanism. The belief that vedic mantras could be used to bring about effects in the world gave rise to theoretical developments that will be studied in § IIA.4.

IIA.2.3. The ideal Brahmin

Purity of life was and remained a central concern for Brahmins, as is clear from the extensive literature on Dharma that developed around it. It is beyond the scope of this study to give a survey of this literature, or even of the most important rules it

contained.[427] Here we may recall that the literature on Dharma was still in its formative stage at the time of Patañjali, though not without at least some predecessors before Kātyāyana.[428]

Ritual purity implies separation from human society at large. And indeed, literature provides us with evidence to show that the ideal brahmanical life is lived away from society, without contact with the rest of the world. Clearly this could only remain an ideal for most Brahmins, for they could not *en masse* retire to the forest. However, the ideal exerted an influence — and continued to exert and influence — on the way of life of at least certain exemplary Brahmins, and on literary and artistic stereotypes. As we have seen, there are good reasons to think that Alexander already had come across a number of Brahmins who were trying to live more or less closely in accordance with this ideal.

In para-vedic literature the ideal of living a life independent of society finds expression in a figure who came to be called *vānaprastha* 'forest-dweller'. In certain early texts it is the way of life of certain householders, which shows that in origin the life of the forest-dweller has nothing to do with the four *āśrama*s (options or stages of life) to which it came to be assigned. This way of life, and the ascetic practices that accompany it, have been discussed in *Greater Magadha* (§ IIA.1; pp. 79 ff.). The literary theme of the brahmanical hermitage in the forest, also called *āśrama*, and corresponding to the real life *agrahāra*s that were put at their disposition by generous donors, has been analyzed in *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism* (§ 2.4; pp. 74 ff.). The *āśrama* as hermitage is part of brahmanical self-representation, because its inhabitants dwell there in glorious independence, dedicating themselves to ritual activities. The *agrahāra*, by its very existence, reveals brahmanical dependence on the powers that be, and does not fit in easily into brahmanical self-representation. *Agrahāra*s, therefore, are rarely mentioned in brahmanical literature, and all the more in inscriptions commissioned by donors who did not wish to miss this opportunity of glory for themselves. Since, then, these brahmanical institutions have already been dealt with elsewhere, we can turn our attention to some features that have not so far been commented upon.

What strikes in descriptions of vedic forest-dwellers is that they are all engaged in ritual activity, in their remote huts or hermitages. Ritual activity is also expected from the recipients of an *agrahāra*, as we have seen. Given that Brahmanism sees itself as continuing the vedic tradition, this is at first sight bizarre. Brahmins used to carry out sacrifices for others, preferably rulers, and were rewarded for doing so. The distinction between officiant and sacrificer (*yajamāna*) was as clear as daylight: the typical sacrificer *could* not sacrifice on his own, and the officiant *would* not sacrifice on his own behalf. Rulers, who ideally were Kṣatriyas and not Brahmins, were not entitled to perform their own sacrifices, and sacrificial priests, who had to be Brahmins, did this for them.

All this changed during the period under consideration. And it did not only change for forest-dwellers. Individual rites — the so-called *gṛhya*- or domestic rites — make their appearance, and we have already considered (in § I.2.4, above) the indications that suggest that the relevant texts, the Gṛhyasūtras, started being produced in our period. Domestic rites are private rites, carried out by the sacrificer himself. In these texts there

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[427] Kane's *History of Dharmaśāstra* (second edition 1968-1977) remains extremely useful, as are Olivelle's (1999; 2000; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2005a; 2009) translations and studies of the early literature. See further Derrett 1973.

[428] See § I.2.2, above.

is normally no distinction between sacrificer and officiant. The development that led to this is remarkable, and deserves our attention.

One scholar who has drawn attention to the phenomenon of vedic sacrifices without officiants is J. C. Heesterman, who speaks in this connection of the *interiorization* of the sacrifice. In Heesterman's article "Brahmin, ritual, and renouncer", first published in 1964, and reprinted in 1985 in *The Inner Conflict of Tradition* (pp. 26-44), he finds in the vedic ritual a development toward ever decreasing involvement with others. The pre-classical sacrifice, he claims, involved rivalry between different parties. This 'agonistic cooperation' has disappeared in the classical sacrifice, where only one institutor of the sacrifice (*yajamāna*) remains. This *yajamāna,* however, is still dependent on his officiants. The next step, therefore, would be in the direction of discarding the officiants. In Heesterman's words (1985: 38-39): "The development of brahmanical theory, set off by the individualization of the ritual, did not stop at the point where the host-guest, protagonist-antagonist complementarity was fused into the single unit of *yajamāna* and officiants. It had to advance to its logical conclusion, that is, the interiorization of the ritual, which makes the officiants' services superfluous". With the interiorization of the ritual, Heesterman thinks, "we touch the principle of world renunciation, the emergence of which has been of crucial importance in the development of Indian thinking".

The notion of a pre-classical sacrifice with 'agonistic cooperation' is not based on any evidence at all.[429] The real explanation for this remarkable development of the vedic sacrifice, I propose, is as follows. The vedic sacrifice essentially depended on powerful and rich sponsors. During the period we are considering, these sponsors became rare or disappeared altogether. Brahmins might have dropped their sacrificial tradition, but they didn't. Rather they developed individual rites that Brahmins could carry out on their own, and that became part of brahmanical self-representation. Indeed, sacrificing for someone else came to be looked upon as inferior. This will be clear from the following passage from the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (9.5.2.12-13):[430]

> now who performs these [rites] for another, he causes these oceans [the rites] to dry up [for himself]; those dried up, his meters are dried up; after the meters, the world (*loka*); after the world, the body (*ātman*); after the body, [his] children and cattle. Indeed he becomes poorer (*pāpīyas*) daily, who performs these rites for another. ... now who does not perform these [rites] for another becomes more prosperous (*śreyas*) daily. Indeed this [rite] is his divine, undying, body (*ātman*); who performs these [rites] for another gives his divine body to another. Only a dried trunk remains.

If you leave a Brahmin to himself, not only will he interact as little as possible with society, he will engage in rites for whose performance he does not need anyone else. The brahmanical sage in his hermitage passes his time performing sacrificial rites, so much so that smoke is a constant feature of a hermitage.[431]

It is in these circumstances that the classical *sattra* has its place. The *sattra* as described in relatively late vedic and para-vedic literature is a long sacrificial session

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[429] Bronkhorst 2012: 237-238.
[430] Tr. Tull 1989: 39-40.
[431] See the first act of Kālidāsa's *Abhijñānaśākuntala*.

with a number of officiants, but without sacrificer (*yajamāna*). Falk (1985: 275) sums up the main features of the classical *sattra* in the following four points:[432]

1. Only Brahmins can participate. (*Als Teilnehmer kommen nur Brahmanen in Betracht.*)
2. There is no sacrificer. One of the participants assumes the role of *yajamāna* whenever in the *ekāha*-paradigm the sacrificer has to act. In spite of this special function, all the results of the sacrifice devolve upon all the participants. (*Es fehlt der klassische Opferherr. Einer der brahmanischen Opferer übernimmt die Rolle des Yajamāna immer dann, wenn nach dem ekāha-Paradigma der Opferherr tätig werden muß. Trotz dieser Sonderrolle fallen aber alle Früchte des Opfers allen Teilnehmern gemeinsam zu.*)
3. Since there is no sacrificer who orders the sacrifice, there is no *dakṣiṇā* either. (*Da der beauftragende Opferherr fehlt, gibt es auch keine Dakṣiṇā.*)
4. The basic form of the *sattra* is the *dvādaśāha.* (*Grundform des Sattras ist der Dvādaśāha.*)[433]

Falk then argues on the basis of other vedic passages that the original *sattra* was not like this, but for our present purposes the origin of the *sattra*-sacrifice has no particular interest.[434] It is the classical form that interests us. The classical *sattra* is presumably performed for the benefit of the officiants, but this raises the inevitable question what these officiants lived on. To quote Caland & Henry (1906: X): "On pourrait dès lors se demander, non pas quel intérêt ils [les officiants/sacrifiants du *sattra*] avaient à le célébrer, — car il serait irrévérencieux de les croire incapables d'une foi sincère et d'une piété qui se suffit à elle-même, — mais du moins de quoi vivaient ces hommes, qui, absorbés tous les jours dans les pratiques d'une dévotion minutieuse et pénible, n'avaient sûrement pas le loisir de se créer des ressources par ailleurs. Mais tout indique que les *sattra*s étaient des exercises purement sacerdotaux, comme ceux de nos communautés monastiques, accomplis par des collèges de prêtres, que rentaient de riches monarques ou seigneurs, en récompense de la bénédiction qu'appelaient sur leurs armes our leur domaine les prières ainsi récitées chaque jour et graduées suivant le cours de l'année."

Caland and Henry, no doubt correctly, extract from the texts what they do not tell us: that powerful and/or rich sponsors were required to make the performance of a *sattra* possible. The *sattra* is therefore not only an instance of the so-called interiorization of the sacrifice, of a wish to do without a sacrificer. It is also testimony of changed sacrificial surroundings. No longer was sacrificial ritual part of a primary religion, inseparable from the state, as it presumably had been.[435] In the new situations Brahmins would be happy to receive enough support — preferably in the form of an *agrahāra* — to do their own things. The *sattra* is one of these 'own things'. It is part of the ritual activity that Brahmins engage in on their own, but which yet inspires confidence in their sponsors.

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[432] On *sattra*s in the *Mahābhārata*, see also Narsalay 2015: 101-109.

[433] Falk refers to two dictionaries of vedic ritual (Renou 1954: 156; Sen 1978: 115; one might add Mylius 1995: 129); Hillebrandt 1897: 154 ff.; Keith 1925: II: 349-352; Kane, HistDh II/II pp. 1239-1246.

[434] But see § I.1.4, above.

[435] See *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism*, § 2.1, pp. 27 ff.

And yet, it should be kept in mind that the desire to step outside society, outside the obligation of giving and receiving, also finds expression in the classical *sattra*. In the article mentioned earlier, Heesterman (1964: p. 38 of the reprint) expresses this as follows:

> the highest place in the hierarchy of sacrifices is taken up by the sacrifice 'without dakṣiṇā', according to *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* 1.5.7. Such sacrifices are the *sattra*s of the classical ritual. In the sattra only Brahmins participate. They unite their sacrificial fires and thus are actually assimilated with each other and are fused into one single unit. Each of them is at the same time yajamāna and officiant, and consequently, dakṣiṇās are neither given nor received. It is clear, however, that in this way the Brahmin and his ritual were limited to the point where they shut themselves out from the wider community.

It seems clear that the classical *sattra* has its place in the process where Brahmins had lost, or were losing, their positions as priests in a primary religion, and were reinventing themselves, mainly by turning inward.

Michael Willis, in his book *The Archaeology of Hindu Ritual* (2009), states (p. 104):

> In the old ritual literature, *sattra* referred to a long sacrificial session, normally one performed by priests for their own benefit and thus without a *yajamāna*. Epigraphic evidence for this kind of performance is furnished by a mid-second-century inscription from Mathurā that commemorates a *sattra* lasting twelve days.[436] Later inscriptions, in substantial contrast, use the word *sattra* to designate an institution for the feeding of ascetics and needy people, something epigraphers have explained as a 'charitable almshouse.'[437]

One wonders how substantial the contrast between earlier and later *sattra* really is. In a sense, presumably all *sattra*s were ways of extracting donations from sponsors, whatever the texts say about it. Granted that important changes may have affected the *sattra* over time, it is no surprise that inscriptions present this institution differently from the texts. We have seen that the *āśrama* of literature corresponds by and large to the *agrahāra* of the inscriptions: essentially a single institution looks altogether different from the points of view of the recipients and the donors respectively. Something similar may have

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[436] Willis adds the following note: "Lüders, *Mathurā Inscriptions*, 126 (lines 5-6) *māṇacchandogena iṣ[ṭv]ā sattre[ṇ]a dvā[d]aśar[ā]ttreṇa yūpaḥ pratiṣṭhā[p]itaḥ* (i.e., 'Māṇacchandoga [a Māṇa of the Sāmaveda?], having performed a *sattra* lasting twelve days, has set up this sacrificial post'). The record is dated year [1*]24 in the reign of Vasiṣka. As the Kuṣāṇa era began in Spring 127, this dates CE 251, see Falk, 'The Yuga of Sphujiddhvaja and the Era of the Kuṣāṇas,' *Silk Road Art and Archaeology* 7 (2001): 121-36. For the position of Vāsiṣka, see J. Cribb, 'Early Indian History,' in *Buddhist Reliquaries from Ancient India*, edited by M. Willis (London, 2000): 48."

[437] Willis's note: "For example, F. Kielhorn, "The Sasbahu Temple Inscription of Mahipala, of Vikrama-Samvat 1150," IA 40 (1886), line 102: *dadau rājāniruddhāya tena sattraṃ pravarttate.* Sircar, *Indian Epigraphical Glossary*, s.v. The brief comment offered in Sircar, *Select Inscriptions*, 1: 348, n. 5, is sufficient to show the degree to which the *sattra* and other offerings have not been properly analysed."

happened in the case of the *sattra*, even though in this case apparently the same term was used by donors and recipients alike.

IIA.3. Illiteracy

This chapter returns to the question of writing in early brahmanical texts. Writing is still not mentioned in texts that were composed well after it had become widespread in India, even in brahmanical circles.[438] This is true of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, better known as *Manusmṛti*. Olivelle (2005: 24-25) has argued that this text dates from the 2nd to 3rd centuries CE, and this may indeed be its date.[439] At this time writing was used, also by brahmanical authors.[440] And yet, the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* only refers to writing as it was used in legal documents, never as the means by which the text itself had been laid down.[441] Few would conclude from this that the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* was a text that had been composed and handed down only orally. The text simply continues the tradition of pretending that important brahmanical compositions had nothing to do with writing. Similar things could be said about the *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra*, whose chronological relationship to the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* remains obscure. This text, too, refers to written evidence in judicial proceedings, but to no other contexts in which writing had its place (as, presumably, in composing and studying the *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra*).

In spite of this attitude toward writing, the brahmanical tradition takes pride in having produced intellectually sophisticated texts from an early date onward. Pāṇini's grammar, which, as we have seen, may date from before Alexander, is the example *par excellence*. As far as we can tell, the brahmanical tradition sees no contradiction in the coexistence of illiteracy and intellectual sophistication; as is its wont, it remains silent on the question. For modern scholars it is a challenge. The present chapter will discuss the challenge and some solutions that have been proposed.

IIA.3.1. The problem

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[438] *Aitarya Āraṇyaka* 5.3.3 is often cited in connection with the question whether writing was known in vedic times. According to Falk (1992) it does not concern writing. Houben (forthcoming) disagrees, stating: "It can … not be excluded that the couple of terms, *ullikhya* and *avalikhya*, refers to the writing and erasing of writing on a wooden writing board". Saraju Rath informs me that the earliest surviving depiction in sculpture of a brahmanical scribe occurs in Nagarjunakondi and dates from the third century CE.

[439] See § I.2.2, above.

[440] Einicke's (2009: 465) remark — "Es ist anzunehmen, dass die Kunst des Schreibens zunächst hauptsächlich von einer begrenzten Gruppe, wohl zumeist Brahmanen, ausgeübt wurde" — overlooks the brahmanical dislike for writing. If, moreover, we accept "die wahrscheinliche Existenz eines Kanzlei- und Archivwesens schon im 3. Jh. v. Chr." (Einicke 2009: 465 n. 270, with a reference to Janert 1969), i.e. under the Mauryas, the involvement of Brahmins as writers in the political administration of that empire becomes even less plausible. Cp. Janert 1969: 898: "Während bekanntlich viele Züge der indischen Geistesgeschichte in dem Wirkungsbereich der frühen indischen Priester wurzeln, gehört aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach das Verfahren der graphischen Fixierung von Texten im alten Indien nicht dazu."

[441] Hofer 2009.

In classical Greece, the production and use of written texts began to increase rapidly around the early fifth century BCE, and accelerated tremendously during the course of the fifth and fourth centuries. Complete illiteracy must have been common in the early fifth century, but much less so in the late fourth. During a period of barely two centuries literacy had become widespread, so one can reasonably and fruitfully ask what transformations of thought and expression this entailed.

The situation in India is entirely different. We are in no position to determine a period of two centuries during which literacy became an inalienable part of society, so that the effects of this change might then be studied. We do know approximately when writing began to be used in India, but we do not know how widespread its use then was. The surviving literature, though voluminous, rarely mentions reading and writing, and where it does, it is likely to do so in order to give expression to the inferior status of these activities. Indeed, the *Mahābhārata* (13.24.70) tells us that those who write down the Veda go to hell.[442] A number of texts were handed down orally, as are some to this day; it is difficult to find out exactly which texts fell into this category at any particular period. The Brahmins, sometimes referred to as the literate caste, were in reality first of all ritual specialists who knew their sacred texts by heart. They could accomplish their ritual tasks without literacy, and there can be no doubt that many learned Brahmins were strictly speaking illiterate. In this situation it is not easy to study the effects of literacy.

I will concentrate here on a feature that has been claimed to have arisen in India independently of literacy, viz. rationality. The discussion of rationality and its relation to literacy has been inspired by the anthropologist Jack Goody who, in a number of publications, has presented a 'great divide' theory, not specifically for India, but for all societies that pass from an oral to a literate stage.[443] Goody did his own fieldwork among the LoDagaa of Northen Ghana, where he recorded — the first time in writing, later using a tape recorder — the recitation of their Bagre myth. Based on this experience, and on the analysis to which the resulting corpus was subjected, Goody arrived at certain ideas about orality that he considers generally valid.

IIA.3.2. Ordinary memorisation versus vedic memorisation

A number of Indologists have reacted to Goody's ideas and pointed out that his conclusions cannot be extended to India without major adjustments. Beside ordinary memorisation, India knows an altogether different kind of memorisation, viz. vedic memorisation.[444] This kind of memorisation appears to be unique in the world, and must, in India itself, be strictly distinguished from other forms of memorisation. Vedic memorisation, which a youngster acquires in his teens or even before, uses special techniques to make sure that no syllable of the text committed to memory be lost.[445] Understanding the content of what is learnt by heart is not part of this training,[446] and is sometimes claimed to be a hindrance rather than a help.[447]

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[442] Scharfe 2002: 8.
[443] For Goody on rationality, see esp. Goody 1996, chapters 1 and 2.
[444] Goody's ideas on the Vedas can be found in Goody 1987, chapter 4.
[445] See e.g. Staal 1961. The effects of such memorisation can be observed in the brain; Hartzell et al. 2015.
[446] Aithal 1991: 11; see also the passage from al-Bīrūnī cited below. Kane (HistDh II/I p. 348) claims: "Even in the 20th century ... there are hundreds of brāhmaṇas who learn not only the

Memorising the Veda in this manner goes hand in hand with the refusal to write down these texts. This at any rate is what the Persian traveller al-Biruni maintained in the eleventh century, in the following often cited passage:[448] "The Brahmins recite the Veda without understanding its meaning, and in the same way they learn it by heart, the one receiving it from the other. Only few of them learn its explanation, and still less is the number of those who master the contents of the Veda and their interpretation to such a degree as to be able to hold a theological disputation. ... They do not allow the Veda to be committed to writing, because it is recited according to certain modulations, and they therefore avoid the use of the pen, since it is liable to cause some error, and may occasion an addition or a defect in the written text. In consequence it has happened that they have several times forgotten the Veda and lost it ... [N]ot long before our time, Vasukra, a native of Kashmir, a famous Brahmin, has of his own account undertaken the task of explaining the Veda and committing it to writing. He has taken on himself a task from which everybody else would have recoiled, but he carried it out because he was afraid that the Veda might be forgotten and entirely vanish out of the memories of men, since he observed that the characters of men grew worse and worse, and that they did not care much for virtue, nor even for duty." Several centuries before al-Biruni the Chinese pilgrim Yijing wrote:[449] "The Vedas have been handed down from mouth to mouth, not transcribed on paper or leaves." The means at our disposal confirm that vedic memorisation has been, and still is, highly efficacious. A number of vedic texts appear to have been preserved in this manner for countless generations without any deviation from

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whole of the Ṛgveda ... by heart, but also commit to memory the pada text of the Ṛgveda, the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa and Āraṇyaka and the six Vedāṅgas (which include the 4000 aphorisms of Pāṇini and the extensive Nirukta of Yāska) without caring to understand a word of this enormous material." And Bühler claimed in the 19th century (1886: xlvii): "A perfect Vaidik of the Āśvalāyana school knows the Rig-veda according to the Saṃhitā, Pada, Krama, Jaṭā and Ghana Pāṭhas, the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa and the Āraṇyaka, the ritualistic Sūtras of Āśvalāyana, Śaunaka's Prātiśākhya and the Śikṣā, Yāska's Nirukta, the grammar of Pāṇini, the Vedic calendar or Jyotiṣa, the metrical treatise called the Chandas, Yājñavalkya's Dharmaśāstra, portions of the Mahābhārata, and the philosophical Sūtras of Kaṇāda, Jaimini, and Bādarāyaṇa. Similarly the Vaidiks of the Yajus, Sāman, and Atharvan schools are able to recite, more or less perfectly, the whole of the works of their respective Śākhās as well as some other non-Vedic books. But it would be in vain to expect from such men an explanation of the literary treasures which they possess." Unfortunately Kane does not tell us how thoroughly the other texts (different from the *Ṛgveda*) are being memorised, and nor does Bühler specify how many perfect Vaidikas there were in his time. My own very limited dealings with one of the most respected vedic reciters around Poona, Pandit Kinjawadekar Shastri, taught me that his knowledge of the *Ṛgveda* and its *Pada-* and *Kramapāṭha* was stunning, but that this same traditional scholar (who did indeed admit not to understand the contents of what he recited) had difficulties with a passage from the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* (or was it the *Upaniṣad*?) which I asked him to recite.

[447] Interestingly, learning to read and write disables the South Slavic narrative poets studied by Parry and Lord; Ong 1982: 59. It is not known to me whether this question has ever been raised with respect to vedic reciters. Ong further observes (p. 61): "Significantly, illiterate singers in the wiedely literate culture of modern Yugoslavia develop and express attitudes toward writing … . They admire literacy and believe that a literate person can do even better what they do, namely, recreate a lengthy song after hearing it only once." This observation cannot easily be transferred to vedic recitation in India.

[448] Sachau 1888: I: 125.

[449] Tr. Takakusu 1896: 182.

the original. Indeed, "We can actually regard present-day Ṛgveda-recitation as a *tape recording* of what was first composed and recited some 3000 years ago." (Witzel 1995a: 91).[450]

Since vedic memorisation plays a crucial role in some of the arguments to be considered below, I will cite a passage from the introduction to a recent book by K. Parameswara Aithal, who here describes what he has learnt by visiting numerous accomplished vedic reciters. Aithal depicts the method of teaching in the following manner (1991: 12):

> In the early stages the procedure is somewhat like this: The young boys who have had their initiation (*upanayana*), sit in front of the teacher after they have finished their purificatory baths an performed the daily rituals, etc. The teaching begins early in the morning, soon after sunrise, with the chanting of the sacred syllables HARIḤ OM, as prescribed by the *Veda-lakṣaṇa* texts. First the teacher recites each *mantra*, *pāda* (= quarter) by *pāda*, and the pupil recites it three times immediately after the teacher. This *pāda* by *pāda* recitation is repeated twelve times. The same method is followed for the recitation of the halves of the *mantra*-s and for the full *mantra*-s. Usually one session lasts until one *adhyāya* is completed. Altogether each *mantra* is repeated 108 times. The study of the *pada*, *krama*, *jaṭā*, etc., is variously graded according to the ability of the individual student. The procedure is very strenuous and time-consuming and thus requires great patience. Since no material reward, nor any kind of professional prospect can be expected from such a study these days, firm faith in the spiritual efficacy and divinity of the Vedic Word is the essential prerequisite for such a rigorous course of study.

The existence of this unique form of vedic memorisation, which is without known parallel, appears to be uncontroversial among Indologists. It primarily concerns vedic texts, and is not easily transferred to other texts, not even to other holy texts. This is illustrated by descriptions such as the one by C. J. Fuller, from which we learn (1984: 138; cited Goody 2000: 17) that pupils at a school in Tamilnadu that is under the overall control of the Kanchipuram Śaṅkarācārya's monastery learn passages from traditional Āgamas "by memorising exactly the passages recited to them by their teachers. It is considered vital that these passages' words, pronunciation and scansion are all memorised absolutely accurately, and this cannot be done by reading books. ... Only when a passage has been fully memorised does the teacher explain its meaning." In spite of this imposed

[450] Note that Renou (1960: 41 n. 1) provides some information that suggests that writing the Veda was not altogether unknown in relatively early days: "La Pāṇ[inīya] Śikṣā 32 (= Yājñ[avalkya] Śi[kṣā] 198) (Ghosh 1938: 72; JB) moque les récitateurs qui utilisent un texte écrit, les *likhitapāṭhaka* (en même temps que les *anarthajña*); la Nār[adīya] Śi[kṣā] 2.8,19 s'élève également contre celui qui lit. Le [*Mahābhārata*] 13.23,72 vulg. (= Mhbh 13.24.70; JB) juxtapose les *vedānāṃ lekhakāḥ* avec les corrupteurs (*dūṣaka*) et les vendeurs du V[eda] (*vedavikrayin*)." Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's *Tantravārttika* (6th or 7th century CE) on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.7 (p. 123 l. 20-21) contains the following statement: *yathaivānyāyavijñātād vedāl lekhyādipūrvakāt / śūdreṇādhigatād vāpi dharmajñānaṃ na saṃmatam //* ... "Just as no knowledge of dharma is accepted [to arise] from the Veda if it is not properly mastered, if writing etc. have preceded it, or if it has been studied by a Śūdra." Further passages that discourage the use of writing are referred to in Kane, HistDh II/I p. 348-349. See also Malamoud 1987.

discipline these traditional Āgamas are not being preserved by an exclusively and uninterrupted oral tradition.[451] The school just mentioned was founded in the early 1960s, and one of its teacher's concerns is that many pupils forget much of what they have learnt after returning to work in their temples; not even the refresher courses run by the school can prevent this. It is not impossible that medical texts were memorised in a similar manner, whether with more success we do not know. One of them, the *Suśrutasaṃhitā*, describes the process as follows:[452] "At the time of study the teacher should teach the pupil according to his capacity *pada*, *pāda* or *śloka*. And those *pada*s, *pāda*s and *śloka*s should be arranged in order (?, *krameṇa*), and thus one should combine them one by one." This passage shows some similarity with texts describing the teaching of vedic texts, but it is too short to derive definitive conclusions from it.

As stated above, not all memorisation in India is of the vedic kind.[453] Goody (2000: 13-14) draws attention to a study by John D. Smith (1991) of the Rajasthani epic of Pābūjī. Smith (1991: 26) points out that the epic of Pābūjī has "a degree of textual fixity that seems not to be known in other oral epic traditions", but this does not change the fact that the differences between the performances by different performers are considerable (pp. 25-26). Indeed, Smith is of the opinion that "[t]here is some reason to suppose that the epic as performed at the present day actually is more stylised, more 'flat', than at an earlier period — in other words, that there has been an actual shift away from a differentiated narrative and towards greater and greater uniformity" (p. 24). It may here be added that the reciters of this Rajasthani epic learn their text, along with other skills, by practice only, with no formal preceptor (p. 39). Interestingly, Smith's chief informant maintained that the oral transmission was a secondary development from an original written form (pp. 18-19). However that may be, Smith's study reminds us that memorisation of the vedic kind and memorisation of the 'ordinary' kind are strictly to be kept apart, even in India. Colas (1999: 38) illustrates the same contrast with the help of two classical texts: "les transmissions orales qui ... véhiculèrent [ces deux textes] furent de nature très différentes. Le premier texte est le Ṛgveda, transmis oralement et sans corruption pendant vingt-cinq siècles, grâce à un ensemble de mnémotechniques réservées à certains groupes de brahmanes: la fidélité de l'oralité védique surpasse alors de loin celle de la transmission écrite. À l'opposé, l'autre texte, l'épopée du Mahābhārata ..., a fluctué au gré de la récitation des bardes, il foisonne en fautes grammaticales et défie les méthodes modernes de l'édition critique."

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[451] Cp. Fuller 1999: 52: "In principle, the teaching method is entirely oral ... Nevertheless, students do have copies of the texts they are learning, and — rather like actors learning their lines — they often refer to the words on paper to help them memorise them. ... All the gurus insist that oral instruction is indispensable and that memorisation is far more important than understanding. .. [The students] mainly learn a series of relatively short passages from the manuals ... of Aghorasiva or other preceptors ..."

[452] *Suśrutasaṃhitā* 1 (*Sūtrasthāna*), 3.54: ... *adhyayanakāle śiṣyāya yathāśakti gurur upadiśet padaṃ pādaṃ ślokaṃ vā, te ca padapādaślokā bhūyaḥ krameṇānusandheyāḥ, evaṃ ekaikaśo ghaṭayed*. Falk (2001a: 196) paraphrases and comments: "teaching proceeds either in *pāda*s, half-stanzas of full stanzas depending on the capacity of the pupil. After that the taught portions are to be combined one by one. Unfortunately, the process referred to by *krameṇa* is not described in full." Scharfe (2002: 261) translates *te ca padapādaślokā bhūyaḥ krameṇānusandheyāḥ* as "and these words, quarters and stanzas should be step by step paraphrased".

[453] For a study of a large number of oral epics in India see Blackburn et al. 1989.

IIA.3.3. Pāṇini

As already indicated, Goody connects rationality with literacy. The term 'rationality' is notoriously vague, and there will be occasion to say more about it below. At this point it is important to mention that ancient India has left us a remarkably sophisticated intellectual composition, the famous grammar of Pāṇini; many scholars consider this grammar to be a manifestation of rationality if ever there was one. Indeed, they like to recall that the linguist Leonard Bloomfield (1933: 11) called it "one of the greatest monuments of human intelligence". Some Indologists use Pāṇini's grammar to criticize the very notion that the development of rationality is intimately linked to the appearance of literacy. One of them is Frits Staal, who has published articles with titles such as "The fidelity of oral tradition and the origins of science" (1986) and "The independence of rationality from literacy" (1989). Staal believes that we are "under the sway of cultural prejudices" including "the prejudice that writing is more reliable and therefore better than memory" (1986: 27).

In the publications just mentioned, Staal concentrates on two areas of early Indian thought, both of which he considers sciences: the science of ritual and the science of grammar.[454] Both are historically linked to vedic recitation and memorisation: the science of ritual because vedic recitation takes place during the ritual, and the science of grammar because it deals, among other things, with the sandhi between words. (Vedic recitation distinguishes two versions of the recited texts, the *saṃhitāpāṭha* and the *padapāṭha*; the former is the version with sandhi, the latter the one without it.) Staal, however, goes further. The vedic tradition of transmission, he states (1986: 27/275), "has led to scientific discoveries that are of enduring interest and from which the contemporary West still has much to learn". Staal is not content with the assertion that this tradition of transmission was merely an interesting **object** of study; he is convinced that these sciences were somehow part of that tradition: that they arose from within it. More specifically, he believes that Pāṇini's grammar was composed without the help of writing.

Staal is well enough acquainted with Pāṇini's grammar to know how extraordinarily complex it is. He cites earlier scholars who were puzzled by this, but points out that in many cases "the at first sight puzzling order of Pāṇini's rules enables him to make generalizations that would fail to be captured otherwise" (1986: 270). This obliges Staal to think of a way in which Pāṇini could have composed this complex grammar without the use of writing. He suggests two solutions. The first is: Pāṇini was an extraordinary genius. Realising that this solution may not find favour with all his readers (because it does little beyond giving a name to the problem), Staal then proposes the following explanatory scenario (Staal 1986: 36-37/284-285):

> Pāṇini worked in close collaboration with some colleagues or, more likely, pupils. Let us assume, for example, that he had more or less completed the rules of vowel sandhi, and provisionally formulated these in a consistent manner and to his satisfaction. Now there appears a problem elsewhere in the grammar; and the only way in which it can be given a simple solution is by inverting two of the sandhi rules he had just formulated. Immediately a host of problems arise, and the rule

[454] For the science of ritual as conceived of by Staal, see Staal 1982.

> system begins to generate ungrammatical forms. How to save it, safely modify and keep track of it without losing the thread?
>
> The solution is simple: Pāṇini asked his favorite pupil to memorize the rules for vowel sandhi he had provisionally formulated. He turned his attention elsewhere, and returned to effect the required inversion. The student who was given the special assignment heard it, and knew precisely how to react to it by reformulation. Other pupils who had memorised other portions of the grammar were eagerly listening in order to find out how any proposed modification would affect their domain; and if trouble arose, they immediately took steps to overcome the problem by changing the rules, their order, their formulation, or whatever else had to be changed. This led to revisions elsewhere in the grammar, supervised and synthesized by Pāṇini himself. There are many ad hoc devices for patching up rules that must have been resorted to on such occasions and that can in fact explain certain oddities that we meet with in the corners of Pāṇini's grammar.

I have quoted this passage at length because it both plays, and has to play, an essential role in Staal's argument, and in that of all those who maintain that Pāṇini's grammar is the product of an exclusively oral culture.

Staal's reflections find support, at least at first sight, in subsequently published studies about writing in ancient India. Harry Falk's *Schrift im alten Indien* (1993) is widely regarded as the definitive study on this subject. It shows that all the literary indications that had been taken to prove the use of writing before the period of emperor Aśoka (ca. 268-233 BCE) do no such thing.[455] Moreover, Falk maintains that the inscriptions of Aśoka themselves show that writing was new, and underwent important improvements during the realm of the emperor itself. In other words, writing was not introduced into India until just before, or during, the reign of Aśoka. Falk adds that the script used in Aśoka's inscriptions is insufficiently refined phonologically to be used for Sanskrit; this adaptation supposedly occurred several centuries later.

It is no surprise that Falk subscribes to Staal's position to the extent that Pāṇini's grammar must have been composed orally, without any use of writing whatsoever. Indeed, Falk states in an article (1990: 110) that it is our fault, not Pāṇini's, that it is difficult for us to imagine how such an intricate system could have been developed without writing.

Here, I submit, Falk goes too far. It is fair to expect that we believe that vedic memorisation — though without parallel in any other human society — has been able to preserve very long texts for many centuries without losing a syllable. The evidence in support of this is strong, and the determined sceptic can, still today, visit traditional vedic scholars and test the extent and the precision of their mastery of the texts concerned. However, the oral composition of a work as complex as Pāṇini's grammar is not only

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[455] Cousins (2013: 95) considers it yet "quite unbelievable" that Aśoka could have have his numerous inscriptions carved "only a decade or so after the invention of the alphabet in which the inscriptions were written" and "therefore exclude[s] the possibility of the creation of the Brāhmī alphabet during the realm of Asoka". This position finds support in pre-Aśokan writings in Brāhmī that have come to light; see Houben & Rath 2012: 13. These two authors conclude (p. 14): "Brāhmī did exist at least a century or two before Aśoka and that too in distant Sri Lanka". See further below.

without parallel in other human cultures, it is without parallel in India itself.[456] It would have to be regarded as a totally unique event, in India and in the world, and here the least one can ask for is some indication as to how Pāṇini did it. It simply will not do to state that our difficulty in conceiving any such thing is our problem.[457] Staal understood this. The credibility of his position, and that of Falk, is intimately linked to the plausibility of his explanation.

In this context it is only appropriate to point out that Pāṇini, far from being totally unfamiliar with writing, is generally accepted (also by Falk) to be the first Indian author to unambiguously refer to it.[458] It is true that the brevity of his reference does not allow us to determine with certainty what kind of writing he was referring to. Hinüber (1990: 57) suggests Kharoṣṭhī or Aramaic but prefers the former; Falk (1993: 258-259) argues that it must have been Aramaic, a script used exclusively by a professional class of writers in the service of the Achaemenid Empire. Aramaic was not used or understood by anyone outside this caste of writers, certainly not by Brahmins. Falk's is a possible interpretation of Pāṇini's reference to *lipi* 'script', but clearly not the only one.

To this must be added that, thanks to the work carried out by Hinüber (1990: 34-35) and Falk (1993: 303-304), we now know that Pāṇini lived, in all probability, far closer in time to the period of Aśoka than had hitherto been thought. According to Falk's reasoning, Pāṇini must have lived during the decennia following 350 BCE, i.e. just before (or contemporaneously with?) the invasion by Alexander of Macedonia. Indeed, in a more recent publication (Falk 1994: 326-327) the possibility is considered that Pāṇini may have lived under the Mauryas (which is what Patañjali believed), and therefore (until) after the invasion of Alexander. It is moreover generally agreed that Pāṇini lived in the Northwest of the Indian subcontinent, in what is now Pakistan.[459]

Falk and those who agree with him like to cite the evidence from Megasthenes who, around 300 BCE, recorded that no writing was used in India. Megasthenes' evidence, which seems to be reliable,[460] may apply to the heartland of India, primarily the capital Pāṭaliputra of the Maurya Empire to which he had been sent as ambassador by Seleucus Nicator. It is an altogether different question whether Megasthenes' testimony can be taken to be valid for the Northwest of the subcontinent, which was (or had been until very recently) part of Seleucus' empire. Indeed, Nearchus' earlier testimony

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[456] Cf. Malamoud 1997: 105-06; 2002: 148: "Mais peut-être faut-il distinguer entre ce que requiert la composition d'un texte et les caractéristiques qui facilitent sa transmission. Il est certain que les Sūtra, par de tout autres moyens que la poésie, sont conçus pour être confiés à la mémoire. Mais l'enchaînement de ces fils, surtout de ceux qui tissent la grammaire, suppose de la part des auteurs une prévision de tous les détail de l'ensemble, une mémoire raisonnante, une puissance intellectuelle dont on voit mal comment elles pourraient se déployer sans le secours de l'écriture."

[457] All Falk says is (1990: 110): "Before Pāṇini perfected the system there were many generations in different parts of the subcontinent working on it and it is impossible to reconstruct the steps or to estimate the span of time needed to lead to such an end."

[458] Hinüber (1990: 57) mentions a passage in the *Rāmāyaṇa* (1.12.6) which may have contained *lipikara*, the word known to Pāṇini, in the meaning 'painter' rather than 'writer', but this can hardly have been the meaning known to Pāṇini.

[459] Cp. § I.1.1, above.

[460] See however Houben & Rath 2012: 13: "the statements of Megasthenes may have to be reconsidered."

confirms the existence of writing in the parts of the subcontinent that he visited with Alexander.[461] Pāṇini, as we have seen, lived in those parts.

Regarding the early history of writing in India the following passage from Richard Salomon's book *Indian Epigraphy* must be cited, which refers to various other publications.[462] This passage reads (1998: 12):

> [A] new body of material has recently come to light that seems to support the older theory that Brāhmī existed before Mauryan times, that is, in the fourth century B.C. or possibly even earlier. This is a small group of potsherds bearing short inscriptions, evidently proper names, which were found in the course of excavations at Anurādhapura, Sri Lanka in strata which are said to be securely assigned by radio-carbon dating to the pre-Mauryan period. Various dates have been proposed for these graffiti, ranging from the sixth to the early fourth century B.C. The more recent publications on the subject have tended to favor the later date within this range, but in any case, these inscriptions still seem to show that Brāhmī did indeed predate the Mauryan period.

Salomon cautions his readers to be careful, and he is no doubt right in doing so.[463] Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that the script Pāṇini knew may have been Aramaic, Kharoṣṭhī, or an early form of Brāhmī, or indeed any two or even all three of these.[464]

In the present context it is worthwhile to recall that the *Ṛgveda Padapāṭha may* have been the written version of the *Ṛgveda*, written down before Pāṇini. This theory would explain the archaic features that the Padapāṭha — unlike the Saṃhitāpāṭha — preserves. These features have been discussed in § I.2.6, above, and need not be repeated here. We may however recall that the thesis of a written Padapāṭha has been revived by Michael Witzel (2011), though in a rather different shape. According to Witzel, the Padapāṭha of the *Ṛgveda* was not itself written down, but was created under the influence of an Avestan Padapāṭha-like text, which *was* written down.

Falk is aware of the archaic features of the *Ṛgveda Padapāṭha* and of their importance in the debate about writing in ancient India. His book *Schrift im alten Indien* promised to deal with them in extenso in a separate publication (1993: 250). The intended article has subsequently come out (Falk 2001a). It contains an interesting, though speculative, account of the origin of the Saṃhitāpāṭha and Padapāṭha of the *Ṛgveda*, in which it is postulated that these two versions at some time in the past drifted apart, to get reunited again afterwards. No word is said about the Padapāṭha's archaic features, and one must perhaps assume that the period of separate development is to be held responsible for the differences between the two versions (even though Falk does not say

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[461] So Goyal 1985: 82-100. Hinüber (1990: 21) considers it probable that Nearchus referred to Aramaic writing.

[462] Deraniyagala 1992: II: 739-750; Allchin 1995: 163-181 & 209-216; Coningham, Allchin, Batt & Lucy 1996: 76-77. See further Cousins 2013: 96 f.

[463] Rumour has it that a mistake was made in the radio-carbon dating.

[464] Hinüber (1990: 55 f.) expresses surprise about the fact that the Maurya Empire introduced two completely different scripts (Kharoṣṭhī and Brāhmī) at the same time. He comes to the conclusion that Kharoṣṭhī is older than Brāhmī. This conclusion may need reconsideration in the light of the discoveries in Sri Lanka.

so).[465] The question whether this explanation (if it is one) is better than the one it must replace remains open.

Summing up, it is an open question whether Pāṇini used writing in composing his grammar. If he did, it may well be that we owe this much admired piece of scholarship to that fact. But perhaps he didn't. The very uncertainty that surrounds the first use of writing by Indian scholars obliges us to refrain from drawing a definite conclusion.[466]

By way of conclusion we may look at a passage of Hartmut Scharfe's recent book *A New Perspective on Pāṇini* (2009). The relevance of this passage for the question of Pāṇini's acquaintance with writing justifies it to be quoted at length (pp. 69-71):

> Many of Pāṇini's rules are formulated so dense that it is not easy to see how they could be pronounced, let alone be understood and applied. … VII 2 5 … *hmyanta-kṣaṇa-śvasa-jāgṛ-ṇi-śvy-editām* … must have been recited slowly: *h-m-y-anta* … to be understandable. In VI 1 3 … *na ndrāḥ saṃyogādayaḥ* … similarly *n-d-rāḥ* must have been recited very slowly. Difficult would also be the distinction of two nasals in VII 2 115 *aco ñṇiti*.
>
> What may be difficult becomes virtually impossible when two stops are involved. In III 4 107 Pāṇini wanted to teach that personal endings beginning with /t/ or /th/ receive an augment /s/ (*su*^{t}); but [53] a genitive dual *t-th.oḥ would have been more than difficult to pronounce. Rule III 4 107 therefore appears as *suṭ tith.oḥ.* In VIII 2 38 he referred to a suffix beginning with /t/ or /th/ instead with *tath.oḥ* … In VII 2 104 … *ku tih.oḥ* … Here again **t-h.oḥ* would be difficult to pronounce let alone be understood properly. None of the endings referred to in III 4 107 (viz. *–ta*, *-tam*, *-thas*, *-tham*) justifies the '*ti*' of Pāṇini's sūtra, nor do the endings referred to in VII 2 104 (*ku-taḥ*, *ku-tra*, *ku-ha*). If the /i/ in III 4 107 (*ti-th.oḥ*) and in VII 2 104 (*ti-h.oḥ*) do not represent an /i/ in the object language (i.e., Sanskrit), they could be tags, bound to vanish as the Sanskrit words emerge. They would have been marked with a nasal pronunciation that was subsequently lost. No unwanted forms would result, since no tag /i/ is taught except in connection with roots. We would have a vacuous application; the commentators explain the insertion of /i/ as *uccāraṇārtham* "for the sake of pronunciation".
>
> But this explanation would not be acceptable in other cases, e.g. in VI 1 71 *hrasvasya piti kṛti tuk* … The augment /t/ is tagged with a ^{k} which indicates that the /t/ is added at the end of the root. But what is the status of /u/ in *tu*^{k}? It is not a valid sound of the word in the object language (i.e., Sanskrit), and it cannot be a tag because of unwanted consequences. A tag ^{u} indicates that a stop denotes its whole class, i.e. *tu* denotes /t, th, d, dh, n/, except when it is a suffix: I 1 69 *aṇ-udit savarṇasya cāpratyayaḥ*. Since *tu*^{k} is not a suffix, we would get the undesired form *sarva-jith*, *sarvajid*, etc. along with the correct *sarva-jit*. The correct form of Pāṇini's sūtra should be *hrasvasya piti kṛti t*^{k}.
>
> In the aorist form *apaptat* "he fell" Pāṇini did not recognize the reduplication of the root √*pat*; he assumed an infix /p/ (i.e., *apa[p]tat*) that is tagged with an ^{m} to mark it as a infix: VII 4 19 … *pataḥ pu*^{m} … Again, *pu* would

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[465] One might then also have to assume that the *Ṛgveda Padapāṭha* was preserved in a more western area than its *Saṃhitāpāṭha*, where language was less affected by retroflection; see Deshpande 1995: 74, with references to Mehendale, Bloch and Burrow.

[466] More on the question of Pāṇini and writing in Appendix VII, below.

> include not only /p/, but also /ph, b, bh, m/ which is not desired. The correct form of Pāṇini's sūtra should be *pataḥ p*^{m}.
>
> In Pāṇini's sūtra III 1 108 *hanas ta ca* … the correct form should be *hanas t ca*. It is obvious, I think, that *hrasvasya piti kṛti tk*, *pataḥ pm* and *hanas t ca* would be difficult to pronounce and even harder to understand — or to apply correctly. But with slow and careful recitation and proper explanation the listener could grasp the meaning of the rules.

As is clear from Scharfe's last sentence, he proposes that a number of Pāṇinian sūtras were initially not pronounced as they are now. To explain the present form of these sūtras, he suggests that the process of writing them down at a later time is responsible for the distortions. This is not however true for all of them: some unpronounceable sūtra have survived in their original shape: *hmyanta-* …, … *na ndrāḥ* …, *aco ñṇiti*.

Scharfe is convinced that Pāṇini composed his grammar orally, without the help of writing. If one considers the option that it may not have been composed orally, another explanation for these noteworthy features becomes possible. In that case one may consider that Pāṇini *wrote* all these sūtras in their unpronounceable shape, so that none of the difficulties and possible confusions pointed out by Scharfe were present, because unpronounceability would not be an obstacle.

However, Pāṇini's grammar would *also* be recited, not least because Brahmanism came to cultivate the image of a tradition independent of writing. And the relative weight given to the recited version of the text may then have turned the oral text into its orthodox version, in spite of the contradictions and potential confusions that could result from this.[467]

This way of viewing the matter frees us from the obligation to postulate that early recitation of Pāṇini's grammar was particularly slow and careful. The supposition that Pāṇini could write unpronounceable sequences such as *tk*, *pm* and *tca* poses no problem once we assume that he could write *hmyanta*, *na ndrāḥ* and *aco ñṇiti* (which we have to if we believe that Pāṇini used writing for composing his grammar).

IIA.3.4. The *Mahābhāṣya*

According to Falk, Pāṇini's earliest surviving commentators Kātyāyana and Patañjali did not use writing either.[468] It is worth our while to briefly review some of his arguments. Consider the following:[469]

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[467] Scharfe adds a further example on p. 114: a short *a* is added to four of the five roots enumerated in P. 7.2.57 *kṛta-cṛta-cchṛda-tṛda-nṛtaḥ.* For Scharfe this short *a* is a non-phonemic sound, for us a sound that the exigencies of recitation added, and which subsequent tradition came to look upon as authoritative.

[468] According to Mathur (1996: 128 and fig. 60), the Archaeological Museum of Kurukshetra University (accession no. 81.485) contains a terracotta depicting a seated boy who is "writing alphabet on a wooden board in Brahmi script". Mathur dates this terracotta to the 2nd cent. BCE, roughly the time of Patañjali, and adds: "One such figure is also in the National Museum Collection".

[469] Falk 1993: 266-267.

> Wie P. Thieme 1935 ausführlich dargelegt hat, gab es keine ununterbrochene mündliche Tradition von Pāṇini zu Kātyāyana und Patañjali. Zwischen Autor und Kommentatoren war das Wissen um Akzentuierung und Nasalierungen einzelner Sūtras verloren gegangen. Thieme erklärte die Verluste als Produkt einer Schrift, die wohl Zeichen für Vokale und Konsonanten aufwies, aber noch keine für Akzente und Nasalierung (122 ff.). Wäre dem so, dann hätte schon dem Vārttikakāra ein Manuskript vorliegen müssen, das ihn durch seine Unvollständigkeit verunsichert hätte. Doch sprechen weder Kātyāyana noch Patañjali jemals von einem Manuskript. Sie erwähnen keine Lesarten, keine abgebrochenen Ränder oder verblassten Buchstaben.

Falk does not express disagreement with Thieme's position that the oral tradition linking Pāṇini with Kātyāyana and Patañjali had been interrupted. And yet, there are good reasons to doubt it.[470] What is more, it appears that Patañjali was convinced that he had the text of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* as it had been taught by Pāṇini. The passages that have been considered proof that certain features, such as accents, had been lost to Patañjali, do no such thing when examined more closely.[471]

Let us continue considering Falk's argument. If, for argument's sake, we accept that the oral tradition of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* had been interrupted, what else but a written tradition could have saved Pāṇini's grammar from total perdition? Falk suggests the following: “die mündliche Tradition folgte ähnlichen Prinzipien wie die vedische, die über den Wechsel von *saṃhitāpāṭha-* zu *padapāṭha*-Rezitation jeglichen Kontakt zur ursprünglichen Diktion der Ṛṣis verloren hatte”. However, accents have been very well preserved in oral vedic recitation; only the nasalisation of *ūṃ*, preserved in the *Ṛgveda Padapāṭha*, has been lost in the *Saṃhitāpāṭha*. Furthermore, Falk's remarks to the extent that neither Kātyāyana nor Patañjali mention manuscripts, variant readings, etc. lose their force in the light of our earlier reflections about brahmanical culture, and of more recent authors, who certainly did use writing, but never mentioned any of these things.[472]

Falk then continues (p. 267):

> In Anbetracht dessen, was heute über die Verwendung der Schrift für Sanskrit bekannt ist, erscheint es völlig undenkbar, dass schon um 250 v.Chr. (angeblich: Kātyāyana) oder um 150 v.Chr. (etwas sicherer: Patañjali) ein phonetisch derart raffinierter Text wie die Aṣṭādhyāyī schriftlich fixiert werden konnte. Es fehlten zu jener Zeit immer noch Doppelkonsonanz, *virāma*, *visarga*, velarer Nasal, den man für die Aṣṭādhyāyī unbedingt hätte entwerfen müssen, da er hier und in keinem anderen Sanskrit-Text als Phonem erscheint. ...
>
> Der Zustand der Brāhmī zur Zeit der Śuṅgas, die Natur des Textes und vor allem das Schweigen der beiden frühen Kommentatoren zu jeder Form von Schriftlichkeit verlangt zwingend nach der Erklärung, dass Pāṇinis Text, ebenso wie die Vārttikas und wohl auch das Mahābhāṣya selbst, ganz und gar den Bedingungen oraler Tradition folgten.

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[470] Note "that the Vedic reciters who recite the text of the Aṣṭādhyāyī today recite it with the three accents (*traisvarya*)"; but that this may not correspond to "the original accentuation" of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*; Deshpande 2011: 66-67, 74 ff.

[471] See Appendix VII, below.

[472] For some examples, see Bronkhorst 1991a: 212 f.

It is a pity that Falk does not discuss the consequences of his position. The *Mahābhāṣya* is as long as, if not longer than, the *Ṛgveda*.[473] A complete memorisation of the *Ṛgveda*, including its Padapāṭha and Kramapāṭha, "extends to more than eight years, with ten to twelve hours of learning each day" according to K. P. Aithal (1991: 12), as cited by Falk (1993: 323). There is no evidence that I know of suggesting that even half that time (or for that matter: any time at all) was ever reserved for memorising the *Mahābhāṣya* in the vedic style (as opposed to studying it; don't forget the fundamental difference between vedic and other forms of memorisation.) The *Mahābhāṣya* itself complains that 'nowadays' students, having studied the Veda, are in no hurry to study Pāṇini's grammar.[474] It is hard to believe that those same uninspired students would learn Pāṇini's grammar plus another text the size of the *Ṛgveda* by heart.

Yijing's remarks on the Sanskrit grammarians would at first sight seem to be in disagreement with the above. A closer inspection shows that this is not the case. Yijing, as has been shown in detail by John Brough (1973), made a number of serious mistakes in his account of Sanskrit grammatical literature, confusing both authors and texts. It seems nevertheless clear that he knew (or had heard of) the *Mahābhāṣya*, which he knew by the name *Cūrṇi*, but which he failed to distinguish from the *vārttika*s which it contains. Confusingly, he appears to use the expression *Vṛttisūtra* for the *vārttika*s, but ascribes far too great a length to this text (18'000 ślokas), which he seems to believe to have been studied independently from the *Cūrṇi*. This great length is no doubt to be explained by the fact, pointed out by Brough, that Yijing was unable to discriminate between the *vārttika*s and the *Mahābhāṣya*. This leaves us with the question what Yijing may have precisely been referring to when mentioning the duration of studying this text. However that may be, he says the following about it (Takakusu 1896: 175): "Boys of fifteen begin to study this commentary, and understand it after five years. ... All these books (?) should be learnt by heart. But this, as a rule, applies only to men of high talent, while for those of medium or little ability a different measure (method) must be taken according to their wishes. They should study hard day and night, without letting a moment pass for idle repose." About the *Cūrṇi* he says (p. 178): "Advanced scholars learn this in three years."

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[473] The *Ṛgveda*, according to Gonda 1975: 9, contains 165.007 words. A low estimate of the number of words in the *Mahābhāṣya* — 1412 pages in Kielhorn's edition, each containing on average some 200 words — comes to a total that is higher than that. (The length of the *Mahābhāṣya* is said to be 36.000 granthas, i.e., 36.000 x 32 = 1.152.000 syllables; see Bhāgavata 1999: Upodghāta p. 09.)

[474] Mahā-bh I p. 5 l. 6-11: *purākalpa etad āsīt: saṃskārottarakālaṃ brāhmaṇā vyākaraṇaṃ smādhīyate / tebhyas tatra sthānakaraṇānupradānajñebhyo vaidikāḥ śabdā upadiśyante / tad adyatve na tathā / vedam adhītya tvaritā vaktāro bhavanti: vedān no vaidikāḥ śabdāḥ siddhā lokāc ca laukikāḥ / anarthakaṃ vyākaraṇam iti / tebhya evaṃ vipratipannabuddhibhyo 'dhyetṛbhya ācārya idaṃ śāstram anvācaṣṭe: imāni prayojanāny adhyeyaṃ vyākaraṇam iti /* "In olden days it was like this: brahmins studied grammar after their (initiation-)ceremony. After they had learnt the different places of articulation, the articulatory organs and the extra-buccal process of articulation, they were taught the Vedic words. Nowadays, it is not like this. Having learnt the Veda [the students] are quick to say: 'the Vedic words are known [to us] from the Veda, and the ordinary words from common speech. [So] grammar is useless.' To those students entertaining false notions the teacher teaches this science [of grammar] saying: 'these are the uses, [therefore] grammar must be studied.'" (tr. Joshi and Roodbergen 1986: 68; modified)

It has to be repeated that Yijing's remarks have to be read with much caution. But assuming his testimony about the method of studying grammatical texts to be by and large correct, there is an obvious contrast with the way he described vedic learning, which we already considered above. About the latter he says (p. 182): "The Vedas have been handed down from mouth to mouth, not transcribed on paper or leaves. In every generation there exist some intelligent Brâhmans who can recite the 100,000 verses." He says no such thing about grammatical texts. In other words, these grammatical texts were not exclusively handed down from mouth to mouth. Indeed, Yijing makes a point of stating that less talented students would not learn them by heart at all. The long duration required for studying the *Mahābhāṣya* (three years? five years? eight years?) can be explained by the great complexity of its contents, not necessarily by the effort needed to learn it by heart. Yijing's account contains no hint that the *Mahābhāṣya* was ever studied the vedic way.

If we now return to the question of scripts, it is hard to see how one can be certain that the Brāhmī script at the time of the Śuṅgas could not yet be used for Sanskrit, since practically all our early evidence is in other languages than Sanskrit. With the growing popularity of Sanskrit or 'Epigraphical Hybrid Sanskrit' as inscriptional languages all the necessary characters (*ṛ*, *au*, *ṅa*, *ḥ*, and *halanta* or *virāma*) as well as consonantal clusters appear in the inscriptions (Salomon 1998: 37).[475] It is not evident that this is bound to imply that these or similar characters cannot have been used in Sanskrit non-inscriptional writing well before these inscriptions. To this may be added the 'überraschende Tatbestand' (Hinüber 1990: 61) that Brāhmī has ligatures which serve no purpose in the Middle-Indic languages for which it is used; ligatures are of course essential for writing Sanskrit.[476]

It is important to insist once again on the difference between vedic memorisation and other forms of memorisation. Many of the non-vedic feats of memorisation enumerated in Falk's chapter "Berichte vom Umfang des Memorierten" (1993: § 14.1, pp. 321 f.) concern either texts that have been handed down in rather widely differing versions, thus showing the unreliability of this method of memorisation (cf. Falk 1993: 322: "Häufig mussten sich die Chinesen mit lückenhaften [buddhistischen] Texten zufrieden geben, weil ihren Gästen das eine oder andere Kapitel aus dem Gedächtnis

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[475] Hinüber (1990: 61) appears to consider it significant that the *Lalitavistara*, where it enumerates the list of Brāhmī signs, skips the letter *ṛ*. This same list does however contain *ai*, *au*, and *ṅa*; see Lal(V) p. 89. It is to be kept in mind that the list in the *Lalitavistara* is used to inculcate some important truths with the help of words or expressions that have the sound concerned in the first or second place (*a*: *anityaḥ sarvasaṃskāra[ḥ]*; *ā*: *ātmaparahita*; etc.). In such a list there is no place for *ḥ* and *halanta / virāma*, and perhaps not for *ṛ* (the Sanskrit index to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* — Abhidh-k-bh(Hi) — contains just nine entries beginning with *ṛ*, none of which may have been suitable). It is furthermore not clear that this enumeration of sounds concerns specifically the Brāhmī script. In this context it may be of interest to note that the Kharoṣṭhī script of one of the early buddhist manuscripts from Gandhāra has a sign for *ṛ* (i.e. for *kṛ*; see Salomon 1999: 123).

[476] Cp. Colas 1997: 127: "la finesse de l'analyse phonétique dont témoignent les premières écritures indiennes (attestées au III^{e} siècle avant notre ère) trahit l'intervention des érudits mêmes qui déconsidéraient l'écrit. Le bon sens suggère donc que ces clercs employèrent l'écriture plus tôt que le III^{e} siècle avant notre ère, peut-être dans des manuscrits utilisés comme aide-mémoire." On p. 129 Colas expresses his view that the first Indian writing systems must have been created in the circle of grammarians or under their influence.

geschwunden war"); or texts that could at any time be corrected with the help of their written versions. (The buddhist manuscripts found in Northwest India from the first century CE suggests that the buddhist texts that were memorised may have had written versions from an early date onward; see Salomon 1999.) The *Mahābhāṣya* is different: it is a highly technical text which appears nonetheless to have been preserved in a form that hardly deviates from the original.[477]

IIA.3.5. Systematic philosophy

I have concentrated so far on Pāṇini's grammar because it is probably the most 'intelligent' composition from the late-vedic period that has survived ("one of the greatest monuments of human intelligence", as we have seen). Writing can help in composing particularly complex works, even though we do not know whether it did in the case of Pāṇini. Writing can have other effects, too. It allows readers access to works that do not belong to their own tradition. There will be a limit to the extent of what even the best memoriser can memorise, and to what he will be willing, or allowed, to memorise. It is difficult to believe that people put much effort into memorising texts which they looked upon as heretical, wrong, or dangerous.

It seems undeniable that Pāṇini was familiar with a considerable portion of vedic literature, going well beyond any single Veda. So was his commentator Patañjali.[478] This circumstance might be used to argue for the existence of written vedic texts at the time of these linguists, but this would not be a particularly strong argument. Representatives of different Vedas were in contact with each other (one needs several of them to execute a sacrifice), and it is conceivable that they provided each other with suitable examples to illustrate, say, specific grammatical rules.

However, it was no doubt much harder to gain access to texts belonging to altogether different, even hostile, traditions. This happened in an intellectual development that began some time after Pāṇini, and which distinguishes itself in an essential manner from the development that led to his classical grammar. Let me try to explain what the difference consists in.

It has already been pointed out that Pāṇini's grammar is a very intelligent piece of work. It does not however challenge generally accepted opinions, as far as we can tell. Even though modern scholarship has been fascinated by, and therefore often has concentrated on, its comparison with modern linguistics, studies that deal with the intellectual background of Pāṇini's grammar reveal a fundamental continuity with late-vedic thinking.[479] This fits in with the general picture in which Pāṇini, and perhaps other grammarians before him, organised and systematized ideas that were generally accepted, rather than providing a total break with what preceded.

Some time after Pāṇini such a break — or rather: a number of them — *did* take place in Indian thinking. In the various schools of what is commonly called classical Indian philosophy revolutionary new ideas came up — quite suddenly it appears — which *did* constitute radical breaks with what preceded. Buddhist thinkers all of a sudden denied the existence of phenomenal reality, sometimes going to the extent of claiming

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[477] See in this connection Bronkhorst 1987a: 14-42 ("The text history of the *Mahābhāṣya*").
[478] See *Greater Magadha* ch. III.2.
[479] Bronkhorst 1981b; 2011b: 8-13.

that no Buddha exists or ever existed. Certain brahmanical thinkers — most notably the Vaiśeṣikas — came up with most remarkable analyses of reality, maintaining for example that a pot and its two halves constitute three different entities. Others argued that nothing ever comes into existence, and that future entities exist already in their material causes. The most orthodox defenders and interpreters of the Veda, the Mīmāṃsakas, came to deny the very existence of the vedic gods and claimed, more generally, that practically nothing in the Veda is to be taken literally. This list could easily be extended. For our present purposes it is most important to see that something dramatic happened to an important number of Indian thinkers during the rather limited period of a few centuries.

One of the great tragedies of Indian intellectual history is that little is known of the details of these momentous changes. Only rarely can we associate a revolutionary development with one or more known individuals. We know even less about the circumstances that set these changes going. However, it seems certain that they had much to do with the fact that the thinkers concerned had to defend their points of view in encounters with opponents who totally disagreed with them. The opposition between Buddhists and Brahmins appears to have been particularly important in all this, but oppositions between schools within these and other movements were important, too. Thinkers were obliged to defend their positions, because they might be summoned by the regional ruler to confront a star speaker from a competing school. As a result they made their position as coherent as possible, and removed, suppressed or de-emphasised any feature that would appear problematic to a critical outsider. If one understands rationality to mean, or imply, openness to criticism (freely accepted or imposed) in all areas,[480] the case could be made that the early Indian philosophers, who had to deal with critics who would not grant them an inch, are at least as much if not more entitled to the qualification 'rational' than Pāṇini.[481]

It is important to add some specifications to the above. Debates between proponents of different currents of belief or practice took place long before the beginning of classical Indian philosophy. We can be certain that early Buddhism and Jainism, for example, being missionary movements, did not eschew meetings and discussions with others. The early buddhist canon preserves memories of such encounters, and the descriptions found in it of early Jainism, for example, turn out to be fairly reliable. Yet neither early Buddhism nor early Jainism felt obliged to improve its own position as a result of such meetings. They did not need to, because there was no one to reward the winner and punish the looser in such informal debates. This, however, appears to have changed in subsequent centuries. We know that in classical India kings might oblige representatives of different movements to participate in public debates, in which much might be at stake, e.g. the life or freedom of the participants, or the well-being of their movement. Public debates of this kind no doubt inspired authors to compose the manuals of debating skills that come into existence during the first centuries of the Common Era.

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[480] This is easily misunderstood. Houben, for example, criticises this notion in the following words (2001: 170 n. 8): "there may very well be areas of reality which, for the thinkers involved, are fundamentally beyond critical inquiry". This may indeed be true for individual thinkers, but that is not the point. The point is that in a rational tradition thus conceived, the enemies and opponents of thinkers will be free to criticise issues that for the latter are beyond critical inquiry, and that the thinkers criticised will yet have to listen and respond to this criticism. A rational tradition must in this way be understood as a social phenomenon, not as a description of the habits of thought of individual thinkers.

[481] For an elaboration of this idea of rationality and references, see § III.2, below.

And these same public debates appear to have inspired thinkers to revise and improve their positions, thus creating the schools of classical philosophy. It seems however likely that beside these public debates informal debates continued to be held. After all, the Buddhists and the Jainas were still interested in making converts, and for this purpose discussions are necessary with as yet unconverted people.[482]

We are informed about the classical debates mainly through the reports of foreign visitors; two examples will be briefly presented here. The Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Xuanzang has left us a detailed account of his visit to India in the first half of the seventh century of the Common Era. In this account he regularly mentions debates between representatives of different schools of thought. The debates he refers to normally took place in the presence of a king, and tended to end in victory for one of the two parties, and defeat for the other. According to the biography of Xuanzang composed by his pupil Huili, Xuanzang himself volunteered to participate in a debate on one occasion. The event is described as follows:[483]

> At that time a heretic of the Lokāyatika school came to seek a debate and wrote his argument in fourteen points, which he hang on the door of the monastery, while he announced, 'If anybody is able to refute any one point of my argument, I shall cut off my head to apologize!'
> After the passage of several days, nobody came out to accept the challenge. The Master [= Xuanzang] then asked his personal servant to take down the poster, destroy it, and trample the broken pieces under his feet. Being greatly enraged, the Brahmin asked, 'Who are you?' The servant said in reply, 'I am a servant of the Mahayana-deva.' The Brahmin, who had already heard of the fame of the Master, was ashamed of himself and did not say anything more. The Master sent for him and brought him to the presence of the Venerable Śīlabhadra [Xuanzang's teacher of Nālandā Monastery], with various virtuous monks as witnesses, to start a debate with him about the principles of his school and the theories founded by other heretical sects as well.

At this point Xuanzang starts to criticise various heretical schools, among them the two brahmanical schools of philosophy called Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika, but not, surprisingly, the Lokāyatika school. Only his criticism of the Sāṃkhya school is given in some detail. The text then continues:

> In this manner the argument was carried on with repeated refutations; and the Brahmin remained silent and said nothing. Then he rose to his feet and said with apology, 'I am defeated, and I am ready to keep my word.' The Master said, 'We

[482] Eltschinger (2012b) makes the interesting observation that "the overwhelming majority of the pre-fifth-century Buddhist polemical rhetoric seems to address fellow Buddhists in the form of Abhidharmic disputation. Moreover, the early Mahāyāna literature (*sūtras* and *śāstra*s alike) pays only marginal attention to the outsiders, concentrating its arguments on the inferiority of the Śrāvakayāna and directing its acrimony against 'mainstream' Buddhism. In other words, … the opponents most regularly contended with by the Buddhists were co-religionists." (p. 431). With regard to the fifth and subsequent centuries, "there is every reason to believe that the rise of Buddhist epistemology and the concomitant decline of Abhidharma can be accounted for as Buddhist answers to new challenges of a non-philosophical character." (p. 480)
[483] Li 1995: 132 f. (modified)

> Buddhists do not take any man's life. I now make you my slave, and you should work according to my orders.' The Brahmin was glad to obey the Master's orders with reverence, and was brought to his living quarters. All those who heard about this event praised it with delight.

It is unlikely that this passage accurately presents what happened. It is hard to believe that a Brahmin who was seeking a debate would accept total defeat without as much as uttering a word. But nor would we expect historical accuracy in a document that primarily sings the glory of Master Xuanzang. It will be interesting to see what kind of arguments supposedly led to his victory in debate.

The text does not offer much information with regard to the arguments used, with one notable exception. The Master is supposed to have dealt with the Sāṃkhya system of thought in a rather more detailed manner. First he presents an outline of the system, which agrees with what we know about it. After this exposition he draws attention to what he considers its lack of coherence. It is not clear why a follower of the Lokāyatika school should have wished to defend ideas belonging to the altogether different Sāṃkhya school of thought. Xuanzang's exposition and refutation of the Sāṃkhya position can therefore hardly have been part of his debate with his hapless opponent. Nor is it likely that a real Sāṃkhya would have felt defeated by the reflections brought to bear on their system by the Chinese pilgrim. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that Xuanzang is depicted here as presenting what is an accurate description of the main features of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, and that, having presented this outline, he tries to show its inner incoherence. The fundamental assumptions of this philosophy do not, according to the position attributed to Xuanzang, justify the functions it ascribes to the various entities it postulates.

Accounts like this are extremely interesting, and give us a glimpse, if ever so faint, of situations India's philosophers may have been familiar with. In the present context we have to limit our reflections to one issue: How did Xuanzang know the system of his opponents so well? It seems extremely unlikely that he had been trained by one of them. It is much more likely that he had studied their texts, either alone or with the help of a Buddhist teacher. Indeed, Xuanzang himself reports that Sāṃkhya and various other non-buddhist topics were taught at the buddhist university of Nālandā.[484] It seems safe to conclude that intellectual confrontations like the one involving Xuanzang could not have taken place, at least not in this form, without access to written documents; and indeed, there is no controversy about the extensive use of reading and writing at his period. But what do we know about the debates that took place many centuries before Xuanzang? And what did the participants in those debates know about the views of their opponents? We will return to these questions below.

First we turn to our second example, which is situated a few centuries before the time of Xuanzang. It depicts a debate between a Buddhist and a Sāṃkhya in which, this time, the latter is victorious. The story is found in Paramārtha's *The Life of Vasubandhu*. The main character is the Sāṃkhya teacher Vindhyavāsa, who modified the Sāṃkhya doctrine and came to think that the doctrine set forth by him was the greatest, and that nothing could be superior to it. However, Buddhism was flourishing at that time. Vindhyavāsa therefore resolved to refute it. None of the great Buddhist masters being present, Vindhyavāsa debates with the old Buddhamitra, who is completely defeated.

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[484] Lalmani Joshi 1967: 127,

Buddhamitra only gets away with his life because he is a Brahmin. Instead he receives a beating and Vindhyavāsa receives three lacs of gold as a prize.[485]

The story has a happy ending after all, for Vasubandhu, after his return, composed a work criticising the Sāṃkhya doctrine in such a competent manner that the heretics had nothing left for them to fall back upon. In this way, without meeting Vindhyavāsa, Vasubandhu took full revenge on him and wiped off the disgrace put upon his teacher.

These examples show that loosing a debate could have serious consequences. It is not surprising that debating manuals were produced, some of which have survived. Public debates had to be won, and all possible means were used in order to attain that goal. This included trickery, but also straightforward, and soundly based, criticism of each other's positions. It is this aspect of the debate tradition that has no doubt exerted a more lasting influence. Criticism directed at others and criticism received from others had the unavoidable effect that all participants in these debates refined their own positions. Incoherent or inconsistent views would not survive scrutiny, neither by an opponent in debate nor by the thinker himself who did not wish to be exposed by those who disagreed with him.

This process of improving and systematising one's own position becomes visible, perhaps for the first time, in a scholastic development of Buddhism during the centuries preceding the Common Era. Buddhist scholasticism of that period, called *Abhidharma*, has mainly survived in two bodies of texts, belonging to two schools of Buddhism: Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda. The Theravāda Abhidharma shows ongoing refinement, but little or no attempt to develop a coherent system of thought. Several texts of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, on the other hand, testify to the attempts at coherence made in this school. Since the innovations concerned were made on the basis of traditional material, the result is often quite complex, and this is not the place to deal with them in full detail.[486] I will mention only a few striking features here. The Sarvāstivāda conception of the world is essentially atomistic. The macroscopic, and therefore composite, objects that we are acquainted with from everyday experience do not really exist. What really exist are the ultimate constituents, called *dharma*s. A particularly important composite object is the human person, which also does not really exist. The atomistic understanding of the world also finds expression in the belief in momentariness: nothing exists for more than a single moment.[487] Various questions linked to this atomistic vision of the world are raised and often answered by introducing an appropriate *dharma*. The question, for example, how different bundles of *dharma*s stick together so as to form different persons (remember that persons do strictly speaking not exist), is answered with the introduction of a *dharma* called *prāpti* 'possession'. Other difficulties were connected with the belief that mental events occur only one at a time in one person. This leads to difficulties in the case where someone observes, say, his own desire. This activity involves two mental events, the observation and the desire, which cannot simultaneously exist. When the observation is present, the observed desire must of

[485] Takakusu 1904: 283 f. The passage is cited in full in *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism* pp. 183-184.

[486] For a slightly more detailed, but still very incomplete, presentation, see Bronkhorst 2009: 61-114.

[487] Momentariness is not explicitly mentioned in early Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, but this position can quite safely be attributed to their authors; see Bronkhorst 1995.

necessity be non-present. Observation of a desire is therefore only possible if a non-present object (the desire) exists. The Sarvāstivādins concluded from this that past and future exist. This particular view, incidentally, is responsible for their name, Sarvāstivāda, the "position (*vāda*) according to which everything (*sarva*) exists (*asti*)". Sarvāstivāda, as will be clear from this very brief presentation, made a major effort to rationalise its teachings, Theravāda did not. Sarvāstivāda played a major role in the tradition of debate that came to involve all schools of philosophy, whether buddhist, brahmanical, or jaina; it seems even likely that the Sarvāstivādins were the first to adhere to this tradition of debate in India. Theravāda played no such role, and indeed left India before this tradition of debate had attained a prominent position.

The marginal role of Theravāda Buddhism is illustrated by one of the earliest surviving texts in India dedicated to criticising the positions of others. This text is the *Kathāvatthu* "Text dealing with disputes", according to tradition composed 218 years after the death of the Buddha (Hinüber 1996: 70 f.), and belonging precisely to the Theravāda branch of Buddhism. It criticises in its oldest portions a position that we know was held by the Sarvāstivādins, mentioned earlier. An analysis of the criticism presented in the *Kathāvatthu* shows that its author had not understood, and perhaps had no knowledge of, the arguments used by the Sarvāstivādins to justify their position. The Sarvāstivādins held that past and future exist, and their argumentation, as we have seen, was built on their fundamental belief that no two mental events can simultaneously occur in one person. The author of the *Kathāvatthu* presents instead an argument that is totally nonsensical.[488]

The *Kathāvatthu*, then, is a text that criticises the position of others without being properly informed about it (at least in this case). No wonder that its uninformed criticism carried little weight. The Sarvāstivādins were not obliged to change their views as a result of the criticism expressed in this Theravāda text, and did not do so. Moreover, the Theravādins felt no need to develop their own views into a coherent whole.

All this takes us back to the question of writing. It may not be necessary to know writing in order to debate, or for producing a well-constructed argument, or for seeing the weakness in the position of someone else. However, to destroy the position of one's opponent, one has to know that position. If the opponent belongs to a tradition altogether different from one's own — as is the case in a confrontation between a Brahmin and a Buddhist — knowledge of the other's texts is unlikely to be part of one's own curriculum. In such cases the most obvious way of gaining access to the position and defensive arguments of one's opponent is by studying the texts that the opponent himself has read. (Other ways are possible, but no doubt rare: according to legend, the brahmanical thinker Kumārila had in his youth joined a buddhist monastery in order to gain deep knowledge of the doctrines he was going to criticise; cp. Hulin 2001: 24.)

For much of the history of Indian philosophy there can be no doubt that the main participants in the ongoing debate read the writings of their opponents. Authors criticise each other and show considerable familiarity with the writings of their worst enemies. For this part of the history of Indian philosophy the importance of writing cannot be doubted.

To illustrate the extent to which at least certain philosophical authors were acquainted with the literature of their opponents, I refer to a passage in the *Nyāyavārttika*

[488] Bronkhorst 1993.

of Uddyotakara, a commentator who wrote around the year 600.[489] In this passage Uddyotakara criticises the buddhist doctrine of No-Self (*anātman*). One of the arguments he presents is that the Buddhists, by believing this, go against their own sacred texts. At this point Uddyotakara cites a text which it is not possible to locate in the surviving versions of buddhist Sūtras. But apparently the cited passage was not well-known to the Buddhists in Uddyotakara's time either, for he says: "Don't say that this is not Buddha word; it occurs in the *Sarvābhisamayasūtra*." Apparently Uddyotakara had made such extensive searches in the sacred literature of his opponents that he had unearthed a passage that few Buddhists knew.

We have to address the question whether classical Indian philosophy came about as a result of acquaintance with writing. Is it possible that it would *not* have come about without it? Questions like these are difficult to answer. Most of the earliest surviving philosophical texts present their own system and pay little explicit attention to other philosophies. It seems safe to maintain that they had become interested in systematising their own position and removing inconsistencies because they felt threatened by other thinkers. But one can *be criticised* by others without knowing the details of their positions. What is more, one can *criticise* the positions of others without knowing those positions all that well.

We have seen that the *Kathāvatthu* illustrates this. It criticises other positions, but in the one case where we can check what it is doing we find that it had not understood the position it criticised at all. Not seeing the inner coherence of the views it criticises, the Theravāda tradition apparently did not feel the need to increase the coherence of its own, as the Sarvāstivādins had done. There is a great temptation to conclude that the Theravādins had no access to the texts of their opponents. This in its turn might be interpreted to mean that they did not yet use writing at that period. But was the situation different for the contemporary Sarvāstivādins?

Unfortunately this is far from clear. It appears that the Vaiśeṣika philosophy arose under the influence of Sarvāstivāda thought,[490] but it is not clear how much in-depth knowledge of that buddhist school was required in order to be familiar with its main theoretical presuppositions; the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (the oldest text of this school) may in any case be too young to be of importance in this discussion. The same may be true of the *Nyāyasūtra*. The early Sarvāstivāda texts that have been preserved do not as a rule speak of the positions of others. However, a Gāndhārī manuscript fragment from the first century CE (which is being prepared for publication by Collett Cox) contains parts of a polemical, non-Sarvāstivāda, Abhidharma text that criticises alternative positions, most notably the Sarvāstivāda. Alternative views are also mentioned in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, a voluminous commentary that may have been composed, in its earliest form, in the first half of the second century CE. This text does not only mention the deviating opinions of other Sarvāstivādins: rival schools of Buddhism receive coverage also, as do a variety of non-buddhist schools.[491] Unfortunately it seems that the information we find in this text about non-buddhist schools is so sparse that no certain conclusions can be drawn about the acquaintance of its authors with the texts of their non-buddhist rivals. This question is

[489] For details, see Bronkhorst 1996.
[490] See § III.4.1, below.
[491] Buswell & Jaini 1996: 110-111.

in need of further study as far as the *Mahāvibhāṣā* is concerned,[492] but it is clear that other early Sarvāstivāda texts, including the *Abhidharmahṛdaya*,[493] the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*,[494] and even Vasubandhu's more recent *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*[495] tell us very little about rival non-buddhist schools. By contrast, the text which is partially preserved in the so-called Spitzer manuscript (third century CE at the latest) contains frequent references to "non-Buddhist literature and topics, e.g., the Mantras, Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads, *arthaśāstra*, *kāmaśāstra*, Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata, the *kalā*s, etc., and notably to the non-Buddhist philosophical schools of Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika" (Franco 2000: 558 [53]; cp. 2004). Familiarity with the doctrines of different schools is also attested in the *Buddhacarita* 'Acts of the Buddha' by Aśvaghoṣa, a Buddhist author belonging to the first centuries of the Common Era. This poem contains a description (and criticism) of the Sāṃkhya philosophy that appears to be well informed.[496] It also contains indications that suggest its author was acquainted with Vaiśeṣika.[497] Regarding Aśvaghoṣa, Johnston observed (1936: II: xviii): "he had an acquaintance, so wide that no parallel can be found to it among other Buddhist writers, with all departments of Brahmanical learning, including some knowledge of the Veda and ritual literature as well as mastery of all the sciences a kavi was expected to have studied." However, this may not be evidence for the accessibility of all this learning to non-Brahmins, but rather for the opposite, viz., that Aśvaghoṣa was born a Brahmin and had been given a Brahmin's education; this is indeed what the Chinese tradition maintains. For familiarity with brahmanical philosophical learning on the part of a buddhist author we have to turn to Nāgārjuna, whose *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* and *Vigrahavyāvartanī* betray thorough knowledge of the *Nyāyasūtra*.[498] All this information about other schools in these works may not, however, be of much help, since it seems unlikely that anyone would seriously maintain that the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and the poems of Aśvaghoṣa, not to speak of the works of Nāgārjuna, were composed orally: with these texts we have no doubt entered the age of literacy.[499]

And yet, even in an age of literacy information may be difficult to obtain. Qvarnström (1999: 172) paints the following depressing picture:

> [T]here were no public libraries, no public centers of education or information. Philosophical systems were, so to speak, private property. To learn something about the 'exoteric' views of an opponent one might attend or participate in a public debate (*vāda*).

This picture is no doubt too bleak. Hinüber (2001: 359), referring to Qvarnström's remarks, draws attention to the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, which stipulates that when books are left by testament to the buddhist order, the buddhist books should be kept

[492] Cp. Willemen, Dessein, Cox 1998: 239 (Sāṃkhyas, Vaiśeṣikas, Lokāyatas, Śabdavādins).
[493] Willemen 1975.
[494] Dessein 1999.
[495] See the indexes in Abhidh-k-bh(Hi) and Abhidh-k(VP) VI; cp. Bronkhorst 1997.
[496] Cp. Ramakrishna Rao 1964; Kent 1982.
[497] Bronkhorst 2005.
[498] Bhattacharya 1977; Lindtner 1982: 87 f.; Bronkhorst 1985; Oetke 1991: 44 f.; Tola & Dragonetti 1995; Meuthrath 1999.
[499] It is in this context interesting to recall that the (*Mahā-*)*Vibhāṣā* is familiar with the numerical place-value system (Bronkhorst 1994).

and given to the library, whereas books belonging to other śāstras should be sold.[500] This rule would make no sense if there were no readers who read books belonging to different philosophical and scientific traditions.

IIA.3.6. Conclusions

The conclusions to be drawn from the reflections above cannot but be disappointing. It may be that writing played a role in the composition of Pāṇini's grammar, but we don't really know. It may be that literacy, and access to the writings of thinkers belonging to different schools, made possible the intellectual revolution that created classical Indian philosophy, but once again, we cannot be sure.[501] All we know is that the subsequent development of classical Indian philosophy depended upon access to written documents not only of the own school, but to those of others as well.

IIA.4. Sanskrit and the Veda

Brahmins, in their self-understanding, owed their special status to the fact that they knew and preserved the Veda, which includes numerous *mantra*s that are supposed to be effective if correctly pronounced in the right circumstances. Their particular concern with the correct pronunciation of those *mantra*s is responsible for their interest in phonetics, and for the composition of treatises dealing with this topic, either in general or focused on specific vedic texts. The effectiveness of those *mantra*s, furthermore, showed that these *mantra*s, and the language of these *mantra*s, had a close affinity with reality. Sanskrit and reality were, in their opinion, closely connected, and this is a theme that comes up again and again in brahmanical thought.[502]

This fundamental conviction found expression in a single encompassing vision, in which both the Sanskrit language and the Veda had their place. In this vision, Sanskrit was eternal, i.e., without beginning in time; other languages were at best corruptions of the only language that really existed, viz. Sanskrit. The Veda, too, was without beginning in time, and therefore without author. It needed no author, because the Veda was the pure expression of the Sanskrit language.[503] Studying Sanskrit and studying the Veda were therefore two sides of the same coin. This issue will be taken up in the present chapter.

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[500] *Gilgit Manuscripts* vol. III part 2, p. 143 l. 5-7: *pustakānāṃ buddhavacanapustakā avibhajya cāturdiśāya bhikṣusaṃghāya dhāraṇakoṣṭhikāyāṃ prakṣeptavyāḥ / bahiḥśāstrapustakā bhikṣubhir vikrīya bhājayitavyāḥ /*

[501] The extent of the interaction between different schools of thought during the centuries preceding the Common Era is often underestimated; see Bronkhorst 2006.

[502] Vincent Eltschinger (2013: 207-208, with references) points out that Dharmakīrti repeatedly ascribes to his Mīmāṃsaka opponent the idea that *mantra*s yield their results due to a natural capacity (*bhāvaśakti*), an idea that does not appear to find expression in the extant Mīmāṃsā treatises. The absence of this specific term in the relevant treatises does not change the fact that the general idea would seem to fit Mīmāṃsā thought quite well, in spite of Eltschinger's hesitations.

[503] Jim Holt (2012: 86) asks his readers to imagine a "series that has no beginning and no end, ... consisting of an infinite succession of copies of some book — say, the *Bhagavad Gita*. Suppose that each book in the series is faithfully copied by a scribe, letter for letter, from the preceding

IIA.4.1. The linguistic background of Brahmanism

Language has always been a major concern for Brahmanism, not least because of its inseparable connection with the Veda. Brahmins are expected to study and recite the Veda.[504] Without doing so, they are in danger of losing their status and of becoming a Śūdra.[505]

Scholars have observed that the general outlook of the vedic Brāhmaṇas can be described as magical thought.[506] They contain numerous identifications of or correlations between items that are, at first sight, unconnected, as when the god Viṣṇu is identified with the sacrifice, or the cow with breath.[507] Certain identifications are based on the phonetic similarity of the words used to designate the items concerned. These identifications are based on the implicit conviction that language and reality are interconnected.[508] The vedic Brāhmaṇas do not explicitly state what precise procedure they follow. However, in most cases this procedure is relatively straightforward. Items designated by words that resemble each other are thought of as connected. These items can be of many kinds: concrete objects, abstract notions, actions, etc. All that counts is the resemblance between word forms.[509]

By way of example, consider the following passage from the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (2.1(6).1):

> They (the gods who went upwards to heaven) obstructed (*ayopayan*) it (the way to heaven) by means of the sacrificial post (*yūpa*); in that they obstructed (*ayopayan*)

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book in the series. Now, for each given copy of the *Bhagavad Gita*, the text is fully explained by the text of the preceding copy, from which it has been transcribed. But why should the whole series of books, extending back infinitely far in time, be copies of the *Bhagavad Gita*? Why not copies of some other book — *Don Quixote*, say, or *Paradise Lost*? Why, for that matter, should there be any book at all?" Transferred to the Veda, which has been repeated since beginningless time, this implies that the content of the Veda requires an explanation that goes beyond the fact that it has been (orally) copied and recopied forever. This explanation is that pure speech finds expression in the Veda, and in the Veda alone.

[504] Kane, HistDh II/I: 107-108.

[505] Manu 2.168.

[506] Witzel 1979; Oldenberg 1919.

[507] Oldenberg 1919: 110 f. On these identifications, see further Renou 1946; Smith 1989: 30 ff.

[508] Correlations are not limited to vedic India. Michael Witzel (2012: 290-291), while discussing the great divide between the two mythological regions he calls Laurasia and Gondwana, points out: "The the use of correlations is … a general human trait, nevertheless the way they are employed and the use they are put to differ in the two regions. For example, African sorcey lays greater stress on objects used, 'fetishes', as seen in Caribbean Voodoo. Little care is given to the actual wording employed in sorcery. … Conversely, Laurasian magic prominently employs the power of the word, the magical formulas establishing correlations, along with pertinent actions, whether in the Trobriand Islands, in India, with the Austronesian Ami in Taiwan, or in ancient Japan." See also p. 429: "Where we can observe Laurasian shamanic and priestly tradition, such as among the traditional Siberian and Nepalese shamans, the Trobriand Islanders, the Ami priests of aboriginal Taiwan, and the Vedic Indian Brahmins, it puts considerable, even extraordinary stress on the power of speech."

[509] Numerous examples can be found in Deeg 1995.

> by means of the post (*yūpa*), that is why the post has its name (lit. that is the *yūpa*-ship of the *yūpa*).[510]

Or the following one, from the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* (3.11.8.7-8):

> Prajāpati (the creator god) did not know how to give the sacrificial fee (*dakṣiṇā*). He put it in his right hand (*dakṣiṇaḥ*). He took it, speaking the ritual formula: 'For fitness (*dakṣa*) I take you, the sacrificial fee (*dakṣiṇā*).' — Therefore he became fit (*adakṣata*). The one who *knowing thus* receives the sacrificial fee (*dakṣiṇā*), becomes fit (*dakṣate*).[511]

A third example comes from the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* (1.7.4.6):

> "You are the grass-bundle (*vedá*), you are gain; may I gain", he says. By the grass-bundle the gods won (*avindanta*) the desirable wealth of the Asuras; that is that what makes the *vedá* the '*vedá*'.[512]

Passages like these display more than innocent word play. They are believed to reveal hidden links, and their knowledge is thought to bring various kinds of benefit. A number of vedic texts provide this knowledge by bringing these links to light.

In Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and Yāska's *Nirukta* we witness efforts that were made in late-vedic times to systematize the vedic conviction that similarities in the realm of words hide connections. This means that similar words and their meanings are connected. Systematizing this belief almost inevitably leads to a search for minimal semantic entities, minimal meaning bearers. This search succeeded to a considerable extent in the discipline of Grammar (*vyākaraṇa*), which shows how minimal meaning bearers jointly give rise to 'regular' word formations. Beyond the limits of Grammar, Etymology (*nirukta/nirvacana*) did its best, but never succeeded in systematically identifying minimal meaning bearers. Yāska could not say that there were none, because this would go against the vedic conviction that was his point of departure. In the end, he could do no more than offer a more or less satisfactory method to find the meanings of unknown words. He calls Etymology the 'complement of Grammar' (Nir 1.15: *tad idaṃ vidyāsthānaṃ vyākaraṇasya kārtsnyam*). Both Etymology and Grammar are elaborations of the magical belief concerning the relation between words and things that is omnipresent in vedic literature.

A very simple (and simplified) example will illustrates how Pāṇini's grammar 'works'. To express *he/she/it is* in Sanskrit, the semantic elements that have to find expression are 'being', 'agent', 'third person singular' and 'present tense'. 'Being' gives rise to *bhū*, 'agent' to *laṭ*, which is replaced by *ti* in order to express 'third person singular': *bhū* + *ti*. For various reasons an element *a* is then inserted between these two

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[510] AitBr 2.1.1: *taṃ vai* ***yūpen****aivā****yopayaṃs*** *taṃ yad* ***yūpen****aivā****yopayaṃs*** *tad* ***yūpasya yūpatvaṃ.*** Tr. Gonda 1975: 377.

[511] TaitBr 3.11.8.7-8: *sa vai tam eva nāvindat/ yasmai tāṃ* ***dakṣiṇām*** *aneṣyat/ tāṃ svāyaiva hastāya* ***dakṣiṇāy****ānayat/ tāṃ pratyagṛhṇāt/* ***dakṣāya*** *tvā* ***dakṣiṇāṃ*** *pratigṛhṇāmīti/ so* ***'dakṣata dakṣiṇāṃ*** *pratigṛhya/* ***dakṣate*** *ha vai* ***dakṣiṇāṃ*** *pratigṛhya/ ya evaṃ veda iti/* Tr. Witzel 1979: 13. Cf. Gonda 1991: 177.

[512] TaitS 1.7.4.6: *vedo 'si vittir asi vedeyety āha/ vedena vai devā asurāṇāṃ vittaṃ vedyam avindanta/ tad vedasya vedatvam*. Tr. Lubin forthcoming a.

(*bhū* + *a* + *ti*), and the vowel *ū* of *bhū* is reinforced so as to become *o*: *bho* + *a* + *ti*. A phonetic rule, finally, replaces *o* of *bho* with *av*, resulting in *bhavati*. The derivation of this word passes therefore through the following stages:

bhū
bhū + *laṭ*
bhū + *ti*
bhū + *a* + *ti*
bho + *a* + *ti*
bhav + *a* + *ti*

Each preceding stage in this derivation determines what is going to be the next one.

This is not always the case. Consider the form *bhavatu*, which is an imperative and expresses the meaning *he/she/it must be*. Its derivation is similar to that of *bhavati*, but adds one more stage:

bhū
bhū + *loṭ*
bhū + *ti*
bhū + *a* + *ti*
bho + *a* + *ti*
bhav + *a* + *ti*
bhav + *a* + *tu*

The step from *bhavati* to *bhavatu*, i.e., the replacement of *i* by *u* (or *ti* by *tu*) depends on the element *loṭ* that was present in the second stage, but has meanwhile disappeared. Here, therefore, the final stage is not determined by the immediately preceding one.

Whatever the details, it is not difficult to see how Grammar makes sense against the background of vedic thought in general. Grammar shows the formation of correct words out of ultimate meaning bearers. It is because of this relationship between words and the ultimate meaning bearers that words can be linked to each other, and to items in the external world, in the manner that is taken for granted in vedic thought.

IIA.4.2. The eternal nature of Sanskrit

An innovation introduced by the new Brahmanism is the belief that the Sanskrit language — i.e., its words and sounds — are eternal, and therefore without beginning and end. Patañjali the grammarian did so, but he was not the first. Already Kātyāyana held that belief, as is clear from *vārttika*s such as P. 1.1.56 vt. 12: *anupapannaṃ sthānyādeśatvaṃ* ***nityatvāt***. There is, on the other hand, no indication that Pāṇini had accepted it. Nor had Yāska, who uses the word *nitya* a few times in his *Nirukta*, but never in the sense ‘eternal’.[513] Assuming, for simplicity's sake, that all Brahmins adopted this new

[513] See Bronkhorst 1996a; 1984. Deshpande (1985) thinks that “the notion of the Divine Eternal Sanskrit was not the creation of the Sanskrit grammarians”; he rather thinks that “this notion in its various forms goes back to ancient Vedic texts” (p. 146). This does not change the fact that the transition from Pāṇini and Yāska to Kātyāyana and Patañjali is not altogether continuous.

conviction of the eternality of words more or less simultaneously, and considering that Yāska is almost certainly more recent than Pāṇini,[514] this would have happened at some time between Yāska and Kātyāyana.

It is possible that the oldest version of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* was not yet acquainted with the notion of eternal words. Frauwallner (1961: 121 [319]) thought that the sūtras that make that particular claim (MīmSū 1.1.6-23) are a later insertions into the text. This, if correct, would mean that Mīmāṃsā, the school of vedic interpretation, had begun its existence already before Kātyāyana and Patañjali. As will be explained below, the belief in the eternality of words, and of the Veda, is a corner stone of classical Mīmāṃsā, so much so that it is hard to imagine what the earlier form of Mīmāṃsā, which presumably existed before the time of Kātyāyana and Patañjali, may have looked like.

The new belief in the eternality of words had consequences for Grammar,[515] and these consequences are visible in the work of Patañjali (and to a lesser extent in the work of Kātyāyana, who in this respect appears to agree with him). This belief pulled the rug from underneath the efforts of Pāṇini, Yāska and no doubt others.[516] No longer is Grammar ultimately motivated by the search for minimal meaning bearers that help to explain the hidden links that connect words and their meanings, following a fundamental tenet of vedic thought. No longer is language the outcome of the dynamic interaction of minimal phonetic elements expressive of minimal meanings. On the contrary, for Patañjali words are eternal 'entities' with meanings that they have possessed from all eternity. The parts of words that join up and are modified or replaced one by one have no place in Patañjali's scheme of things. The reality behind the addition and substitution of elements in a word is, for him, that whole words are replaced by whole words. In other words, for Patañjali the basic elements of Pāṇini's Grammar have lost their independence. What is more, Patañjali reduces the derivational process to a mental process: the knowledge of one word followed by the knowledge of another.[517]

This difference between Patañjali and his predecessors is subtle, but has radical consequences. For one thing, it affects Patañjali's understanding of the text of Pāṇini's Grammar. Consider the following. Pāṇini used a number of terms to indicate the optional use of certain formations. The particle *vā* indicated that the use of a particular form was to be preferred; *vibhāṣā* indicated the opposite, viz., that the resulting form should rather not be used; and *anyatarasyām* showed equal preference for two possible forms.[518] Patañjali shows no awareness of this distinction. This might be explained, and has been explained, by the assumption that Patañjali no longer knew the correct interpretation of these terms, that the correct understanding of Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* had been lost by his time. However, nothing is less certain.[519] Even if Patañjali was aware of the distinction between these three particles, his different vision of the Sanskrit language had no place

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[514] Bronkhorst 1984.

[515] They were not without consequences for the interpretation of the Veda either: the *aitihāsika* 'historical' way of interpreting, still known to the *Nirukta*, disappears thereafter from the records; see Pollock 1990: 331.

[516] Deshpande (1997: 100) points out that "Kātyāyana … is different from Pāṇini in his concerns, and yet does not have the developed terminology of Patañjali to refer to this distinction in linguistic ontology (i.e., between fixed true sounds and uttered sounds, JB)."

[517] Mahā-bh I p. 75 l. 8-14, on P. 1.1.20 vt. 5. More will be said about Patañjali's interpretation of the derivational process in § III.3.2, below.

[518] Kiparsky 1979.

[519] On the question whether Patañjali knew the original text of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, see Appendix VII.

for more or less preferred words.[520] His language consisted of correct words, and excluded incorrect words. Correct words are not preferred to one another; they are all equally correct. Certain correct words may not be used very often. Following the lead of Kātyāyana's *vārttika*s, Patañjali discusses four rarely used words in particular: *ūṣa* 'you dwelt', *tera* 'you crossed', *cakra* 'you made', *peca* 'you cooked'. His point is that these words may be rare, but there is no doubt about their correct grammatical formation and therefore about their meaning. And as it so happens, these words *are* used in some vedic texts. Other correct words, Patañjali points out, are not used among cultured Brahmins but they *are* used by foreigners. More recent brahmanical thinkers, most notably the Mīmāṃsakas, the professional interpreters of vedic texts, agree with Patañjali, and have to confront the question what meaning to ascribe to such words. Can one simply accept the meaning in which foreigners use these words, or should one try to arrive at their meaning by strictly brahmanical means, such as Etymology? Whatever the answer to this question, it is clear that correct words, though eternal, are not necessarily all used even by educated Brahmins. Some may be used in other worlds, and some may even 'survive' among foreigners.[521]

The belief that words are eternal is also not without repercussions on the question what words refer to, for eternal words must refer to eternal things. Most words, or at any rate nouns, can be used to refer to two 'things': an individual or a general notion. Patañjali is aware of this double potential of many nouns, and uses the expressions *form* (*ākṛti*) and *substance* (*dravya*) to distinguish between the two. Since the meaning of words has to be eternal, which of these two has to be considered their "real" meaning? Patañjali dedicates a passage to this question, and comes to the conclusion that "the word refers to that which we look upon as eternal."[522]

IIA.4.3. New ideas about Sanskrit and the Veda

The belief that the Sanskrit language, or more specifically its words, are eternal and therefore without beginning finds expression, perhaps for the first time, in the works of the grammarians Kātyāyana and Patañjali.[523] The words of the Sanskrit language have always been there, and constitute the linguistic counterparts of what there is in the world. This belief gives rise to some interesting questions. Does it mean that we can derive reliable information about the world from the Sanskrit language? The answer, as we will see, is yes. We will consider four ways in which the Sanskrit language and reality corresponded to each other, at least according to some.

Categories of words and categories of things

Can we conclude from the different kinds of words that exist what kinds of things there are in the world? For example: Can we transfer linguistic categories to the real world?

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[520] This is, in essence, also the point of Kiparsky 2012.
[521] Mahā-bh I p. 8 l. 23 – p. 10 l. 3.
[522] Mahā-bh I p. 7 l. 8-25.
[523] We will discuss the effects of this belief on the interpretation of grammar in § III.3.2, below.

And can we conclude from the presence of a word in Sanskrit that the corresponding object exists?

Many brahmanical thinkers of the time would give an affirmative answer to these last two questions. With regard to the parallelism between linguistic categories and the real world, they appear to have thought of such a parallelism as completely self-evident. This is the reason why there do not seem to be any passages in their classical works that discuss this issue explicitly.

Consider the following observation in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*:

> Words relate in three ways to their objects: There are words that relate to universals (*jātiśabda*), there are words that relate to qualities (*guṇaśabda*), and there are words that relate to actions (*kriyāśabda*).[524]

These three kinds of words are what we would call nouns, adjectives, and verbs. Elsewhere in his *Mahābhāṣya* Patañjali points out that words that relate to universals designate both universals and individuals:

> A word that relates to a universal designates both a substance and a universal.[525]

Patañjali's threefold division of words — which was certainly not meant to be exhaustive — is later used by the Vaiśeṣika school of philosophy to develop an ontology in which the three corresponding entities — substances, qualities and actions — constitute the three fundamental categories. This school of thought exerted a profound influence on other schools, notably Nyāya, and based its very structure on the belief in the parallelism between words and things. A more detailed discussion of this school will be found in § III.4.1, below.

Words

The next question is: If words correspond to things, what can we learn from these words about the world? Can we, for example, conclude from the existence of a word that the object it denotes exists, too? At first sight this question may look bizarre. Can we derive from the existence of the word 'Martian' in English that there are Martians? Or from the word 'angel' that angels exist?

Comparison with the English words 'Martian' and 'angel' exposes us to the danger of thinking of Sanskrit as just another language, different from but at the same time comparable to any of the innumerable languages of this world. This is not the way brahmanical thinkers thought about it. For them, Sanskrit was the only real language, beginningless and not created by human beings. Moreover, it was the language of the Veda, a beginningless body of literature. New words designating imaginary entities might not exist in this language. It is therefore conceivable that there were brahmanical thinkers who took it for granted that the existence of a Sanskrit word guaranteed the existence of the corresponding item. But did they actually do so?

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[524] Mahā-bh I p. 20 l. 8-9: *trayī ca śabdānāṃ pravṛttiḥ/ jātiśabdā guṇaśabdāḥ kriyāśabdā iti/.*
[525] Mahā-bh I p. 230 l. 17: *jātiśabdena hi dravyam apy abhidhīyate jātir api.*

A passage from the *Nyāyavārttika*, a work composed in northwestern India presumably in the sixth or seventh century CE, shows that its author Uddyotakara did so, at least for certain words. This passage deals with the existence of the self, and expects from those who use that word to specify what it refers to. This challenge applies most particularly to those who deny the existence of the self: they, too, use the word, so they, too, must specify what it refers to. The passage reads:[526]

> Here, to begin with [one must say] that the two (*sic*!) words (*pada*) 'the soul does not exist' (*na asti ātmā*) contradict [each other]: the word 'soul' (*ātmā*), [even when placed] in syntactic agreement with the words 'does not exist' (*na asti*), does not communicate the non-existence of the soul. For with the word 'soul', one expresses [its] existence, and with 'does not exist', its negation; the [very] thing denied in one place appears in the other. For example, the word 'pot', in syntactic agreement with 'is not [there]' (*na asti*), cannot communicate the non-existence of the pot; rather, it denies [its presence] in a particular place or at a particular time. [The sentence] 'the pot is not' (*nāsti ghaṭaḥ*) denies [its presence] in a particular place, [as in the example] 'it is not in the house'; or it denies [its presence] at a particular time, [as in the examples] 'it is not [there] now', 'it was not [there] before', 'it will not be [there] later'. None of these negations are possible for someone who does not accept the existence of the pot. Likewise, [in the sentence] 'the soul does not exist', is the soul denied with respect to a particular place or with respect to a particular time?

Uddyotakara continues:[527]

> He who denies the soul [altogether] must specify the object of the word 'soul'. *Indeed, we do not see a word without an object.*

We can be sure that Uddyotakara was not the only Naiyāyika who believed that there is a perfect correspondence between words and things. A related and relatively secondary question was how and why it is like that. Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya*, which may belong to the second half of fifth century CE,[528] presents us with two answers to this question. According to the first answer, words are a means of inference; Vātsyāyana rejects this answer, but not without first describing it:

> The word is a means of inference; it is not a distinct means of knowledge. –Why? Because the object of a word is inferred. – How so? Because it is not apprehended

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[526] NV introducing 3.1.1 (p. 699 l. 1 ff.): *tatra nāsty ātmeti pade tāvad vyāhanyete, nāstiśabdasamānādhikaraṇo 'yam ātmaśabdo nātmano 'sattvaṃ pratipādayati. kiṃ kāraṇam? ātmeti sattvam abhidhīyate, nāstīti tasya pratiṣedhaḥ, yac ca yatra pratiṣidhyate tat tasmād anyatrāsti, yathā nāstinā samānādhikaraṇo ghaṭaśabdo na ghaṭābhāvaṃ pratipādayituṃ śaknoti, api tu deśakālaviśeṣe pratiṣedhati. nāsti ghaṭa iti deśaviśeṣe vā pratiṣedho gehe nāstīti, kālaviśeṣe vā pratiṣedha idānīṃ nāstīti prāṅ nāsti ūrdhvaṃ nāstīti. sarvaś cāyaṃ pratiṣedho nānabhyupagataghaṭasattvasya yuktaḥ. tathā nāsty ātmeti kim ayaṃ deśaviśeṣe pratiṣidhyate atha kālaviśeṣe iti.*

[527] NV p. 701 l. 5-6: *ātmapratiṣedhaṃ ca kurvāṇenātmaśabdasya viṣayo vaktavyaḥ. na hy ekaṃ padaṃ nirarthakaṃ paśyāmaḥ.*

[528] Franco & Preisendanz 1995.

> by means of perception. A sign-possessing object, though unapprehended, comes to be known through a knowledge of the sign; it follows that [the sign] is a means of inference. Likewise, an object, though unapprehended, comes to be known through a knowledge of the word by which it is designated. Therefore, the word is a means of inference. … There is also the following reason: when a means of knowledge is distinct, apprehension involves two distinct processes. For apprehension takes place one way in the case of inference and another way in the case of analogy. … But in the case of word and inference, apprehension does not involve two processes. The process involved in inference is the same as the process involved in word. Since there is no difference, the word is a means of inference. … One grasps an object through verbal knowledge when the relation between a word and the object connected to it is well known, just as one grasps an object through inferential knowledge when the relation between an inferential sign and the object possessing the sign is well known.[529]

Vātsyāyana himself has a different answer:

> It is not because of words on their own that one believes in the existence of imperceptible objects such as 'heaven', 'the Apsarases', 'the Northern Kurus', 'the seven continents', 'the ocean', or 'the shape of the world'; rather, one believes in their existence because they have been spoken of by trustworthy people. Otherwise one would not believe in them. Inference, however, is not like this.[530]

This does not prevent Vātsyāyana from stating:[531] "There are as many naming words as there are things."

There are reasons to think that there were Mīmāṃsakas who believed that the mere existence of a word guarantees the existence of the item denoted. Their position is criticized in Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* on sūtra 1.1.7. This sūtra introduces the notion of reliable-teaching (*āpta-upadeśa*). The rules of Sanskrit grammar allow of two ways to analyze this compound: 'teaching by a reliable person' or 'teaching that is reliable'. The *Nyāyabhāṣya* opts for the former interpretation, but Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* introduces an opponent who disagrees, for the following reason:

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[529] NBh on 2.1.49-51, (J) p. 133-134, (TA) p. 534-535: *śabdo 'numānaṃ na pramāṇāntaram. kasmāt? śabdārthasyānumeyatvāt. katham anumeyatvam? pratyakṣato 'nupalabdheḥ. yathānupalabhyamāno liṅgī mitena liṅgena paścān mīyata ity anumānam. evaṃ mitena śabdena paścān mīyate rtho 'nupalabhyamāna ity anumānaṃ śabdaḥ. itaś cānumānaṃ śabdaḥ. …. pramāṇāntarabhāve dvipravṛttir upalabdhiḥ. anyathā hy upalabdhir anumāne 'nyathopamāne …. śabdānumānayos tūpalabdhir advipravṛttir yathānumāne pravartate tathā śabde 'pi. viśeṣābhāvād anumānaṃ śabda iti. …. saṃbaddhayoś ca śabdārthayoḥ saṃbandhaprasiddhau śabdopalabdher arthagrahaṇaṃ yathā saṃbaddhayor liṅgaliṅginoḥ saṃbandhapratītau liṅgopalabdhau liṅgigrahaṇam iti.*

[530] NBh on 2.1.52, (J) p. 134-135, (TA) p. 536: *svargaḥ apsarasaḥ uttarāḥ kuravaḥ sapta dvīpāḥ samudro lokasaṃniveśa ity evamāder apratyakṣasyārthasya na śabdamātrāt pratyayaḥ, kiṃ tarhi? āptair ayam uktaḥ śabda ity ataḥ saṃpratyayaḥ, viparyayeṇa saṃpratyayābhāvāt. na tv evam anumānam iti.*

[531] Nbh 1.1.4 (p. 109): *yāvadarthaṃ vai nāmadheyaśabdāḥ*. Note that Vātsyāyana, following the sūtra, does not maintain that all cognition is expressible in words.

> [If we only accept teaching by a reliable person,] there would be no teaching concerning such entities as *svarga*, *apūrva* and *devatā*, because these things are beyond the senses. If reliability is the direct perception of a thing, there would be no discourse informing us about such entities as *svarga*, *apūrva* and *devatā*, since no one can see them. For this reason it is appropriate [to analyze the compound] as "teaching that is reliable" rather than as "teaching by a reliable person".[532]

Uddyotakara rejects this position, but it is possible to identify those who held it. The distinction between 'teaching that is reliable' and 'teaching by a reliable person' must be understood in the light of the belief that the Veda has no author. The Veda, according to those who held this belief, contains reliable teaching, but is not the teaching by one or more reliable persons: it is authorless. The belief in the authorlessness of the Veda is characteristic of Mīmāṃsā, the school of vedic interpretation. This suggests that Uddyotakara's opponent is a Mīmāṃsaka.

This impression is confirmed by the presence of *apūrva* in the list of items enumerated. I leave this term untranslated, primarily because there is no simple English term that corresponds to it. *Apūrva* is a technical term of Mīmāṃsā, which designates an Unseen Effect[533] (*apūrva* literally means 'unprecedented') responsible for the future outcome of sacrificial activity.

There is one further passage informing us of the belief that the existence of a word guarantees the existence of the corresponding entity. It is a verse in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (2.119), which reads:

> They say that the characteristic of what is to be conveyed is that all words have things corresponding to them; this applies to words such as 'cow' as much as to the words *apūrva*, 'deity' and 'heaven'.[534]

The same examples here as in Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* confirm that the same thinkers are referred to, presumably Mīmāṃsakas.

Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, too, has something to say about the three items *apūrva*, 'deity' and 'heaven':

> Or rather, the perception of a thing is the means by which we are able to infer that the [corresponding] word exists, because there is nothing that has no word [to denote it]. *Just as the words 'heaven', apūrva, and 'deity', when perceived, enable us to infer that things that are absolutely imperceptible exist*, in the same way, does not a thing when perceived enable us to infer that the [corresponding] word exists?[535]

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[532] NV 1.1.7 (p. 174): *svargāpūrvadevatādiṣūpadeśo na prāpnoti atīndriyatvāt. yadi sākṣātkaraṇam arthasyāptiḥ, svargāpūrvadevatādīn na kaścit paśyatīti tatpratipādako vyavahāro na syāt. tasmād āptaś cāsāv upadeśaś ceti yuktaṃ, nāptasyopadeśa iti.*

[533] I borrow this expression from Benson 2010: 36.

[534] Vkp 2.119: *asty arthaḥ sarvaśabdānām iti pratyāyyalakṣaṇam/ apūrvadevatāsvargaiḥ samam āhur gavādiṣu//*

[535] Bronkhorst 1987c: 28 l. 7-10: *atha vārthopalabdhiḥ śabdāstitvānumānam/ na hi kaścid artho 'śabdo 'sti/ tatra yathaiva svargāpūrvadevatāśabdā upalabhyamānā atyantāparidṛṣṭānām*

This passage, too, takes it for granted that the three entities 'heaven', 'deity' and *apūrva* must exist because the words for them exist.

Then there is the Buddhist thinker Bhavya, who in his *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* 9.5 attributes to Mīmāṃsakas the view that the existence of objects such as heaven and *apūrva* are known on the basis of the Veda.[536]

There is, finally, a passage that explicitly criticizes the Mīmāṃsā school of thought for maintaining that a word, say 'cow', is a valid means of cognition for knowing the universal concerned (in this case 'cowness'). This passage occurs in the *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, a sceptical author belonging to the eighth century. Arguing that a valid means of knowledge should bring about apprehension of something not apprehended before, he claims that individual words cannot bring about such apprehension.[537]

The preceding passages inform us about an early Mīmāṃsā position. The Mīmāṃsakas were however not the only ones to believe in the close relationship between words and things. A passage from the *Yuktidīpikā*, a Sāṃkhya text, is interesting in this respect. It states that there are two kinds of words, some created by the supreme seer, i.e. Kapila, and based on the things themselves; other words have been given, presumably by more recent users of Sanskrit, on the basis of the external appearance of the things denoted. Informed users have no need for words that have not been created by the supreme seer. The passage reads:[538]

> A name is a word meant to convey the thing named. It is of two kinds: based on the thing itself and based on its shape.
> From among these two, a name based on the thing itself depends on the activity of the thing by virtue of the thing itself. Following the thing as it resides in the own form of the thing consisting of its universal etc., it convey the thing named as it really is. Examples are 'cooker' (*pācaka*) and 'cutter' (*lāvaka*).
> A name based on the shape of a thing, on the other hand, is merely a means to convey the thing named and facilitates only the communication of its shape without conveying the meaning of its parts; it conveys the thing named by virtue of a convention even if the thing named is not really like that. Examples are:

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astitvānumānam evaṃ kiṃ na gṛhyate 'rtha upalabhyamānaḥ śabdāstitvasyānumānam iti/. Tr. Unebe 2011: 547-548, modified.

[536] Kawasaki 1977: 6-7; Lindtner 2001: 92: *atyantākṣaparokṣe hi pratipattiḥ kathaṃ bhavet/ adṛṣṭaliṅgasaṃbandhe svargāpūrvādivastuni/*

[537] Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa: *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* (ed. Solomon 2010) p. 57 & 211-212.

[538] YD (WM) p. 7 l. 16-27 (cf. Łucyszyna forthcoming): *saṃjñipratyāyanārthaḥ śabdaḥ saṃjñā/ sā ca dvividhā/ arthanibandhanā svarūpanibandhanā ca/ tatrārthanibandhanārthavaśenārthakriyāpekṣā/ jātyādyarthasvarūpāntarbhāvī yathārthas tathābhūtam eva saṃjñinaṃ pratyāyayati/ tadyathā pācako lāvakaḥ iti/ svarūpanibandhanā punaḥ saṃjñipratyāyanopāyamātraṃ svarūpamātropakāriṇī vināvayavārthaṃ samayavaśād atathābhūtam api saṃjñinaṃ pratyāyayati/ tadyathā gajakarṇo 'śvakarṇa iti/ prayatnato bhagavataḥ paramarṣer ārṣeṇa jñānena sarvatattvānāṃ svarūpam upalabhya saṃjñāṃ vidadhato nāsti svarūpanibandhanaḥ śabdaḥ/ tadyathā pradhīyante 'tra vikārā iti pradhānam/ puri śete iti puruṣa ityādi/ tanmatānusāriṇām apy ācāryāṇāṃ tābhir eva saṃvyavahārān nāsty apūrvasaṃjñāvidhānaṃ praty ādaraḥ/*

> 'elephant-ear' (*gajakarṇa*; name of a spirit) and 'horse-ear' (*aśvakarṇa*; name of a tree).
> A word based on the shape of a thing does not belong to [the vocabulary of] the revered supreme seer who through effort creates the names of all essences after having grasped their own form by means of his seer's knowledge, as in *pradhāna* — which is thus called because all modifications are placed in it (*pradhīyante 'tra vikārāḥ*) —, *puruṣa* — thus called because it rests in the body (*puri śete*) — and elsewhere. Also teachers who follow his views have no regard for the creation of new names, because they converse by means of those names only.

Since most of the passages considered inform us about a Mīmāṃsā position, one would expect to find the same also in Śabara's *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*. Interestingly, one does not. Indeed, there are reasons to think that Mīmāṃsā had abandoned this position at the time of Śabara. For Śabara's commentary does express views about the three entities just considered — 'heaven', *apūrva* and 'deity' — but rather than maintaining that the existence of these three is vouchsafed by the words that designate them, Śabara comes close to denying that two of them — 'heaven' and 'deity' — exist at all.[539] Regarding the 'Unseen Effect' (*apūrva*), Śabara does not deny its existence. But far from claiming that it must exist because there is a word for it, he tries to prove its existence by giving other reasons.[540]

The end of Śabara's passage on deities may reveal the reason why he abandoned the belief that the objects denoted by words of the Sanskrit language must necessarily exist. It refers several times to the 'attendants' of the deity, and there can be little doubt that temple priests are meant.[541] Śabara, like so many orthodox Brahmins in his time and later, was very critical of temple priests, and of the worship of gods they orchestrated. His criticism takes the form of a denial of the very existence of the deities that the temple priests are supposed to serve. This, however, was only possible by way of abandoning a belief that had been part of Mīmāṃsā thought presumably until his day.[542]

Mīmāṃsā, then, abandoned the belief that there is a perfect correspondence between words and things. The passages considered from Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* and Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* strongly suggest that this belief had so far been part of it. We know, moreover, that there had been Mīmāṃsā treatises before Śabara composed his monumental *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*. We know from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī* that this author was still aware, in the ninth century,[543] of 'old Mīmāṃsakas' (*vṛddhamīmāṃsaka*) who held opinions different from those of the 'followers of Śabara' (*śābara*).[544] Unfortunately, none of their works have survived. However, a few texts belonging to other schools criticize this belief, as we have seen, and they do so in a manner that

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[539] Śabara proposes to understand 'heaven' (*svarga*) in the sense 'happiness' or 'delight' (*prīti*; on sūtra 4.3.15, p. 72 l. 6-7; and on sūtra 6.1.2, p. 179 l. 11). Dharmakīrti takes him to task for this in his *Pramāṇavārttika* 1.320 (see Eltschinger et al. 2012: 49 ff.)
[540] Śabara's *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* on sūtra 2.1.5, p. 358 l. 16 - p. 373 l. 1 & p. 377 l. 1-7.
[541] Cp. Willis 2009: 207 ff. See also Colas 2004: 151-155; 2012: 119 ff.
[542] This did not free Mīmāṃsakas from the task of distinguishing between deities where the details of ritual required this; see Yoshimizu 2014.
[543] For the date, see Potter 1977: 341-342.
[544] Nm ed. Varadacharya, vol. I, p. 664; ed. Śukla p. 255: *vṛddhamīmāṃsakāḥ yāgādikarmanirvartyam apūrvaṃ nāma dharmam abhivadanti yāgādikarmaiva śābarā bruvate*. Cf. Bronkhorst 1989b: 113 [384].

reveals that the belief was held — or had been held — by Mīmāṃsakas. Presumably this belief once found expression in the texts that are now lost.[545]

This conclusion is confirmed by a discussion at the beginning of the Śabara's *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*. The discussion concerns the meaning of the word *dharma*, a crucial term in Mīmāṃsā. Based on what ground do we have knowledge of *dharma*? Three sūtras (1.1.3-5) deal with this issue, and quite exceptionally, Śabara provides two altogether different commentaries on them. The first commentary is short, and amounts to this that the word (i.e., the word *dharma*) is the ground on which the knowledge of *dharma* is based. The second commentary is long, and has been taken from a commentator about whom we know no more than that Śabara calls him Vṛttikāra ('commentator'). It seems safe to think that the first commentary was the traditional one. The second commentary, the one attributed to the Vṛttikāra takes on all sorts of new ideas, and strays considerably from the sūtras it is supposed to explain. It contains a number of remarks that are of interest in the present context.

Consider first the presumably traditional explanation of the sūtras. Śabara points out, under sūtra 1.1.4, that perception (*pratyakṣa*) cannot be the ground on which our knowledge of *dharma* is based. Introducing sūtra 1.1.5, he then adds that inference (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*), presumption (*arthāpatti*) and absence (*abhāva*) cannot be its cause either, because these are preceded by perception. In his (traditional) comments on that sūtra he tells us what its ground is:[546] "The eternal link of the word with its object is the ground on which that *dharma*, which is of the nature of the Agnihotra sacrifice and so on, unknown by means of perception etc., is based." He explains this in the following lines:[547]

> The eternal link of the word with its object is the ground on which that *dharma*, which is of the nature of the Agnihotra sacrifice and so on, unknown by means of perception etc., is based. For it is instruction. 'Instruction' (*upadeśa*) is what we call the pronouncement of specific words. And this knowledge does not go wrong. For this knowledge, once arisen, does not change into its opposite. And of knowledge that, once arisen, does not change into its opposite one cannot say "it is not like this", "it is not as it is known", "it is as it is not known". One would have in that case one thing in one's mind, and something else in one's speech. From someone who speaks like that one would learn contradictory things, viz., "it is" and "it is not". It is therefore a means of cognition, because it is independent. For, such being the case, no other knowledge will be required, nor another person.

In other words, on the basis of the word *dharma* we know that *dharma* exists.

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[545] On the strict atheism of Mīmāṃsā that turns out not to be all that strict, see Bronkhorst 2009a: §2; Freschi 2012: 7-8.

[546] Frauwallner 1968: 24 l. 5-6: *autpattikaḥ śabdasyārthena saṃbandhas tasya agnihotrādilakṣaṇasya dharmasya nimittaṃ pratyakṣādibhir anavagatasya.*

[547] Frauwallner 1968: 24 l. 7-14: *upadeśo hi bhavati. upadeśa iti viśiṣṭasya śabdasya uccāraṇam. avyatirekaś ca bhavati tasya jñānasya. na hi tad utpannaṃ jñānaṃ viparyeti. yac ca nāma jñānam utpannaṃ na viparyeti, na tac chakyate vaktuṃ "naitad evam" iti, "yathā vijñāyate, na tathā bhavati"; "yathaitan na vijñāyate, tathaitad" iti. anyad asya hṛdaye, anyad vāci syāt. evaṃ vadato viruddham idam avagamyate "asti nāsti ca" iti. tasmāt tat pramāṇam, anapekṣatvāt. na hy evaṃ sati pratyayāntaram apekṣitavyaṃ puruṣāntaraṃ vā.*

The second commentary on sūtras 1.1.3-5 — the so-called *Vṛttikāra-grantha*, which Śabara quotes from an earlier commentator — is harder to interpret with confidence. On the link between words and things the Vṛttikāra says:[548] "The link, not made by humans, of the word with its object is the [cause of] knowledge of the thing of the nature of the Agnihotra sacrifice and so on (i.e. of dharma) unknown by means of perception etc." This, of course, is close to what Śabara had said. But it is not certain that it means quite the same thing, for the Vṛttikāra adds:[549] "In this way there is correct knowledge that is of the nature of an injunction." It appears that the knowledge directly derived from words here only concerns injunctions, not the existence of items for which there is a Sanskrit word. The Vṛttikāra adds a further explanation, as follows:[550]

> If the link were to have been made by humans, the knowledge could be suspected of being incorrect, because it would then be the knowledge of someone else. But if the word itself speaks, how could it be incorrect? In that case the knowledge does not come from another person. When one says "he speaks", this means "he makes known", that he is the cause that [the thing] is known. If, because the word itself is the cause, one understands of one's own, how could it state a falsehood of the form "it is not like that"?

I am not sure whether this throws further light on the Vṛttikāra's intentions. The following lines do, and they show that injunctions and nothing else were on his mind. We read here, for example, "An injunction does not create a doubt of the kind 'it may be the case, or not'",[551] contrasting the injunction with items of information one may obtain through other means of cognition. The passage concludes with an unambiguous remark: "It follows that the *dharma* is exclusively of the nature of injunctions."[552] Almost the same remark is repeated later on in the *Vṛttikāra-grantha* ("It follows that the *dharma* is exclusively of the nature of injunctions and nothing else").[553] The accent has clearly shifted from knowing *dharma* to knowing that *dharma* is exclusively of the nature of injunctions.

Interestingly, the question of deities and other unobservable entities comes up in the *Vṛttikāra-grantha*, too. But far from using words like *devatā* to prove that deities must exist, the Vṛttikāra uses them to prove that words have not been created by a name-

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[548] Frauwallner 1968: 34 l. 15-17: *apauruṣeyaḥ śabdasyārthena saṃbandhas tasya agnihotrādilakṣaṇasya arthasya jñānaṃ pratyakṣādibhir anavagamyamānasya*.
[549] Frauwallner 1968: 34 l. 17: *tathā ca codanālakṣaṇaḥ samyakpratyaya iti*.
[550] Frauwallner 1968: 34 l. 17-22: *pauruṣeye hi sati saṃbandhe yaḥ pratyayaḥ, tasya mithyābhāva āśaṅkyeta. parapratyayo hi tadā syāt. atha śabde bruvati kathaṃ mithyā iti? na hi tadānīm anyataḥ puruṣād avagamaḥ. "bravīti" ity ucyate "avabodhayati, budhyamānasya nimittaṃ bhavati" iti. śabde cen nimittabhūte svayam avabudhyate, kathaṃ vipralabdhaṃ brūyān "naitad evam" iti.*
[551] Frauwallner 1968: 34 l. 22-23: *na cāsya codanā "syād vā na vā" iti sāṃśayikaṃ pratyayam utpādayati.*
[552] Frauwallner 1968: 36 l. 4-5: *tasmāc codanālakṣaṇa eva dharmaḥ*. The reason justifying this conclusion appears to be that only injunctions cannot possibly be contradicted by other means of knowledge, but the passage is obscure.
[553] Frauwallner 1968: 48 l. 13-14: *tasmāc codanālakṣaṇa eva dharmo nānyalakṣaṇaḥ.* The reason here is that only injunctions are independent of other people and of other cognitions.

giver:[554] "In the case of unobserved things, such as deities and so on, the giving of a name is pointless and impossible." This line does not tell us whether the Vṛttikāra believed that deities exist, for deities cannot be observed, whether they exist or not.

In these passages the Vṛttikāra makes the impression of avoiding the issue to some extent. He yet engages in a discussion with thinkers — probably Cārvākas[555] — who are explicit about their denial of the necessary existence of things for which there is a word. It is in this discussion that he is forced to clarify his position: "We do not designate the word 'I', when used, as ground for [the existence of] some other object, but rather the recognizing knowledge that is different from the word."[556] In other words, we do not claim that the soul exists because there is a word, 'I', that refers to it. Here, then, the Vṛttikāra comes out in the open: he draws no ontological conclusions from the existence of words. We know that Śabara followed him in this.

We may conclude this section with the observation that many of the brahmanical authors we have considered believed that there is a word for all things and vice-versa. This was also, perhaps primarily, the position of the Mīmāṃsakas who, however, abandonded it after some time, presumably out of antipathy against temple-priests, whose livelihood and source of income depended upon the belief that deities existed. Śabara denied the existence of deities and of heaven (in spite of the fact that Sanskrit has words for them); he may in this respect have followed the example of the 'commentator' (Vṛttikāra), part of whose commentary he cites in his own *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*.

Vedic sentences

The close correspondence between Sanskrit and reality had given rise to the idea that we can learn something about the world from the words of Sanskrit. This idea was in the end abandoned, at least by some, and not wholeheartedly: remnants survived in the ontology of Vaiśeṣika and in some of the other passages considered above.

But if the words of the Sanskrit language cannot be accepted as reliable sources of information, what about its sentences? There is, of course, a big difference between words and sentences, or at any rate between words and most sentences. Sentences that we ourselves produce are not on the same level as words: the latter are beginningless and closely associated with reality; the former are new productions and can give expression to much beside truth, including plain lies. In other words, Sanskrit sentences cannot in general be looked upon as reliable sources of information. New Sanskrit sentences produced by speakers are as unreliable as new words produced by speakers.[557]

However, there *are* certain Sanskrit sentences that are on the same level as individual words: they are the sentences of the Veda. These sentences, like Sanskrit words, have always been there and are as close to reality as individual Sanskrit words are. Or even more so. Those who no longer trusted the reliability of Sanskrit words as sources of information were left with only the vedic sentences. Seen from the

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[554] Frauwallner 1968: 48 l. 7: *anupalabdhe ca devatādāv arthe 'narthakaṃ sajñākaraṇam aśakyaṃ ca*.

[555] *Greater Magadha* p. 363 f.

[556] Frauwallner 1968: 56 l. 7-9: *na vayam "aham" itīmaṃ śabdaṃ prayujyamānam anyasmin arthe hetutvena vyapadiśāmaḥ, kiṃ tarhi śabdād vyatiriktaṃ pratyabhijñāpratyayam*.

[557] One could think of the four incorrect synonyms of *gauḥ* ('cow') that Patañjali enumerates: *gāvī*, *goṇī*, *gotā*, *gopotalikā*. All of these are incorrect, only *gauḥ* is correct.

brahmanical point of view, what was at stake was not the reliability of a body of text that had been preserved, but the reliability of the Sanskrit language, which found its natural expression in the Veda.

We find, then, that the task of providing reliable information about the world became the responsibility of the sentences of the Veda. Some authors state this explicitly. One is Vācaspatimiśra, who does so in his commentary on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 5 while explaining the term 'revelation' (*śruti*):

> Revelation is the knowledge of the meaning of *sentences* that is born from those *sentences*. And that knowledge is intrinsically valid because it is born from the Veda that has no author; it is correct because it is free from all doubt concerning possible shortcomings. In this manner also the knowledge born from traditional texts, the epics and Purāṇas, which are all based on the Veda, is correct.[558]

But already Śabara had put the following words in the mouth of an opponent:

> Even if words and their relations to objects are innate and permanent, nevertheless, *dharma* cannot be what is indicated by Vedic injunctions. For an injunction is a sentence. In the sentence "He who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra sacrifice," no single word (on its own) means that one attains heaven through the Agnihotra. One understands this only when the three words (*agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*) have been spoken, and there does not exist a fourth word [denoting "heaven-through-Agnihotra"] distinct from this group of three words.[559]

Many philosophers could subscribe to the general belief that vedic sentences are reliable, but the specific task of figuring out what those sentences actually said belonged to Mīmāṃsā, the school of vedic hermeneutics. This school developed a number of principles, some of which we will briefly discuss.

The point of departure is expressed as follows in Śabara's *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*:

> It is a contradiction to say 'the Vedic word speaks' and 'incorrectly'. When one says 'it speaks', this means 'it makes known', that it is the cause that a thing is known.[560]

This general principle is fundamental, but only of limited use in determining what all the sentences that constitute the Veda actually say. Śabara is aware of the fact that sentences can be ambiguous in that they often allow of multiple interpretations. The interpreter of vedic sentences must therefore not merely find a possible meaning of the sentence concerned, but the meaning that is nearest to the text. (Recall that the intention of the

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[558] TatKaum on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 5, p. 86: *śrutir vākyajanitaṃ vākyārthajñānam/ tac ca svataḥ pramāṇam apauruṣeyavedajanitatvena sakaladoṣāśaṅkāvinirmuktaṃ yuktaṃ bhavati/ evaṃ vedamūlasmṛtītihāsapurāṇajanitam api jñānaṃ yuktam/.*

[559] MīBh 1.1.24: *yady apy autpattiko nityaḥ śabdaḥ saṃbandhaś ca tathāpi na codanālakṣaṇo dharmaḥ/ codanā hi vākyam/ na hy agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma ity ato vākyād anyatamāt padād agnihotrāt svargo bhavatīti gamyate/ gamyate tu padatraya uccarite/ na cātra caturthaḥ śabdo 'sty anyad ataḥ padatrayasamudāyāt/.* Translation based on Biardeau 1964: 192.

[560] MīBh on sūtra 1.1.2 (Frauwallner 1968: p. 16 l. 18-19), quoted below.

author plays no role, since the Veda has no author.) The search for the 'nearest meaning', and the rejection of 'more remote' meanings, characterizes Śabara's *Bhāṣya* throughout, and is fundamental to his procedure.

Śabara's exegetical efforts frequently concentrate on comparing two different interpretations of a vedic statement. One of the two is in the end discarded, the other one retained. The Mīmāṃsā has formulated a number of criteria meant to be of help in making a correct decision. These criteria do not interest us in themselves at present. We are more interested in the type of reasoning used to establish those criteria, and to choose between different interpretations in general. Here we find that Śabara sometimes uses the expressions 'nearest meaning' (*saṃnikṛṣṭa artha*) and 'more remote meaning' (*viprakṛṣṭa artha*). Of these two, Śabara always gives preference to the 'nearest meaning'. He follows in this respect the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* on which he comments. Sūtra 3.3.14[561] enumerates a number of factors that can play a role in the interpretation of a vedic statement and adds that, in cases where several of these factors apply simultaneously, the ones figuring later in the enumeration are weaker than the earlier ones, **because the meaning obtained with their help is more remote** (*arthaviprakarṣāt*).

Consider, as a concrete example, the injunction "One [must] worship the *gārhapatya* [fire] with the Aindrī".[562] The Aindrī is a sacred formula which begins with the words: *kadā ca na starīr asi nendra saścasi dāśuṣe*.[563] This formula contains the name Indra, which might be taken to indicate that it is to be used in order to worship the god Indra. The injunction, on the other hand, states clearly that the Aindrī must be used to worship the *gārhapatya*, which is a sacrificial fire. In other words, two conflicting interpretations present themselves.

Śabara's *Bhāṣya* discusses this question at length under sūtra 3.3.14. The position finally accepted is as follows. The injunction to worship the *gārhapatya* fire is explicit (*pratyakṣa*) and constitutes for this reason the nearest interpretation. The formula *kadā ca na* etc. does not state explicitly that Indra is to be worshipped with it; this latter interpretation is therefore more remote and must be discarded.[564]

Consider next the sacred formula: *syonaṃ te sadanaṃ kṛṇomi ghṛtasya dhārayā suśevaṃ kalpayāmi; tasmin sīdāmṛte pratitiṣṭha vrīhīṇāṃ medha sumanasyamānaḥ* "I make your seat agreeable, with a stream of clarified butter I make it very dear. Sit on it, establish yourself in the nectar of immortality, oh oblation of rice, being favorably disposed."[565] Unlike the formula studied above, there is in this case no injunction that specifies the context in which this formula is to be used. One must therefore be guided by its contents. But here there is a difficulty. The formula has two parts: the first part concerns the preparation of the seat, the second the placing of the sacrificial cake. Should the whole formula be used at both occasions? Or should one use the first half during the preparation of the seat, and the second half while the sacrificial cake is placed on it? Here, too, the answer depends on the relative 'proximity' of the different interpretations. The 'nearest' interpretation will eliminate the others. Which is the nearest interpretation

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[561] MīmSū 3.3.14: *śruti-liṅga-vākya-prakaraṇa-sthāna-samākhyānāṃ samavāye pāradaurbalyam arthaviprakarṣāt*.
[562] MaitS 3.2.4 (ed. v. Schroeder p. 20 l. 13): *aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhate*.
[563] MaitS 1.3.26; RV 8.51.7; etc. Jamison & Brereton (2014: 1135) translate: "Never are you a barren cow, nor, Indra, do you go dry for the pious man."
[564] A similar reasoning is presented under sūtra 5.4.1.
[565] TaitBr 3.7.5.2-3, which has *karomi* instead of *kṛṇomi*. With *kṛṇomi* this formula is found MŚS 1.2.6.19.

in this case? For Śabara there is no doubt.[566] The connection between the second half of the formula and the placing of the sacrificial cake is direct, more direct at any rate than the link between the first half of the formula and this activity. The second half refers to the placing of the cake, whereas the first half is syntactically connected with the second half, which in its turn refers to that activity. A similar reasoning applies to the relationship of the two halves to the preparation of the seat.[567]

The *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* under sūtra 3.3.14 contains a number of further discussions relating to the relative priority of one out of two possible interpretations of a vedic statement. This sūtra establishes, as a matter of fact, a number of principles of priority that are used throughout the *Bhāṣya*. All these discussions have in common that one of two interpretations is discarded because it is less 'near' than its competitor. We shall not study all these cases here. The two examples which we have considered suffice to reveal a general exegetical principle of the Mīmāṃsā: the correct interpretation of a vedic statement is its most direct interpretation. The direct interpretation, we further learn, follows as far as possible what the text states explicitly, and avoids inferential and multi-layered arguments.

There is an obvious 'psychological' or 'epistemological' dimension to these discussions, which however rarely becomes explicit. But sometimes Śabara gives a hint that he is aware of it. So at the end of his discussion of sūtra 3.3.14. Here we learn that in the case of competing interpretations, different **notions** (*pratyaya*) are in competition. The difference between a correct and an incorrect notion is that the latter is followed by another notion to the extent that it is incorrect, whereas the former is not.[568]

The principle that the most direct interpretation is the correct one pervades many other discussions in Śabara's *Bhāṣya*. For one thing, if we are to find the most direct interpretation of a vedic statement, it must exist and be unambiguous. This is not evident in all cases. Take the meanings of individual Sanskrit words. Almost any Sanskrit word, as is testified by the dictionaries, has various meanings.[569] Which is the 'direct' interpretation that we must choose? The Mīmāṃsā takes a categorical position in this matter: each word has but one primary sense; the other meanings are derived from this primary sense. The primary sense is known from the word alone; secondary meanings are understood because of some connection with the primary sense that is understood first.[570]

In concrete cases it is not always easy to decide which of two known senses is primary, which one secondary. Where there are vedic passages that clearly use the term concerned in one of the two meanings, there is no difficulty. The word *yava*, for example, can refer to barley and to long pepper. The vedic sentence "Where other plants wither, these [*yava* plants] stand up happily, as it were" shows that the meaning 'barley' is primary in the Veda.[571] Sometimes the Veda does not help to make the choice. Take the

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[566] On MīmSū 3.3.14 (p. 255 f.).
[567] Under MīmSū 2.1.46 Śabara shows that this one sacred formula (*mantra*) consists of two sentences.
[568] On MīmSū 3.3.14 (p. 267 f.).
[569] One is reminded of an observation by Doniger & Smith 1991: xxiii: "it has been said that every word in Sanskrit designates its basic meaning, the opposite of that, a word for an elephant, a name of God, and a position in sexual intercourse."
[570] Cf. Śabara on MīmSū 3.2.1: *yaḥ śabdād evāvagamyate, sa prathamo 'rtho mukhyaḥ/ mukham iva bhavatīti mukhya ity ucyate/ yas tu khalu pratītād arthāt kenacit saṃbandhena gamyate, sa paścādbhāvāj jaghanam iva bhavatīti jaghanyaḥ/ guṇasaṃbandhāc ca gauṇa iti/.*
[571] Śabara on MīmSū 1.3.9.

example of the word *parvan*. It is known right from the Himālaya down to Cape Comorin,[572] Śabara reminds us, that this word is used in the sense 'time' and 'combination'. Which of these is the primary sense? Etymological reflections point to 'combination' as the primary sense. The meaning 'time' can be obtained from this primary sense.[573] Different reasons are adduced to choose between the two meanings of *caru*, 'vessel' and 'oblation of rice', both of them 'known from the Himālaya down to Cape Comorin'. The details, and the outcome, of this discussion do not interest us at present.[574] What interests us is the presupposition that expresses itself in them, namely the principle that vedic statements allow of an unambiguous and direct interpretation.

Śabara's *Bhāṣya* on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.30-35 contains an interesting discussion on what exactly is denoted by words. Is it the shape (*ākṛti*) shared in common by all individuals designated by that word? Or is it an individual (*vyakti*) thus designated? Both are understood when a word (and Śabara obviously thinks here in the first place of generic terms, such as "cow") is pronounced, but both cannot be designated (no doubt for the same reason as above, viz., that a word cannot have two "meanings"). Only the shape is directly expressed. Śabara explains why in the following passage: "It is self-evident that an individual is understood when a word is pronounced. The distinction whether [the individual is understood directly] from the word or from the shape is not evident [to everyone]."[575] Śabara subsequently establishes that the individual is understood from the shape rather than from the word, by showing that an individual is known from the shape even when no word is uttered; and where a word is uttered but the relevant shape is not understood, there no individual is understood either. In other words, what we understand directly from the word is the shape. This shape, in its turn, can bring to our mind an individual characterized by it. This means that the shape, rather than any individual, comes most immediately to our mind when hearing a word. And this means, in view of the principle under discussion, that words denote shapes rather than individuals.[576]

Elsewhere in Śabara's *Bhāṣya* a different answer is considered to the question as to which is the notion most directly communicated by words. According to an opponent, it is the notion of mere sound devoid of meaning. This position is clearly inspired by the principle we are studying. Words first communicate the notion of sound; the meaning that we understand from a word arises as a result of recognizing the sound first. Ergo, words primarily communicate the notion of sound. It is obvious that this conclusion, though close to the general principle of exegesis of the Mīmāṃsā, cannot be acceptable. Both the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (7.2.5) and Śabara's *Bhāṣya* reject it by stating that the connection between words and meanings is natural (*autpattika*). In other words, no extra step is required to get from hearing the sound to understanding its meaning. This way the exegetical principle of the Mīmāṃsā is saved. One could also say that the belief that the words and meanings of the Sanskrit language have an inherent connection is closely linked to the dogma that vedic statements can be correctly and unambiguously interpreted by choosing the 'most direct' interpretation, that is, the interpretation that involves the minimum of mental or epistemological stages.

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[572] Or 'up to the Himālaya and up to Cape Comorin', as Wezler (1992: 472) prefers to translate this expression.
[573] Śabara on MīmSū 9.2.51-53.
[574] See Śabara on MīmSū 10.1.34-44.
[575] Śabara on MīmSū 1.3.33: *tad etad ātmapratyakṣaṃ yac chabda uccarite vyaktiḥ pratīyata iti/ kiṃ śabdād utākṛter iti vibhāgo na pratyakṣaḥ/.*
[576] For an assessment of Śabara's argument, see Scharf 1993.

This same principle allows us to understand other discussions in Śabara's *Bhāṣya*. Some words express a meaning different from the one suggested by their parts. The word *kuśala* is an example. The parts *kuśa* + *la* explain the word as "he who cuts (*lāti*) *kuśa* grass." Yet *kuśala* expresses the meaning 'skilful'. Śabara admits that the meaning 'skilful' can be explained as a derivative of the meaning 'who cuts grass'. Yet the meaning 'skilful' must be preferred, precisely because we understand the word in that sense. In other words, we arrive more directly at the meaning 'skilful'.[577] This same type of reasoning applies even to words that are only used by barbarians.[578]

Direct interpretation determines what analysis to apply to the compound *niṣādasthapati*. At first sight two interpretations seem possible: 'leader (*sthapati*) of the Niṣādas', or 'leader who is a Niṣāda'. The Niṣādas constitute a tribe outside the regular brahmanical order of society, who are not, therefore, allowed to participate in vedic rites. Yet the *niṣādasthapati* is mentioned in the context of a vedic sacrifice. The question is unavoidable whether this leader is himself a Niṣāda. The second analysis designates him as one, whereas the first analysis leaves the possibility open that he is not. Śabara prefers none-the-less the second analysis. His reasoning is as follows: The part *niṣāda-* in *niṣādasthapati* means primarily, and therefore most directly, 'Niṣāda'. The meaning 'of the Niṣādas', which appears in the first interpretation, can only be arrived at secondarily.[579] The exegetical principle that the most direct interpretation is to be accepted decides therefore in favor of the meaning 'leader who is a Niṣāda', and this in spite of the ritual problems this interpretation entails.

It is easy to see that this same principle can be used to justify the belief that words in the Veda have the same meaning as in ordinary life. The very first sentences of Śabara's *Bhāṣya* present this line of reasoning in connection with the interpretation of sūtras, but it is clear that the same applies to the interpretation of vedic statements. The main weakness of any other position is that it entails superfluous effort (*yatnagaurava*). This argument derives its strength from the principle that we now know, and according to which the best and only acceptable interpretation is the most direct one, i.e., the one that implies minimal mental effort. Śabara on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.30 states simply that there is no difference between words in the Veda and in ordinary life, because we do not notice a difference between them.[580]

Attention has already been drawn to the psychological/epistemological dimension of many of the exegetical arguments. This dimension is rarely made explicit. An exception is the discussion of the injunction "one should perform the Darśa and the Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices" (*darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ yajeta*).[581] This injunction is incomplete: it does not specify how these sacrifices are to be performed. Indeed, Śabara calls this injunction "the beginning of an injunction" (*vidhyādi*), which needs an end. The required supplementary information is found in the section that prescribes adding fuel to the fire, etc. (*agnyanvādhānādividhānakāṇḍa*). The injunction forms one single statement with this section, which has been put next to it *in the mind*; the resulting single statement is of the form "One should *in this manner* perform the Darśa and the Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices".[582]

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[577] See Śabara on MīmSū 6.7.22.
[578] Śabara on MīmSū 1.3.10.
[579] Śabara on MīmSū 6.1.51.
[580] Śabara on MīmSū 1.3.30: *na teṣām eṣāṃ ca vibhāgam upalabhāmahe*.
[581] The origin of this quotation is obscure. See Garge 1952: 125, 128, 136.
[582] Śabara on MīmSū 8.1.2: … *vidhyādiḥ … agnyanvādhānādividhānakāṇḍena … buddhau saṃnihitenaikavākyatāṃ yāti darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ yajetettham iti.*

This proximity in the mind has to be treated with caution, as we can learn from Śabara's discussion under sūtra 3.1.21. This discussion concerns the sections (*anuvāka*) 7 to 11 of *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* 2.5. Sections 7 and 8 deal with the *mantra*s called *Sāmidhenī*; section 9 deals with the *Nivid*s; section 10 continues the discussion of certain *Sāmidhenī*s. The question presents itself whether the sections that deal with the *Sāmidhenī*s can be understood together, thus constituting the context (*prakaraṇa*) for section 11. The idea is launched that sections 7, 8 and 10 can be understood "as a single statement" (*ekavākyatā*) because the sections 7 and 8 come together with section 10 *in the mind*. This idea is rejected with the argument that these sections are separated from each other by another section that deals with a different subject. Where another subject is introduced, the earlier subject is no longer present in the mind. Here the opponent persists, and observes that one can recall the earlier subject through mental effort (*dhyāna*), etc. Śabara's reply is important: In that case the result is due to human understanding, and is no longer vedic.[583]

This last remark is significant. It identifies the mind as a potential source of error in the interpretation of a vedic statement. The correct interpretation must therefore involve an absolute minimum of participation of the mind. In fact, the most direct interpretation is precisely the one that involves the least participation of the mind. It is of course axiomatic for the Mīmāṃsā that the perfect interpretation of a vedic statement exists, and can be found. In other words, it is possible to reduce the participation of the mind to an absolute minimum.

It is easy to see how this position can be extended so as to cover all forms of valid cognition. It then states that all forms of cognition are right, unless they have been interfered with. This, of course, is what came to be known under the name *svataḥprāmāṇya*. Schmithausen (1965: 158-159), while presenting the position of the Vṛttikāra (whose comments on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.4-5 are included in Śabara's *Bhāṣya*; see above), observes correctly:

> Die wahre Erkenntnis ist also der **Normalfall**, der Irrtum aber das **Abnorme**, da er durch ein **zusätzliches** Moment, die Störung, bewirkt ist. D.h. alle Erkenntnis ist **grundsätzlich wahr**, kann jedoch **ausnahmsweise** durch Störungen **verdorben** werden.

These disturbances (*Störungen*; *doṣa*) can very well come from the mind. Correct perception, the Vṛttikāra observes, can fail to come about because the mind is disturbed by hunger etc., or the sense-organ by the eye disease called *timira* etc., or the outer object by minuteness and the like.[584]

It will be clear that the notion of self-sufficient validity of valid cognition (*svataḥprāmāṇya*) and the exegetical principle identified in the preceding pages are closely related. Both try to identify, then to exclude, disturbing influences from the process leading to valid cognition, and both start from the assumption that such

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[583] Śabara on MīmSū 3.1.21: *avaidikaḥ sa puruṣabuddhipūrvako vākyārtho bhavet*. A parallel situation is discussed under MīmSū 2.1.49. Of a sequence of three *mantra*s only the first one has a verbal form; number two requires (but does not have) another verbal form; and number three requires the same verbal form as number one. According to Śabara, this verbal form can be supplied to the third *mantra*, but it is not the vedic word that is supplied, but the identical secular word.

[584] Frauwallner 1968: 26 l. 12-14: *yadā kṣudādibhir upahataṃ mano bhavati, indriyaṃ vā timirādibhiḥ, saukṣmyādibhir vā bāhyo viṣayas, tato mithyājñānam, anupahateṣu samyagjñānam.*

identification and exclusion are indeed possible. Perception that arises from a causal complex that is free from disturbing factors is necessarily correct. In the same way, vedic statements naturally (*svataḥ*) (i.e., when there are no disturbances by more than basic human mental activity) give rise to an interpretation (i.e., understanding, cognition) that is as a result necessarily correct. The belief that an interpretation can — and should — be found that has arisen without disturbances is a programmatic principle that determines how to interpret vedic statements. Interpreting the Veda means identifying disturbing factors — such as the more than basic activity of the human mind — and eliminating them. Any interpretation that requires more participation of the mind than is strictly necessary is no longer vedic, it is due to human understanding.

The purity of the Veda, then, is endangered by the activity of the human mind, or any other mind for that matter. This conviction expresses itself in another fundamental dogma of the Mīmāṃsā, too. For mental activity does not only threaten to play a role in the interpretation of a text; mental activity normally plays a role in its composition, too. The Mīmāṃsā avoids this danger by denying that the Veda has been composed at all. The Veda has no author, and this is possible because it has no beginning in time. Eternality and authorlessness are therefore two sides of the same position. And this position is ultimately based on the belief that the purity of the Veda is endangered by contact with any mind, be it human or divine.

In order to justify this position, the Mīmāṃsā presents a theory of the inherent correctness of the word by itself, which can however be lost on account of the use made of it by human beings. The following passage, with the beginning of which we are already familiar, explains this:

> It is a contradiction to say '[the Vedic word] states' and 'incorrectly'. When one says 'it states', this means 'it makes known', that it is the cause that the thing is known. … If, then, it is understood on the basis of an injunction that the Agnihotra results in heaven, how can one say that it is not like that? And if it is not like that, how can it be known? It is contradictory to know a thing that does not exist. … With regard to a statement made by a human being, on the other hand, if it comes from a person who is trustworthy, or if it refers to the realm of the senses, it is not incorrect. But if it comes from an untrustworthy person, or if it does not refer to the realm of the senses, then it is produced by the human understanding [only] and is not a means of valid knowledge.[585]

It goes without saying that the dogma of the authorlessness of the Veda, too, like the principle of interpretation discussed earlier, influences the way vedic statements are interpreted. A text without beginning cannot refer to events that happened at any particular time.[586] Śabara is aware of this, and explicitly refers to it at some places. There

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[585] *Śābara Bhāṣya* 1.1.2 (Frauwallner 1968: p. 16 l. 15 – p. 18 l. 5): *vipratiṣiddham idam abhidhīyate "bravīti ca vitathaṃ ca" iti/ bravīti ity ucyate 'vabodhayati, budhyamānasya nimittaṃ bhavati iti/ …/ yadi ca codanāyāṃ satyām "agnihotrāt svargo bhavati" ity avagamyate, katham ucyate "na tathā bhavati" iti/ atha laukikaṃ vacanaṃ, tac cet pratyayitāt puruṣād indriyaviṣayaṃ vā, avitatham eva tat/ athāpratyayitāt puruṣād anindriyaviṣayaṃ vā, tat puruṣabuddhiprabhavam apramāṇam/.*

[586] Strangely enough, the rabbinical interpretation of the Hebrew canon does not seem to accept this inference: even though the scriptures are timeless, they do refer to historical events. See Böhl 1991: 162.

is, for example, a vedic statement that says that the god Prajāpati extracted his omentum.[587] Śabara discusses it and observes: "If a historical event were to be referred to, the Veda would be open to the charge of having a beginning."[588] Similarly, the vedic statement "We grasped your right hand, o Indra"[589], if taken literally, would be open to the same charge.[590] Elsewhere (1.1.31), his belief in the beginninglessness of the Veda obliges Śabara to give different interpretations to expressions such as *prāvāhaṇi* and *auddālaki*, which normally signify 'son of Pravāhaṇa' and 'son of Uddālaka'.[591] In cases like these the principle of the most direct interpretation and the dogma of the beginninglessness of the Veda are in conflict. For clearly, the most direct interpretation of the statement "Prajāpati extracted his omentum" is that Prajāpati, at some point of time, extracted his omentum. The principle of the most direct interpretation meets with difficulties in other situations, too. Some vedic statements do not agree with our experience. Śabara gives the following examples: "The trees sat down for a sacrifical session"; "The snakes sat down for a sacrificial session"; "The old bull sings mad [songs]".[592] Cases like these serve as justification to deviate in numerous instances from the most direct interpretation, and resort to a secondary interpretation instead. Secondary interpretations play a major role in Mīmāṃsā.[593] In the end most of the Veda is interpreted in this way by this school. This does not, however, change the fact that a secondary interpretation is only allowed in cases where the primary interpretation is not possible for one reason or other. The statements that remain for direct interpretation are few indeed. Only vedic statements that are not, and cannot be, in conflict with other sources of knowledge are in the end retained. Such statements are the injunctions. The injunction, Śabara explains, is a part of the Veda that communicates something unknown by other means.[594]

But even if, for practical reasons, only a minority of vedic statements can be strictly interpreted according to the rule of interpretation expounded above, the general principle remains unaffected. It states that each vedic statement allows of a most direct interpretation that is independent of the mental activity of the person who "receives" this interpretation.

The Veda, then, is not produced by a human mind (nor by any other mind for that matter), and nor should it be interpreted by a mind. Or rather, only those interpretations that reduce the interference of the mind to a minimum can be accepted as correct. In this

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[587] TaitS 2.1.1.4: *sa ātmano vapām udakkhidat*.
[588] Śabara on MīmSū 1.2.10: *vṛttāntānvākhyāne 'pi vidhīyamāne ādimattādoṣo vedasya prasajyeta.*
[589] RV 10.47.1 etc.: *jagṛbhmā te dakṣiṇam indra hastam.*
[590] Śabara on MīmSū 9.1.9: *athaivam ucyate, tasyaitad vacanaṃ yo gṛhītavāṃs tasya hastam iti/ ucyate/ naitad adhyavaseyam/ ādimattādoṣo vedasya prasajyate*.
[591] Pollock (1989: 608; 1990: 330) refers to this passage in an article that draws attention to the non-historical nature of much of Sanskrit literature, possibly in imitation of the Veda.
[592] Śabara on MīmSū 1.1.32: *vanaspatayaḥ sattram āsata; sarpāḥ sattram āsata; jaradgavo gāyati mattakāni*. None of these three citations seems traceable in the Veda as we know it.
[593] Not only in the Mīmāṃsā. Fox (1991: 41) observes with regard to Biblical interpretation: "Unerring scripture requires the acceptance of allegory, the belief that a text may appear to say one thing while meaning another."
[594] Śabara on MīmSū 1.4.1: *kaścid asya (= samāmnāyasya) bhāgo vidhir yo 'viditam arthaṃ vedayati yathā somena yajeta iti*. We will see below that certain Vedāntic thinkers maintained that the Veda communicates also certain other things, different from injunctions, that cannot be known by other means.

way the Veda remains pure, not touched by any mind, both in its composition and in its interpretation. This purity of the Veda, however, is only possible if it is accepted that the Veda is eternal, i.e., without beginning, and secondly, that this corpus allows of a 'direct' interpretation. The first consequence was a central tenet in the world view of classical Mīmāṃsā. The second consequence constituted a point of departure for philosophical developments and elaborations within the school.

Other sentences

Brahmins were primarily interested in vedic words and sentences. Non-vedic words were incorrect, and could therefore be discarded. Non-vedic sentences, on the other hand, could use correct Sanskrit, and if they were truthful, they could not be discarded as incorrect. And yet, even true and correct Sanskrit sentences presented difficulties that could not be ignored. These difficulties, it appears, were first pointed out by Buddhists, but once brought to light, they obliged brahmanical thinkers to deal with them in detail. These reflections gave rise to the most interesting philosophical developments within Brahmanism. Since they received their initial impetus from Buddhism and can also otherwise not be separated from developments inside Buddhism, they will be discussed in Part III (§ III.4.2).

IIB. BRAHMINS AND SOCIETY

Brahmins, as we have seen, did not need other members of society — or at least they claimed that they did not need them. But the other members of society did need Brahmins. For many centuries, Brahmins presented themselves — and were accepted by a growing proportion of the population — as the masters of all knowledge worth knowing. This included forms of knowledge that provide power, among these rites and spells. Clearly this aspect of brahmanical knowledge added immensely to their attraction, not least among those with access or aspirations to worldly power. Generally speaking, Brahmins were thought of — and thought of themselves — as being closest to what we may call the sacred.

The present Part IIB will discuss two aspects of this belief. It will first show brahmanical behavior was looked upon as exemplary and worthy of imitation. Subsequently it will point out how brahmanical literature of the period emphasizes, explicitly or implicitly, that brahmanical power is virtually limitless and exceeds even the power of kings.

IIB.1. *Imitatio Brahmanae*

Implicit in the Brahmins' vision of themselves was a vision of the society in which they lived. This vision of society is most easily understood as an extension of the Brahmins' vision of themselves. Some parts of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* illustrate this most aptly.

As pointed out by Rocher (1975), this text prescribes six activities for the Brahmin. These six activities form three binaries:

adhyayana : adhyāpana
yajana : yājana
dāna : pratigraha

These terms can respectively be translated as follows:

-"studying the Vedas" / "making others study the Vedas"
-"performing sacrifices for one's own benefit" / "making others perform sacrifices for their own benefit"
-"giving gifts" / "receiving gifts"

The first items in these three binaries — "studying the Vedas", "performing sacrifices for one's own benefit" and "giving gifts" — are the activities Brahmins will supposedly engage in when left to themselves. The corresponding second items do no more than induce others to do the same. These others, to be sure, are the members of the three highest caste-classes (Brahmins, Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas) and exclude the Śūdras. The members of those caste-classes are told to imitate the Brahmins, at least in these three respects.[595] It will become clear that the imitation of Brahmins extends further.

[595] The question whether and to what extent all this is no more than fictional schematization with little or no link to reality must always be kept in mind. See, e.g., Scharfe 2002: 88-89: "It is doubtful ... that kṣattriyas and vaiśyas ever devoted as much time to Vedic study as did the

Let us reconsider the points discussed in connection with the core vision in Part IIA.

Purity of descent is a *sine qua non* for being a Brahmin. From a brahmanical point of view, the same restraint applies to all other groups in society. Intermarriage between different groups results in a lower status for the descendents. Starting from a fundamental fourfold division of society (see below), brahmanical theoreticians added numerous lower groups that were supposedly the outcome of intermarriages between members of those original divisions.[596] The general idea is that intermarriage between groups is to be avoided, and leads to loss of status.

Ritual purity, too, is an essential feature of a Brahmin's life. And once again, many of the rituals that accompany the life of a Brahmin are accessible to others. That is to say, members of a society that is organized according to brahmanical principles follow the brahmanical example to the extent they are permitted to do so.

Vedic knowledge is another feature that was extended to society at large. Briefly put, non-Brahmins were divided into those entitled to vedic knowledge, and those who were not. The former included political rulers and their kin (called *kṣatriya*) and certain others (*vaiśya*); those without access to vedic knowledge fell under the general category of *śūdra*. The resulting four caste-classes — *brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya*, *vaiśya* and *śūdra* — constitute the four *varṇa*s, which came to be thought of as an essential aspect of Hinduism (*varṇāśrama-dharma*). The question whether many members of the caste-classes different from Brahmins who had access to vedic learning, i.e. who came to be included in the category of twice-born (*dvija*), actually took advantage of this privilege must remain open, but it seems justified to remain skeptical in this respect.

The use of Sanskrit is a different matter. Knowledge of this language (unlike knowledge of the Veda) was accessible to all, it being the only 'real' language. During the first centuries of the Common Era we see indeed that Sanskrit is increasingly used by non-Brahmins. North-Indian Buddhism, after using other languages for half a millennium and developing a highly sophisticated philosophy in those other languages, shifted wholesale to Sanskrit. Jainism followed a few centuries later.[597] Inscriptions from roughly that period found on the island of Socotra, far away from continental India, show that sailors, most or all of whom were certainly not Brahmins, used Sanskrit.[598] Sanskrit also

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brahmins." "Our texts [i.e., mainly Dharma- and Gṛhyasūtras], maybe because they were composed by brahmins in the Vedic tradition or maybe also because they were primarily concerned with preservation of this tradition, have features that make sense only when applied to brahmins. The incoming student is asked to name his *gotra*, i.e., his descent from his eponymous ancestor — but only brahmins have a *gotra*!" A footnote (no. 15) adds: "ĀpDhS I 6,18,9 forbids the graduate on his return to his home to accept food from members of the three other social orders: *trayāṇāṃ varṇānāṃ kṣattriya-p[r]abhṛtīnāṃ samāvṛttena na bhoktavyam* 'A returning graduate shall not eat from the three social orders that beging with kṣattriya (i.e., kṣattriya, vaiśya, śūdra).' This makes sense only for a brahmin graduate, for a kṣattriya or vaiśya graduate should be able to eat with his kinsmen." See also p. 101 n. 84: "In Bhāsa's Avimāraka act 5 (after stanza 5), Raghuvaṃśa XI 64, and Daśakumāracarita chapter 2 the sacred thread (*upavīta*) is considered as the mark of a brahmin only, suggesting that kṣattriyas and vaiśyas may not have passed through *upanayana* regularly."

[596] For a detailed study, see Brinkhaus 1978.

[597] On the question how and why Buddhism and Jainism developed differently in India, see Appendix VIII.

[598] See Strauch 2012.

makes its appearance in political inscriptions during this period. In all these cases (including the case of Buddhism) the increasing use of Sanskrit testifies to an increasing degree of brahmanization.

The above observations show that brahmanization often finds expression in the tendency to imitate the brahmanical life-style and customs. Imitating gods or their representatives is a feature observed in other religions.[599] Imitating Brahmins makes sense if Brahmins were looked upon as gods or their representatives. Brahmanical literature tells us, as a matter of fact, that Brahmins are gods. We find this claim already in vedic literature,[600] and texts from the period we are studying say much the same.[601] Consider further the following lines from the *Mahābhārata* (13.35.19-21):[602]

> As a result of contempt for Brahmins, the demons live in water. Through the grace of Brahmins, the gods reside in heaven. [Just as] it is impossible to touch ether, or move the Himalaya, or restrain the Ganges by means of a dam, [so] the Brahmins are invincible in the world. The earth cannot be ruled in opposition to the Brahmins. The noble Brahmins are gods even to the gods themselves.

The observation that Brahmins were looked upon, or wanted to be looked upon, as gods helps to explain that the features of a brahmanized society can to a fair extent be described in terms of imitation, the imitation of Brahmins by those who are not Brahmins themselves. However, it does not answer the question why others would be willing to accept the divine status of Brahmins. Did they not have eyes to see that Brahmins were human beings like themselves?

We must not forget that Brahmins originally owed their special position to their role as sacrificial priests. They never renounced this privilege, even during the difficult period when there were few sponsors left who were interested in vedic sacrifices. When times turned once more to their advantage, Vedic sacrifices were again on the list of services Brahmins offered to interested rulers. Puṣyamitra, the general who was instrumental in bringing down the Maurya Empire, is believed to have performed a Horse Sacrifice (*aśvamedha*),[603] and various more recent rulers followed his example. But this

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[599] See, e.g., Petersen 2013 and Stuckrad & Petersen 2013.

[600] E.g. AVŚ 6.114.1(?); 11.1.23; 12.3.38; 12.4.23; TaitS 1.7.3.1; 2.5.9.6; KāṭhS 8.13; MaitS 1.4.6; ŚPaBr 2.2.2.6; 2.4.3.14; 3.1.1.11; 4.3.4.4. Cf. Macdonell & Keith 1912: II: 82, with references to Weber 1868: 35-36; Schroeder 1887: 146-147.

[601] So *Viṣṇusmṛti* 19.20; Manu 9.313-319; 11.84; Mhbh 13.47.42; 13.136.20; *Amarakośa* 2.7.4. Cf. Rocher & Rocher 1962; Scharfe 1989: 98 n. 540-541; Falk 1994: 313 ff.

[602] Mhbh 13.35.19-21: *brāhmaṇānāṃ paribhavād asurāḥ salileśayāḥ/ brāhmaṇānāṃ prasādāc ca devāḥ svarganivāsinaḥ// aśakyaṃ spraṣṭum ākāśam acālyo himavān giriḥ/ avāryā setunā gaṅgā durjayā brāhmaṇā bhuvi// na brāhmaṇavirodhena śakyā śāstuṃ vasuṃdharā/ brāhmaṇā hi mahātmāno devānām api devatāḥ//*

[603] "Echos of this apparently most impressive event are found in the famous line in Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya* (Mahā-bh 2:123.3-4): *iha puṣyamitraṁ yājayāmaḥ* 'Here we are conducting a sacrifice for Puṣyamitra'; in Kālidāsa's drama *Mālavikāgnimitra* (where Puṣyamitra's son Agnimitra is a major character); and, finally, in Buddhist sources such as the *Aśokāvadhāna*." (Houben 2011: 174). Thite (2015) points out that the *aśvamedha* "was never actually performed in strict accordance with its description in the Vedic literature"; even the authors of the Sanskrit epics did not know the details of its vedic description. Somethings similar

time Brahmins had more on offer. Their ritual and otherworldly competence remained a crucial asset, used to provide services to other members of society. These services pertained to the rites of passage that, following brahmanical example, marked important events in people's lives. They also concerned interpreting signs, predicting the future and other such activities that only Brahmins could perform in virtue of their other-worldly competence. This same otherworldly competence enabled Brahmins in more recent centuries to take on the role of temple priests (see § IIA.1.3, above). All of these activities emphasized the Brahmins' role as intermediaries between this world and a higher reality. Their constant private preoccupation with ritual confirmed it further. However, here as elsewhere, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The proof of successful ritual activity is the ritual power that results from it. And possession of ritual power is a theme that the brahmanical texts of the period, especially those that aim directly or indirectly at a non-brahmanical audience, regularly emphasize.

IIB.2. Brahmanical power

IIB.2.1. The Atharva-Veda

Brahmins had supernatural powers. In the good old days these flowed through the performance of the solemn ritual. Without clients for these expensive rites, the supernatural powers of the Brahmins were in danger of being underused and overlooked. Fortunately there was a solution to this problem: the magical formulas that came to be collected in the *Atharva-Veda*. "According to the Aṅgirasakalpa of the Atharvaveda there are in the atharvanic tradition ten classes of rites, viz. those that, like the German *Segen*, are to appease or avert evil (*śāntika*), that are to promote welfare (*pauṣṭika*), to bring others into subjection by means of charms (*vaśa*), to hinder or paralyse (*stambhana*), to bewilder (*mohana*), to bring about hatred (*dveṣaṇa*), to eradicate (*uccāṭana*), to kill (*māraṇa*), to seduce (*ākarṣaṇa*), and to scare away (*vidrāvaṇa*)."[604] Whether or not we accept this enumeration as exhaustive or even fully appropriate (activities like prognostication and medical cures were also associated with the *Atharva-Veda*), it will be clear that the formulas collected in the *Atharva-Veda* provide opportunities to Brahmins to use their supernatural powers also outside the realm of extensive and expensive solemn rites. These kinds of formulas and the associated rites made it possible for Brahmins to exert their powers even in hostile situations, in circumstances where the support of the ruling classes was not guaranteed or worse.

It goes almost without saying that these alternative ways of using their supernatural powers came in handy during the time when Brahmanism had to reinvent itself and had to establish its worth in the eyes of ruling classes for whom the solemn vedic ritual was not part of inherited custom. The formulas of the *Atharva-Veda* were of the greatest importance to Brahmins during this period. Indeed, it is possible, even likely, that these formulas were collected into what we now call the *Atharva-Veda* precisely during this period. A consideration of references to the *Atharva-Veda* and its formulas in vedic and early post-vedic literature supports this.

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can be said about many other vedic sacrifices.

[604] Gonda 1975: 277.

The Atharva-Veda in tradition

The *Atharva-Veda* has come to be looked upon as number four of a set of four Vedas: *Ṛg-Veda*, *Yajur-Veda*, *Sāma-Veda* and *Atharva-Veda*. This was not always the case. In fact, our early sources rarely speak of four Vedas: they prefer the numbers three and five. The *Atharva-Veda* does not figure in the list of three, nor is it usually included in the list of five. Let us consider the evidence.

The tradition of five (rather than three or four) Vedas is attested both in vedic and non-vedic texts. The buddhist canon preserves it in a form which does not mention the *Atharva-Veda*. The following phrase recurs often in Pali:

> *... tiṇṇaṃ vedānaṃ pāragū sanighaṇḍuketubhānaṃ sākkharappabhedānaṃ itihāsapañcamānaṃ padako veyyākaraṇo ...*[605]

The same phrase occurs in Sanskrit with minor variations:

> *... trayāṇāṃ vedānāṃ pāragaḥ sanighaṇṭakaiṭabhānāṃ sākṣaraprabhedānām itihāsapañcamānāṃ padaśo vyākaraṇaḥ ...*[606]
>
> *... trayāṇāṃ vedānāṃ pārago sākṣaraprabhedānām itihāsapañcamānāṃ sanighaṇṭakaiṭabhānām*[607]
>
> *... trayāṇāṃ vedānāṃ pārago sanirghaṇṭhakaiṭabhānām itihāsapaṃcamānām akṣarapadavyākaraṇe analpako ...*[608]
>
> *... trayāṇāṃ vedānāṃ pārago akṣaraprabhedānām itihāsapaṃcamānāṃ sanighaṇṭukaiṭabhānām anupadakavyākaraṇakuśalo ...*[609]

An echo of this phrase is found in *Avadāna* 33 of the *Divyāvadāna*:

> *... vedān samanusmarati sma sāṅgopāṅgān sarahasyān sanighaṇṭukaiṭabhān sākṣaraprabhedān itihāsapañcamān ...*[610]

All these phrases appear to enumerate five Vedas. The reason to think so is that *itihāsapañcamānām* (or its equivalent in Pali) is a Bahuvrīhi compound qualifying *vedānām*, and should therefore be translated: "with *itihāsa* as fifth [Veda]". We shall see that this interpretation fits other evidence that will be discussed presently.

The different phrases show some variation regarding the precise contents of Vedas number four and five. They all consider *itihāsa* 'legend' part (sometimes the whole) of the fifth Veda. Most of them agree that the fourth Veda encompasses *akṣara* / *akkhara* 'phonology (PTSD)' and *pra-/pabheda* 'etymology (PTSD), exegesis (Rhys Davids 1899: 109)', or perhaps rather *akṣaraprabheda* / *akkharappabheda* 'philologische Technik (Franke 1913: 87)'; one however does not include them in any Veda. The items

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[605] DN I.88, 114, 138; MN II.133, 141, [146,] 147, 165, 168, 210; AN I.163, 166; III.223; Sn p. 105.
[606] Avś II.19.
[607] Mvu I.231.17-18.
[608] Mvu II.77.9-10; Mvu II.89.16-17 has *kuśalo* for *analpako*.
[609] Mvu III.450.6-7.
[610] Divy 619.21-23.

nighaṇṭa / *nirghaṇṭa* / *nighaṇṭu* / *nighaṇḍu* 'lexicology / etymology (BHSD), synonymische Wortverzeichnisse (Franke, id.), explanation (PTSD), indices (Rhys Davids, id.), vocabularies (Horner 1957: 317)' and *kaiṭabha* / *keṭubha* 'ritual science (BHSD), Hilfsbücher (Franke, id.), ritual (PTSD)' are usually part of the fourth Veda, in two cases of the fifth.

Some passages of the *Madhyamāgama* preserved in Chinese mention five Vedas,[611] but specify the contents of the fifth one in an altogether different way:

> [He] has crossed the four classical texts, with the correct literature of profound intelligence on causes and conditions as fifth.[612]

Here one may suspect that the *Atharva-Veda* has, implicitly, made its way into this list. If so, this may indicate its relative lateness.

The five Vedas are again, this time explicitly, referred to in an otherwise obscure verse of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (I.29):

> *pañcaveda* (v.l. *-vedā*) *sataṃ samam/*
> *tapassī brāhmaṇācaraṃ* (v.l. *caraṃti*)*//*

(Note that the prose portions of the Pali canon refer always to five Vedas; only in verse the three Vedas are referred to a few times,[613] and this may be an abbreviation dictated by the demands of metre.)

The five Vedas are enumerated, finally, in the *Dīpavaṃsa* (Dīp V.62): ... *iruvedaṃ yajuvedaṃ sāmavedaṃ pi nighaṇḍuṃ itihāsañ ca pañcamam.*

In vedic literature itself we find the five Vedas enumerated at *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 7.1.2, 7.1.4, 7.2.1 and 7.7.1. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 7.1.4 reads: *ṛgvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmaveda ātharvaṇaś caturtha itihāsapurāṇaḥ pañcamo vedānāṃ vedaḥ pitryo rāśir daivo nidhir vākovākyam ekāyanaṃ devavidyā brahmavidyā bhūtavidyā kṣatravidyā nakṣatravidyā sarpadevajanavidyā*. Most of the terms of this list are unknown (see Horsch 1966: 33). It is clear that *caturtha* 'the fourth' refers to a Veda, viz., the *Atharva-Veda*: the same must therefore be true of 'the fifth'. (We may follow Horsch, and thus indirectly W. , in taking *itihāsapurāṇaḥ pañcamo vedānāṃ vedaḥ* together, translating '*itihāsa* and *purāṇa*, which constitute the fifth Veda among the Vedas'. This does not however affect our main argument.)[614]

The buddhist enumerations of five Vedas have no place for the *Atharva-Veda*. The jaina canonical scriptures contain an enumeration which seems clearly derived from the one used by the Buddhists, but ***with*** the *Atharva-Veda*. Unlike the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*,

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[611] Sometimes the *Madhyamāgama* mentions four Vedas where the parallel in Pāli mentions only three of them; see, e.g., Analayo 2011: 527 n. 3; 2012a: 158 n. 10 [12].
[612] TI 26 (vol. 1) p. 663c line 8, p. 680b lines 28-29, p. 685a lines 11-12.
[613] Th 1171; SN IV.118; Jā VI.214.
[614] Śaṅkara's comments on ChānUp 7.1.2 are intriguing (cf. Horsch 1966: 36). *Vedānāṃ vedaḥ* is taken as a new item after the fifth Veda, meaning *vyākaraṇa*, because by means of *vyākaraṇa* the *Ṛg-Veda* etc. are known in their division into *pada* etc. (*vyākaraṇena hi padādivibhāgaśo ṛgvedādayo jñāyante*). The result is so close to the enumerations in *Avadānaśataka* and *Mahāvastu* presented above that it seems likely that Śaṅkara had undergone buddhist influence in this regard.

it does not simply drop the 'original' fourth Veda, but moves it to the sixth place. *Itihāsa* keeps its traditional fifth place. The result is an enumeration of six Vedas:[615]

> *riuvveda-jajuvveda-sāmaveda-athavvaṇaveda-itihāsapaṃcamāṇaṃ nighaṃṭachaṭṭhāṇaṃ caüṇhaṃ vedāṇaṃ saṃgovaṃgāṇaṃ sarahassāṇaṃ sārae vārae pārae ...*

Interestingly, an enumeration that is several times repeated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (2.4.10; 4.1.2; 4.5.11 [= ŚPaBr 14.5.4.10; 14.6.10.6; 14.7.3.11]) and *Maitrāyaṇīya* (6.32) *Upaniṣad*s apparently knows the *Atharva-Veda* but does not call it a Veda: *ṛgvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo 'tharvāṅgirasa itihāsaḥ purāṇaṃ vidyā upaniṣadaḥ ślokāḥ sūtrāṇy anuvyākhyānāni vyākhyānāni.* Three items are called Veda, none of the others are.

This last enumeration counts among a number of vedic passages that name the *Ṛg-*, the *Yajur-* and the *Sāma-Veda*s, but not the *Atharva-Veda*. The terms *Ṛg-Veda*, *Yajur-Veda* and *Sāma-Veda* also occur in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (5.32 [25.7]), the *Ṣaḍviṃśa Brāhmaṇa* (1.5.8; 4.1.2), and in three further passages from the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (11.5.8.3-6; 12.3.4.9; 14.4.3.12 [= BĀrUp 1.5.5]). It would seem that in these passages the terms *Ṛg-Veda*, *Yajur-Veda* and *Sāma-Veda* — in the singular — denote what is nowadays also known by the names *Ṛgveda-Saṃhitā*, *Yajurveda-Saṃhitā* and *Sāmaveda-Saṃhitā*.[616] The non-mention of the *Atharva-Veda*, as Veda, suggests that its hymns were not collected until after the other three Vedas had been constituted.

A confirmation that the *Atharva-Veda* did not exist as a collection until long after the other three Vedas had been collected is found in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. Sections 3.1-5 make a number of comparisons, or rather identifications, of which the following are of interest to us. Section 3.1 states that the bees are de *ṛc* (pl.), the flower is the *Ṛg-Veda*; in 3.2 the bees are the *yajus* (pl.), the flower is the *Yajur-Veda*; and in 3.3 the bees are de *sāman* (pl.), the flower is the *Sāma-Veda*. The interesting observation comes in section 3.4, where the bees are the *atharvāṅgirasaḥ* and the flower is *itihāsapurāṇam*. In 3.5, finally, the bees are the hidden teachings (*guhyā ādeśāḥ*), which may be the Upaniṣads, and the flower is Brahman (n.). Since the *atharvāṅgirasaḥ* are the formulas collected in the *Atharva-Veda* as we know it, the logic of the situation would have required that the flower in 3.4 be identified with the *Atharva-Veda*. The fact that it is not, strongly suggests that the author of this passage did not know of such a definite collection of *atharvan*s and *aṅgiras*es. *Itihāsa* and *purāṇa* certainly do not designate the *Atharva-Veda*, neither separately nor jointly (see Horsch 1966: 13f.).

Bloomfield (1899: 2 f.), too, came to the conclusion "that many hymns and prose pieces in the [*Atharva-Veda*] date from a very late period of Vedic productivity." Indeed, "there is nothing in the way of assuming that the composition of such texts as the [*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*] and [*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*] preceded the redactions of the Atharvan Saṃhitās."

At least one recension of the *Atharva-Veda* existed, in its collected form, at the time of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* (second half of the second century BCE). This text cites in its opening passage the first lines of the four Vedas. First comes *śaṃ no devīr abhiṣṭaye*, which begins the Paippalāda version of the *Atharva-Veda*. Patañjali even

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[615] Viy 2.1.12; 9.33.2; *Aupapātika Sūtra* (ed. Leumann) section 77, and elsewhere, see Charpentier 1914: 28.

[616] Note that these expressions are totally unknown to the vedic texts.

informs us of the size of the *Atharva-Veda* known to him, saying (Mahā-bh vol. 2, p. 378, l. 11; on P. 5.2.37): *viṃśino 'ṅgirasaḥ.* This fits the twenty books of the *Paippalāda Saṃhitā*.[617] We may conclude from this that the *Paippalāda Saṃhitā* existed more or less in its present form in the middle of the second century BCE.[618]

This survey shows two things: First, it demonstrates that the formulas of the *Atharva-Veda* enter rather late into regular enumerations. And second, it confirms that references to an *Atharva-Veda* in collected form are later still.

The Atharva-Veda in the Gṛhyasūtras

The very fact that the *Atharva-Veda* or its formulas found acceptance in polite society should be interpreted in the light of our earlier reflections: Brahmins who had lost their secure position in society needed these formulas and the accompanying rites in order to create a new living for themselves. We must expect a similar increase of respectability for the *Atharva-Veda* in the Gṛhyasūtras. This is indeed what we find.

The first thing to be noted is that, as pointed out by Hermann Oldenberg in 1892 (p. x), "the Atharva-veda Saṃhitā … may be regarded in the main as a treasure of Gṛhya verses". The special connection of the *Atharva-Veda* with Gṛhya ritual is emphasized by the fact that, where as a general rule each Gṛhyasūtra presupposes a previous knowledge of the ritual which is acquired through the study of the corresponding Śrautasūtra, this relation is reversed in the domain of the *Atharva-Veda* literature: here the Śrautasūtra (the *Vaitāna Sūtra*) presupposes the Gṛhyasūtra (the *Kauśika Sūtra*) (Oldenberg 1892: xxx-xxxi, with p. xxxi n. 1; Gonda 1977: 545, 614).

Several Gṛhyasūtras refer to the *Atharva-Veda as Veda*. Śāṅkhāyana (2.10.8), Kauṣītaka[619] (2.6.8), Hiraṇyakeśin (1.2.8.14), Pāraskara (2.5.13) and Mānava (1.2.6; 1.22.18) clearly indicate that they know four Vedas. Pāraskara (2.10.4-7) and Hiraṇyakeśin (2.8.19.6) mention the *Ṛg-*, *Yajur-*, *Sāma-* and *Atharva-Veda*s by name; so does the Mantrapāṭha that accompanies the *Āpastamba Gṛhyasūtra*.[620]

The above shows that many, if not all, Gṛhyasūtras give the *Atharva-Veda* (the *collected* text) a place in the enumeration of Vedas which it had often been denied by others. Some indications suggest that the *Atharva-Veda* had not just obtained a place in the traditional enumeration, but a place of relative honour.[621] This may follow from the

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[617] Note that the *Mahābhāṣya* also prefers the Paippalāda version of the *Atharva-Veda* in some citations (see Renou 1953: 463; Rau 1985: 103).

[618] Among the texts that explicitly refer to the *Atharva-Veda* we must mention the later portions of the *Milindapañha* (Mil 178.15-17: *Irubbedaṃ Yajubbedaṃ Sāmavedam Athabbaṇavedaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ itihāsaṃ purāṇaṃ nighaṇḍu keṭubhaṃ akkharappabhedaṃ padaṃ veyyākaraṇaṃ …*) and perhaps the *Arthaśāstra* (KAŚ i.3.1-2: *sāmargyajurvedās trayas trayī/ atharvavedetihāsavedau ca vedāḥ/*).

[619] The *Kauṣītaka Gṛhyasūtra*, which professes to belong to the same Ṛgvedic tradition as the *Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtra* (Gonda 1977: 606-07), follows the latter "during the greater part of the work, nearly word for word" (Oldenberg 1886: 6).

[620] Gonda 1977: 579.

[621] The honour is relative, for not as great as it might have been, given the shared subject-matter of *Atharva-Veda* and Gṛhyasūtras. Bloomfield (1897: xliv) proposes as explanation that "even the Gṛhya-rites, popular, nay vulgar, as they must have been in their untrammelled beginnings, were, so to speak, Rishified, and passed through in due time a process of school-treatment which

name which Śāṅkhāyana (1.16.3) and Kauṣītaka (1.10.1) reserve for the *Atharva-Veda*, viz., *Brahma-Veda*. This, as we discussed earlier (§ I.2.4) may be taken to indicate that these Gṛhyasūtras looked upon the *Atharva-Veda* as the Veda of the Brahman-priest. We have also seen that the expression *Brahma-Veda* is virtually confined to texts of the *Atharva-Veda*, and this is barely surprising. The *Śāṅkhāyana* and *Kauṣītaka Gṛhyasūtra*s are the only exceptions to this rule. We concluded from this that the *Śāṅkhāyana* and *Kauṣītaka Gṛhyasūtra*s accept that there is a special connection between the Brahman-priest and the *Atharva-Veda*. This is important, because there is also a connection between the Brahman-priest and the Purohita, the 'domestic priest' of the king. The *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects* states the following about it (Macdonell & Keith 1912: II: 7-8, s.v. **Purohita**):

> According to Geldner, the Purohita from the beginning acted as the Brahman priest in the sacrificial ritual, being there the general superintendent of the sacrifice. In favour of this view, he cites the fact that Vasiṣṭha is mentioned both as Purohita and as Brahman: at the sacrifice of Śunaḥśepa he served as Brahman, but he was the Purohita of [King] Sudās; Bṛhaspati is called the Purohita and the Brahman of the gods; and the Vasiṣṭhas who are Purohitas are also the Brahmans at the sacrifice. It is thus clear that the Brahman was often the Purohita; and it was natural that this should be the case when once the Brahman's place became, as it did in later ritual, the most important position at the sacrifice. … Later, no doubt, when the priestly activity ceased to centre in the song, the Purohita, with his skill in magic, became the Brahman, who also required magic to undo the errors of the sacrifice.

In the ritual texts of the *Atharva-Veda*

> the office of the Brahman, the fourth priest at the śrauta-ceremonies, who oversees and corrects by means of expiatory formulas (*prāyaścitta*) the accidents and blunders of *hotar*, *udgātar*, and *adhvaryu*, is said to belong to an Atharvavedin, and the *Vaitāna-sūtra* in fact exhibits the *bhṛgvaṅgirovid* in possession of that office. … [A] similar claim is advanced in respect to the office of the purohita. Again and again it is stated that the purohita, guru, or brahman of a king, the chaplain or house-priest, shall be conversant with the Atharvan writings, shall be an Atharvan priest …[622]

Can we conclude from the above that the authors of the *Śāṅkhāyana* and *Kauṣītaka Gṛhyasūtra*s — and by extension, the authors of other Gṛhyasūtras that include the *Atharva-Veda* in their list of now four Vedas — accepted that there was a special link between the office of Purohita and the *Atharva-Veda*? It is useful to recall that certain Dharmasūtras emphasize the need of a Purohita to be skilled in Atharvan formulas.[623] The

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estranged them as far as possible from the specifically Atharvanic connections, and assimilated them, as far as possible, to the Ṛg-veda, Sāma-veda, and Yajur-veda, as the case may be."

[622] Bloomfield 1897: lviii.

[623] So *Yājñavalkya Dharmaśāstra* 1.312; *Gautama Dharmasūtra* 11.17.

Arthaśāstra, too, does so.[624] As a matter of fact, it appears that there was "a conscious effort of the Paippalāda brāhmaṇas [of the Atharvaveda] to appear as best suited to be the king's purohita", whereas "the Śaunaka school do not seem to have the same agenda in the redaction of its Saṃhitā".[625] It appears "that the Paippalādins collected heterogeneous material, taken from various sources and originally also meant for other purposes, to meet the demand for new 'royal hymns'".[626]

Consider in this connection the following observation, drawn from the same article in the *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects* (p. 8): "In historical times [the Purohita] represented the real power of the kingship, and may safely be deemed to have exercised great influence in all public affairs, such as the administration of justice and the king's conduct of business." Compare this with the characterization of a court of justice (*sabhā*) in the *Pāraskara Gṛhyasūtra* (3.13.2) as *āṅgirasī* "related to Aṅgiras or to the Aṅgirases". It is far from evident what Aṅgiras or the Aṅgirases have to do with the court of justice, unless we consider that the author of this Sūtra assumed that Atharvan priests had a closer connection with the court than others. This would be a matter of course if the Brahman-priests had come to be looked upon as particularly apt to play the role of royal Purohita.[627]

The Atharva-Veda in the Mahābhārata

The *Atharva-Veda* occupies a respected position in the *Mahābhārata*, too. About the general relationship of this epic to vedic literature we can do no better than cite *The Sanskrit Epics* by John Brockington (1998: 7-9):

> References to the Vedas in general terms are found not uncommonly in the *Mahābhārata* and are spread relatively evenly. Anything more explicit, even the listing of the three or four Vedas or mention of Vedas along with Vedāṅgas, tends to be concentrated in the more didactic or otherwise later parts of the text. Thus, … the sound of the *Yajur*, *Ṛg* and *Sāma Veda*s along with prose — in the context probably the Brāhmaṇas are meant — rises from hermitages at 3.27.3ab;[628] the four Vedas with the Aṅgas and Upāṅgas are put on a par with truth at

[624] KAŚ 1.9.9 (tr. Olivelle 2013: 74): *purohitam uditoditakulaśīlaṃ sāṅge vede daive nimitte daṇḍanītyāṃ cābhivinītam āpadāṃ daivamānuṣīṇām atharvabhir upāyaiś ca pratikartāraṃ kurvīta* "He should appoint as Chaplain a man who comes from a very distinguished family and has an equally distinguished character, who is thoroughly trained in the Veda together with the limbs, in divine omens, and in government, and who could counteract divine and human adversities through Atharvan means." Malamoud (2012: 625) observes, in connection with the *Arthaśāstra*: "L'Atharvaveda est bien, comme on peut s'y attendre, l'intersection du corpus védique, de la *śruti* comme fondement du *dharma* brahmanique, et du monde multiforme de la *māyā*."

[625] Lopez 2010: 51 & 83, as cited in Lelli 2015: 378. Note in this connection that Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* "gehört in die nächste Nähe … des Paippalāda-Atharvaveda" (Rau 1985: 103).

[626] Lelli 2015: 379.

[627] On the distinction between civil and criminal courts in ancient India, see now Olivelle 2012a.

[628] Mhbh 3.27.3: *yajuṣām ṛcāṃ ca sāmnāṃ ca gadyānāṃ caiva sarvaśaḥ/ āsīd uccāryamāṇānāṃ nisvano hṛdayaṃgamaḥ.*

3.61.16ab;[629] … the *Sāma*, *Yajur* and *Ṛg Veda*s were absent in the Kṛtayuga but in the Dvāparayuga there are four Vedas and men know four, three, two, one or none (3.148.13a[630] and 26-27,[631] in the *Tīrthayātrāparvan*); Nārāyaṇa declares to Mārkaṇḍeya that he produced the *Ṛgveda*, *Sāmaveda*, *Yajurveda* and the *Atharvan*s at 3.187.14ab.[632] In … Nārada's description of the celestial halls the *Ṛgveda*, *Sāmaveda*, *Yajurveda*, *Atharvaveda*, as well as Upavedas and Vedāṅgas are there (2.11.23-24);[633] within the *Sanatsujātīya* Brahman is not in the *Ṛg*, *Yajur*, *Atharva* or *Sāma Veda*s (5.44.21ab).[634] Alongside such listings of four Vedas, the following *pāda* giving just the three Vedas may be noted: *ṛco yajūṃṣi sāmāni* at 9.35.33a[635] (in the less well known *Tīrthayātrāparvan* narrating Balarāma's pilgrimage, which also refers to the muni Sārasvata's recitation of the Vedas at 9.50.2-3[636]) and 12.243.2c[637] (also at 1 App. 1.23 pr., and in different wording at 6.31.17d[638] and 12.230.8b[639]). However, to set against this, there are a number of separate references to the *Atharvaveda*, of which perhaps the most notable is that the group of spells given to Kuntī by which she can bring the gods to her is revealed in the *Atharvaśiras*[640] (3.289.20cd);[641] others occur at 1.64.33[642], 5.18.7-8[643] (Atharvāṅgirasa), 8.49.69ab (*atharvāṅgirasī* [!] *hy eṣā śrutīnām uttamā śrutiḥ*), 13.10.34a (*atharvavede vede ca*, making a distinction between it and the rest) and 13.95.75c = 96.44c (with mention in the first half of the verse of Advaryu and Chandoga). … [I]n the *Bhagavadgītā* Kṛṣṇa declares that he is the *Sāmaveda* of the Vedas (6.32.22ab)[644], the *pitṛmedha* is celebrated for the dead

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[629] Mhbh 3.61.16: *catvāra ekato vedāḥ sāṅgopāṅgāḥ savistarāḥ/ svadhītā mānavaśreṣṭha satyam ekaṃ kilaikataḥ.*
[630] Mhbh 3.138.12-13: *nāsan kṛtayuge tāta tadā na krayavikrayāḥ/ na sāmayajurgvarṇāḥ kriyā nāsīc ca mānavī.*
[631] Mhbh 3.148.26-27: *dvāpare 'pi yuge dharmo dvibhāgonaḥ pravartate/ viṣṇur vai pītatāṃ yāti caturdhā veda eva ca// tato 'nye ca caturvedās trivedāś ca tathāpare/ dvivedāś caikavedāś cāpy anṛcaś ca tathāpare//*
[632] Mhbh 3.187.14: *ṛgvedaḥ sāmavedaś ca yajurvedo 'py atharvaṇaḥ/ mattaḥ prādurbhavanty ete mām eva praviśanti ca.*
[633] Mhbh 2.11.23: *ṛgvedaḥ sāmavedaś ca yajurvedaś ca pāṇḍava/ atharvavedaś ca tathā parvāṇi ca viśāṃ pate.*
[634] Mhbh 5.44.21: *naivarkṣu tan na yajuḥṣu nāpy atharvasu; na caiva dṛśyaty amaleṣu sāmasu.*
[635] Mhbh 9.35.33: *ṛco yajūṃṣi sāmāni manasā cintayan muniḥ*
[636] Mhbh 9.50.3: *yatra dvādaśavārṣikyām anāvṛṣṭyāṃ dvijottamān/ vedān adhyāpayām āsa purā sārasvato muniḥ.*
[637] Mhbh 12.243.2: *sarvān vedān adhīyīta śuśrūṣur brahmacaryavān/ ṛco yajūṃṣi sāmāni na tena na sa brāhmaṇaḥ.*
[638] Mhbh 6.31.17: *pitāham asya jagato mātā dhātā pitāmahaḥ/ vedyaṃ pavitram oṃkāra ṛk sāma yajur eva ca.*
[639] Mhbh 12.230.8: *apṛthagdarśinaḥ sarve ṛksāmasu yajuḥṣu ca.*
[640] Note the variant *atharvāṅgirasi*, and cf. Bloomfield 1897: xvii.
[641] Mhbh 3.289.20-21: *tatas tām anavadyāṅgīṃ grāhayām āsa vai dvijaḥ/ mantragrāmaṃ tadā rājann atharvaśirasi śrutam// taṃ pradāya tu rājendra kuntibhojam uvāca ha.*
[642] Mhbh 1.64.33: *atharvavedapravarāḥ pūgayājñika saṃmatāḥ/ saṃhitām īrayanti sma padakramayutāṃ tu te.*
[643] Mhbh 5.18.6-7: *tatas tu bhagavān indraḥ prahṛṣṭaḥ samapadyata/ varaṃ ca pradadau tasmai atharvāṅgirase tadā// atharvāṅgirasaṃ nāma asmin vede bhaviṣyati.*
[644] Mhbh 6.32.22: *vedānāṃ sāmavedo 'smi devānām asmi vāsavaḥ.*

> warriors with *sāman*s (11.26.39c, cf. *sāmnām ṛcāṃ ca nādena* at 40a) and at 13.14.159ab the *Sāmaveda* is supreme among the Vedas, just as the *Śatarudrīya* is among the Yajur hymns.

Brockington's observations, though useful, have to be read with care, for they do not distinguish between different kinds of mantras (e.g. *ṛc*, *yajus*, *sāman*) on one hand, and the Vedas that carry their names (e.g., *Ṛg-Veda*, *Yajur-Veda*, *Sāma-Veda*) on the other.[645] If we concentrate on the latter, we find that none of the passages referred to merely enumerate the usual three Vedas (*Ṛg-Veda*, *Yajur-Veda* and *Sāma-Veda*), two of them mention four Vedas without specifying which ones are meant (3.61.16; 3.148.26), one enumerates the four Vedas as *Ṛg-Veda*, *Sāma-Veda*, *Yajur-Veda* and *Atharva-Veda* (2.11.23), and one gives the following enigmatic enumeration: *ṛgvedaḥ sāmavedaś ca yajurvedo 'py atharvaṇaḥ* (3.187.14). If we translate this, with Van Buitenen (1975: 591), as "Ṛg-Veda, Sāma-Veda, Yajur-Veda and the Atharvans" the suggestion is conveyed that the *Atharva-Veda*, unlike the other Vedas, either did not exist, or was not thought of as a collection. This interpretation is however far from certain.[646] Some of the passages that only refer to the *Atharva-Veda* maintain the ambiguity as to its collected nature (3.289.20; 8.49.69). (Since the use of plural nouns, usually *atharvāṅgirasaḥ*, to refer to the *Atharva-Veda* continued for a long time, one should be careful in drawing chronological conclusions from it; see Bloomfield 1897: xvii.) One, finally, speaks of the Saṃhitā of the *Atharva-Veda* and its Pada- and Krama-pāṭha (1.64.33: *saṃhitāṃ … padakramayutāṃ*).[647] Here the *Atharva-Veda* is clearly thought of as a collected whole.

Brockington's sample of passages,[648] then, creates the impression that the *Atharva-Veda* has in the *Mahābhārata* taken a place on a par with the three other Vedas, even though it is still sometimes referred to as if it was not yet a finished collection of hymns.[649]

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[645] If we assume, with the *Mīmāṃsākoṣa* (VI p. 3089), that there are three and only three kinds of (vedic) mantras — viz., *ṛc*, *yajus* and *sāman* — then the mantras in the *Atharva-Veda*, too, belong to these three categories. As a matter of fact, the *Atharva-Veda* shares a fair number of mantras with the Ṛg-Veda. Note however that the authors of the *Mahābhārata* may not always strictly distinguish between mantras and Vedas; an example is 5.43.1ab: *ṛco yajūṃṣy adhīte yaḥ sāmavedaṃ ca yo dvijaḥ*.

[646] The normal plural of *atharvan* is *atharvāṇaḥ* rather than *atharvaṇaḥ*. We might therefore translate "the Ṛg-Veda, the Sāma-Veda, the Yajur-Veda and [the Veda] of Atharvan". Alternatively, we may interpret (with Bloomfield, 1897: xxv) *atharvaṇaḥ* as a variant of *ātharvaṇaḥ*, in which case we have to translate "the Ṛg-Veda, the Sāma-Veda, the Yajur-Veda and the Atharva[-Veda]".

[647] Note that the word *saṃhitā* in vedic literature always means *sandhi*, so that the *saṃhitā-pāṭha* of a vedic text is its version with *sandhi*, different from its *pada-pāṭha* (version consisting of separate words) and other versions. The use of *saṃhiṭā* in this line from the *Mahābhārata* appears to be an early manifestation of the later usage, in which *saṃhitā* means "collection".

[648] We may add Mhbh 8.24.80-81, which mentions Ṛg-Veda, Sāma-Veda, *itihāsayajurvedau* (!) and *atharvāṅgirasau*.

[649] Similarly Bloomfield, 1897: li: "The position of the Atharvan in the *Mahābhārata* may be characterised in the single statement that its importance as a Veda, and its canonicity, are finally and completely established". Bloomfield, 1897: lii gives a long list of *Mahābhārata* passages that mention the four Vedas, one of them being the *Atharva-Veda*.

IIB.2.2. The authorship of the *Mahābhārata*

An alternative to Sukthankar's thesis

Almost eighty years have passed since V. S. Sukthankar published his article "The Bhṛgus and the Bhārata: a text-historical study" (1936). More than fifteen years ago Brockington resumed its main thesis in the following words (1998: 155-56):

> The process of transformation seems in the case of both epics to be linked with passing from the hands of their traditional reciters, the sūtas and *kuśīlava*s, into those of the brāhmans as the guardians of all traditional learning. In a seminal article, Sukthankar elucidates the role of the Bhārgavas in the amplification of the *Mahābhārata* and in particular its brahmanisation. He goes through the text, section by section, noting the evidence for Bhārgava influence whenever it appears. For example, within the *Ādiparvan*, Sukthankar identified the *Aurvopākhyāna* (1.169-173) with its Bhārgava hero as 'a digression within a digression'; in the *Sabhāparvan* there are only brief mentions of Bhārgavas, usually included in lists of those present on various occasions, whereas the *Āraṇyakaparvan* has a considerable amount of Bhārgava material incorporated into it. The largest amount of Bhārgava material is included in the *Anuśāsanaparvan*.
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> As his name Bhārgava indicates, Rāma Jāmadagnya is the hero of the Bhṛgu group of brāhmans, who were especially connected with the inflation of the *Mahābhārata* after supplanting the *sūta*s and through it with bolstering the claims to superiority of the brāhmans. … [M]ost of the Bhārgava inflations, such as the extreme emphasis on Rāma Jāmadagnya, remain and Sukthankar thought that the *Mahābhārata* only passed from their control when the last four books were being added. Thus, Rāma Jāmadagnya's participation in epic events results from interpolation and accounts of his massacre of the *kṣatriya*s are intended to emphasise Bhārgava control over the epic itself, reflecting not a military but a literary struggle.

Sukthankar's article has exerted a major influence on *Mahābhārata* studies during subsequent years, with many scholars accepting its main thesis. This thesis, to put it briefly, is that the Bhārgavas — i.e. the real historical Bhārgavas, not the Bhārgavas that figure in stories in the epic — played an important role in the amplification and brahmanisation of the *Mahābhārata*. Bhārgava control over the epic only passed onto others when the last four books were added.

Sukthankar's article expresses this thesis most explicitly perhaps on p. 74: "The infiltration of masses of Bhārgava material in the shape of Bhārgava myths and legends, the manner of its treatment, and even that strange admixture of the Epic with the Dharma and Nīti elements … thus appears[s] to find a simple and straightforward explanation in the assumption of an *important unitary diaskeuasis of the epic under very strong and direct Bhārgava influence*." (Sukthankar's emphasis). Its attraction to subsequent scholarship is clear from Goldman's remark, made in 1977 (p. 2) that "[t]his theory has proven basic to all subsequent study of the *Mahābhārata*."

Sukthankar's assumption, his main thesis, is not the only one capable of explaining the abundant Bhārgava material in the *Mahābhārata*. Exactly the same facts

allow, I propose, of an altogether different explanation. Sukthankar's thesis explains literary features with the help of an assumed historical situation. This assumed historical situation is based on these literary features only, and is not confirmed by independent evidence.[650] The alternative explanation I will suggest is based on the historical situation as depicted in this book, a situation in which Brahmanism had to assert itself in unfavorable circumstances. The importance of the *Atharva-Veda* has already been pointed out in the preceding chapter. The following reflections will take this importance as point of departure.

Since the *Mahābhārata* is at least in part a mythological text, it will be interesting to see which are the mythological sages prominently associated with the *Atharva-Veda*. These are, above all, Atharvan, Aṅgiras and Bhṛgu. Of these three, the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* (1.1.4-5 and 7-8) narrates that the first two were created by Brahma, that twenty Atharvanic and Aṅgirasic descendent sages emanated from them, and that finally the *Ātharvaṇa Veda* was produced by the Atharvans, the *Āṅgirasa Veda* by the Aṅgirases.[651] The compound *bhṛgvaṅgirasaḥ* makes its appearance later, and only in Atharvan texts. Bhṛgu has the tendency to replace Atharvan in the Atharvanic tradition.[652]

We know that Bhṛgu and his descendents play a major role in the *Mahābhārata*. However, Aṅgiras and his descendants do so, too. Brockington (1998: 156) says the following about it:

> N. J. Shende, from a count of references to individual brāhmans, demonstrates the greater frequency of mention of the Āṅgirasas, even than of the Bhṛgus.[653] To these may be added the narrative by Mārkaṇḍeya about the origin of the fires and the role of Aṅgiras as an Atharvan. Shende therefore modifies Sukthankar's hypotheses by suggesting that 'the Bhṛgvaṅgirases were jointly responsible for the final redaction of the Mahābhārata'.

From among the major brahmanical families, the Bhṛgus are mentioned 1'500 times in the *Mahābhārata*, the Aṅgirases 3'200 times, and each of the remaining families less than a hundred times. Shende draws from this a conclusion similar to Sukthankar's. He concludes that the Āṅgirasas were co-responsible for the redaction of the *Mahābhārata*. Since he does not contest Sukthankar's findings, he ends up with a joint responsibility, shared by Bhārgavas and Āṅgirasas.

Enough preparatory work has been done by now to see that this conclusion is not the only one possible. The fact that the Bhārgavas and the Āṅgirasas, just these two, outcompete all other brahmanical families in the *Mahābhārata* can hardly be historical coincidence. These two families represent, in the Indian imagination of that time, the supernatural powers associated with the formulas of the *Atharva-Veda*.[654] We have seen that these powers, rather than those associated with the solemn ritual, were vital for the Brahmins of that time in order to regain a position of respect in society. The

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[650] See, e.g., Minkowski 1991: 399: "neither Sukthankar nor any subsequent proponent of this theory … has presented any epigraphical, textual or other historical evidence independent of the epic that demonstrates the existence of a distinct Bhārgava movement."
[651] Bloomfield 1897: xxii-xxiii.
[652] Bloomfield 1897: xxvi-xxvii.
[653] Reference to Shende 1943.
[654] It is not to be forgotten that Bhārgava and Āṅgirasa are gotra names, not confined to Brahmins with links to the *Atharva-Veda*; cf. Proferes 2003; 2007: 6-13; Mahadevan 2011.

Mahābhārata, too, was meant to serve that purpose. It could do so by showing, through the intermediary of stories, what enormous powers Brahmins possessed. The powers concerned were primarily those associated with atharvan formulas, and were therefore most appropriately exemplified through the feats of those who were particularly closely connected with those powers, viz., the Bhārgavas and the Āṅgirasas.

Recall that the intended audience of the epic included wordly rulers, those whom the Brahmins would call Kṣatriyas. Brahmins had to get the message across that they, in spite of appearances, had powers comparable to or even exceeding those of kings. The *Mahābhārata* shows this by recounting what their most powerful representatives had done. These most powerful representatives of the Brahmins were, and could not but be, Bhārgavas and Āṅgirasas, the masters *par excellence* of atharvanic powers.

It is easy to show this for the Bhārgavas, who have received more scholarly attention than the Āṅgirasas. The most famous example is the Bhārgava Rāma Jāmadagnya, who destroyed all the Kṣatriyas thrice seven times over.[655] This historical fact — it is presented as one — "is mentioned *ten* times, in nearly identical form" in the *Mahābhārata*; what is more, "the humiliation of the pride of the Kṣatriyas by the Bhārgava Rāma is mentioned about a *score* of times".[656] This should be enough to convince any ruler that displeasing a Brahmin might carry serious risks for him. The story of the Bhārgava Aurva, who almost committed a similar act of total destruction, would further remind him that the only way to avoid such a fate was mollification of the Brahmin concerned.[657]

More frequently the Bhārgavas, and the Āṅgirasas with them, use other means to guarantee success in battle to those whose sides they are on, viz., secret magical weapons.

These same stories recall that Brahmins can basically do what they like, and get away with it. The Bhārgavas provide, once again, a particular clear example. To cite Goldman (1977: 5): "The central concerns of the Bhṛgus appear from the mythology to have included death, violence, sorcery, confusion and violation of class-roles (*varṇāśrama-dharma*), intermarriage with other varṇas (*varṇasaṃkara*), and open hostility to the gods themselves. In addition, several of the Bhārgava sages are shown in the epic to have engaged with impunity in such activities as theft, drinking liquor, and killing a woman, acts that are condemned unequivocally in the law texts as especially improper for brahmans." This shows that Brahmins have the power to do what they please, and it is only by their good grace that they often follow the rules which they have themselves laid down in their treatises.

All this only makes sense, of course, if we keep in mind that the ideal audience of the epic is not constituted by other Brahmins, but by worldly rulers.[658] Brahmins are not encouraging each other to break their self-imposed rules; they rather remind their rulers that they can choose not to obey them, and there is nothing anyone can do to stop them.

It follows from our preceding reflections that the important roles played in the *Mahābhārata* by Bhārgavas and Āṅgirasas have nothing to do with the participation of

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[655] Cf. Goldman 1977: 18 f.; Fitzgerald 2002.
[656] Sukthankar 1936: 65.
[657] See Goldman 1977: 11 f.
[658] According to Hegarty (2012: 189), "the Mahābhārata successfully institutionalized itself to the extent that it was used by kings and Brahmins for acts of both self-legitimation and selfexploration for centuries, indeed millennia, to come".

these two groups of Brahmins in the composition, or rather brahmanisation, of this text, but rather are concerned with the image its redactors wished to project of Brahmins. This image was best served by an increased emphasis on the brahmanical powers that were associated with the *Atharva-Veda*, and consequently by the regular presence in the stories of the Brahmins who were most intimately connected with this Veda.[659]

[659] So Hiltebeitel 1999. See also Simson 2011: 642 f.

III. EXTERNAL INFLUENCE

Part II has tried to present what might be considered Brahmanism's core vision. As behooves Brahmanism's claim to independence, this core vision was mainly developed independently of outside influence. The new Brahmanism was not, of course, immune to outside influence. Right from the beginning it was in constant interaction with surrounding cultures, so much so that its core vision slowly but certainly became overlaid with features that were not part of the original vision, and sometimes in plain contradiction with it. The present Part III will deal with some of these features.

Brahmanism borrowed in more ways from its surroundings than can be dealt with here. We had occasion to mention local cults and traditions that it incorporated in the course of time (see, e.g., § I.1.3, above). In *Greater Magadha* some features were discussed that Brahmanism borrowed from the cultural region to its east ('Greater Magadha'), among them the notion of cyclic time, Kapila (and with him presumably the fundamentals of the Sāṃkhya philosophy), and most importantly: the idea of rebirth and karmic retribution. In this Part something more will be said about the way in which Brahmanism incorporated rebirth and karmic retribution, followed by an analysis of the elements that gave rise to brahmanical philosophy. A final chapter will discuss the origin of the Indian theater.

III.1. Karma and the individual

Part II of *Greater Magadha* dealt with "Brahmanism vis-à-vis rebirth and karmic retribution", so there is no need to discuss here the influence that the doctrine of karma — which had not been part of the brahmanical tradition until it came into contact with the culture of Greater Magadha — came to exert on brahmanical culture. The present chapter will merely look at one area in which there was a fundamental difference of outlook between traditional Brahmanism and the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution, and at the manner in which the former dealt with that difference. This is the area of the individual.

Two scholars in particular have made claims about individualization in ancient India: Louis Dumont and J. C. Heesterman.

Dumont believed that there was a fundamental opposition in India between the renouncer and the man in the world.[660] (He presented this opposition as characterizing Indian society throughout most of its history, but in fact his thoughts concerned the late-vedic period and the beginnings of Buddhism and Jainism in particular, i.e., the centuries preceding the Common Era.[661]) The renouncers of that period, according to Dumont, did not only have individuality, they also were, perhaps as a result, responsible for all religious and other innovations that took place in India during that time. The question is: Does Dumont's theory satisfactorily explain the situation depicted in the early texts? Were the great religious discoveries he talks about — primarily the new ideas expressed in the Upaniṣads, the origin of Buddhism and Jainism, etc. — invented by renouncers? Or had these people become renouncers because of prior convictions and ideas with which they had grown up? Dumont takes it for granted that the renouncers he talks about —

[660] See Dumont 1959; 1960; 1982.
[661] Bronkhorst 1997a; 1999b.

including the Buddha and the Jina — came from a vedic milieu. They had become renouncers (Dumont does not tell us why), as a result of which they subsequently introduced new ideas and innovations into Indian thought and religion, prominently among these the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution. They could become innovators by virtue of the fact that they renounced the vedic milieu. We will see that in reality the historical situation was more complex.[662]

One might take a position different from Dumont and assume the opposite. One could consider that the vedic tradition itself developed the theory of rebirth and karmic retribution, which in its turn inspired certain people to become renouncers. This is the position of J. C. Heesterman, who articulates this point of view in an article that was reprinted in a volume called *The Inner Conflict of Tradition* (1985). Heesterman, like Dumont, believes that a conflict is to be assumed to explain these and other developments in Indian thought. But contrary to Dumont, his conflict is an 'inner conflict'. That is to say, it is not a conflict between different groups in Indian society — renouncers and men-in-the-world — but rather a conflict that is inherent in the single vedic tradition.

Heesterman develops this idea in an article "Brahmin, ritual, and renouncer", which is chapter two of his book *The Inner Conflict of Tradition*, mentioned earlier. He there derives the Upaniṣadic karma doctrine from certain presumed developments in the vedic sacrifice (p. 34 f.). The interiorization of the ritual, moreover, is presented as the logical conclusion of its ongoing *individualization* (p. 38 f.). And here we touch, still according to Heesterman, the principle of world renunciation. To quote his own words (p. 41-42):

> The difference between classical ritualism and renunciation seems to be a matter rather of degree than of principle. The principle is the *individualization* [emphasis added, JB] of the ritual, which could not but lead to its interiorization.

The emergence of renunciation, also according to Heesterman, has been of crucial importance in the development of Indian religious thinking. To substantiate this claim, which he does not further elaborate, Heesterman refers without comments in a note to Dumont's article "World renunciation in Indian religions", whose content we considered above. It would seem that Heesterman agrees with Dumont's thesis to the extent that renouncers have been responsible for most of the discoveries and innovations in Indian religious life. He disagrees, however, with respect to the Brahmin, whom Dumont views as the opposite of the renouncer, while Heesterman puts him on a par with the renouncer.[663] Renunciation, in Heesterman's opinion, can be understood as a development of vedic thought. Both he and Dumont would probably agree that individualization came about in opposition to the predominant vedic tradition, either in those who renounced vedic society and left it (Dumont), or within that tradition as a result of certain internal developments (Heesterman).

Perhaps it is the sociological orientation of these two scholars — Dumont and Heesterman — that leads them to identify the aim of renunciation with "liberation from

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[662] A link between individuality and renunciation is still presupposed in Peter Sloterdijk 2009 (*Du mußt dein Leben ändern*), where it speaks of "die Erfindung des Individuums durch die isolierende Hervorhebung seines Wirkungs- und Erlebenskreises aus dem Kreis aller anderen Welttatsachen" (p. 350) and "Geburt des Individuums aus dem Geist der Rezession" (p. 353).
[663] Heesterman 1985: 231-32 n.32.

the fetters of life as commonly experienced in this world", as Dumont puts it; Heesterman describes the renouncer as "emancipated from the relations which govern [the world]" (p. 39). Descriptions like these tend to make one overlook the aims the early texts themselves ascribe to the renouncers. It turns out that not all renouncers pursue the same goal. What is more, the English term 'renouncer' is not the translation of any one single Sanskrit term.[664] There are a number of Sanskrit terms more or less corresponding to 'renouncer' that are not however treated as synonyms in the texts.[665] As so often, the urge to translate Indian expressions into expressions which are meaningful to the modern investigator, is responsible here for a failure to understand the texts on their own terms.

Dumont explained the main religious developments in ancient India with the help of an opposition between people who left the world, i.e. renouncers, and those who stayed there. Heesterman postulated a similar opposition, but one present within single individuals.

Evidence is growing that neither Dumont nor Heesterman had it right. The innovations concerned (to which I will return below) did not arise in one single tradition, but were largely the result of two different cultures that were situated in different parts of northern India and came to influence each other, ever more strongly, during the centuries preceding the Common Era. These two cultures were centred in two different regions of the Ganges valley. Beside vedic culture, centred in its western parts, there was another culture to its east, centred in Greater Magadha, i.e., Magadha and surroundings.[666] Magadha is often depicted in brahmanical texts as a region unfit for Brahmins. This did not prevent it from becoming the centre of the first great empire that the subcontinent had ever seen: the Maurya Empire that for the first time united almost the whole of India. Magadha and surroundings are moreover the area where the Buddha and the Jina — the founders of Buddhism and Jainism respectively — preached their messages. An important characteristic of the culture of Greater Magadha that distinguished it from vedic culture was the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution. Buddhism and Jainism, and other religious movements in Greater Magadha, all shared a common aim: putting an end to rebirths. The paths toward this goal taught by the different teachers, including the Buddha and the Jina, often consisted in various forms of asceticism and renunciation. These paths, including the ones preferred in Buddhism and Jainism, were paths toward liberation from rebirth, not, or not primarily, freedom from society.

The goal to put an end to rebirths, and the paths supposedly leading there, came to exert an influence on late-vedic culture, but this took time, partly because the problem these paths were meant to solve — i.e., the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution — was not part of vedic tradition. Late-vedic tradition came to accept this belief in some of its texts, and with it variants of the partly renunciatory paths that were based on it. Accepting this belief was apparently a difficult process, for even a thousand years after its first appearance in the vedic Upaniṣads we still find brahmanical currents that do not accept it. This process accounts in part for the institution of renunciation that finds expression in some late-vedic texts.

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[664] "Sehr grosszügig fasst Dumont in der Institution des 'renouncer' aber auch alle anderen indischen Formen des Asketen-, Mystiker- und Mönchtums zusammen, ohne in irgeneiner Weise genauer zu unterscheiden." (Fuch 1988: 417)

[665] The Sanskrit term that literally corresponds closest to English 'renouncer' is *saṃnyāsin*. This term enters relatively late into the relevant literature, and refers to the renunciation of the sacred fire by the person who opts for the fourth *āśrama* (see below).

[666] All this has been argued in great detail in *Greater Magadha*.

But this is only part of the picture. During and after the Maurya Empire, and beginning perhaps already before it, vedic religion underwent a transformation that led to Brahmanism, an ideology that in the course of some thousand years was to become the predominant socio-political ideology of the whole of South Asia and much of Southeast Asia as well. Central in this ideology is the hereditary class of Brahmins, who in due time succeeded in making themselves indispensible in social and political life. This ideology is borne by the idea of the Brahmin as a superior being who owes nothing to society, whereas society owes everything to him. The ideal Brahmin, though in possession of great powers, often chooses to live in a hermitage (*āśrama*) separate from the human world. Unlike the buddhist and jaina renouncers, who survived by begging for food, the brahmanical hermit does not beg and does not accept anything whatsoever from society. He survives on the roots and fruits he finds in the forest, and spends almost all of his time engaged in sacrificial rituals.

This type of brahmanical hermit is often, though not always, called *vānaprastha* 'forest-dweller' in the relevant texts. His way of life corresponds to brahmanical ideology in that the forest-dweller is independent of society and its products. It is at the same time clear that in its strict form the brahmanical forest-dweller is an ideal rather than a possible way of life.[667] It is open to doubt whether anyone can survive for long on a vegetarian diet consisting (largely or wholly) of roots and fruits found in the forest, especially if one is expected to spend most of one's time engaged in various vedic rites, maintaining the vedic fire all along.[668] But real or not real, the brahmanical forest-dweller exerted an enormous influence on popular imagination — epics like the *Mahābhārata* know large numbers of forest-dwellers — and induced countless rulers to provide Brahmins with places where they could engage in their pious pursuits, with this difference that a village was normally part of the deal: the inhabitants of the village had to direct the taxes that normally went to the king to the Brahmins concerned. The ideal of the isolated forest-dweller gave, in historical reality, rise to Brahmins who ruled over villages. At present we are however concerned with the ideal, not with what it became in historical reality.

The *vānaprastha* is a completely brahmanical creation, closely linked to the image that Brahmanism projected of itself. There was no place for *vānaprastha*s outside

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[667] This does not mean that people did not try to live as closely to the ideal as possible. A similar observation can be made with respect to the buddhist ideal of living alone, "like (the horn of) a rhinoceros". Strangely, Clarke (2014: 6 with p. 174 n. 39) appears to object to understanding the exhortation as evidence of actual buddhist practice in India, at least by some.

[668] Cf. *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism* p. 76 n. 125: "It is possible to wonder, with Annemarie Mertens (2005: 255 n. 95), whether there really were brahmanical ascetics. As she puts it: "Denkbar wäre …, dass [die brahmanischen Asketen] lediglich ein weiteres 'Konstrukt' der beiden Gruppen (i.e., Brahmins and Buddhists, JB) darstellen, das ihnen zur eigenen Profilierung diente". It would indeed be interesting to know whether the ecological conditions of the Indian subcontinent make it possible for an individual to survive on nothing but the fruits and roots which he comes across in his corner of the forest, without any access to the agricultural products of society (and without the use of animal products); yet this is what the normative texts suggest. Wrangham (2009: ch. 1) shows that survival in the wild without cooking is scarcely if at all possible for humans. And the BBC television series 'Wild Food' by Ray Mears (2007) reminds us of the massive amount of time hunter-gatherers require to find and prepare their food; this hardly corresponds to the image of the peaceful life of the brahmanical ascetic in his *āśrama* who, moreover, is not supposed to hunt."

Brahmanism. Neither Buddhism nor Jainism knows that kind of renouncer. At the same time this is the only kind of ascetic that fully renounces society: the *vānaprastha* is totally independent of society, and needs nothing from it; he does not even beg for his food, and dresses in forest products, primarily the bark of trees.[669]

But the other kind of ascetic, the one who pursues the end of rebirths and survives by begging, came to influence Brahmanism as well. The result is that the classical texts of Brahmanism present different kinds of renunciation: renunciation of the type of the *vānaprastha*, and renunciation of the wandering religious beggar who aims for the end of rebirths. The earliest of these texts present the two as a choice. Later on the two are incorporated in a temporal succession of four life stages: after religious studies and the subsequent founding of a family, the aging father then becomes a *vānaprastha*, and toward the end of his life he becomes a wandering religious mendicant. This sequence is completely artificial (at least toward its end), and may never have been followed, but it did become part of orthodoxy. The stages are now called *āśrama* (very confusing, since *āśrama* can also mean 'hermitage'), and the rule of the *āśrama*s (*āśramadharma*) became, along with the rule of caste-classes (*varṇa*), almost as good as a definition of Hinduism: *varṇāśrama-dharma*.

The above may seem somewhat schematic, but it does, I believe, bring out the fundamental issues involved. People renounced for different reasons, and these reasons depended on what aim they were pursuing. The purely brahmanical form of renunciation strove to total independence of society, and the texts repeatedly specify that its reward is heaven. Others renounced for reasons that were initially not brahmanical, viz., liberation from rebirths and karmic retribution. Those who looked for liberation from rebirths and karmic retribution used methods — most typically: the practice of inaction, i.e., motionlessness — that obliged them to live away from society; this break was not however complete, and did not prevent these renouncers from returning to society to beg for food. Buddhism subsequently developed monasteries and monastic institutions that placed the monastic community right in the middle of society, and other groups of renouncers followed their example.

Where does all this leave us with regard to the theories of Dumont and Heesterman? Both missed the point in an essential manner. The innovations of the pre-Common Era centuries were not the result of prior renunciation, but rather the opposite: renunciation was the result of the particular visions of reality that were held in the communities into which future renouncers were born. Classical Brahmanism depicted Brahmins as being fundamentally superior to and independent of all other human beings, and the notion of a Brahmin renouncer who lived that way was an essential part of this idea. The religious currents of Greater Magadha, on the other hand, started from the belief that acts (*karma*) lead to endless rebirths; one can only put a stop to these if one somehow manages to put a stop to those acts. This was only possible, if at all, outside society. The subsequent interaction of these different ideas and ideals led to a multitude of forms of renunciation, but the underlying concerns remain visible in most of them.

[669] Olivelle (2011a: 12) cites *Gautama Dharmasūtra* 3.26-35: "An anchorite [here called *vaikhānasa*, JB] shall live in the forest, living on roots and fruits and given to austerities. He kindles the sacred fire according to the procedure for recluses and refrains from eating what is grown in a village. He may also avail himself of the flesh of animals killed by predators. He should not step on plowed land or enter a village. He shall wear matted hair and clothes of bark or skin and never eat anything that has been stored for more than a year." See further Olivelle 2011a: 48 f.

An important question remains. Individualization implies personal responsability for one's acts. This, if I understand it correctly, is how Dumont thought about it. In 1981 he brought out an article "La genèse chrétienne de l'individualisme moderne, une vue modifiée de nos origines", that two years later became part of his book *Essais sur l'individualisme* (1983).[670] He talks here about an 'individu-en-relation-à-Dieu' and about 'individualisme absolue'. I do not claim to fully understand Dumont,[671] but it seems clear that he talks here about things such as individual responsability. But personal responsability for one's acts is the most characteristic feature of the doctrine of karmic retribution: one's own deeds determine one's own future, in this or a next life. This particular conviction underlies the religious currents that originated in Greater Magadha (and only later did it find its way into Brahmanism). It is the very reason for the existence of Buddhism, Jainism and other similar currents. It was not invented by renouncers, but was the reason why they became renouncers to begin with. In other words, the belief in karmic retribution was widely held, also among laypeople, in parts of eastern India. What are the implications for the question of individualization?

Unfortunately we know little or nothing about the way in which the notion of rebirth and karmic retribution came about. Earlier generations of scholars have tried to explain it as a development within vedic thought. This is no longer possible, because we now have strong reasons to believe that this notion developed outside the vedic tradition: the few late-vedic texts that are acquainted with this notion (i.e., some passages in the oldest Upaniṣads) betray the influence they underwent from the culture of Greater Magadha. We do not know why and when the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution became part of the culture of Greater Magadha.

Be this as it may, the inhabitants of this region shared a belief that held them individually responsible for their acts: only their own acts and no one else's would determine in what form and conditions they would be reborn in a future life. This induced certain individuals to take destiny into their own hands, for example by becoming ascetics. This led to the appearance of various new religious movements. Three of these we know by name — Buddhism, Jainism and Ajivikism — but there are clear indications that there were others. These religious movements proposed different solutions to the shared fear of endless numbers of rebirths. The solutions consisted of various ways of putting an end to these rebirths. These solutions were, at any rate initially, individual solutions: they were meant to rescue individuals from continued rebirths.

As I stated earlier, we do not know how this individualization came about. We have no sources from Greater Magadha that precede Buddhism and Jainism. However, we know a great deal more about the *de-individualization* that occurred when the doctrine of karma fell in brahmanical hands.

We have already seen that the option to become a wandering mendicant, striving for release from rebirth and karmic retribution, came to be incorporated into Brahmanism as one of the options open to a Brahmin. The early texts repeatedly assert that this is not the preferred option, which is rather to become a householder. The authors of these early texts reluctantly included the option of becoming a wandering mendicant, presumably

[670] An English version came out in 1982.

[671] I may not be the only one. Maurice Bloch (2012: 120), for example, states that "when ... we try to relate Geertz's discussion of the Balinese 'person' (1973), with Dumont's 'individual' (1983), Mauss's 'moi' (1938) and Rosaldo's 'self' (1984) ... I have to admit that I am completely lost".

because it had gained popularity among certain Brahmins. We have also seen that the mendicant option was later delegated to the last position in a sequence of life-stages, thus reserving it for old or even very old men, effectively discouraging young Brahmins from spending their lives in the pursuit of liberation from rebirth and karmic retribution.

Brahmanism clearly felt threatened by the individual responsability and initiative that accompanied the doctrine of karmic retribution. The search for individual release did not fit easily into the brahmanical worldview, for here every person is expected to stick to their social role, whether they like it or not.

A particularly interesting attempt to immunize the threat this posed to brahmanical society finds expression in the *Bhagavadgītā*, a text that was to become extremely popular in Hinduism, and has remained so until today. In order to understand its message (or at least the part or aspect of its message that is relevant in the present context), we must consider some of the thoughts that accompanied the belief in karmic retribution.

According to this belief, deeds carried out in this life will have an effect in future lives. This process can only be interrupted by the complete cessation of all activity. This explains the central role that suppression of activity and immobility play in the asceticism practised by those who wished to escape from the round of rebirths. However, there was another solution. Many accepted that the core of one's being, one's self, is essentially inactive. Realizing this was as good as abstaining from all activity, because it entailed the liberating insight that in reality one does not act, so that there can no longer be question of karmic retribution.

This belief about the real nature of the self changes the picture altogether. We saw that karmic retribution links all our activity, all that we do, to effects in a future life. But all that *we* do is, or should be, all that our inner self does. Our inner self, however, does not act at all, it is totally inactive. There can, therefore, be no karmic retribution for what our inner self does. If only we realize this, we will be freed from the cycle of rebirths and karmic retribution.

It is easy to see that this second path is a path of knowledge, of an inner realization of the true nature of one's self. This realization may accompany ascetic practices, and it often does. There are indications in the early jaina texts that such a belief about the nature of the self had adherents among the early Jainas, but this belief did not survive for long in Jainism, and was soon replaced by an altogether different conception of the self.[672] However, this belief about the inactive nature of the inner self had great attraction for the followers of Brahmanism.

Recall that the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution is unknown to the bulk of Vedic literature. Brahmanism became acquainted with it at a late date, and different groups of Brahmins reacted differently to it. Some, and among them the most orthodox, did not want to hear of it. Śabara — the Mīmāṃsaka who wrote the very important *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* that is also know as *Śābara Bhāṣya* — still has no place for rebirth and karmic retribution around the middle of the first millennium CE. The Cārvākas, sometimes called materialists by modern scholars, still rejected this doctrine toward the end of the first millennium CE.[673] But other groups of Brahmins accepted it already quite early. And in doing so they were confronted with the same questions that had occupied thinkers in Greater Magadha. They were inevitably drawn to the two responses of inactivity asceticism and the realization of the inactive nature of the inner self. Both these

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[672] See *Greater Magadha* pp. 33-34, with references.
[673] On the Cārvākas as a Brahmanical school of thought, see *Greater Magadha* pp. 150-159.

responses found followers among Brahmins, but the second one, about the inactive inner self, became particularly popular.

This second response found expression in different brahmanical schools of philosophy. The philosophical school called Sāṃkhya is of special importance for us at present. The origin of this school may lie in Greater Magadha, but Sāṃkhya came to be incorporated into Brahmanism, so that it came to be thought of as a brahmanical school of philosophy. The Sāṃkhya philosophy postulates a fundamental division into two of all that exists. On one hand there is the self (depending on the school one considers, there can be one single self for all, the Supreme Self, or one separate self for each person; the term often used is *puruṣa*), on the other there is everything else. This everything else usually goes by the name of *prakṛti*, sometimes translated 'primal matter', and Sāṃkhya has a great deal to say about it, among others that it has three constituents (*guṇa*). It has much less to say about the *puruṣa*, the self, for the simple reason that the self does nothing. The way in which *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* interact is of course a matter of great concern to the Sāṃkhya philosophy, but it is necessary to enter into details now. For our present purposes it suffices to see that the fundamental scheme of Sāṃkhya is directly related to the question of karmic retribution and liberation. Someone who masters the Sāṃkhya philosophy knows that his deeper self is inactive and not involved in the events of this world, including the activities of his (or her) own body and mind. This philosophy can be looked upon as the intellectual counterpart of inactivity asceticism, and it is not surprising that the two often go hand in hand. Texts like the *Mahābhārata* use the term Yoga to refer to inactivity asceticism, and point out that Sāṃkhya and Yoga go together, or even that the two are, at bottom, the same. Long after the *Mahābhārata*, a much-developed form of Yoga finds expression in the *Yogaśāstra* (i.e., *Yogasūtra* and *Yogabhāṣya*), but even there the link with Sāṃkhya is still strong. One is tempted to think that Sāṃkhya is primarily a philosophy of ascetics, or at any rate a philosophy that by its nature is connected with asceticism.

In spite of their regular co-occurrence, there is an important difference between the first and the second response, i.e. between the path of inactivity asceticism and the path of insight into the fundamentally inactive nature of the inner self. The ascetic, if he reaches liberation at all, does so at the moment of death. Before his death, while still alive, he may be close to liberation, but he has not yet reached it, he is not liberated.

Insight into the true nature of the self is a different matter. To reach this insight, one has to be alive. And if this insight is sufficient for being freed from karmic retribution, this means that one could become liberated while still being alive, i.e. there might be people around who are freed from rebirth and karmic retribution. In more recent centuries, a person who is liberated while alive would come to be known as *jīvanmukta* 'liberated while alive'.[674] However, texts from the earlier period, including texts that are more or less contemporary with the *Bhagavadgītā*, do not know this term, and are ambiguous and vague about the notion.[675]

This vagueness has consequences. If one accepts that there are living people who are freed from rebirth and karmic retribution, one is confronted with the question how such people, once liberated, act in the world. More recent texts — most specifically perhaps the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* and the *Jīvanmuktiviveka* — discuss this issue at length (Fort 1998: 11 ff.). Texts from the time of the *Bhagavadgītā*, including the *Bhagavadgītā* itself,

[674] See Sprockhoff 1964; Fort 1998; Mesquita 2007.
[675] See Appendix V, below.

do not, and indeed, they do not clearly distinguish between a liberated person and a person who wishes to be liberated. But this leaves place for one of the *Bhagavadgītā*'s special messages.

Let us be clear about it that the *Bhagavadgītā* has plenty to say about the ascetic life, about the person who withdraws from society. But its most important message, which is also the reason why it could become part of the *Mahābhārata*, is that one can pursue the highest goal while yet staying in society. Arjuna, in spite of his wishes, is not asked to leave society. He can pursue the highest goal while yet fulfilling his obligations as a warrior.

Arjuna is not liberated. The text talks about his liberation as something that may happen in the future.[676] Even so, Arjuna is encouraged to know his inner self, the self that does not act.[677] The self is identified with the Supreme Self, but that, too, does not act.[678] Rebirth and karmic retribution are the result of attachment to the activities of the Prakṛti.[679] He, who knows that his inner self is different from everything else, from Prakṛti, will not be reborn.[680] But what then happens to his body and mind? It is here that the *Bhagavadgītā* introduces a new notion: Body and mind, which are different from the self and belong to the Prakṛti and its constituent Guṇas, will continue to act on their

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[676] Bhag 9.28: *śubhāśubhaphalair evaṃ mokṣyase karmabandhanaiḥ/ sannyāsayogayuktātmā vimukto mām upaiṣyasi//* "Thus you will be freed from the prison of deeds and their results, good and evil. Wholly trained in renunciation, released, you will come to me." (tr. Bolle)

[677] Bhag 2.19-21: *ya enaṃ vetti hantāraṃ yaś cainaṃ manyate hatam/ ubhau tau na vijānīto nāyaṃ hanti na hanyate// na jāyate mriyate vā kadācin nāyaṃ bhūtvā bhavitā vā na bhūyaḥ/ ajo nityaḥ śāśvato 'yaṃ purāṇo na hanyate hanyamāne śarīre// vedāvināśinaṃ nityaṃ ya enam ajam avyayam/ kathaṃ sa puruṣaḥ pārtha kaṃ ghātayati hanti kam//* "Who thinks this one a slayer, or who thinks of him as slain, both lack understanding. He neither slays nor is slain. He is never born. He never dies. He has not come to be, nor will he come to be. Primeval, he is unborn, changeless, everlasting. The body will be slain, but he will not. How can the man who knows him as imperishable, eternal, unborn, and changeless, kill anyone? Whom does he cause to be killed, Son of Pṛthā?" (tr. Bolle, modified). For the translation of verse 20b ("He has not come to be, nor will he come to be"), see Bronkhorst 1991b: 303.
Bhag 2.24cd: *nityaḥ sarvagataḥ sthāṇur acalo 'yaṃ sanātanaḥ* "Subsisting always, everywhere, immobile, fixed is the eternal one." (tr. Bolle)
Bhag 2.30ab: *dehī nityam avadhyo 'yaṃ dehe sarvasya bhārata* "That person existing in everyone's body is for ever inviolable" (tr. Bolle)

[678] Bhag 13.31: *anāditvān nirguṇatvāt paramātmāyam avyayaḥ/ śarīrastho 'pi kaunteya na karoti na lipyate//* "The changeless, supreme self, though dwelling in the body, does not act and is not affected by action, for it has no beginning and is not subject to the states of matter." (tr. Bolle)

[679] Bhag 13.21: *puruṣaḥ prakṛtistho hi bhuṅkte prakṛtijān guṇān/ kāraṇaṃ guṇasaṅgo 'sya sadasadyonijanmasu//* "For when the spirit exists in primal matter it enjoys the states matter brings about. Its attachment to those states effects good and evil births." (tr. Bolle)

[680] Bhag 13.23: *ya evaṃ vetti puruṣaṃ prakṛtiṃ ca guṇaiḥ saha/ sarvathā vartamāno 'pi na sa bhūyo 'bhijāyate//* "Who thus knows the spirit and primal matter with its states is not born again, no matter what he does in life"; Bhag 13.29: *prakṛtyaiva ca karmāṇi kriyamāṇāni sarvaśaḥ/ yaḥ paśyati tathātmānam akartāraṃ sa paśyati//* "Primal matter alone is at work in all that is done. Who sees this and sees that he himself is not engaged in acts has true insight". The end of rebirth is also mentioned in Bhag 8.15-16: *mām upetya punarjanma duḥkhālayam aśāśvatam/ nāpnuvanti mahātmānaḥ saṃsiddhiṃ paramāṃ gatāḥ// ābrahmabhuvanāl lokāḥ punar āvartino 'rjuna/ mām upetya tu kaunteya punarjanma na vidyate//* "Great men reach me and do not take a new birth fleeting and miserable. They have attained their perfect fulfillment. On this side of God's abode worlds are cycles, Arjuna, but for those who reach me there is no repetition." (tr. Bolle)

own.[681] And how do body and mind act on their own? The answer that the *Bhagavadgītā* gives is: in accordance with one's position in society. Indeed, the duties of Brahmins, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras are determined by the Guṇas that arise out of the respective natures of each of these.[682] In Arjuna's case, this means: he will behave like a Kṣatriya, a warrior, and fight the war that he, as a warrior, is expected to fight.[683]

It will be useful to contrast this with the more typical effect that the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution had on people. This belief convinced many people that they had to leave society and dedicate themselves to their individual liberation, preferably through ascetic practices. This had given rise, and continued to give rise, to many ascetic movements, and contributed to the fact that many foreign visitors, from Megasthenes, around 300 BCE, to modern times, were struck by the numerous ascetics they could observe in India. The message that the *Bhagavadgītā* delivers to Arjuna is the complete opposite of all this: Rather than leaving society, the person who looks for liberation should *stay* right in it and concentrate on his or her duties in society. The *Bhagavadgītā* arrives at this message on the basis of the same theoretical assumptions that induced others to *leave* society.

This reinterpretation of earlier material by the *Bhagavadgītā* is a striking *tour de force*. Far from preaching an escape from society, the *Bhagavadgītā* preaches the social ideal of a completely static society, in which no one aspires to another position than the one into which he or she is born. No need to add that this implies respect for the superior status of Brahmins. The popularity of the *Bhagavadgītā* is obviously the best guarantee of brahmanical privilege that one could dream of and a total obstruction to every form of innovation, whether social or otherwise. Surprisingly, Dumont understands the *Bhagavadgītā* differently, so much so that he thinks that the devotion to God it preaches allows all, even non-renouncers, to become individuals. I will not enter into a detailed discussion of this strange position, and rather repeat my observation that the *Bhagavadgītā* embodies one attempt among others, though perhaps the most sophisticated one, to assure *de-individualization*, total acceptance of one's place in the world with all that entails.

We have so far considered ways in which Brahmanism absorbed the new doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution, but in such a manner that its dangerous aspects were securely kept under control. By trying to relegate the active search for freedom from rebirth to the very end of a person's life, the life of the renouncer could be strictly

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[681] Bhag 3.27: *prakṛteḥ kriyamāṇāni guṇaiḥ karmāṇi sarvaśaḥ/ ahaṅkāravimūḍhātmā kartāham iti manyate//* "Always and everywhere, acts are done by the states arising in primal matter. A man totally confused in his self-consciousness imagines: *I act*." (tr. Bolle)

[682] Bhag 18.41: *brāhmaṇakṣatriyaviśāṃ śūdrāṇāṃ ca paraṃtapa/ karmāṇi pravibhaktāni svabhāvaprabhavair guṇaiḥ//* "Spritual guides, warriors, producers of wealth, and the servant class, O Conqueror, have tasks and rites which differ according to the state natural to each class" (tr. Bolle). Bhag 18.42-44 details what those duties are.

[683] Kṛṣṇa's situation is similar, in that he, based on *his* Prakṛti, creates the world without being attached to it: Bhag 9.8-9: *prakṛtiṃ svām avaṣṭabhya visṛjāmi punaḥ punaḥ/ bhūtagrāmam imaṃ kṛtsnam avaśaṃ prakṛter vaśāt// na ca māṃ tāni karmāṇi nibadhnanti dhanañjaya/ udāsīnavad āsīnaṃ asaktaṃ teṣu karmasu//* "Depending on my own nature, time after time I send them forth, this host of beings, without their will, by dint of that nature. This activity does not imprison me, O Fighter for Wealth! I appear as an onlooker, detached in the midst of this work." (tr. Bolle, modified)

regulated and institutionalized. By proclaiming that the best form of renunciation is renouncing the fruits of one's deeds, with the result that the best way to search for freedom from rebirths is through dutifully adhering to one's role in society, the conflict between brahmanical order and search for freedom was killed in the bud. Since the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution might give rise to individuals, i.e. people who actually took responsibility for themselves rather than accepting brahmanical guidance in all fields, Brahmanism could not but adjust this doctrine to its own needs and requirements.

Why did Brahmanism accept this doctrine at all? Interestingly, it appears that there was a lot of resistance against it, and that this resistance continued for more than a thousand years. The most radical rejection found expression in a school of brahmanical thought commonly referred to in modern literature as materialism, but whose central position was the rejection of rebirth. This school — whose adherents are called Lokāyatas or Cārvākas — flourished for a while and produced a number of texts. These texts are now lost, because this brahmanical school lost out in the long run against the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution, whose success on the Indian subcontinent became total. But this took time. We know that representatives of the Cārvāka school of thought still existed toward the end of the first millennium CE. After that date they disappeared, and their texts were no longer copied. Criticism of the Cārvākas went on for quite a while, even after the year 1000 CE, but they now were mere strawmen to whom one could attribute all imaginary forms of wickedness because there were no real Carvakas around any longer to defend themselves.[684]

It is important to realize that until the middle of the first millennium the Cārvākas were close to the perhaps most conservative and orthodox thinkers in the vedic tradition. Mīmāṃsā is a school of brahmanical thought whose prime concern is the interpretation of the ancient Veda. This school still had no place for rebirth and karmic retribution in its most important surviving classical text, composed in the fifth century CE. Only after that did it open up to the new doctrine.

Also threatening to Brahmins was the idea that their preeminent position might be thought of as the result of good deeds performed in earlier lives. This, if true, would deprive them of the conviction that their superiority was inherent, and would therefore accompany them forever, even in future births if such a thing existed. We do indeed find that certain brahmanical texts accept rebirth and karmic retribution while yet maintaining that Brahmins are a special case, that God himself gave them their preeminence at the moment of creation. Their special status therefore belongs to them, and has nothing to do with deeds they may have performed in earlier lives.[685]

What all these examples illustrate is that Brahmanism was a strong force toward *de-individualization* in early India, and that the doctrine of rebirth of karmic retribution needed special treatment before it could be absorbed into Brahmanism.

Personal responsability plays an important role in the discussion above. The doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution makes the individual responsible for his fate. Brahmanism, in spite of resistance, ended up accepting the doctrine, but made efforts to take the sting out of it by reducing the individualistic element to the extent possible. In this way Brahmanism did the exact opposite of what Christianity did in the West, judging by Larry

[684] See *Greater Magadha* p. 150 ff.; Bronkhorst 2008a.
[685] See Appendix III.

Siedentop's recent *Inventing the Individual* (2014). Christianity taught that the fate of each person at the final judgment depended only on that person, not on the group to which she belonged or on her hereditary status in society. Here, as in the case of rebirth and karmic retribution, personal responsability was central. The Christian emphasis on the responsability of the individual contrasted with the family and clan-centered emphasis of Greek and Roman antiquity, but in the long run the Christian perspective gained the upper hand. In India the opposite happened. Here the long-term winner was Brahmanism, which to a large extent succeeded in suppressing the individual element that characterized the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution. It is true that the development from equality before God to a society with at least a semblance of equality took a very long time in Europe. The conviction that one's future births are determined by one's own actions and nothing else was no immediate guarantee for an egalitarian society. But a development in that direction, if ever there was one, appears to have been nipped in the bud by the rise of Brahmanism.

III.2. Rationality

The notion of rationality used here — which will be explained in detail below — is inseparable from critical debate. A tradition of rational inquiry is one whose members feel inclined, or obliged, to listen and respond (verbally) to criticism of their ideas. The little we have learned about Brahmanism so far should make it obvious that Brahmanism did not provide fertile ground for the development of such a tradition. Brahminical knowledge is sacred knowledge, not something that should or could be subjected to criticism. In spite of this, critical debate did become part of Brahmanism, at least in its philosophical schools. These schools illustrate the consequences of a tradition of rational inquiry: being subjected to unfriendly criticism forced their adherents to develop coherent systems of thought. But this tradition of rational inquiry, not surprisingly, had a hard time imposing itself. Indeed, it seems to be a general truth that traditions of rational inquiry have a hard time imposing themselves wherever they occur. There are, as a matter of fact, only very few cultures in which traditions of rational enquiry have found a place. India, and with it brahmanical culture, is one of these. Our first task is to investigate how this happened.

III.2.1. How rationality came to India

India has had a long tradition of rational debate linked to systematic attempts to make sense of the world and our place in it. For a long time different systems of philosophy existed side by side, and during much of this time their adherents made major efforts to show that only their own system was right and all the others were wrong or incoherent. The result of this ongoing debate was that many thinkers tried to improve their own systems and in the process refined and developed them. At the same time the art of debate and of proof received ample attention, and logic underwent a long development which scholars are still engaged in unraveling.

Examples of criticism and disagreement may be found in a variety of human cultures, but instances of resulting changes in the systems that are subjected to criticism may be less common. Indeed, Randall Collins (1998: 163 f.) observes that there is

abundant evidence that conflict is sometimes creative. Some kinds of structural rivalry drive innovation by opposition. However, others have the opposite effect on intellectual life, producing stagnation and particularism. Creative changes driven by rivalry constitute the dynamic of the history of classical Indian philosophy, as we will see below. One factor, viz. the presence in India of a tradition of rational inquiry (see below), not envisaged by Collins, may help explain why.

The features mentioned above (debate, criticism), along with a further condition to be specified below, will here be called a tradition of rational inquiry.[686] India has such a tradition of rational inquiry, but the same is not true of all human cultures. The presence of a tradition of rational inquiry in India expresses itself, as indicated earlier, in its tradition of rational debate and its results: the attempts made by thinkers to improve their own system, and the refinements and developments that this entailed. We might say that systems of thought were subjected to sceptical inquiry, and recall what Richard H. Popkin, an expert on the sceptical tradition in the West, says about scepticism (1996: xviii): "For years I have been toying with the idea of writing an article describing scepticism as being like an anonymous letter. The question of who is the author may be of some interest, but it is not the main concern. The recipient has the letter. The letter raises a host of problems for the recipient in defending his or her dogmatic philosophical position. Whether the anonymous author can be found or identified, dead or alive, sane or insane, does not help in dealing with or dismissing the problems. So whether scepticism can be consistently stated is not the main point. The thrust of the sceptical attack is in the effect it has on the dogmatist, who cannot evade the thrust by denouncing the sceptical opponent whom he or she may not be able to find, identify or classify. It is the dogmatists who have to do the defending, if they can, regardless of whether the sceptic really exists as a flesh and blood member of the human race, or as a raving inmate of a mental institute, or a science fiction character. ... The sceptic, real or imaginary, has led the non-sceptics to struggle over and over again to find a coherent and consistent way of putting their intellectual house in acceptable order (acceptable to honest dogmatists), only to find that another sceptic, real or imaginary, is creating another mass of doubts that require further examination and rethinking. The sceptic, the anonymous letter writer, does not

[686] Some such use of the term ‘rational’ is not new, and is close to its use by William Warren Bartley III and Peter Munz; cp. Munz 1985: 50: "We say, if we are Panrationalists, that it is rational to criticise everything and to hold on to only those statements which have so far withstood criticism. In this view, ‘reason’ does not denote a substantive faculty or a correct method of arriving at statements which are true; but a negative quality. When one is rational, one is open to criticism and an absolutely limitless invitation to criticism is the essence of rationality." Cp. further the statement "there is no better synonym for ‘rational’ than ‘critical’" attributed to K. Popper by Piatek (1995: 171) (cp. Popper 1998: 109; Artigas 1999); also Miller 1994; Munz 1993: 177. — Note that already Plato described reasoning "as the silent debate of the soul with itself" (Sorabji 1993: 10, with references to *Theaetetus* 189E-190A, *Sophist* 263E-264A, *Philebus* 38C-E; but see also Sorabji 1993: 65-67), i.e. as what we might call an interiorized debate. Sorabji further draws attention (1993: 36-37, further 67-71; with reference to *De Anima* 3.3) to Aristotle's claim "that belief involves being persuaded, which in turn implies possessing reason (*logos*)". This does not necessarily involve dialogue with others, and Sorabji assumes that "Aristotle would allow his persuasion to be self-persuasion". — The use of the term ‘rational’ here advocated does away with the problem of having to distinguish between different forms of ‘reason’ or ‘rationality’ as maintained, e.g., by Pierre Vidal-Naquet (Vernant & Vidal-Naquet 1990: Présentation).

have to be part of that process, but only has to await the results, and be ready to prepare another anonymous letter."

One further condition must be specified: as in the case of Popkin's anonymous letter writer, in a tradition of rational inquiry there are no areas of reality which are fundamentally beyond the realm of critical examination, no areas which should exclusively be left to tradition, revelation, or insight. This condition in particular distinguishes a 'tradition of rational inquiry' from 'rationality' as understood by various authors (see, e.g., Staal 1989; Goody 1996: ch. 1).[687] It implies that rational inquiry can be used even in realms that might encroach upon other sources of authority, such as tradition and religion, and even ordinary perception. It is perhaps no coincidence that both in ancient Greece and in ancient India, soon after traditions of rational inquiry had established themselves, thinkers appeared who put unlimited confidence in the power of reasoning. Both the Eleatics in Greece and Nāgārjuna and his followers in India did not hesitate to reject perceived reality on the basis — not of tradition, revelation, or special insight — but of mere argument.[688] Let it be clear that having a tradition of rational inquiry does not imply that every thinker is rational, i.e. critical and open in all respects and in all the areas about which they express themselves. Moreover, having a tradition of rational inquiry is not the same as being able to think intelligently. People may think intelligently about a variety of things, without trespassing into areas that belong to tradition, revelation, insight or religion.[689]

There are reasons to believe that, apart from ancient Greece and India and their inheritors, there are no other early cultures that were in the possession of a tradition of rational inquiry. This claim runs the risk of being opposed by those who maintain that there are *three* philosophical traditions in human history: those connected with Europe, India, and China respectively.[690] It appears that China has never had a rational tradition in

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[687] A contemporary debate where the parties involved do not seem willing to allow that there are no areas of reality which are fundamentally beyond the realm of critical examination is the religious dialogue between Moslems and Christians. Cp. Waardenburg 1998: 48: "Le débat entre les deux religions tient ainsi d'une sorte de compétition pour la 'possession' de *la* Révélation", et p. 109: "Aussi triviale que la remarque puisse paraître, la différence essentielle entre un monologue et un dialogue réside tout de même dans le fait que dans le second cas on écoute et répond à ce qu'a dit l'autre. ... Dans ce sens, le dialogue interreligieux et notamment celui entre musulmans et chrétiens commence à peine."

[688] This is an enduring feature of the two traditions. For Greece, cp. Lloyd 1991: 102: "The readiness of Greek philosophers early middle and late to countenance radical and radically counter-intuitive solutions — driven by arguments — is indeed a recurrent phenomenon distinctive of what the Greeks themselves understood by rationality." For India, see the examples discussed in Bronkhorst 2011b.

[689] Note that a tradition of rational inquiry, a social fact, is here taken to exert a decisive influence on individual thought, a psychological fact. Cp. Horton 1993: 330: "[T]he Old Adam ... is anything but spontaneously self-critical. So far as possible, he hangs on to his established framework come what may. If he starts to criticize it himself, this is usually only by way of anticipating the critical assaults of other thinkers committed to rival frameworks. In [a] consensual setting, such others are by definition absent."

[690] See, e.g., Scharfstein 1997; 1998: chapter 1. For references to earlier literature, see Halbfass 1997: 302. References to literature in which more than just three philosophical traditions are recognised in Halbfass 1997: 301; Scharfstein 1998: footnote on p. 4-5, with p. 532 note 6.

the sense here proposed.[691] I will argue this point, following the lead of the Sinologist A. C. Graham, who has given a great deal of thought to the question of rationality in China.[692]

Interestingly, Graham *does* think that China knew rationality at some point in its history.[693] He dedicates a chapter of his book *Disputers of the Tao* (1989) to it. Here we read: "In China rationality develops with the controversies of the schools, and dwindles as they fade after 200 B.C." (p. 75). He draws attention to the so-called 'sophists' in China, and compares these with the Greek Eleatics: "Nothing could be more disorientating, more disruptive, than reason first awakening to and revelling in its powers. One may well wonder how philosophy ever gets past this stage, with the most ancient paradoxes forever returning to plague it. The first discovery of uninhibited reason is that it leads inevitably to absurd conclusions. So why go farther? The Greeks did get past this initial disorientation, the Chinese never did." (p. 75-76). It is open to question whether the Eleatics' way of questioning should be described as 'disorientation', even though the term may very well apply in the Chinese situation. The Eleatics used their reason not only to undermine the universally accepted conception of the real world, but to determine what reality is like: unborn, imperishable, whole, unique, immovable, etc.[694] The Indian philosopher Nāgārjuna, too, used reason to tell us what reality is like: he arrived at the conclusion that no thing exists, as Claus Oetke's analyses have shown.[695] The Chinese thinkers mentioned by Graham, on the other hand, do not seem to have used

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[691] It is important to take note of the fact that the absence of "a rational tradition in the sense here proposed" is not the same as the absence of rationalism *tout court* or the absence of a science of logic (Reding 2004: 15, 31).

[692] Cp. further Jullien 1995; Goody 1996: 26 f. Kohn's (1995) discussion of the debates between Buddhists and Taoists is interesting in this connection. Note that Graham was very much concerned with the subject of our query, as is evident, for example, from the questions he formulated in the Preface to his *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science* (1978: xi): "Is the Greek ideal of rationality a discovery made once only in history, or does it have parallels in India and China? Are there episodes in Oriental, as in Greek and Mediaeval science, which anticipate in part the Scientific Revolution in the 17th century?"

[693] Graham's reflections induced J. J. Clarke (1997: 200) to react that "it is plausible to argue that Eastern ways of thinking have a rationality that may differ in certain respects from those characteristic of the West, but which is not less 'rational' for that". Personally I would be more inclined to agree with Chad Hansen who — in a chapter on 'methodological reflections' which agrees in various ways with positions taken by me in connection with the interpretation of an Indian text (Bronkhorst 1986: xiii f.) — observed (1983: 19): "... that Chinese philosophy is logical in something like a dispositional sense is not a discovery but [our] decision. It is a decision to propose, criticize, and defend interpretations in a particular way, using consistency and coherence as critical standards." This methodological position does not, of course, tell us anything about the extent to which Chinese thinkers themselves were willing to apply such standards in areas belonging to tradition, revelation, insight or religion.

[694] Cp. Guthrie 1965: 26 f., 87 f.

[695] E.g. Oetke 1988a. It is regrettable that Guthrie (1965: 53 n. 1), instead of comparing Parmenides with Nāgārjuna, compares him with "the cosmic illusion of Maya in Indian thought". No wonder that he arrives at the conclusion that "India and Parmenides are poles apart" and that "in truth the motives and methods of the Indian schools, and the theological and mystical background of their thought, are so utterly different from those of the Greeks that there is little profit in the comparison". Guthrie, and no doubt many others with him, had fallen prey to the tendency to see mysticism in everything Indian.

their reasoning for much beyond 'hair-splitting and paradoxical talk', as they were accused of doing. Indeed, one of their most famous paradoxes concerned the 'white horse': the claim was made that a white horse is not a horse. It appears that reason in India and Greece could be used to challenge tradition and other sources of authority, whereas in China much less importance was attached to this new tool. Logically it may be possible to compare the situations in the three traditions. From the point of view of the importance given to rational argument, even in the hands of the so-called 'sophists', reasoning in China does not seem to have emancipated itself from the level of simple *spielerei*.

Graham sums up the situation in his article "Rationalism and anti-rationalism in pre-Buddhist China" (1989a). He observes here (p. 142/98-99): "About 300 B.C. the Later Mohists undertake the enterprise of grounding the whole Mohist ethic in the analysis of moral concepts. This surely is rationalism as we find it in Greece, the plainest example in the Chinese tradition. But the Sophists have already provoked the reaction of the Taoist Chuang-tzu (c. 320 B.C.), who will have a much more lasting influence in Chinese thought. ... Chuang-tzu's position is 'anti-rationalism' (denial that reason is the right means to see things as they are) rather than 'irrationalism' (which allows you to see things as you like). After 200 B.C. Chinese thinking channels in the orthodox Confucian direction (ethical, practical, conventional) and the unorthodox Taoist (spontaneous, mystical, disreputable). The former is often 'rational', in that it checks its synthesizing by analysis, but not 'rationalistic' in the sense of Later Mohist or Greek thought, which tries to detach rational demonstration wholly from common-sense synthesizing; the latter remains anti-rationalist as philosophical Taoism, and its continuation as Ch'an or Zen in Chinese Buddhism." It seems clear that a tradition of rational inquiry in which the power of reasoning was considered, not just useful or amusing, but a vital instrument for establishing the truth at all levels, even those normally claimed by other sources of authority, has never seen the light of day in China.[696] It is in this context interesting to observe that Indian buddhist logic, when introduced into China in the seventh century of our era, did not survive for long. Its fate was to be mainly handed down as a secret science in buddhist circles, and largely ignored by everyone else.[697] As Harbsmeier (1998: 361) points out, "Buddhist logic in India had its social roots in the wide-spread practice of public philosophical debate, whereas this social practice never quite took root in China". Harbsmeier further reports that he carried out a comparative study of the Sanskrit and Chinese versions of the *Nyāyapraveśa* (with the help of several Sanskritists) which led him to the following remarkable conclusion (p. 402): "Hsüan-Tsang's Chinese translation is not only often an improvement on the Sanskrit original, it has turned out — to my great surprise — to be generally easier to read as well." This suggests that there is no reason whatsoever to attribute the relatively minor role of logic in China to the Chinese language. Harbsmeier adds the following reflections about Chinese buddhist logic (*yin ming*) (p. 414): "One may speculate why this remarkable logical flourish in

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[696] According to Harbsmeier's (1998: 268), in ancient China "[r]easoning tended to consist in an appeal to historical example and traditional authority", the very opposite of what we mean by rational inquiry. The absence of systematic criticism had consequences which Landes describes in the following terms (1998: 344): "This want of exchange and challenge, this subjectivity, explains the uncertainty of gains and the easy loss of impetus. *Chinese savants had no way of knowing when they were right*. It is subsequent research, mostly Western, that has discovered and awarded palms of achievement to the more inspired."

[697] See Frankenhauser 1996, esp. pp. 19, 25.

China remained as marginal as it did to the Chinese intellectual tradition as a whole. Obvious perennial questions re-emerge from these summary considerations: Why did buddhist logic not catch on even among Chinese Buddhists, not to speak of Chinese thinkers within other traditions? Why, for that matter, do we not find a sustained presence of a significant intellectual subculture cultivating the traditions of *yin ming* and of Mohist logic for that matter? Why did no one want to read the *yin ming* literature? Why did those who did read it in later times tend to misunderstand it? Why did the practice of *yin ming* decline whereas Aristotelian logic was revived and developed into a central discipline within the European educational curriculum? These are questions that belong properly to the anthropology of logic. They concern the societal and cultural conditions that may or may not favour the cultural and sociological success of the intellectual practice of the science of logic." Is it possible that a tradition of rational inquiry is to be counted among the societal and cultural conditions that may favour this cultural and sociological success of logic?

The comparison with China is interesting and useful in many ways. It shows that the absence of a tradition of rational inquiry has nothing whatsoever to do with stupidity or backwardness. China, as we learn from Joseph Needham's *Science and Civilisation in China*, made a large number of important discoveries in the field of technology in the course of its history, and was perhaps technologically the most advanced country on earth at the dawn of the scientific revolution in Europe.[698] In other words: not having a tradition of rational inquiry is not the same as not being able to think intelligently.

It seems possible, then, that there are two, and only two, independent traditions of rational debate and inquiry (in the sense indicated above) in the history of mankind. These two are, in their oldest accessible forms, linked to Greece and India respectively.[699]

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[698] Recall in this connection the impressive maritime expeditions that took the Chinese to many Asian countries and even to Africa eighty years before Vasco da Gama; see Levathes 1994; Landes 1998: 93-98. David S. Landes on the other hand, in his book *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations* (1998: 45 ff.), draws attention to the fact that many Chinese inventions were confined to the imperial court and had little impact on society at large. He further speaks about the "mystery [of] China's failure to realize its potential" (p. 55 f., with some explanations that have been put forward) and wonders why there was "subsequent retreat and loss" after "exceptional creativity and precocity" (p. 339). Lloyd makes the following observation with regard to classical Chinese philosophy (1990: 125-26): "clearly insofar as the ideas a philosopher produced were directed at a ruler whom he was hoping to influence, and insofar as the ruler himself was the final arbiter of the value of those ideas, those factors may well have imposed certain constraints on the ideas considered worth putting forward, constraints that may be thought to have inhibited, if not excluded, the development both of radical solutions to problems and of theoretical, abstract, impractical ones". For a comparative analysis of early Chinese and Greek thought in relation to their different social and political backgrounds, see Collins 1998: 146 f. Regarding classical Chinese philosophy, Lloyd (1990: 125-26) makes the following observation: "clearly insofar as the ideas a philosopher produced were directed at a ruler whom he was hoping to influence, and insofar as the ruler himself was the final arbiter of the value of those ideas, those factors may well have imposed certain constraints on the ideas considered worth putting forward, constraints that may be thought to have inhibited, if not excluded, the development both of radical solutions to problems and of theoretical, abstract, impractical ones". For a comparative analysis of early Chinese and Greek thought in relation to their different social and political backgrounds, see Collins 1998: 146 f.

[699] It is open to question whether the Indian sciences took part in and profited from this tradition of rational debate and inquiry. Cp. Randall Collins 1998: 551: "Organizationally, the

Such a tradition, once properly established, may attain an impetus of its own that ensures its continuation, even in less than ideal circumstances. Greek thinking subsequently influenced the Hellenistic world and its inheritors, primarily Western Europe and the world of Islam, and its tradition of rational inquiry came along, usually in a watered down form.[700] Indian thought, especially in its buddhist forms, spread eastward, and its tradition of rational inquiry, though not able to acquire a lasting foothold in China, left its traces in the Tibetan tradition of debate. The possibility that there are two and only two independent traditions of rational inquiry, one of these coming from India, should lend to the study of Indian philosophy an interest that extends far beyond regional concerns. If this kind of philosophy is so exceptional, something that does not automatically come about wherever human beings have enough leisure to think of more than their daily concerns, how and why did it arise in India, and not in any other civilizations except ancient Greece?

The question as to how and why rational philosophy arose in India has a parallel: how and why did rational philosophy arise in Greece? Unlike the previous one, this question has received a fair amount of attention in scholarly literature. It seems clear that the sudden rise of scientific knowledge and philosophy in ancient Greece had much to do with the prevailing custom of critical discussion, and of convincing others of one's own point of view,[701] which was linked to the particular political situation prevalent in ancient Greece. Geoffrey Lloyd, in his book *Magic, Reason and Experience* (1979), draws attention to the parallelism that exists between two important features. One is the fact that in Greece, from the sixth century BCE onward, questions how society should be regulated and concerning the merits and demerits of different kinds of constitutions came to be a subject for open — and not merely theoretical — discussion. The other is the prominent characteristic of Greek speculative thought to be able to challenge deeply held assumptions about ‘nature’ and to debate such issues as the origin of the world. He then observes (p. 249): "In some respects we appear to be dealing not just with two analogous developments, but with two aspects of the same development." Having supported and illustrated this observation in various ways, he states (p. 255): "Where the topic of how the state should be governed could be debated openly by the citizen body as a whole, there were, we may presume, fewer inhibitions — at least in some quarters — to challenging deep-seated assumptions and beliefs about ‘natural phenomena’, the gods or the origin or order of things." The features most characteristic of what I have proposed to call a tradition of rational inquiry: primarily free and uninhibited discussion of all issues even in areas which might encroach upon other sources of authority, appear to be intimately linked to the political situation of Greece at that time. Inhibitions, i.e., the fear

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mathematicians, astronomers, and medical doctors were based in private familistic lineages and guilds, never part of the sustained argument provided by philosophical networks. Public networks of argument did exist in India; its philosophical lineages reached high levels of abstract development. Only mathematics and science were not carried along with it." This question will be further discussed in § III.2.2, below.

[700] On the passage of Greek thought into Arabic culture, see Gutas 1998. The Arab conquests, as Gutas points out (p. 13), united areas and peoples that for a millennium had been subjects to Hellenization ever since Alexander the Great.

[701] See, e.g.,Vernant 1962; Lloyd 1979: ch. 4; 1987: 78 f. Cp. also Popper 1959: 149 f.; Lloyd 1991: 100-120. Jullien (1995) points out the extent to which confrontation, a common feature of ancient Greek political and military life, was conducive to the development of rationality, whereas ancient China, which avoided confrontation, did not develop this feature.

of encroaching on other sources of authority, would seem to be that which prevents traditions of rational debate and inquiry from coming about in the majority of human societies.[702]

How and why did systematic philosophy arise in India? Having noted the link between the sudden rise of a tradition of rational inquiry in ancient Greece on one hand, and the accompanying political situation on the other, one is tempted to look for a similar political situation in ancient India. Unfortunately this procedure holds little promise. We are not at all certain that anything like the Greek city-state ever existed in ancient India. This may be clear from the following quotations.

Vijay Kumar Thakur (1981: 250) states: "we are not sure whether commercial towns on Athenian pattern existed in India or not. It is possible that some towns in the Punjab, which the Greeks called 'independent towns', were similar types of commercial towns along the roads leading from India through the Punjab to Iran. This would mean that they had a completely different type of administrative machinery [from other towns in India]. Although we have no details of the administration of such towns, it can be presumed that their administrative system in a way tallied with the administration of large tribal oligarchies. The city administration, basically oligarchical in nature, might have carried the business of the town through discussion."[703] Thakur then continues (p. 250-52): "Till the Mauryan period, the guilds were solely concerned with their economic activities while exercising some authority over their members. The situation, however, changed in the post-Mauryan times. A very important, and rather novel, development in the polity of this period was the emergence of almost autonomous governments in at least a dozen cities of northern India in the second and first centuries B.C. The administration of these cities was evidently in the hands of the guilds. Guilds of traders belonging to these cities issued copper coins, which is ordinarily done by the ruling power, for it is an important insignia of sovereignty. At least in five pre-Indo-Greek coins, the term *nigama* is clearly mentioned; four out of them bear the names of the different quarters of Taxila. Yet another coin found from Taxila records the term *pañchanigama* (sic). ... A somewhat similar practice seems to have prevailed at Kauśāmbī also, for it is known as *nigama* on one of its coins. Coins of the guild of the *gandhikas*, literally meaning perfumers but really general merchants,[704] have also been found in the region around Kauśāmbī. ... Such coins representing certain cities are not to be found from the latter half of the 1st century B.C. This possibly indicates that with the establishment of the Sātavāhanas and the Kuṣāṇa kingdoms in the first two centuries of the Christian era, these towns lost their autonomous character ..."[705] Ray (1986: 49), similarly, observes that "numismatic

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[702] Joseph Needham's question ("What were the inhibiting factors in Chinese civilisation which prevented a rise of modern science in Asia analogous to that which took place in Europe since the 16th century onwards ...?" cited in Wulff 1998: 9) may therefore find at least a partial answer in the absence of a tradition of rational inquiry in China. Wulff (1998: 63) proposes another answer ("Die Chinesen hatten einfach nicht die spezifischen historischen Voraussetzungen dafür, deren Verkettung die Entwicklung in Europa bewirkte") and enumerates thirteen factors that played an important role in the development of European science; this approach would seem to beg the question.

[703] On the independent towns here mentioned see further Bongard-Levin 1986: 67 f.

[704] On the role of aromas and perfumes in early trade, see Donkin 1999: ch. 1, esp. p. 15 f.

[705] Ahmad Hasan Dani (1986: 58 ff.) expresses reservations with regard to this interpretation of *nigama* (which goes back to D. R. Bhandarkar); see further Thapar 1992: 96; Chakrabarti 1995: 311; H. P. Ray 1994: 20, 192.

evidence suggests that after the fall of the Mauryas several cities acquired power and issued their own die-struck coins"; she mentions Mahiṣmati, Tripuri, and Tagara or Ter in particular. Unfortunately, we know little about these cities beyond the fact that for a short while they struck their own coins. Was this independence accompanied by democratic institutions that encouraged free debate? So far there is no evidence to support this.

How then did a tradition of rational inquiry arise in India? If traditions of rational inquiry are not the kind of things that appear automatically and inevitably wherever some minimum conditions are satisfied, then what was responsible for the appearance of such a tradition in India? The question is not easy to answer, not least because of the scarcity of documents for the period that seems most relevant in this connection. We enter therefore into a realm of speculation, or at best informed guesses. The importance of the problem leaves us no alternative but to go ahead.

What do we know about the early history of systematic philosophy in India? Not very much. Of the two main schools of early brahmanical philosophy, Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika, the first one obviously had its roots in a pre-systematic period.[706] The classical school of Sāṃkhya preserves the traces of that earlier phase, and has the greatest difficulties to create a system that is coherent and resistant against outside criticism. Its efforts are only partially successful, and the school slowly disappears from view in the second half of the first millennium.

The other early brahmanical school, Vaiśeṣika, is quite different. Scholarly attempts to identify its pre-classical and pre-systematic roots lead nowhere, and it seems likely that it was created as a coherent system. An in-depth comparison with the buddhist philosophy current in the early centuries of the Common Era shows that, in spite of numerous differences, the two share a number of fundamental positions. More precisely, they share some positions, while in some other respects they hold positions which are each other's mirror images. No such similarity exists between the Sāṃkhya philosophy and either the buddhist or the Vaiśeṣika system. Indeed, it appears that the Vaiśeṣika system was created in response to the particular system of buddhist philosophy — called Sarvāstivāda — to which it is in some respects so close.[707]

This in its turn suggests that the original impulse for the development of Indian rational philosophy came from Buddhism. This is fortunate, because a considerable number of buddhist texts from around and before the beginning of the Common Era have been preserved. Many of these texts do not contain anything resembling the kind of rational philosophy we are looking for, but some do. In order to properly appreciate this, let us briefly and schematically consider how Buddhism developed after the death of its founder. Attempts had been made to preserve his words, both regarding the appropriate behavior of monks and nuns (*vinaya*) and his teaching in a narrower sense (*sūtra*). Beside this, efforts were made to distill the most important ideas and concepts from his teaching; this gave rise to lists of so-called *dharma*s, which were elaborately ordered and commented upon in the texts of the *Abhidharma Piṭaka*, 'basket of things relating to the teaching'. Two collections of texts bearing this name have been preserved in their entirety, belonging to two different buddhist schools: the *Abhidharma Piṭaka* of the Theravāda school, and the *Abhidharma Piṭaka* of the Sarvāstivāda school.

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[706] Sāṃkhya had its roots in the culture of Greater Magadha; see *Greater Magadha* pp. 35 ff., 61 ff.

[707] See § III.4.1, below.

A closer study reveals important differences between these two collections.[708] The most important difference for our present purposes is the presence in the Sarvāstivāda basket of a new way of ordering and classifying the *dharma*s, the so-called *pañcavastuka*. Before the introduction of the *pañcavastuka*, and in the Theravāda texts all along, the *dharma*s were classified with the help of a schematization that was believed to derive from the Buddha himself, but which was unsatisfactory and even problematic in various respects. From a historical point of view the difficulties connected with this earlier schematization are easy to explain: the idea of enumerating and classifying *dharma*s had arisen well after the disappearance of the Buddha, and searching among his words for schemes to classify them was bound to fail.

The new classification, the *pañcavastuka*, brought some amount of reason and coherence into Sarvāstivāda scholasticism. Moreover, this development was accompanied by others, which together changed the initial attempt to preserve the concepts taught by the Buddha into an attempt to create a coherent system of philosophy. For reasons that cannot be presented at this moment the list of *dharma*s became a list of all there is. Moreover, from an original doctrine of no-self the conclusion was drawn that no composite objects exist. The Buddha's words to the extent that everything is impermanent and therefore painful, came to imply that everything is momentary and exists just one moment. New *dharma*s were introduced whose primary task it was to make the thus created ontological scheme coherent and intelligible. In brief, the Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism underwent a process of rationalization. The Theravāda school, on the other hand, underwent no such development.

How do we explain this difference between Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda? The question invites an easy, almost obvious, answer, once we take into account where and when the Sarvāstivādins worked and lived. Sarvāstivāda belonged to the Northwest of the Indian subcontinent, i.e., Gandhāra and surrounding regions.[709] Theravāda, on the other hand, belonged before its emigration to Sri Lanka to an area more to the south; Vidiśā has been suggested.[710] There are reasons to believe that the first Sarvāstivāda or proto-Sarvāstivāda attempts at systematizing took place in or before the middle of the second century BCE.[711] During this period there was a Hellenistic kingdom in Gandhāra and surroundings, which, originating from Bactria, had re-established itself there around the year 185 BCE, at the time of the collapse of the Maurya Empire. We know from elsewhere that Hellenistic kings used to cultivate philosophy and liked to be surrounded by wise men at their courts, with whom discussions took place.[712] Archaeological excavations in Afghanistan, where the capital of the Bactrian Greeks has been identified, confirm that this was the case here, too. Not only has a Greek philosophical papyrus been found;[713] it even appears that Clearchus of Soloi, a direct pupil of Aristotle, visited the

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[708] This and the following paragraphs are based on the chapter "Arrranging the Doctrine" in Bronkhorst 2009: 61 ff.

[709] Cp. Willemen et al. 1998: 36 ff. ("History and Sarvāstivāda"); 149 ff.; Salomon 1999: 5 f.

[710] Frauwallner 1956b: 18.

[711] See § III.3.2, below. It is not clear when exactly Sarvāstivāda as an identifiable school came into existence; cp. Willemen et al. 1998: 147 f.

[712] Préaux 1978: 212-238. Cp. Avi-Yonah 1978: 50 ff. ("Hellenistic monarchy in its relations to philosophy, poetry, religion").

[713] Rapin 1992: 115-121. Karttunen (1997: 268 f.) points out that the Aśokan edicts in Greek show some knowledge of Greek philosophical terminology.

place.[714] In general, "on s'étonne que la plupart des documents grecs rédigés en Iran ou en Asie centrale respectent aussi parfaitement qu'ils le font les habitudes linguistiques et graphiques, les tournures rhétoriques, les formules juridiques, les présupposés idéologiques et les références culturelles des textes du même type produits au même moment dans le mond grec méditerranéen"; and "Les historiens du mond hellénistique connaissent bien l'extrême homogénéité culturelle de ce monde et ses traits culturels dominants (pratique de la langue grecque 'commune', la *koinè*; formation rhétorique des élites; culture littéraire partagée, fondée sur la connaissance intime des oeuvres des poètes; fréquentation des gymnases, des théâtres; pullulement des concours, sportifs, mais aussi littéraires, musicaux, dramatiques ...)"[715] We have little direct information about the Greek kingdom in Gandhāra, apart from the names of some kings. It has yet been said: "Dans le Gandhara, aux deux derniers siècles avant notre ère et dans les toutes premières décennies de notre ère, plusieurs textes en langue indienne gandhari et en écriture kharoshthi attestent la survivance, dans l'administration locale, de titres grecs: stratège (*stratego*), *anakaios* (*anamkaya*, *anakaya*), *episkopos* (*epesukupena* [instr.]), méridarque (*meridarkhena* [instr.]). Les détenteurs de ces titres portent les uns des noms grecs, les autres des noms indiens. Une inscription au moins, la dédicace à une divinité hindoue d'un petit bol d'argent de tradition hellénistique, offert à cette divinité par un méridarque nommé Kalliphôn (un nom grec courant), est bilingue, grecque et gandhari; une dédicace analogue faite par un autre méridarque est purement grecque."[716] We can safely conclude that there was a noticeable Greek cultural presence in Gandhāra from 185 BCE onward.[717] We also know that there was a strong buddhist presence, presumably from the time of Aśoka onward.

Was there any interaction between the Greeks and the Buddhists? This is *a priori* likely in view of the fact that Buddhism is, or at any rate was at that time, a proselytizing religion, which would not shun contact with people adhering to other beliefs or traditions. This openness to other traditions seems confirmed by the circumstance that the buddhist art from Gandhāra shows strong Hellenistic influence.[718] Influence took also place in

[714] Robert 1973: 207-237; Rapin 1992: 128, 389; Karttunen 1997: 99, 288. If it is true that the Neo-Pythagorean Apollonios of Tyana visited Taxila in or around 44 CE (cp. Lamotte 1958: 518 f.; Karttunen 1997: 7 f., 306 n. 295; B. N. Mukherjee arrives at 46 CE, see Dani 1986: 69), one might be tempted to conclude that an interest in Hellenistic philosophy still existed at that time in Northwest India. Dani (1986: 70) speaks about "the preference that the ruling elite [of Taxila] had for Hellenistic models" during this period. However, "on the spiritual side, it is Buddhism that dominated" (ibid.).

[715] Rougemont 2014: 17, 19.

[716] Rougemont 2014: 16. Reference to *Inscriptions grecques d'Iran et d'Asie centrale*, par Georges Rougemont (Londres, 2012), n° 88 bis et 88 ter, and especially to P. Bernard's contribution (p. 271-273).

[717] Allon (2007), basing himself on the scarcity of direct evidence, argues that there was "weakness of Greek culture in the North-West" (p. 138). It should not however be forgotten that until the discovery of Ai Khanoum the notion of a vibrant Greek culture in Bactria, too, was thought of as a mirage; the discovery of this ancient city changed that (see Mair 2014: 3). With respect to Gandhāra, Taddei (2015: 66) speaks of "a local culture that was precisely deeply Hellenistic". See also the following note.

[718] Strictly speaking, in "Gandhāra there can be no Hellenistic 'influences' because ... Gandhāra itself is a province of eastern Hellenism" (Callieri 2007: 161; cited in Falk 2009a : 558 [554]); "The Gandharan School is not an example of Hellenistic influence upon Indian art, but the reverse" (Taddei 2015: 35, citing E. B. Havell); "the Gandhāra School was merely a branch of the

other areas of culture, though probably later.[719] Did the Greeks enter into discussion with the Buddhists? It is tempting to think that they did, and that the Greek tradition of rational debate obliged the Buddhists to rethink their positions. We have already seen that the Sarvāstivāda texts of that period and region show that their positions were indeed subjected to a thorough revision. But is there any evidence that supports the idea that the Greek tradition of debate may have played a role here?

There is. A buddhist text has been preserved which purports to record a discussion between a Buddhist monk and the Indo-Greek king Menander. It has rightly been observed that "there is little in the text which is Greek, aside from the name of the king".[720] Yet the very existence of such a text — I am speaking of "The Questions of King Milinda" (*Milindapañha* in Pāli), which has been preserved in Pāli and in Chinese translation[721] — allows us to conclude that Greeks and Buddhists discussed religious and related issues, or at the very least that the Buddhists of that region remembered the Greeks as participants in debates. It is not adventurous to conclude that the Greeks may have exerted an influence on the Sarvāstivāda Buddhists, quite simply by engaging them in debates.[722] This conclusion seems confirmed by the fact that a number of Greeks appear to have converted to Buddhism.[723]

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cosmopolitan Graeco-Roman art of the early empire" (Taddei 2015: 35, citing V. A. Smith); "the time has now come for Gandharan art to be considered not as a phenomenon to be explained by the interplay of 'influences' but as the product of a mature Hellenism that found itself in direct contact with Buddhism" (Taddei 2015: 66). See further Lamotte 1958: 469-487, where also other forms of Greek influence on Buddhism are discussed. See also Nehru 1989, with further references. It is to be kept in mind that the surviving buddhist art from Gandhāra is more recent than the Hellenistic kingdom mentioned above; see Fussman 1987. At the same time, "Gandhāran art can no longer be considered Indo-Roman, not after Surkh Kotal and other excavations in Bactria" (Karttunen 1997: 278, with references to further literature). See further Posch 1995.

[719] Most notably on Indian astronomy; see Pingree 1978a, esp. vol. I, p. 3 f. Equally important might be that the Indo-Greeks may have started an era in India; see Daffinà 1988: 55 f.; Karttunen 1997: 296; Salomon 2005; 2012; Fussman 2011: 522 ff. See also Thundy 1993: 256 f.

[720] Halbfass 1988: 19. The original of the two preserved Chinese translations of this text presented probably Sarvāstivāda doctrines; vgl. Lamotte 1958: 465; Demiéville 1925: 74.

[721] It would be more correct to speak of a Milinda corpus, various versions of which have been identified. Peter Skilling (1998: 92 f.) observes that this corpus was more varied and extensive than previously thought, and lists the known versions.

[722] Note that the *Milindapañha* did not itself exert this influence. Quite the contrary, it appears that the Greeks exerted a direct influence on the Buddhists through contacts and discussions, not (or not primarily) through texts. The question as to why the Chinese, who translated the *Milindapañha* into their own language, were not influenced by this text is therefore beside the point.

[723] The Pāli *Mahāvaṃsa* states "that at the Foundation Ceremony of the Mahā Thūpa [in Anurādhapura], thirty thousand monks, under Yona-Mahādhammarakkhita, came from Alasandā in the Yona country" (DPPN II p. 699 s.v. Yonā). Alasandā refers no doubt to one of the cities called Alexandria founded by Alexander the Great, this one in present-day Afghanistan (Ai Khanoum? Kandahar?; cp. Karttunen 1997: 279, 281). Karttunen (1997: 297; cp. 1994: 331) refers to a Nagarjunakonda cave inscription of the third century CE mentioning the Yavanas among peoples having converted to Buddhism. These and other inscriptions do not necessarily refer to Greeks (cp. Ray 1994: 84; 1988), but Karttunen observes (1994: 332): "It is ... true that with confidence the Yona/Yavana can be only connected with Greeks in the earliest inscriptions, but to me it seems quite likely that in all our cases the word is somehow related to the Greeks."

To my knowledge no Greek ideas have ever been shown to be part of Sarvāstivāda buddhist thought, nor indeed of any other school of Indian philosophy. But we are at present not talking about ideas, but about the way people deal with them. What I propose is that the Buddhists of northwestern India adopted the method of rational debate and inquiry from the Greeks. They adopted this method and along with it the willingness (or obligation) to use it in areas that used to be the exclusive territory of tradition and religion, but they do not appear to have adopted anything else in the domain of philosophy. This method alone, however, profoundly affected their ideas. It forced them to rethink their intellectual and religious heritage, and organize it in a manner that made it more coherent and more resistant to critical questioning by outsiders.

Once the tradition of rational inquiry had been established, it was apparently capable of continuing when circumstances changed. It even spread all over India. This, too, is in need of explanation. The Buddhists of Gandhāra did not adopt a tradition of rational inquiry out of love for debate but rather, it appears, because they found themselves in a situation that compelled them to engage in debates and justify their positions. Once the Greeks were gone, they might have abandoned their newly acquired habit. In reality they did no such thing. The explanation may well be that Hellenistic culture did not fully disappear with the Greeks. Among the features that subsequent rulers maintained we must count the habit of organizing philosophical debates at their courts. We do not know how frequently such debates were held, but their very possibility was high in the minds of philosophical thinkers: a lost debate at court could have negative consequences. In due times even Brahmins became involved, and this meant the beginning of brahmanical systematic philosophy.

What about the Upaniṣads? Don't they contain philosophy?[724] The old Upaniṣads, whatever their exact dates, certainly predate the second century BCE, and therefore the establishment of the first Indo-Greek kingdom. How then can it be seriously maintained that Indian philosophy owes its origin to the presence of a Hellenistic kingdom in northwest India?

Two things must be distinguished. As said earlier, the contents of classical Indian philosophy, both buddhist and brahmanical, are, to the best of my knowledge, completely Indian. At the same time, the available evidence suggests that no tradition of rational inquiry (in the sense intended here, manifested by critical debate and attempts to create coherent views of reality) existed in India before the period we are considering. Vedic literature, and this includes the Upaniṣads, does not tend to develop coherent systems. These texts do value knowledge, that is to say, a certain kind of knowledge. Rationality, on the other hand, is conspicuous by its absence. It is true that the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads record a number of famous debates, but these cannot in any way be called rational. No one, in these debates, is ever convinced by the arguments of his opponent. The winner of a debate, as Walter Ruben pointed out long ago (1928), is not the one who knows better, but the one who knows more.[725] Logical argumentation is completely

[724] Michaels (2004: 30) writes: "We still read that the Brāhmaṇa texts reflect a magical image of the world, which was superseded by the allegedly philosophical perspective of the Upaniṣads, as if there were not still a 'magical' image of the world alongside a 'philosophical' one in India." As pointed out above, rational philosophy of the kind here considered does not exist always and everywhere.

[725] Cf. Lloyd 1979: 60-61; 1987: 87-88; Bronkhorst 2002a.

absent. Apodictic statements are accepted without resistance. Indeed, the teacher does not need to present arguments in support of his teaching, because the very idea that he might teach something that is incorrect does not seem to have occurred to the thinkers of the Upaniṣads. Every thought is correct, but it may be insufficient, and may therefore have to be subordinated to the knowledge of the winner. Asking too many questions, on the other hand, can have dire results. Depending on the interpretation one puts upon the expression concerned, one's head may be shattered, or one may loose one's head in some other way.[726] As to the problem why simple questioning may carry such grave consequences for the unsuccessful participant, Michael Witzel (1987a: 409) reminds us that the vedic examples all deal with knowledge which is 'secret' in one way or another: it may be known only to an eminent person, a teacher who will not pass it on readily even when he is questioned, or it is known to a class of ritual specialists who will not share their esoteric knowledge with rival groups. All this is not of course conducive to the creation of coherent systems of thought.

Witzel has also drawn attention to the many similarities that exist between the Upaniṣadic debates and those recorded in the early buddhist texts. There are differences, to be sure.[727] But, as in the case of the late-vedic texts, there is no question here of elaborating coherent systems of thought,[728] which suggests that these early buddhist debates were primarily meant for internal consumption, and that no need was felt to immunize the own position against criticism. We have seen that the elaboration of coherent systems of thought belongs to a later developmental phase of Buddhism.

Delicate questions remain unanswered for the moment. Can one seriously place the grammarian Pāṇini — whose grammar has been described as "one of the greatest monuments of human intelligence" — in a pre-rational period of India's intellectual history? Pāṇini, who appears to have lived in the second half of the fourth century BCE or later, may have predated Alexander's invasion, but this is not certain.[729] Greek cultural influence in his case is highly unlikely, even if we assume that he lived after Alexander. The Greek presence in Gandhāra following Alexander was of a very short duration, and

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[726] See Witzel 1987a, and Insler 1991.

[727] Cf. Manné 1992. In the discussion between the Buddha and the Jaina Saccaka (*Cūḷasaccakasutta*, *Majjhima Nikāya* no. 35), to take an example, there is an undeniable confrontation of ideas, and the Buddha does not hesitate to point out a contradiction in the speech of his adversary: "Pay attention, Aggivessana. When you have paid attention, Aggivessana, answer. For your last speech does not agree with your first, nor your first with your last" (MN I.232: *manasikarohi Aggivessana, manasikaritvā kho Aggivessana byākarohi, na kho te sandhīyati purimena vā pacchimaṃ pacchimena vā purimaṃ*; tr. Horner 1954: 285). See also Jayatilleke 1963: 205-276 ("The attitude to reason"); Watanabe 1983: 69 ff. ("The development of the dialogue form"). Elsewhere members of other religious currents are described as "clever, skilful, practised in disputing with others, hair-splitters" (e.g. DN I.26: *santi hi kho pana samaṇabrāhmaṇā paṇḍitā nipuṇā kataparappavādā vālavedhirūpā vobhindantā maññe caranti paññāgatena diṭṭhigatāni*).

[728] Richard F. Gombrich (1996: 18) points out that "the Buddha was continually arguing *ad hominem* and adapting what he said to the language of his interlocutor" and concludes that "this must have had enormous implications for the consistency, or rather the inconsistency, of his mode of expression". Whether or not this conclusion is correct, it seems clear that the method of arguing recorded in the early buddhist texts is hardly conducive to the elaboration of coherent systems of thought.

[729] See § I.1.1, above; further Karttunen 1989: 142-146; 1997: 12 with note 49.

the region had to wait until the collapse of the Maurya Empire before Greeks settled there again on a more permanent basis: this was around 185 BCE.

We should not be led astray by terms such as 'rational', 'pre-rational', and the like. The former is no compliment, the latter no criticism. I have already pointed out that the absence of a tradition of rational inquiry has nothing to do with stupidity or backwardness. People do not become more intelligent by being part of such a tradition. What changes first of all is their attitude. In a tradition of rational inquiry as envisaged here thinkers accept — have to accept — the legitimacy of questions and criticism directed even at convictions endorsed by tradition, revelation or insight. For wide-ranging philosophical systems to develop, such an attitude may be essential. For Pāṇini there was, as far as we can tell, no need to be questioning and critical with regard to his tradition. On the contrary, his grammar may have to be looked upon as an elaboration and systematization of the traditional understanding of language.[730] It testifies to the intelligence of its creator, not to the tradition of rational inquiry to which he may or may not have belonged.[731]

The preceding reflections suggest that both Indian and Western systematic philosophy derive one vital element from a common source.[732] This vital element — viz., rational inquiry and analysis — would, moreover, seem to be absent everywhere else in the history of mankind except, of course, in developments that derive from the Greek and the Indian traditions. This suggests that a tradition of rational debate and inquiry has been able to establish itself independently only once in the history of mankind.[733]

III.2.2. Brahmanism and rationality

We noted earlier that Brahmanism and rationality — i.e., institutionalized criticism — make strange bedfellows. Brahmanism adopted a tradition of rational inquiry after (probably centuries after) Buddhism did, presumably under pressure from royal courts that continued the Hellenistic tradition of public philosophical debates. As a result Brahmanism elaborated ontological systems — Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Lokāyata are best known — and established rules of debate, including logic (Nyāya). This is not the place to present these systems in any detail.[734] For our present purpose it is more interesting to observe that Brahmanism adopted a tradition of rational inquiry only in the field of philosophy and nowhere else. In other words, Brahmanism accepted and even cultivated criticism in the one area where they might rely on it in order to win the approval of the political power on which they depended. But this was a choice made under pressure. Only in this area did they have to face opponents — primarily Buddhists — who held altogether different views. In areas where they did not have to confront such opponents they preferred tradition to criticism.

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[730] See however Cardona 2012: 58 and 2007: 705, cited earlier.
[731] See further Bronkhorst 1982: 280-281.
[732] Frits Staal's claim that Greek and vedic mathematics have a common source (see § III.2.2, below) is to be distinguished from the one presented here, and is indeed quite independent of it.
[733] Cp. Lloyd 1979: 258: "Ancient Greece is marked not just by exceptional intellectual developments, but also by what is in certain respects an exceptional political situation: and the two appear to be connected."
[734] For a brief presentation and analysis of their concerns, see Bronkhorst 2008; 2011b.

The above claim — that Brahmanism only accepted rational inquiry in areas where they needed it in order to confront unavoidable opponents, and nowhere else — may at first look difficult to prove. After all, which areas could there possibly be that were equally open to systematic criticism as philosophy?

One such area in which the ancient Greeks used all their critical acumen but the Brahmins did not, is mathematics.[735] The mathematical literature preserved in India is extensive, but little studied;[736] M. D. Srinivas gives the following estimate (1990: 30): "The recently published 'Source Book of Indian Astronomy'[737] lists about 285 works published in mathematics and mathematical astronomy, of which about 50 are works written prior to the 12th century A.D., about 75 are works written during 12-15th centuries and about 165 are works written during 16-19th centuries." A calculation on the basis of all the volumes of David Pingree's *Census of the Exact Sciences in Sanskrit* (including the one that was not yet accessible to the authors of the "Source Book of Indian Astronomy") might reveal even larger numbers of works than this.[738] Mathematics and mathematical astronomy[739] clearly had their practitioners in classical India. Most of them were Brahmins. Buddhists, on the other hand, did not participate in these studies. Buddhists ceded the profession of astrologist/astronomer/mathematician to Brahmins, as pointed out in *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism* (§ 3.2). For this reason the competition with Buddhists, which contributed so much to the form and content of brahmanical philosophy, was absent in the field of mathematics.[740]

Let us now look at some mathematical texts. The *Āryabhaṭīya* of Āryabhaṭa (= Āryabhaṭa I) dates from 499 (Pingree) or 510 (Billard) CE, and contains a chapter on mathematics entitled *Gaṇitapāda* which is "the earliest text of this genre that we have" (Pingree 1981: 56).[741] The *Āryabhaṭīya* is written in *āryā* verses that mainly contain rules

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[735] Medicine may be another such area. Scharfe (2002: 61 f.) illustrates this with some examples, among them the following quotation from Vāgbhaṭa's *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya* (*Uttarasthāna* 40.81): "This [book] shall — because it is established by tradition [and] because one sees obvious results — be applied like a mantra and not be investigated in any way."

[736] Cp. Pingree 1981: 2: "classical astronomy and mathematics had virtually ceased to be studied or taught by the end of the nineteenth century. A new group of Indian and foreign scholars has, however, begun to work in these areas since World War II".

[737] The reference is to B. V. Subbarayappa and K. V. Sarma, *Indian Astronomy: A Source Book*, Bombay 1985.

[738] Note further that "[a]ccording to Pingree's estimation ... there still exist today some 100,000 Sanskrit manuscripts in the single field of *jyotiḥśāstra* (astronomy, astrology, and mathematics)" (Yano 1987: 50).

[739] On Indian mathematical literature see Plofker 2009; on astronomical literature, Pingree 1981.

[740] There were Jaina mathematicians, and a moderate amount of competition between Jainas and Brahmins in this field; see Bronkhorst forthcoming c.

[741] Cp. Prakash Sarasvati 1986: 157: "for the first time we find Āryabhaṭa ... in his Āryabhaṭīya describing [mathematics] as a special section (Gaṇitapāda). Brahmagupta ... also followed Āryabhaṭa in this respect and gave the science of calculation (*gaṇita*) a special place in his treatise on astronomy. The Siddhānta treatises earlier than those of Āryabhaṭa and Brahmagupta do not contain a chapter exclusively devoted to *gaṇita* (the Sūrya-Siddhānta and the Siddhāntas of Vasiṣṭha, Pitāmaha and Romaka are thus without *gaṇita* chapters)." Also Hayashi 1995: 148: "Bhāskara (A.D. 629) tells us that Maskarī, Pūraṇa, Mudgala and other '*ācāryas*' (teachers) composed mathematical treatises, but none of them is extant now. We can only have a glimpse of Indian mathematics of those early times through the extant astronomical works of Āryabhaṭa, Bhāskara, and Brahmagupta, only a few chapters of which are devoted to mathematics proper." It

formulated in a highly condensed form. The rules of the *Gaṇitapāda* in part concern arithmetic, in part geometry. Indeed, the commentator Bhāskara (to be introduced below) clearly states that mathematics (*gaṇita*) is twofold: arithmetic and geometry, or perhaps more precisely: arithmetic of quantities and arithmetic of geometrical figures.[742]

From among Āryabhaṭa's rules, let us concentrate on the probably best known theorem of Euclidean geometry, viz. the Pythagorean theorem. This theorem finds expression in the first half of verse 17 of the *Gaṇitapāda*, which reads:[743] "The square of the base [of a right-angled trilateral] and the square of [its] upright side is the square of the hypotenuse." No more is said about it: no proof is given, no examples and no diagrams.

Staal (1965: 114 = 1988: 158) looks upon the concision of Indian mathematical texts as an adaptation of Pāṇini's method. Others maintain that this conciseness is a sign of the scientific character of Āryabhaṭa's text, as does Pierre-Sylvain Filliozat in the following passage:[744]

> Cette forme littéraire, en particulier le recours à l'ellipse de l'expression et de la pensée, a une autre raison d'être, en plus de l'obéissance à la convention culturelle d'un pays et d'une époque. Elle a une utilité de caractère scientifique, en ce qu'elle relève de la formalisation. Les intellectuels indiens ont reconnu très tôt l'aide apportée à la pensée par l'économie de l'expression, l'outil efficace qu'est un langage technique abrégé. Le premier exemple de formalisation scientifique dans l'histoire universelle des sciences semble bien être le formulaire de linguistique qu'est le *sūtra* de Pāṇini et qui se caractérise par l'emploi d'une métalangue et le passage obligé au niveau de la plus grande généralité afin de permettre l'application d'une formule unique au plus grand nombre possible de cas particuliers. Āryabhaṭa n'a pas poussé la formalisation aussi loin que le grammairien. Mais il ne l'a pas ignorée. Il n'a pas de métalangue à proprement parler, mais il a son vocabulaire technique et surtout il vise le plus haut degré de généralité dans ses propositions. Ceci est une des valeurs scientifiques de son oeuvre.

Filliozat is right in that the Pythagorean theorem is presented in its most general form. Instead of enumerating a number of values valid for specific rectangular triangles (3 : 4 : 5; 5 : 12 : 13; etc.) Āryabhaṭa formulates this rule for all possible rectangular triangles, and for all possible values of its sides. One might consider the possibility that the very

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should of course not be forgotten that much geometry is to be found in texts dealing with mathematical astronomy.

[742] Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya p. 44 l. 18: *gaṇitaṃ dviprakāram: rāśigaṇitaṃ kṣetragaṇitam*. Cp. Hayashi 1995: 62.

[743] Āryabhaṭīya 2.17ab: *yaś caiva bhujāvargaḥ koṭīvargaś ca karṇavargaḥ saḥ*.

[744] Filliozat 1988a: 255-256. Another way of looking at the same characteristic is expressed in Pingree 1978: 533, which speaks about the corrupt tradition of the earliest surviving Sanskrit texts: "The cause of this corruption is usually that the texts had become unintelligible; and this unintelligibility is not unrelated to the style developed by Indian astronomers. The texts proper were composed in verse in order to facilitate memorization, with various conventions for rendering numbers into metrical syllables. The exigencies of the meter often necessitated the omission of important parts of mathematical formulas, or contributed to the imprecision of the technical terminology by forcing the poet to substitute one term for another. ..."

(re-)discovery of, and interest for, the Pythagorean theorem (and of other theorems) by Indian mathematicians is due to the obligation to formulate their knowledge in as concise, and therefore as general, a form as possible.[745] But it must be added that the *Gaṇitapāda*, perhaps because of this same 'Pāṇinian' conciseness, presents the Pythagorean theorem (and many other theorems, as we will see) without proof, and therefore without an indication as to why we should accept it. One might be tempted to conclude from this that the search for brevity, which turned out to be such a great advantage for grammar, was a mixed blessing for mathematics. We will see below that such a conclusion would not do full justice to the available evidence.

[The part of Brahmagupta's *Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta* (628) dedicated to geometry (12.21-47) is as concise as Āryabhaṭa's text, and much the same could be said about it. The Pythagorean theorem is formulated as follows:[746] "Subtracting the square of the upright from the square of the diagonal, the remainder is the square-root of the side; or subtracting the square of the side, the root of the remainder is the upright: the root of the sum of the squares of the upright and side is the diagonal." Here too, no proof, no examples, no diagrams. A third text on mathematics which may perhaps date from a period close to Brahmagupta (Hayashi 1995: 149), the *Bakhshālī Manuscript*, contains in its preserved portions little about geometry (see Hayashi 1995: 97): essentially only the *sūtra* which Hayashi calls N14 (p. 401; Sanskrit p. 221 f.; English translation p. 322 f.). This *sūtra*, which prescribes a way to calculate the volume of a particular solid, is accompanied by an example. The fragmentary state of this text does not allow us to draw far-reaching conclusions.]

It is not fair to judge highly condensed fundamental texts from classical India without taking into consideration that such texts were always accompanied by one or more commentaries, whether oral or written. This is true for Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, which was the starting point for an extensive commentatorial tradition, and which must have been accompanied by some kind of commentary from its very beginning. Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* — which is a commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, even though a special kind of commentary — was composed well before the beginning of the Common Era. More straightforward commentaries on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* no doubt existed from an early time, and even if the oldest surviving commentary of this nature — the *Kāśikā Vṛtti* — is a relatively late text (around 700 CE), it is known that earlier such commentaries existed.[747]

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[745] Filliozat 1995: 46 mentions the 'high degree of generality' — which includes a general formulation of the Pythagorean theorem, "the first theorem enunciated in the history of Sanskrit mathematics" (p. 48) — as "a quality which [a Śulba-sūtra] shares only with Pāṇini's model".

[746] Sharma 1966, vol. III p. 829 (= *Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta* 12.24): *karṇakṛteḥ koṭikṛtiṃ viśodhya mūlaṃ bhujo bhujasya kṛtim/ prohya padaṃ koṭiḥ koṭibāhukṛtiyutipadaṃ karṇaḥ//*. Tr. Colebrooke 1817: 298. As a matter of fact, the Pythagorean theorem occurs several times, in several guises, in this portion of the text; e.g. 12.22cd: *svāvādhāvargonād bhujavargān mūlam avalambaḥ* (tr. Colebrooke: "The square-root, extracted from the difference of the square of the side and square of its corresponding segment of the base, is the perpendicular"); 12.23cd: *karṇakṛtir bhūmukhayutidalavargonā padaṃ lambaḥ* (tr. Colebrooke: "[In any tetragon but a trapezium,] subtracting from the square of the diagonal the square of half the sum of the base and summit, the square-root of the remainder is the perpendicular"); 12.42ab: *jyāvyāsakṛtiviśeṣān mūlavyāsāntarārdham iṣur alpaḥ* (tr. Colebrooke: "Half the difference of the diameter and the root extracted from the difference of the squares of the diameter and the chord is the smaller arrow").

[747] Bronkhorst 2002b: § 2.

Āryabhaṭa's text, too, may initially have been studied under the guidance of a teacher, who would orally provide many of the elements that are lacking in the verses. Written commentaries were subsequently composed, but the earliest ones have not survived. The earliest mathematical commentary that *has* survived[748] is the *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya*[749] of Bhāskara (= Bhāskara I), which dates from 629 CE,[750] i.e. almost exactly from the same year as Brahmagupta's *Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta*. By contrast, the earliest surviving commentary on Brahmagupta's *Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta* — Pṛthūdakasvāmin's *Vivaraṇa* — dates from 864, and belongs to the later period of Śrīdhara and others which will not be considered here.[751]

It is in Bhāskara's *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya*, then, that we will look for the elements that are so obviously missing from Āryabhaṭa's *Gaṇitapāda*.[752] Three of these elements have already been mentioned. What is primarily missing in the fundamental text are a proof of the theorem concerned, examples of how and where it can be applied, and, where they would be necessary, one or more geometrical diagrams to facilitate visualizing the theorem and its proof; in view of the Indian commentatorial customs in other areas we may also expect to find explanations and (re-)interpretations of the exact formulation of the basic text, where necessary.

With this fourfold expectation in mind we turn to the *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* on *Gaṇitapāda* 17ab. We do indeed find here an explanation of the words of the basic text (which in this case is very short, given the unproblematic formulation of the theorem)[753], followed by examples (tasks with solutions, all of which concern triangles the lengths of whose sides relate to each other as 3 : 4 : 5) and diagrams. The only thing that is lacking is a proof of the theorem!

For a reader schooled in Euclidean geometry this is very surprising. An important, even fundamental theorem of geometry is presented, explained and illustrated by Bhāskara with no proof![754] This absence of proof does not stop Bhāskara from frequently using this theorem elsewhere in his commentary. He cites it — in the form given to it by Āryabhaṭa in verse 17ab — in his comments on *Gaṇitapāda* 6ab (p. 56 l. 5), 6cd (p. 58 l. 14-15), 17cd (p. 103 l. 12-13), and uses it implicitly at many other occasions. The theorem is already implied in the explanation-cum-etymology which Bhāskara gives of

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[748] An exception *may* have to be made for the examples accompanying the sūtras of the *Bakhshālī Manuscript*.

[749] This is the name here adopted for the combined text consisting of the *Daśagītikāsūtra-vyākhyā* and the *Āryabhaṭa-tantra-bhāṣya*, expressions apparently used by Bhāskara himself to designate the two parts of his commentary (on chapter 1 and on the remaining chapters respectively); see Shukla 1976: xlix.

[750] The *Gaṇitapāda* of Bhāskara's *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* has been studied and translated by Agathe Keller (2006).

[751] Balabhadra's eighth century commentary on the *Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta* is now lost; Pingree 1983.

[752] It is known that a number of classical commentaries imitated the style of the *Mahābhāṣya*, sometimes calling themselves 'Vārttika' (Bronkhorst 1990). Bhāskara's *Bhāṣya* does not adopt this so-called 'Vārttika-style'.

[753] *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* p. 96 l. 15: *yaś ca bhujāvargaḥ yaś ca koṭivargaḥ etau vargau ekatra karṇavargo bhavati.*

[754] In order to avoid misunderstanding it must here be emphasized that I am aware of the fact that proof (Euclidean or other) does not appear to be essential to geometry in many cultures; see below. The present discussion on the absence of proof in Bhāskara and elsewhere finds its justification in remarks by Ingalls and Staal to be studied in § III.4.3.

the difficult term *karaṇī* ‘surd’ in his introductory remarks to verse 1:[755] "The *karaṇī* is [so called] because it makes (*karoti*) the equation of the diagonal (c) and the sides (a and b) [of a rectangle] ($a^2 + b^2 = c^2$)."

The absence of a proof in the case of the Pythagorean theorem raises the question whether proofs are presented in connection with other theorems. This question has been investigated by Takao Hayashi in the Introduction of his book *The Bakhshālī Manuscript* (1995), where he studies the use of the terms *pratyaya(-karaṇa)* and *upapatti* in particular. We will consider some of the passages concerned below, but note here already that Hayashi arrives at the following conclusion (p. 76): "As a matter of fact ... we can hardly find proofs or derivations of mathematical rules in Bhāskara's commentary on the *Āryabhaṭīya*."

To illustrate this point, we shall consider a passage that might at first sight create the impression that it does provide — or rather: hint at — a proof of a rule; we will see that it doesn't. The rule concerned is presented in the second half of verse 17: "In a circle the product of the two sagittas of the two arcs [that together constitute the circle] equals the square of half the chord."[756]

Fig. 1

Fig. 1: CD x DE = AD^2

That is to say: CD x DE = AD^2. This rule can easily be proved with the help of the Pythagorean theorem:

$AC^2 = AD^2 + CD^2$
$AE^2 = AD^2 + DE^2$
$CE^2 = (CD + DE)^2 = AC^2 + AE^2 = AD^2 + CD^2 + AD^2 + DE^2$
$CD^2 + DE^2 + 2 \times CD \times DE = CD^2 + DE^2 + 2 \times AD^2$
$CD \times DE = AD^2$ q.e.d.

Bhāskara does not however do so, at least not at the beginning of his comments on this rule. Instead he gives a large variety of examples (tasks with solutions), which cover more than six pages of the edition. Having provided (numerical) solutions to all the problems Bhāskara then states:[757] "The verification (*pratyayakaraṇa*) in the case of all these surfaces [is obtained] with the [rule according to which] ‘the square of the hypotenuse equals the sum of the squares of the two rectangular sides’." In spite of the impression which this statement might create, this is not a reference to the proof of the theorem, but a reminder that the Pythagorean theorem can be used, instead of the present theorem, to carry out the calculations and find the solutions to the problems discussed. That is to say, the Pythagorean theorem can be used to verify the solutions that had been

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[755] *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* p. 44 l. 17: *karṇabhujayoḥ samatvaṃ karoti yasmāt tataḥ karaṇī;* tr. Hayashi 1995: 62. The dual is strange, and one wonders whether the original reading may not have been: *bhujayoḥ karṇasamatvaṃ karoti yasmāt tataḥ karaṇī.* For a discussion of the term *karaṇī* in various mathematical texts, see Hayashi 1995: 60-64.

[756] *Gaṇitapāda* 17cd: *vṛtte śarasaṃvargo ’rdhajyāvargaḥ sa khalu dhanuṣoḥ.*

[757] *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* p. 103 l. 12-13: *pratyayakaraṇaṃ ca sarveṣv eva kṣetreṣu "yaś caiva bhujāvargaḥ koṭīvargaś ca karṇavargaḥ saḥ" ity anenaiveti.*

reached with the help of the other theorem. This may be a justification of sorts of that theorem, but hardly a proof in any of its usual senses.[758]

The presentation of geometrical theorems without proof raises the question whether perhaps proofs were known to the authors concerned, but were not recorded in their texts because their literary model — Pāṇini's grammar and its commentaries have been proposed — did not really leave place for them. It is at least conceivable that Āryabhaṭa and Bhāskara (or the mathematicians from whom they took their material) practiced geometry on a more abstract level than is evident from their writings, making sure that the theorems they presented to their readers were based on solid proofs.[759] One would be free to think so, were it not that these two authors present some theorems that are quite simply wrong.[760] This cannot but mean that these theorems were not based on solid proofs, for no such proofs are possible. (It does not exclude the possibility that some form of verification existed; this system of verification, if it existed, was not however capable of discovering and correcting these errors.)

Āryabhaṭa is wrong where he gives the volume of a pyramid as:[761] "Half the product of the height and the [surface of the triangular base] is the volume called 'pyramid'." The correct volume of a pyramid is a third, not half, of this product. In spite of this, Bhāskara accepts Āryabhaṭa's rule and carries out some (incorrect) calculations with its help. The same is true of Āryabhaṭa's incorrect rule for the volume of a sphere.[762]

Āryabhaṭa's incorrect rules have drawn the attention of scholars, and some of them have tried to interpret the rules differently, so as to obtain a correct result.[763] Filliozat and Mazars object to such a reinterpretation in a joint publication (1985),

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[758] Earlier authorities have already drawn attention to the absence of proofs in early classical Indian mathematics. So e.g. Kline 1972: 190, as cited in Srinivas 1990: 76 n. 2: "There is much good procedure and technical facility, but no evidence that [the Hindus] considered proof at all." See however below.

[759] So Hayashi 1994: 122: "Neither the Āryabhaṭīya nor the Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta contains proofs of their mathematical rules, but this does not necessarily mean that their authors did not prove them. It was probably a matter of the style of exposition."

[760] D. E. Smith (1923: 158) claims to find faulty theorems in Brahmagupta's *Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta*, but most of his cases concern a rule (12.21ab) which is presented as approximate (*sthūla*) by its author. His one remaining case — a formula for the area of quadrilaterals that is presented as being valid without restriction, but is in reality only valid for cyclic quadrilaterals (12.21cd) — may have to be interpreted differently; J. Pottage, at the end of a detailed study (1974), reaches the following conclusion (p. 354): "I have been unable to accept that Brahmagupta could have imagined that his rules would apply to all quadrilaterals whatsoever".

[761] *Āryabhaṭīya Gaṇitapāda* 6cd: *ūrdhvabhujātatsaṃvargārdhaṃ sa ghanaḥ ṣaḍaśrir iti.*

[762] Cp. *Āryabhaṭīya Gaṇitapāda* 7: *samapariṇāhasyārdhaṃ viṣkambhārdhahatam eva vṛttaphalam/ tannijamūlena hataṃ ghanagolaphalaṃ niravaśeṣam//* "Half the even circumference multiplied by half the diameter is precisely the fruit (i.e., the area) of a circle. That (the area) multiplied by its own square root is the exact volume (lit. the without-a-remainder solid fruit) of a sphere." (tr. Hayashi 1997: 198; similarly Clark 1930: 27). Bhāskara also provides an approximate, 'practical' (*vyāvahārika*), rule for calculating the volume of a sphere (p. 61 l. 27): *vyāsārdhaghanaṃ bhittvā navaguṇitam ayoguḍasya ghanagaṇitam* "Having divided [into two] the cube of half the diameter multiplied by nine, the calculation of the volume of an iron ball [has been carried out]."

[763] Filliozat and Mazars (1985) mention Conrad Müller (1940) and Kurt Elfering (1968; 1975; 1977).

pointing out that Bhāskara's comments do not support it.[764] They further make the following important observation (p. 40): "Il faut comprendre Āryabhaṭa, non pas dans ses seuls résultats transposés en formules modernes, mais dans sa propre culture intellectuelle." In a more recent publication, Filliozat states (1995: 39): "It is an error to actualise the ideas of past scientists, to transpose in modern terminology their ancient expressions."

Filliozat and Mazars are no doubt right in this, and one would expect that they might try to explain Āryabhaṭa's errors in the light of 'sa propre culture intellectuelle'. Unfortunately they don't do so. These errors remain a total mystery to them, as is clear from the concluding words of their article (p. 46):

> L'existence de telles erreurs chez le grand mathématicien est certes surprenante. Elle l'est encore plus chez Bhāskara, puisque nous savons que son contemporain Brahmagupta connaissait, au moins pour le volume de la pyramide, la formule exacte.

And yet is seems obvious that these mistakes throw light on the intellectual culture of their authors. It seems inevitable to conclude that the theorems propounded by Āryabhaṭa and Bhāskara were not accompanied by proofs, not even in private, not even outside the realm of the written commentary.[765] They were handed down as received truths, with the result that incorrect theorems were not identified as such as a matter of routine by any student who checked the proofs. Bhāskara confirms that he regards the theorems and other information contained in Āryabhaṭa's work as received truths in his commentary on the first chapter, the *Gītikāpāda*. Here he states, under verse 2, that all knowledge derives from Brahmā; Āryabhaṭa pleased Brahmā on account of his great ascetic practices and could then compose, for the well-being of the world, the ten *Gītikāsūtra*s on planetary movement (chapter 1), as well as the one hundred and eight *āryā* verses on arithmetic (ch. 2), time (ch. 3) and the celestial globe (ch. 4).[766] Elsewhere (p. 189 l. 14-15) he calls Āryabhaṭa *atīndriyārthadarśin* "seeing things that are beyond the reach of the senses". It is further noteworthy that in the third chapter, the *Kālakriyāpāda*, Bhāskara cites, under verse 5, a verse from an earlier (non-identified) astronomical text — about the months in which the sun passes the summer and winter solstices — and calls it *Smṛti*, more

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[764] See also Hayashi 1997: 197-198. Smeur 1970: 259-260 presents a hypothesis to explain how the incorrect rule for the volume of a sphere might have come into being.

[765] Keller (2006: II: 27-28) suggests the following explanation: "Although we do not know why and how Āryabhaṭa derived this wrong relation, we can make the following hypothesis: the solid equilateral is probably seen as deriving geometrically from the area by the same process that derives from two lines a surface. This continuity between the two-dimentional field and the three-dimentional field may be the key to the relation given here. As [one] derives the area of an equilateral triangle by the product of half the base and the height, the volume of the pyramid seems to be derived by half its base (which is here the area of an equilateral triangle) and its height." Similarly Plofker 1996: 62 (cf. 2009: 125): "This error ... suggests that in this case reasoning by analogy led Āryabhaṭa astray." Shukla (1972: 44) observes: "It is strange that the accurate formula for the volume of a sphere was not known in India. This seems to suggest that Greek Geometry was not known at all in India ..."

[766] *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* p. 11 l. 23 - p. 12 l. 1: *anenācāryeṇa mahadbhis tapobhir brahmārādhitaḥ/ .../ ato 'nena lokānugrahāya sphuṭagrahagatyarthavācakāni daśa gītikāsūtrāṇi gaṇitakālakriyāgolārthavācakam āryāṣṭaśatañ ca vinibaddham/*

precisely: *our Smṛti* (p. 182 l. 9: *asmākaṃ smṛtiḥ*); he bolsters this position with an argument based on Mīmāṃsā, unfortunately not completely clear in all its details, but which in outline looks as follows: this *Smṛti* has to be accepted, for it is neither in conflict with the *Śruti*, nor with perception. Calling a text *Smṛti* and insisting that it conflicts neither with the *Śruti* nor with perception amounts to granting it the same authority as the Veda itself, and maintaining that it cannot be wrong.[767]

It seems clear from what precedes that there is little space in Bhāskara's geometry for proofs, and none at all for definitions and axioms, the starting points of perfect proofs. This raises the following fundamental question. If the geometrical figures dealt with by the Indian mathematicians under consideration are not constituted of elements laid down in definitions,[768] what then is the geometry of Āryabhaṭa and Bhāskara *about*? If its triangles, circles, pyramids and spheres are not abstractions, what then are they?

We may find a clue to the answer in the following passage of Bhāskara's Bhāṣya on *Gaṇitapāda* verse 11:[769]

> We, on the other hand, maintain that there is a chord equal to the arc [which it subtends]. If there were no chord equal to the arc [it subtends], an iron ball would not be stable on level ground. We infer from this that there is an area such that the iron ball rests by means of it on the level ground. And that area is the ninety-sixth part of the circumference.
> Other teachers, too, have accepted a chord equal to the arc [which it subtends, as is clear from] the following quotation: 'From the body of a sphere, a hundredth part of its circumference touches the earth'.[770]

Both Bhāskara's own words and the line he cites seem to confuse the surface of a sphere and the circumference of a circle. This may for the moment be looked upon as a detail.[771] The most important thing to be learnt from this passage is that for Bhāskara — and no doubt for other teachers as well — spheres and circles are not (or not only) abstract objects, but (also) concrete things whose features are at least to some extent determined

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[767] See on this Pollock 1990, e.g. p. 327: "Both terms [*śruti* and *smṛti*, JB] refer in their primary connotation to one and the same thing — the Veda, as actually recited or simply recalled …"

[768] The Greek situation tends to be idealized. A closer study of the evidence leads Netz (1999: 95) to the following assessment: "Greek mathematical works do not start with definitions. They start with second-order statements, in which the goals and the means of the work are settled. Often, this includes material we identify as 'definitions'. In counting definitions, snatches of text must be taken out of context, and the decision concerning where they start is somewhat arbitrary."

[769] *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* p. 77 l. 9-15: *vayaṃ tu brūmaḥ: asti kāṣṭhatulyajyeti/ yadi kāṣṭhatulyajyā na syāt tadā samāyām avanau vyavasthānam evāyoguḍasya na syāt/ tenānumīmahe kaścit pradeśaḥ so 'stīti yenāsāv ayoguḍaḥ samāyām avanāv avatiṣṭhate/ sa ca pradeśaḥ paridheḥ ṣaṇṇavatyaṃśaḥ/ kāṣṭhatulyajyā 'nyair apy ācāryair abhyavagatā: tatparidheḥ śatabhāgaṃ spṛśati dharāṃ golakaśarīrāt iti.*

[770] The quoted line is problematic, not only because of the neuter ending of *śatabhāgaṃ*, but even more so on account of *golakaśarīrāt* where one would expect something like *golakaśarīratvāt.* Shukla (1976: lxiv) translates: "Due to the sphericity of its body, a sphere touches the Earth by one-hundredth part of its circumference"; Hayashi (1997: 213) has: "A hundredth part of its circumference touches the ground because of its having a spherical body."

[771] Kim Plofker reminds me that one cannot balance a circle on level ground because it would fall over sideways; no confusion may therefore be involved here.

by their behavior in the world of our daily experience. A sphere, we learn, has to have flat surfaces, for only thus can it be stable on level ground.

The question of the absence of proofs in Indian geometry acquires a different dimension once it is clear that Euclidean and classical Indian geometry may not really concern the same objects. The objects of classical Indian geometry — its triangles, circles, spheres etc. — are no mere abstractions, but things present in the outside world. (The fact that the use of triangles formed by such imprecise things as shadows and flames inevitably implies that the mathematician worked with idealized objects, does not necessarily contradict this.) As such it is possible to compare them to the objects of grammatical analysis rather than to Euclidean diagrams. The objects of grammar — sounds, words, phrases — are there in the outside world, and grammar is therefore a science which deals with objects whose existence is quite independent of the volition of the grammarian. To invoke Patañjali's words: one does not visit a grammarian when in need of words as one visits a potter when one needs a jar.[772] In other words, the objects of grammar, unlike pots, are not fashioned in accordance with the wishes of their users. Elsewhere Patañjali states:[773] "Words are authoritative for us; what the word says is our authority." Once again, words do not adjust to grammarians, but grammarians follow the dictates of words. Grammar presents multiple linguistic data with the help of rules that are as general as possible, but that cannot go against the data of language. Similarly, the rules of classical Indian geometry describe numerous geometrical forms that exist in the outside world with the help of rules that are as general as possible. The fact that these rules describe concrete objects rather than mathematical abstractions has as its consequence that they may often be generalizations from concrete observations, rather than general statements derived from first principles.[774] The Pythagorean theorem, seen

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[772] Mahā-bh I p. 7 l. 28 - p. 8 l. 1: *ghaṭena kāryam kariṣyan kumbhakārakulam gatvāha kuru ghaṭaṃ kāryam anena kariṣyāmīti/ na tadvac chabdān prayokṣyamāṇo vaiyākaraṇakulaṃ gatvāha kuru śabdān prayokṣya iti/*

[773] Mahā-bh I p. 11 l. 1-2.

[774] Concerning the nature of the objects of Greek geometry, read the following remarks by Reviel Netz (1999: 54-56): "On the one hand, the Greeks speak as if the object of the proposition is the diagram. ... On the other hand, Greeks act in a way which precludes this possibility ... Take Pünktchen for instance. Her dog is lying in her bed, and she stands next to it, addressing it: 'But grandmother, why have you got such large teeth?' What is the semiotic role of 'grandmother'? It is not metaphorical — Pünktchen is not trying to insinuate anything about the grandmother-like (or wolf-like) characteristics of her dog. But neither is it literal, and Pünktchen knows this. Make-believe is a *tertium* between literality and metaphor: it is literality, but an as-if kind of literality. My theory is that the Greek diagram is an instantiation of its object in the sense in which Pünktchen's dog is the wolf — that the diagram is a make-believe object; it is functionally identical to it; what is perhaps most important, it is never questioned. ... [The text] does not even hint *what*, ultimately, its objects are; it simply works with an ersatz, as if it were the real thing ... Undoubtedly, many mathematicians would simply assume that geometry is about spatial, physical objects, the *sort* of thing a diagram is. Others could have assumed the existence of mathematicals. The centrality of the diagram, however, and the roundabout way in which it was referred to, meant that the Greek mathematician would not have to speak up for his ontology."

Whatever the Greeks may have thought (or not thought) about the objects of geometry, geometry came to be looked upon as dealing with abstractions, so much so that the expression 'Euclid myth' has been coined to designate the false conviction that these objects have anything to do with the outside world: "What is the Euclid myth? It is the belief that the books of Euclid contain truths about the universe that are clear and indubitable. Starting from self-evident truths,

this way, may in the classical Indian context be a generalization of measurements taken from various rectangular triangles; the notion of a general proof for this theorem might have appeared completely out of place to the early Indian mathematicians, just as to a grammarian a general proof of the grammatical rule that *i* followed by *a* is replaced by *y*, not only in *dadhyatra* out of *dadhi atra* but also in all other similar situations, would have looked strange.

Having said this, it should not of course be overlooked that geometrical figures and bodies are not the same kind of things as linguistic expressions. Numerous geometrical rules become obvious with the help of minimal manipulation of figures. Take the rule that the area of a triangle is half the product of its height and its base.[775] This rule follows almost automatically from a look at the following diagram, and there is no need to assume that it is a generalization of a number of measurements.[776] And yet the notion of general proof does not characterize Bhāskara's discussions of geometry.

Fig. 2

Fig. 2: the area of triangle ABC is half the area of rectangle EFCB.

A passage in Bhāskara's comments on *Gaṇitapāda* verse 10 is interesting in this context. We read here:[777]

> [Question:] Why is the approximate circumference [of a circle] given, not its exact circumference?
> [Response:] People think as follows: there is no way in which the exact circumference [can] be calculated.

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and proceeding by rigorous proof, Euclid arrives at knowledge which is certain, objective and eternal. Even now, it seems that most educated people believe in the Euclid myth. Up to the middle or late nineteenth century, the myth was unchallenged. Everyone believed it. It has been the major support for metaphysical philosophy, that is, for philosophy which sought to establish some a priori certainty about the nature of the universe." (Davis and Hersh 1981: 325, cited in Srinivas 1990: 81 n. 14). For a more recent discussion of the objects of (modern) mathematics, see Shapiro 1997; and for a perhaps extreme view as to the relation between mathematics and the universe, see Tegmark 2014.

[775] Cp. *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* p. 48 l. 15-16: *ardhāyatacaturaśratvāt tribhujasya*.

[776] The procedure illustrated in fig. 2 is close to the one which the Chinese mathematician Liu Hui justifies with the reason "Use the excess to fill up the void" (Chemla 1999: 96 f.). Chemla (1997) distinguishes between formal *proofs* (in italics) and proofs that are provided "in order to *understand* the statement proved, to know *why* it is true and not only *that* it is true" (p. 229).

[777] *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* p. 72 l. 10-17: *athāsannaparidhiḥ kasmād ucyate, na punaḥ sphuṭaparidhir evocyate? evaṃ manyante: sa upāya eva nāsti yena sūkṣmaparidhir ānīyate/ nanu cāyam asti: vikkhaṃbhavaggadasaguṇakaraṇī vaṭṭassa parirao hodi (viṣkambhavargadaśaguṇakaraṇī vṛttasya pariṇāho bhavati) iti/ atrāpi kevala evāgamaḥ naivopapattiḥ/ rūpaviṣkambhasya daśa karaṇyaḥ paridhir iti/ atha manyate pratyakṣeṇaiva pramīyamāṇo rūpaviṣkambhakṣetrasya paridhir daśa karaṇya iti/ naitat, aparibhāṣitapramāṇatvāt karaṇīnām/ ekatrivistārāyāmāyatacaturaśrakṣetrakarṇena daśakaraṇikenaiva tadviṣkambhaparidhir veṣṭyamāṇaḥ sa tatpramāṇo bhavatīti cet tad api sādhyam eva/.* For the use of *karaṇī*, see the reference in note 24 above. Note that Bhāskara's edited text has a number of grammatically incorrect occurrences of °*karaṇika*- and *karaṇitva*-; cp. Pāṇ 7.4.14 *na kapi*.

> [Question:] Isn't there the following saying: the circumference of a circle is the square root of 10 times the square of the diameter?[778]
> [Response:] Here too, [the claim] that the circumference of a diameter that equals one is the square root of 10 is mere tradition, and no demonstration (*upapatti*).
> [Objection:] And if one thinks that the circumference, as directly (*pratyakṣeṇa*) measured, of a [circular] area whose diameter equals one is the square root of 10,
> [Response:] this is not [correct], for the measure of surds cannot be expressed.
> [Objection:] If [it is maintained] that the circumference of [a circle] having that diameter (viz. one), surrounded by the diagonal of an oblong quadrilateral whose width and length are one and three [respectively], has the [same] size [as that diagonal],
> [Response:] that, too, has to be established.

This passage is interesting for various reasons. For one thing, it uses the expression *upapatti*, which some translate 'proof', but for which 'demonstration' seems more appropriate. It also states quite unambiguously that "the measure of surds cannot be expressed [in fractions (?)]".[779] But its special interest for us at present lies in the fact that it mentions, and accepts in principle, the idea of direct measurement as a method to reach conclusions of a geometrical nature. It even indicates how the square root of 10 can be measured, so as to compare its length with the circumference of a circle. It appears to be legitimate for Bhāskara to measure the circumference of a circle, presumably with a cord, and derive from this measurement what we would call the value of π. All that he demurs to is the claim that the result of this measurement — in the case of a circle whose diameter is one — will be the square root of 10. This cannot be true, because the square root of 10, like other surds, cannot be expressed, presumably in terms of units or fractions.

It is hard to know what 'demonstration' would have convinced Bhāskara of the truth of the claim that $\pi = \sqrt{10}$. But one thing is sure. The only other time he uses the term *upapatti* in this same commentary, it does not refer to anything comparable to what we would call a proof.[780] The passage concerned occurs in the middle of a discussion of an example under *Gaṇitapāda* verse 6cd. Hayashi (1995: 75; modified) translates it as follows:[781] "Drawing a plane figure in order to show the ground (*upapatti*) of the following Rule of Three".

Bhāskara goes on criticizing the claim that $\pi = \sqrt{10}$ at great length. Part of his criticism is interesting because it reveals that he appears to have extended the respect that he felt for the rules contained in the *Āryabhaṭīya* to other rules, which he perhaps found in other treatises. One way in which he tries to demonstrate the insufficiency of this value

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[778] The saying is in Prakrit and has obviously been borrowed from a Jaina text or context.
[779] David Pingree (private communication) suggested "that Bhāskara's problem was that no *upapatti* could verify that $\pi = \sqrt{10}$ because of the difficulty of relating the square root of a surd to any previously verified theorem".
[780] Hayashi's (1994: 123) following remark is therefore to be read with much caution: "The recognition of the importance of proofs dates back at least to the time of Bhāskara I ..., who, in his commentary on the Āryabhaṭīya, rejected the Jaina value of π, $\sqrt{10}$, saying that it was only a tradition (*āgama*) and that there was no derivation of it."
[781] *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* p. 59 l. 3: *... iti trairāśikopapattipradarśanārthaṃ kṣetranyāsaḥ.*

for π is by showing that it leads to totally unacceptable consequences. The following passage illustrates this:[782]

> And the calculation of an arc on the basis of the assumption that the measurement of a circumference is made with the square root of 10, is not always [possible]. For the *sūtra* for calculating an arc is [the following] half *āryā* verse:
> **The sum of a quarter of the chord and half the sagitta, multiplied by itself, ten times that, the square root of that.**
> [Consider] now the following example: In [a circle] whose diameter is fifty-two, the length of the sagitta is two.
> With the help of the rule "*ogāhūṇaṃ vikkhaṃbham*" one obtains as length of the chord: twenty (20). With this chord the calculation of the arc becomes: a quarter of the chord is 5, half the sagitta is 1, their sum is 6, multiplied by itself: 36, ten times that: 360, the square root of that is the arc.
> The square of the whole chord is four hundred, the square of the arc three hundred sixty; how is that possible? The arc must [certainly] be longer than the chord. Here [on the other hand] the arc being thought out by [these] extremely clever thinkers has turned out to be shorter than the chord! For this reason, homage be paid to this root of 10, charming but not thought out.

This passage cites two rules, both of which Bhāskara calls *sūtra*s. The second of these is "*ogāhūṇaṃ vikkhaṃbham*", which had been cited in full, and illustrated, on the preceding page (p. 73 l. 2 ff.); it is in Prakrit and no doubt derives from a jaina text.[783] Contentwise this rule is no different from verse 17cd of the *Gaṇitapāda*, studied above, and it is surprising that Bhāskara does not mind citing (and obviously accepts without questioning) the rule in the form in which it was used by the Jainas. The first sūtra cited in this passage, on the other hand, is in Sanskrit; it is not known where it comes from, but clearly it offers a calculation involving the square root of 10. Bhāskara uses this rule, and shows that it leads to an absurd outcome. Strictly speaking this may be due (i) to the particular value assigned to π; (ii) to the form of the rule in general, quite apart from the value assigned to π; or (iii) to both of these at the same time. Bhāskara triumphantly concludes that the fault lies with the square root of 10. A small calculation would have shown him that the approximate value of π that he, following Āryabhaṭa's *Gaṇitapāda*

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[782] Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya p. 74 l. 9 - p. 75 l. 4: *pṛṣṭhānayanam api ca daśakaraṇīparidhiprakriyāparikalpanayā sadā na [bhavati/ yataḥ] pṛṣṭhānayane sūtram āryārdham:*
jyāpādaśarārdhayutiḥ svaguṇā [daśasaṅguṇā karaṇyas tāḥ]
[atroddeśakaḥ: dvipañcāśadviṣkambhe dvir avagāhya/]
"ogāhūṇaṃ vikkhaṃbham" ity anena jyā labdhā viṃśatiḥ [20]/ [anayā jyayā] pṛṣṭhānayanam: jyāpādaḥ 5, śarārdhaṃ [1], yutiḥ 6, svaguṇā 36, daśasaṅguṇā 360, etā karaṇyaḥ pṛṣṭham/ sakalajyāvargaś catvāri śatāni, pṛṣṭhaṃ karaṇīnāṃ ṣaṣṭiśatatrayam iti, katham etat saṃghaṭate? jyāyasā jyātaḥ pṛṣṭhena bhavitavyam/ tad etad vicāryamāṇam atyantasūkṣmavādināṃ jyātaḥ pṛṣṭham alpīy[o]mānam āpatitam/ ato 'syai avicāritamanoharāyai namo 'stu daśakaraṇyai/. The edition has *alpīyamānam*.

[783] The rule — which reads in full: *ogāhūṇaṃ vikkhambhaṃ egāheṇa saṃguṇaṃ kuryāt/ caüguṇiassa tu mūḻaṃ jīvā savvakhattāṇam//* — is similar to Pādalipta's *Jyotiṣkaraṇḍaka* 191, which has: *ogāhūṇaṃ vikkhaṃbha mo tu ogāhasaṃguṇaṃ kujjā/ catuhi guṇitassa mūlaṃ sā jīvā va'ttha ṇātavvā//*.

verse 10, does accept ($\pi = 3.1416$), if used with the same but adjusted formula, leads to the same absurdity (6 x 3.1416 = 18.8496 for the length of arc; 20 for the chord). We must conclude that Bhāskara (unless he was confused) really criticized the formula, which may have occurred in a presumably jaina treatise.[784]

This allows us to draw some further conclusions. From a modern point of view Bhāskara might have criticized the wrong formula for calculating a length of arc by contrasting it with a correct one, along with a proof for the latter.[785] He did not do so, most certainly because he did not have a correct formula, much less a proof for it.[786] What is more, it is highly unlikely that he thought in terms of proofs of correct formulae. From his point of view the rules and theorems he had inherited were correct, the ones others had inherited were presumably mostly correct, but some of these led to unacceptable results, and were therefore incorrect.

The preceding reflections teach us the following. Judging by the evidence discussed so far, it is possible to maintain (as some have done) that Pāṇini's grammar exerted an influence on classical Indian geometry. This would explain that both share a number of features. Two features in particular deserve mention:
1. Classical Indian geometry, like grammar, describes objects that exist in the material world, not abstractions. The practice of geometry does not therefore exclude the physical manipulation of such objects, and the search for generalizations based on concrete measurements. This explains that some conclusions — such as the not totally spherical shape of a sphere — may be based on reflections about or observations of material objects.
2. The objects of both classical Indian geometry and Sanskrit grammar are described with the help of rules that are as general as possible. In the case of geometry, the resulting rules look like Euclidean theorems, but unlike the latter, and like the rules of Pāṇini, they do not derive their validity from proofs. This explains that some incorrect rules have been able to slip into the works of Āryabhaṭa and Bhāskara and remain undiscovered for a long time.

Before we jump to the conclusion that these shared features are due to the influence of Pāṇinian grammar on classical Indian geometry, some further facts and arguments have to be taken into consideration. The claimed absence of proofs in classical Indian geometry, in particular, has to be confronted with the conflicting claim that proofs existed already in Indian geometry long before Āryabhaṭa and Bhāskara, and presumably before Pāṇini,[787] viz., in the geometry of the vedic Śulbasūtras.[788] Frits Staal — whose

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[784] Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigama Bhāṣya* on sūtra 3.11 (I p. 258 l. 17-18) contains a different rule for the arc: "The arc (a) is the square root of six times the square of the sagitta (s) plus the square of the chord (c) ($a = \sqrt{(6s^2 + c^2)}$)" (*iṣuvargasya ṣaḍguṇasya jyāvargayutasya mūlaṃ dhanuḥkāṣṭham*); later authors (Mahāvīra, Āryabhaṭa II) accepted again different rules. See Datta 1929: 694, 699.
[785] For the approximation proposed by Heron of Alexandria, see Heath 1921: II: 331.
[786] He could hardly have such a formula in view of his conviction that "there is a chord equal to the arc [which it subtends]"; see above.
[787] Michaels (1978: 56) points out that many terms related to the layering of the altar (the background of vedic geometry) are known to Pāṇini. In a note he mentions, or refers to, *iṣṭakā*, *iṣṭakacit*, *agnicit*, *āṣāḍhā*, *aśvinī*, *vayasā*, etc.
[788] Michaels's (1978: 70 f.) attempts to show that the Śulbasūtras contain theoretical statements about ideal objects ("theoretische Sätze über ideale Gegenstände") have to be treated with caution

views about the importance of grammar underlie some of the claims considered here — maintains this position in an article (1999),[789] but does not provide arguments to bolster it beyond referring to a number of publications[790] by Seidenberg (1978; 1983; one might add 1962; 1975: 289 f.) and Van der Waerden (1983: 26 ff.; one might add 1980).[791] Seidenberg and Van der Waerden — like Staal himself — argue for a common origin of mathematics, or of geometry specifically, as found in various cultures.[792] Staal, for example, pleads for a common origin of Greek and vedic geometry in Bactria / Margiana; Van der Waerden proposes "a Neolithic Geometry and Algebra, invented somewhere in Central Europe between (say) 3500 and 2500 B.C., in which the 'Theorem of Pythagoras' played a central rôle" (1980: 29; cp. 1983: 33-35); Seidenberg claims to prove that "[a] common source for the Pythagorean and Vedic mathematics is to be sought either in the Vedic mathematics or in an older mathematics very much like it" (1978: 329; similarly already Schroeder 1884).[793] More important for our present purposes is that, as pointed out above, these three authors agree that vedic mathematics had proofs. Van der Waerden goes further and maintains that already the original mathematicians (whom he calls the pre-Babylonian mathematicians) had them (1980: 8): "I suppose that these mathematicians had proofs, or at least plausible derivations. A pupil who has to solve a mathematical problem can do it just by applying a rule he has learnt, but the man who invented the rule must have had some sort of derivation. I also suppose that our pre-Babylonian mathematicians had a proof of the 'Theorem of Pythagoras'." Seidenberg is hardly less brazen (1978: 332): "The striking thing [in the *Āpastamba Śulvasūtra*] is that we have a proof. One will look in vain for such things in Old-Babylonia. The Old-Babylonians, or their predecessors, must have had proofs of their formulae, but one does not find them in Old-Babylonia."

The notion of proof that is claimed to have existed in India and elsewhere by the above-mentioned authors has been examined by G. E. R. Lloyd in the 3rd chapter of his

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in view of what we now know about classical Indian geometry (see above) and geometry in other cultures (see below). About the relationship between Śulbasūtras and classical Indian geometry, see Kaye 1919: 3 ("Les oeuvres de la seconde période [= Āryabhaṭa etc.] ne font aucune allusion à un seul de ces sujets des Śulvasūtras") and the qualification added by Michaels (1978: 106: "Allerdings sind insbesonders angesichts dessen, dass einige Termini der [Śulbasūtras] in der jüngeren indischen Mathematik, wenn auch mit teilweise neuer Bedeutung fortleben, hier gewisse Einschränkungen zu erheben").

[789] This does not withhold him from stating (Staal 1999: 113): "The only Indian counterpart to Euclid is the derivational system of Pāṇini's Sanskrit grammar."

[790] To the publications mentioned by Staal one might add Michaels 1978: 96 f., and the literature referred to on p. 97 n. 1.

[791] Staal does not appear to address the question why in India — which purportedly had had both Pāṇinian grammar and Euclid-like geometry — only the former came to play an important role in science and philosophy. Note in this connection that *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* p. 13 l. 24 - p. 16 l. 24 contains a long discussion purporting to show the greater importance of the study of Jyotiṣa than that of grammar.

[792] Reflections about the origin(s) of mathematics may have to take into consideration the extent to which mathematical activities were and are present outside the 'higher' cultures, in societies without writing. See in this connection Marcia Ascher's book *Ethnomathematics* (1991); further Ascher 1994.

[793] Cp. also Friberg 1990: 580: "There are reasons to believe that Babylonian mathematics in a decisive way influenced Egyptian, Greek, Indian and Chinese mathematics, in form as well as in content, during the last half of the -1st mill., if not earlier."

book *Demystifying Mentalities* (1990), some passages of which are worth quoting. Lloyd begins as follows (p. 74):

> At the outset we must be clear that 'proof' and 'proving' may signify a variety of more or less formal, more or less rigorous, procedures. In some domains, such as law, proving a fact or a point of law will be a matter of what convinces an audience as being beyond reasonable doubt. Again in some contexts, including in mathematics, 'proving' a result or a procedure will sometimes consist simply in testing and checking that it is correct. Both of these are quite informal operations. But to give a formal proof of a theorem or proposition requires at the very least that the procedure used be exact and of general validity, establishing by way of a general, deductive justification the truth of the theorem or proposition concerned. More strictly still Aristotle was to express the view that demonstration in the fullest sense depended not just on deductive (he thought specifically syllogistic) argument but also on clearly identified premises that themselves had to fulfil rather stringent conditions ... He was the first not just in Greece, but so far as we know anywhere, explicitly to define strict demonstration in that way.
>
> Two crucial distinctions have, then, to be observed, (1) between formal proofs and informal ones, and (2) between the practice of proof (of whatever kind) and having an explicit concept corresponding to that practice, a concept that incorporates the conditions that need to be met for a proof to have been given.

Lloyd points out that the second distinction, in his view, has been ignored or badly underplayed in recent attempts to see the notion of proof as originating long before even the earliest extant Egyptian and Babylonian mathematics. He then turns to vedic mathematics and argues that the authors of its key texts were not concerned with proving their results at all, but merely with the concrete problems of altar construction. Vedic mathematics is again dealt with in a "Supplementary note: geometry and 'proof' in vedic ritual" (pp. 98-104), where Lloyd observes that "the notion that the authors in question had a clear and explicit *concept* of proof is subject to the general doubt ... that to obtain results is one thing, to have that concept as an explicit one is another. ... It also falls foul of one further fundamental difficulty. This is that no clear distinction is drawn in these texts between the rules that are expressed to arrive at what *we* should call *approximations* and those that are employed to yield what *we* should call *exact* results." (p. 101).

The question could be asked whether the notion of proof is really culture-specific to ancient Greece. Here Lloyd comments (p. 75):

> The practice of proof, in Greece, antedates by several generations the first explicit formal definition (first given by Aristotle in the fourth century B.C.) and the process whereby such notions as that of the starting-points or axioms came to be clarified was both hesitant and gradual. That long and complex development, in Greece, belongs to and is a further instance of the gradual heightening of self-consciousness we have exemplified before, when second-order questions came to be raised concerning the nature, status, methods and foundations of different types of inquiry. None of the attendant circumstances surrounding these developments, and none of the steps by which the various interrelated key notions came to be

> made explicit, can be paralleled in Vedic literature or in the evidence for Vedic society.[794]

Does this mean that we should not expect any such notion to have existed in classical India? Is the notion of proof really a Greek invention, determined by the specific social and political situation prevailing in that culture? And does it follow that all cultures that do possess the notion of proof must have borrowed it — directly or indirectly — from ancient Greece?

Before trying to answer these questions it seems appropriate to recall that the absence of explicit proofs and of an identifiable notion of proof seems to be a common feature of many cultures that produced geometry. O. Neugebauer, for example, states about ancient Babylonia (1957: 45-46; cited in Seidenberg 1975: 286): "It must ... be underlined that we have not the faintest idea about anything amounting to a 'proof' concerning the relations between geometrical magnitudes."[795] Richard J. Gillings — in an appendix meant to counter some of the negative criticism addressed at the mathematics of the ancient Egyptians on account of its lack of formal proof — concludes nonetheless (1972: 234): "We have to accept the circumstance that the Egyptians did not think and reason as the Greeks did. If they found some exact method (however they may have discovered it), they did not ask themselves *why* it worked. They did not seek to establish its universal truth by an a priori symbolic argument that would show clearly and logically their thought processes."[796] Chinese geometry, it appears, did not use proofs either.[797]

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[794] Lloyd sums up his views on the development of proof in the following passages (pp. 95-96): "We can say that the development, in Greece, of the demand for *certainty* sprang in part from a dissatisfaction shared by a variety of individuals with the merely persuasive. ... We have related other intellectual developments that took place in early Greek thought ... to the political and social background, for example the extensive experience that many Greeks had of evaluating arguments in the law courts and assemblies. ... [W]e should conclude that [in the development of formal or rigorous proof] too ... the political and legal background plays a role at least at the beginning of what might otherwise seem a merely intellectual development. However, the qualification to the thesis that must be entered is that, in this instance, that role was not as a source of positive, but rather of negative, models."

[795] Cp. Friberg 1990: 583: "it is clear that the Greek mathematicians completely transformed the intellectual goods they received [from Babylonian mathematics]. ... Rigorous *proofs* based on *abstract* definitions and axioms took over the role played in Babylonian mathematics by a conceptually simpler method, that of using a *reversal of the steps* in an algorithm with given numerical data in order to *check* the computed values."

[796] G. G. Joseph — in a chapter called "Egyptian and Babylonian mathematics: an assessment" — proposes to adjust the notion of proof so as to include these traditions (1991: 127): "A modern proof is a procedure, based on axiomatic deduction, which follows a chain of reasoning from the initial assumptions to the final conclusion. But is this not taking a highly restrictive view of what is proof? Could we not expand our definition to include, as suggested by Imre Lakatos ..., explanations, justifications and elaborations of a conjecture constantly subjected to counter-examples? Is it not possible for an argument or proof to be expressed in rhetoric rather than symbolic terms, and still be quite rigorous?" If one is determined to find proofs in all cultures that had geometry or something resembling it, adjusting the notion of proof may be the way to succeed; it is however open to doubt whether such a procedure adds much to our understanding.

[797] On science and mathematics in Greece and China, see Nisbett 2003: 20-28.

When early in the seventeenth century Euclid's *Elements* were translated into Chinese,[798] by Matteo Ricci and Xu Guangqi, the latter of these two wrote (in the preface to another work) that only after the translation of Euclid's *Elements* into Chinese had it become possible to transmit proofs and explanations. In fact, he maintained, the Western methods of conveying are not essentially different from the methods transmitted in earlier Chinese treatises. What makes Western mathematics more valuable is that it supplies explanations that show why the methods are correct.[799] Joseph Needham (1959: 91) confirms this by stating: "In China there never developed a theoretical geometry independent of quantitative magnitude and relying for its proofs purely on axioms and postulates accepted as the basis of discussion." We learn from Jean-Claude Martzloff's *A History of Chinese Mathematics* that in the Chinese tradition of geometry "the figures essentially refer not to idealities but to material objects which, when manipulated in an appropriate manner, effectively or in imagination, may be used to make certain mathematical properties visible".[800] This has various consequences, among them the use of empirical methods: "To show that the side of a regular hexagon inscribed in a circle has the same length as the radius, six small equilateral triangles are assembled and the result is determined *de visu*. One proof technique for determination of the volume of the sphere involves weighing it."[801] Sometimes "the reader is asked to put together jigsaw pieces, to look at a figure or to undertake calculations which themselves constitute the sole justification of the matter in hand". Martzloff concludes (p. 72): "If one has to speak of 'proofs', it might be said that, from this point of view, the whole of the mathematician's art consists of making visible those mathematical phenomena which are apparent not in Platonic essences but in tangible things".[802] The concern with mathematical objects as parts of objective reality reminds us of the similar concern on the part of Bhāskara, studied above.

Should we then conclude that the notion of proof belongs only to ancient Greece and its inheritors? I think the situation is more complex. Recall that India at the time of Āryabhaṭa and Bhāskara *did* have a clear notion of proof. Such a notion was present in

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[798] It appears that a copy of a Chinese translation of the *Elements* was present in the imperial library at the end of the thirteenth century, but was ignored; see Needham 1959: 105 f. Huff (1993: 241; with a reference to Aydin Sayili, *The Observatory in Islam*, Ankara 1960, p. 189) adds: "Even more tantalizing are the reports that a Mongol ruler in China, Mangu (d. 1257 ...) is said to 'have mastered difficult passages of Euclid by himself'." In another publication, Huff (2011: 72 ff.) points out that Western astronomical knowledge and technology reached China in the 17th century without having much of an effect; he speaks in this connection of a *curiosity deficit*.

[799] Engelfriet 1998: 297-298.

[800] Martzloff 1997: 275. Yabuuti (2000: 40) suggests that Chinese mathematicians deduced theorems like that of Pythagoras by analogy, intuitively.

[801] Martzloff 1997: 72.

[802] Note further Martzloff 1997: 276: "certain texts by Liu Hui [(end of third century CE)] and other mathematicians contain reasoning which, while it is not Euclidean, is no less well constructed and completely exact. Moreover, although they are not numerous, these arguments appear all the more salient because they are without peers in other non-Euclidean mathematical traditions. But they also enable us to understand that Chinese mathematics is in part based on a small number of heuristic operational methods of a geometrical type. ... In fact, the most striking thing is the concrete appearance of the Chinese approach or rather the fact that abstract results are accessed via 'concrete' means. Chinese proofs tend to be based on visual or manual illustration of certain relationships rather than on purely discursive logic."

Indian logic, which had been developing since long before Āryabhaṭa and reached great heights in the persons of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti precisely during the period that separates Āryabhaṭa from his commentator. Bhāskara at any rate, it would appear, could have been aware of the notion of proof, and had no excuse for not providing proofs for his theorems. At first sight the situation of these two mathematicians should not be very different from Euclid in Greece. Greek philosophers developed the notion of proof in their logic, and Greek mathematicians did the same in geometry. Indian philosophers developed the notion of proof in their logic, but the Indian mathematicians did not follow their example. Why not? The situation becomes even more enigmatic if we assume that Indian geometry derives from Greek geometry, and that therefore some Indian mathematicians (presumably well before Āryabhaṭa and Bhāskara) had been familiar with Euclidean procedures.

Recall here that Indian philosophers of the classical period were engaged in an ongoing debate among themselves, in which radically different positions were defended and criticized. This debate went on because all participants were part of a tradition of rational inquiry (see above), which translated itself in the social obligation — partly embodied in kings and their courts — to listen to one's critics and defend one's own point of view. This tradition of rational inquiry had an enormous impact on the shape and direction of Indian philosophy, but it is also clear that the development of logic in the different schools of philosophy was a result of this ongoing confrontation. Logic specified the rules that even one's greatest enemy would have to accept.

Those who studied and practiced mathematics in India were not obliged to defend their positions against critical opponents to the same extent as their philosopher contemporaries. Not only were there no Buddhists to compete with, as we have seen, but apparently mathematics was not a topic about which public debates were organized. To quote Collins (1998: 551): "Organizationally, the mathematicians, astronomers, and medical doctors were based in private familistic lineages and guilds, never part of the sustained argument provided by philosophical networks. Public networks of argument did exist in India; its philosophical lineages reached high levels of abstract development. Only mathematics and science were not carried along with it." And the absence of a buddhist contribution to, and participation in the development of astronomy and mathematics in classical India may be partly responsible for the relative ‘peace’ enjoyed by these branches of learning.[803]

There were differences of opinion, to be sure,[804] but they were apparently not looked upon as particularly threatening. Bhāskara could show that the jaina value for π, or rather their formula for calculating the length of arc that used this value, could not be correct. But apparently such disagreements were not yet considered sufficiently serious to rethink the whole system. Indeed we have seen that Bhāskara does not mind citing an apparently jaina rule to justify a calculation. Indian astronomers and mathematicians, it

[803] Vogel (1997) shows that the Buddhists — or at least some of them — were not averse to following developments in astronomy to fix the dates of their Poṣadha ceremony. The need to fix these dates did not apparently have the same effect as the Christian need to fix the date of Easter; about this latter need Duncan (1998: 79) states: "The history of science in the Middle Ages would have been very different if the bishops at Nicaea had decided to name a fixed date for Easter in the solar calendar"; further details in Heilbron 1999. Note that *jyotiṣa / jyotis* is mentioned in some lists of *kalā*s occurring in buddhist texts; see Franco 2000: 550 ([61]) with note 56.

[804] A whole chapter of Brahmagupta's *Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta* (no. 11: *Tantraparīkṣā*) is dedicated to the refutation of different opinions.

appears, were not engaged in ongoing debate with opponents belonging to different traditions, as were the philosophers.[805] Nor were they — it seems — particularly interested in what was going on in philosophy. Randall Collins claims (1998: 551) that there are no recorded contacts between philosophical and mathematical networks, and that no individuals overlap both activities. This may not be entirely correct: David Pingree (private communication) mentions in this connection Nīlakaṇṭha Somayājin's *Jyotirmīmāṃsā* (written in 1504; cp. Pingree 1981: 50, 128); moreover, Veṅkaṭeśvara Dīkṣita, a late 16th century commentator, combined skills in Mīmāṃsā and mathematics (Pingree 1981: 6, 129).[806] Yet Collins's claim appears to hold true for Bhāskara (and perhaps other mathematicians of his time), judging by the list of authorities cited by him which is given at the end of the edition of his *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* (Shukla 1976: 345-346). Bhāskara often cites grammatical and generally linguistic texts,[807] astronomical texts, some religious and literary treatises, but not a single philosophical work.[808] It is true that we have very little information about the lives and circumstances of the early Indian mathematicians, but there is no reason that I know of to doubt their relative intellectual isolation,[809] combined perhaps with low social esteem.[810] This situation barely changed in more recent centuries, so much so that John Taylor could write in 1816 (p. 37): “Within these two hundred years, however, the mathematical and astronomical sciences appear to have been gradually declining among the Hindus. The Jyotishis of the present day are in general profoundly ignorant of every branch of mathematics. Inattentive to astronomy as a science, they devote themselves solely to the study of astrology, and possess no ambition to arrive at a higher degree of knowledge than what enables them to cast up a nativity, or to determine a lucky hour for marriages, and for performing the numerous ceremonies practise by their countrymen.”

Some scholars are of the opinion that Indian mathematical authors more recent than Bhāskara *did* provide proofs for geometrical theorems. Takao Hayashi, for example, remarks (1995: 75): "the term *upapatti* stands for the proof or derivation of a mathematical formula. We find a number of instances of *upapatti* used in that sense in later commentaries such as Gaṇeśa's *Buddhivilāsinī* (A.D. 1545) on the *Līlāvatī* and

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[805] For a recent example (from Jainism) of the close link between calendrical (i.e. astronomical) and sectarian concerns, see Cort 1999.

[806] He calls his teacher *sarvatantrasvatantra* and *sarveṣu tantreṣu samaṃ svatantraḥ*, his father *advaitavidyācārya* (CESS 5 [1994], p. 735).

[807] See Appendix IX.

[808] The one quotation from the *Vākyapadīya* (p. 22) concerns the meaning and function of *upāya*. Be it noted that Bhāskara's commentary on *Gītikāpāda* 1 enumerates the five *buddhīndriya*s, the five *karmendriya*s, plus *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahaṅkāra*, all of them known from Sāṃkhya (p. 4 l. 11-15). Bhāskara also shows some acquaintance with Mīmāṃsā: p. 182 l. 8 *sarvaśākhāpratyayam ekaṃ karma* may have been cited from Śabara's Bhāṣya on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 2.4.9; the discussion immediately preceding this has a parallel in Śabara on 1.3.2.

[809] Mathematics is most often presented in treatises of astronomy, and it seems likely that astronomers often earned their living as astrologers. Cp. Al-Bīrūnī (E. C. Sachau's translation as reproduced in Chattopadhyaya 1992: 510): "If a man wants to gain the title of an astronomer, he must not only know scientific or mathematical astronomy, but also astrology." Cp. Pingree 1981: 56 as cited in Yano 1987: 54 : "There was never in India a *jāti* [caste, MY] of mathematicians, and rarely anything that could be called a school; most mathematicians were *jyotiṣīs* (astronomers or astrologers)." Pingree (1993: 77) argues that Āryabhaṭa, far from making observations himself, derived the longitudes of the planets "from astrological playing with numbers".

[810] On the low esteem in which astrologers were held, see Kane, HistDh V p. 526 f.

Kṛṣṇa's *Navāṅkura* (ca. A.D. 1600) on the *Bījagaṇita*." M. D. Srinivas (1990) gives a list of commentaries that contain mathematical *upapatti*s in an appendix (no. I; p. 57 f.) to his article; all of them date from the 16th and 17th centuries. The highly interesting question to what extent these later mathematical authors had an explicit concept of proof (not necessarily Euclidean; cp. Lloyd's remarks above) and, if so, when, how and why such a concept made its appearance in Indian mathematical works, cannot be addressed here. One may wonder whether the type of arguing that had become common in philosophical debate slowly found its way into this area of knowledge. But whether or not such a shift of attitude took place in mathematics, there seems to be no doubt that Bhāskara I, the commentator whose work we are considering, was not (yet) affected by it.

The following example confirms this. The *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* contains the following diagram "to convince the dull-witted":[811]

Fig. 3

Fig. 3: There is a square corresponding to AC^2

Bhāskara uses this diagram to show that the square of a diagonal of a rectangular surface does indeed correspond to a geometric square: AC^2 (= $AB^2 + BC^2$) corresponds to the surface ACDE. However, this same diagram could easily be used, and has been used by more recent authors, to prove the Pythagorean theorem (though not, of course, in a 'Euclidean' manner). In this case, as Keller (2006: II: 6) points out, the area of the interior small square (whose sides are equal to $b - a$) increased by the area of the four triangles (whose sides are a and b), gives the area of the big square whose sides are the hypotenuse of the four triangles (in other words: $c^2 = (b - a)^2 + 4 \times ab/2 = a^2 + b^2$). This proof is given by the author Gaṇeśa Daivajña in around 1545 (Srinivas 1990: 39) and, it is claimed, by Bhāskara II around 1150.[812] Bhāskara I had this proof of the Pythagorean theorem so to say under his nose, but he was apparently not interested.

What can we conclude from all this? Reviel Netz observes (1999: 216): "One of the most impressive features of Greek mathematics is its being practically mistake-free. An inspectable product in a society keen on criticism would tend to be well tested." The same cannot be said about Indian mathematics. In spite of all the qualifications that have been considered above, we cannot but conclude that Indian society — or at any rate the society of Indian mathematicians at the time of Bhāskara I — was not keen on criticism, and was not in the habit of testing its mathematical products. Indeed, it may not be possible to speak of Indian society as something homogeneous at all at that time. Brahmins had successfully separated themselves from the rest of society, and even within the brahmanical caste-class hierarchical divisions were omnipresent, as we saw in Part I.[813] *Homo hierarchicus* does not constitute a society that, as a whole, is 'keen on criticism'. Out of sheer necessity some degree of criticism found its way into one sub-

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[811] *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* p. 48 l. 16 f. The edition of K. S. Shukla contains a somewhat different diagram; however, a manuscript page reproduced by Keller's (2006: II: 3) appears to support this construction.

[812] Cp. Srinivas 1990: 35; Sarasvati Amma 1999: 133 f.

[813] *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism* § 3.2 (*Science and religion in classical India*; esp. p. 116 f.) draws attention to the disrepect held by other Brahmins with respect to practitioners of astrology/astronomy/mathematics.

layer, that of the philosophers. Since it did not respond to a deeper need, it did not spread from there, not even to those, such as mathematicians, who might have profited from it.

III.3. Patañjali's reinterpretation of Grammar

In order to assess the influence that early buddhist philosophy exerted on Patañjali, it is necessary first to present in brief what this early buddhist philosophy looked like, especially in the areas that were going to influence the grammarian.

III.3.1. Earliest buddhist systematic philosophy

It seems likely that the strong Hellenistic presence in northwest India is one of the factors that forced the Buddhists of this part of the subcontinent to rethink their buddhist heritage, as a result of which they recreated it from within. They reinterpreted many elements of buddhist teaching and the result was what appears to be the first systematic philosophy in the Indian subcontinent.[814] This philosophy had little in common with buddhist thought as it had existed until then and as it continued to exist especially outside the subcontinent (most notably in Sri Lanka). Briefly, the new philosophy held that the world of our experience is not really what it looks like. It is constituted of countless numbers of minute elements of existence, called *dharma*s. This philosophy can be called atomic, on condition that one keeps in mind that the buddhist dharmas are not all material and are in many respects different from atoms as we may conceive of them in the modern world. These dharmas were not only believed to be exceedingly small, they were also exceedingly short-lived. Dharmas, in fact, are momentary: they disappear the moment after they come into existence.[815] Moreover, the successions of momentary dharmas are steered by a strict rule, the law of conditioned origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*); this law stipulates that the appearance of each new dharma is conditioned by the immediately preceding one, never by earlier ones, nor indeed by the anticipation of succeeding ones.

This last feature of causality as conceived of by the scholiasts of northwest India confronted them with a number of difficulties, and they took great pains to solve them. If only the immediately preceding stage of a causal sequence determines the immediately following one, certain causal sequences become difficult to understand. There should be no gaps in the sequences of dharmas, because there would be no way to bridge those gaps. However, according to buddhist thinking, certain meditative states by their very nature interrupt the mental processes into which they are inserted. Some of these states imply the suppression of all mental activity and of consciousness itself; the term frequently used is *nirodha*. When a meditator arises out of such a state, the first moment of renewed consciousness does not succeed any immediately preceding mental dharma. Given the way the Buddhists now conceived of causal processes, mental states such as *nirodha* should not be able to exist.

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[814] For details, see Bronkhorst 2009: chapter 2 ("Arranging the doctrine").
[815] On the beginning of buddhist momentariness, see Rospatt 1995, along with Bronkhorst 1995.

But causality conceived of in this manner has no place for teleology either:[816] a causal sequence conceived in this manner cannot be guided by any future goal. This made it very difficult for these Buddhist thinkers to account for karmic retribution. Karmic retribution is, of course, a causal process, but not a blind one. It 'aims at' retribution, and is therefore presumably guided by the intended outcome of the process. This, however, should be excluded by the very way in which causal processes were thought of.

Buddhist thinkers took these difficulties seriously, and came up with various solutions. The Sarvāstivāda Buddhists made the claim — a claim that is responsible for their name — that past dharmas exist beside present and future dharmas, so that a past dharma can exert a direct influence on future dharmas. Most other Buddhists did not accept this counter-intuitive position. The Sautrāntikas, for example, proposed another solution: sequences of seeds (*bīja*) connect the deed with its effect. In the case of the meditational state of *nirodha*, the last moment before the suppression of consciousness is connected through this sequence with the first conscious moment after it. Again other Buddhists, particularly the Yogācāras, introduced the notion of *ālayavijñāna*, one of whose functions was, once again, to account for the gaps in continuity in the causal chains of dharmas.[817] It is not necessary to deal with all these solutions in detail. They do show, however, how seriously the Buddhists took their vision of causal chains in which each following element is exclusively determined by the immediately preceding one.

The northwestern Buddhists took one further step. They maintained, as they had to, that the dharmas really exist, but added that dharmas are the *only* things that really exist. Objects that are constituted of dharmas — i.e., everything we come across in our daily experience — do not really exist. By taking this further step, these Buddhists ended up believing that the world of our ordinary experience is not real, that there is a reality hiding behind it that is not evident to ordinary experience.

If the world of our ordinary experience does not really exist, how then are we misled into believing that it does? A frequent answer to this question is: the objects of our experience, whether they be chariots, houses, persons or whatever else, are in reality nothing but names. We are ultimately misled by our language. This answer appears in the *Questions of Milinda* (*Milindapañha*), a text whose title associates it with the Indo-Greek ruler Menander who ruled around 150 BCE.[818] In the beginning of the second book (*Lakkhaṇapañha*) (p. 25 f.)[819] we find the famous observation that a chariot is nothing but a word. But already a canonical passage (the only one, and therefore not necessarily old) states that "just as the word 'chariot' is used when the parts are put together, so there is the use of the conventional expression 'being' when the constituents of a person are

[816] Real or apparent goal-oriented processes constitute a challenge for modern science and philosophy, too. For two altogether different attempts to deal with it, see Deacon 2012 and Nagel 2012.

[817] Schmithausen 1987; further Bronkhorst 2000a: ch. 10 and 11; 2009: 95 f., 108 f.

[818] See Grainger 2013: 64-76 ("The sack of Pataliputra").

[819] For a translation of this passage see, e.g., Rhys Davids 1890: 40 f.; Frauwallner 2010: 72 f.; Linne 1976: 122 f. This portion belongs to the oldest kernel of the *Milindapañha* since it occurs in the Chinese version: TI 1670, vol. 32, p. 696a, l. 9 f. For a translation of the Chinese version see Demiéville 1925: 97 f. The Chinese and Pali versions are compared in Thich Minh Chau 1964: 47 f.

present".[820] Other buddhist texts state the same in different words. A hut, we read in the *Śāriputrābhidharma*, is nothing but a designation.[821] The *Mahāvibhāṣā* illustrates the category of nominal existence (*prajñaptisat*) by enumerating the objects "pot, cloth, chariot, army, forest, hut etc."[822] The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* explains that a composite object is *prajñaptisat*, not *dravyasat*.[823] It became the basis for their language philosophy.

One more question must be dealt with here. If only dharmas exist, and spatially and temporally composite objects do not, one might think that words (and other linguistic units, such as sentences and speech sounds) do not exist either. After all, from the point of view of the Buddhist scholiasts, the position of words was not all that different from pots and chariots: all of them were no more than successions of dharmas, and one might think that the ultimate non-existence of words was no more disturbing than the ultimate non-existence of chariots. For reasons that we can only guess, the Buddhist scholiasts of the Sarvāstivāda school were of a different opinion. Perhaps they thought that the non-existence of words implied the non-existence of the Buddha-word, which would deprive the buddhist tradition of its most valuable asset. But whatever the reason for their concern, the result is visible in their texts. The Buddhist scholiasts posited the existence of words and other linguistic units. This they did in the only way open to them, viz., by stating that words and other linguistic units are dharmas. They postulated the existence of three such dharmas: the 'body-of-word' (*nāmakāya*), the 'body-of-sentence' (*padakāya*), and the 'body-of-sound' (*vyañjanakāya*). These dharmas are already enumerated in the lists of so-called *cittaviprayuka saṃskāra*s in several canonical Abhidharma texts of the Sarvāstivādins: in the *Dharmaskandha* (TI 1537, vol. 26, p. 500c, l. 22, cf. p. 501b, l. 21), the *Prakaraṇapāda* (TI 1541, vol. 26, p. 628c, l. 23-24, p. 634c, l. 19-20; TI 1542, vol. 26, p. 694a, l. 28-29, p. 699b, l. 23) and the *Jñānaprasthāna* (TI 1543, vol. 26, p. 774b, l. 5-15; TI 1544, vol. 26, p. 920b, l. 15-25). The first chapter of the *Prakaraṇapāda* is also known as a separate work called *Pañcavastuka*;[824] here too we find the 'linguistic dharmas' enumerated and explained (TI 1556, vol. 28, p. 997c, l. 27-29; TI 1557, vol. 28, p. 998c, l. 25, p. 1001a, l. 28-29; Imanishi 1969: 8). They are of course a regular feature of later Sarvāstivāda and related works.[825]

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[820] SN I.135: *yathā hi aṅgasambhārā hoti saddo ratho iti/ evaṃ khandesu santesu hoti satto ti sammuti/.*

[821] TI 1548, vol. 28, p. 626c l. 11-12.

[822] TI 1545, vol. 27, p. 42b l. 1-2. Cp. the following statements from the same text, translated by La Vallée-Poussin (1937a: 166-67): "Le Bhadanta Vasumitra dit: 'Le nom qui désigne est *saṃvṛti* ...'"; "Bhadanta dit: 'Parler d'être vivant (*sattva*), de cruche, de vêtement et autres choses, expressions (*vyavahāra*) produites par une pensée non-fausse, c'est *saṃvṛtisatya*; ...'"; "Le Bhadanta Dharadatta dit: 'Le nom, de sa nature (*nāmasvabhāva*), est *saṃvṛti*; ...'"Also the *Vibhāṣā* refers to the principle "Toutes choses sont vides et sans-soi"; see La Vallée-Poussin 1937: 164.

[823] Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 13 l. 24-25, on verse 1.20: *yadi rāśyarthaḥ skandhārthaḥ prajñaptisantaḥ skandhāḥ prāpnuvanti/ anekadravyasamūhatvāt rāśipudgalavat/*

[824] It is not impossible that the *Pañcavastuka* was an earlier work which was later incorporated into the *Prakaraṇapāda*.

[825] See, e.g., Ghoṣaka's *Amṛtarasa* (TI 1553, vol. 28, p. 979c, l. 13-14), Dharmaśrī's *Abhidharmahṛdaya* (TI 1550, vol. 28, p. 831a, l. 2-4), Upaśānta's *Abhidharmahṛdaya* (TI 1551, vol. 28, p. 866a, l. 14-17), Dharmatrāta's *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* (TI 1552, vol. 28, p. 943a, l. 25-28), Skandhila's *Abhidharmāvatāra* (TI 1554, vol. 28, p. 982a, l. 5, p. 987c, l. 23 - p. 988a, l. 11), Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* and *-bhāṣya* 2.47 (p. 80 f.; La Vallée-Poussin 1923-31: ch. II, p. 238 f.), etc.

The precise interpretation of the terms *nāmakāya*, *padakāya* and *vyañjanakāya* varies in the later texts. For our present purposes it is not necessary to study this in detail. One peculiarity of the later interpretations may however be noted: the word *pada* in *padakāya* has come to be interpreted to mean ‘sentence’ or ‘verse foot’. Stcherbatsky (1922: 24 n. 1) considered this "a case exhibiting clearly the desire to have a terminology of its own". Jaini (1959: 98 ff.) on the other hand thought that this unusual meaning of the term *pada* can be traced to Pali. He supports this with an example from the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*,[826] which however does not carry much conviction; there is no reason to doubt that *pada* in this passage simply means ‘word’.[827]

There is no need to show that *pada* in Buddhism always meant ‘sentence’ or ‘verse foot’; it did not always have that meaning in the compound *padakāya*. In the *Prakaraṇapāda* — the earliest text which explains the term *padakāya* — *pada* means ‘word’. *Padakāya* is here explained as "a whole of speech sounds" (TI 1541, vol. 26, p. 628c, l. 24; TI 1542, vol. 26, p. 694a, l. 28-29; TI 1556, vol. 28, p. 997c, l. 28). This interpretation of *pada* is more natural and therefore more satisfactory than ‘sentence’ or ‘verse foot’. It leaves us however with the problem why this word acquired a different meaning later. One would be tempted to think that *nāmakāya* and *padakāya* were at one time synonyms. This, of course, would entail that there was a time when there were not three, but only two linguistic dharmas.

There is some evidence to support this. Before we turn to it, it will be necessary to say something about the Sarvāstivāda canonical Abhidharma texts. These texts, or at least some of them, have not been preserved in the forms in which they were written. The *Dharmaskandha*, for example, is rather the end-product of a development. Frauwallner (1964: 73-80 [1995: 15-21]; 1971: 103 f. [1995: 39 f.]) has adduced reasons to think that both the Sarvāstivāda *Dharmaskandha* and the Pali *Abhidhamma Vibhaṅga* developed out of a common original text. The details of this development are not known to us, nor do we know when exactly this development came to an end. We only know that the end products of these two developments — the *Dharmaskandha* and the *Vibhaṅga* — differ greatly from each other.

In the case of the *Dhātukāya* some insight into the history of the text is made possible by its relationship to the Pali *Dhātukathā* on the one hand, and to the fact that this text, possibly in adjusted form, has been included in the fourth chapter of the *Prakaraṇapāda* on the other. Frauwallner (1964: 85 f. [1995: 26 f.]), who also studied this question, came to the conclusion that a part of the *Dhātukāya* developed beyond the stage embodied in the fourth chapter of the *Prakaraṇapāda*, while another part is further developed in the fourth chapter of the *Prakaraṇapāda*. We see that adjustments and emendations were still added in relatively recent times.

The researches of Yukio Sakamoto (1935) take us to even more recent dates. Sakamoto compared the quotations from the *Prakaraṇapāda* in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* with the readings in the *Prakaraṇapāda* itself, and came to the conclusion that the *Prakaraṇapāda* still underwent changes after the compilation of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*!

It becomes evident from the above that most, perhaps all, of the Chinese translations of Abhidharma works which we possess are translations of emended, and therefore non-original, texts. In order to penetrate as far as possible to the earliest form of

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[826] SN II.36: *ekena padena sabbo attho vutto*.

[827] Viz., the word *phassa* which figures prominently in the preceding discussions.

a certain idea, we must therefore not just use early texts, but where possible early translations as well.

The two Chinese translations of the *Prakaraṇapāda* that we possess were both made after the time when emendations were introduced into the text, and the same is true of one of the two Chinese translations of the *Pañcavastuka*, its separate first chapter.[828] The other translation of the *Pañcavastuka*, however, is old and may have been made by An Shigao, the first translator of whom we know. It may therefore date back to the second century CE. What does this old translation tell us about the number of linguistic dharmas?

The oldest translation of the *Pañcavastuka*, which is probably the oldest translation we possess of any Abhidharma work into Chinese,[829] knows only two linguistic dharmas![830] The clumsiness of this translation makes it hard to determine which two Sanskrit terms were here being translated. The first one reads in Chinese *ming tzu*, which may stand for *nāmakāya* or *padakāya*. I shall use the term *padakāya* for convenience' sake, not because I have any reason to think that this term rather than *nāmakāya* was used. The second term reads *chüeh* in Chinese, which literally means 'cut' or 'break'. This translation was apparently chosen to represent the constituent portions of a word, i.e., the *vyañjana* or rather the *vyañjanakāya*.

This same old translation of the *Pañcavastuka* explains the term *vyañjanakāya* with the words: *tzu wei chü*. This can be translated as "sound as a totality". This seems to indicate that *vyañjanakāya* was not considered a Tatpuruṣa compound but rather a Karmadhāraya. We saw above that the old meaning of *padakāya* was, similarly, a collection of speech sounds, therefore 'word' rather than 'collection of words'. We may conclude that *vyañjanakāya* and *padakāya* (or was it *nāmakāya*?) initially named single sounds and single words respectively, both conceived of as single, indivisible entities.

The early Buddhist scholiasts from northwestern India, then, introduced two or three linguistic dharmas. We will see that in so doing they introduced a notion that was to have a long history in India.[831]

III.3.2. Buddhist influence on Patañjali

Kashmir (where we believe Patañjali lived; see § I.2.1, above) is near Gandhāra, and is sometimes considered part of Greater Gandhāra.[832] Like Gandhāra, it had a strong buddhist presence, and it is more than likely that the Buddhist doctors of Kashmir participated in the intellectual revolution that we have described above. Unlike Gandhāra, Kashmir was conquered by Puṣyamitra after the collapse of the Maurya Empire, and

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[828] For details see Imanishi 1969: 4.
[829] So Demiéville 1953: 446.
[830] See TI 1557, vol. 28, p. 1001a, l. 25 f. Prof. E. Zürcher confirmed this conclusion in a private communication.
[831] Interestingly, and in spite of its success in brahmanical circles, later Buddhists came to reject this in origin buddhist notion, among them Dharmakīrti; see Eltschinger 2007: 157 ff.
[832] The map given by Salomon (1999: 2) suggests that he includes Kashmir in 'Greater Gandhāra'; Behrendt (2004: 16, 22) does so explicitly. David Gordon White (2012) adds Bactria, so as to arrive at a cultural area he calls KGB.

Patañjali indicates that he once worked for this ruler, presumably as a sacrificial priest.[833] Puṣyamitra is reported, already in the early *Vibhāṣā*, to have treated local Buddhists harshly.[834] Buddhism did not disappear from Kashmir as a result; it continued to flourish there for a number of centuries. In other words, it is possible or even likely, not just that Patañjali got into contact with Buddhists, but that he had occasion to become acquainted with the new philosophical developments in their religion.

There are various reasons to think that while writing his *Great Commentary* Patañjali was indeed acquainted with Buddhism.[835] This acquaintance manifests itself in his approach to Grammar, and to language in general. We will study examples below. It also finds expression in some relativement minor features, which we will consider first. Among these we notice the following.[836] The *Mahābhāṣya* cites the following proverb: *āmrān pṛṣṭaḥ kovidārān ācaṣṭe* "Being questioned about mangoes he acquaints [one] with the *kovidāra* (trees)". A similar proverb is known from buddhist literature.

A second reason is as follows. Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 1.3.1 mentions "sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end" *(maṅgalādīni maṅgalamadhyāni maṅgalāntāni śāstrāṇi)*. The *Mahābhāṣya* itself is not stated to have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end. In the case of the *vārttika*s, the "something auspicious in the beginning" is, according to Patañjali, the use of the word *siddhe* in one of the first of them. But this *vārttika* does not appear to be the first *vārttika* in the *Mahābhāṣya*, as I have argued elsewhere.[837] The "something auspicious in the beginning" in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is the word *vṛddhi* in P. 1.1.1 (*vṛddhir ād aic*). The "something auspicious in the middle" in this text is the presence of *bhū-* (instead of *bhv-*) in P. 1.3.1 (*bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ*); P. 1.3.1 is not, of course, anywhere near the middle of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. The "something auspicious in the end" remains unspecified. Some commentators propose the use of *udaya* in P. 8.4.67, which is not the very end of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. It is far from certain that Patañjali had anything specific in mind for the "something auspicious in the end". The question is therefore: whence did Patañjali get the notion of "sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end"?

The answer that suggests itself is simple and straightforward. We find the same notion in a number of buddhist texts. The Dharma, i.e. the truth preached by the Buddha, is there described as "auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end", in Pāli: *ādikalyāṇa*, *majjhekalyāṇa*, *pariyosānakalyāṇa*, in Sanskrit: *ādau kalyāṇa*, *madhye kalyāṇa*, *paryavasāne kalyāṇa*. We find this expression very frequently in the Pāli buddhist texts, esp. in the Vinaya and Sutta Piṭakas.[838] The expression has been preserved in Sanskrit in the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, the *Daśottarasūtra*, the *Nidānasaṃyukta*, and

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[833] Mahā-bh II p. 123 l. 3-4 (on P. 3.2.123 vt. 1): *iha puṣyamitraṃ yājayāmaḥ.* "[Patañjali] speaks about Puṣyamitra in the present tense, as if he was his own king." (Witzel 2006: 478)
[834] Lamotte 1958: 424 ff.
[835] Gornall (2013) explores the "possibility that [Patañjali] was influenced by the views of a heterodox Sarvāstivādin monk, Dharmatrāta" (p. 204).
[836] For details, see Bronkhorst 1995a; 2002c.
[837] Bronkhorst 1987a, part I.
[838] See the *Pāli Tipiṭakaṃ Concordance*, part VI, p. 316, s.v. *ādikalyāṇa*, for references to the Pāli canon.

elsewhere.[839] Several of these texts in Sanskrit belonged most probably to the Sarvāstivādins.[840]

The third reason to be discussed requires more explanation. The *Mahābhāṣya* under P. 3.2.115 contains the following sentences:[841] "Alternatively, there are people who do not perceive the present. For example: Śākaṭāyana from among the grammarians, while sitting at [the side of] the carriage-road, did not perceive a group of carts that passed by."

Buddhist literature contains a similar episode in the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* and its parallels. Here a certain Ārāḍa Kālāma is stated to have had such an experience, or rather non-experience. He described the event in the following words:[842] "Even though conscious and awake I did not hear the sound of five hundred carts passing by."

It is of course tempting to assume that Patañjali was acquainted with the Sarvāstivāda *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*. This alone might then be held to account both for his story about Śākaṭāyana and for his mention of "sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end". This conclusion should not, however, be drawn rashly. The story of Śākaṭāyana in particular has some aspects that might be held to plead against direct borrowing from the buddhist *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*. It is not impossible that the story of Ārāḍa Kālāma is not a buddhist invention. Ārāḍa Kālāma is presented as a non-buddhist teacher, and this may very well be correct. It is therefore conceivable that similar stories were current in non-buddhist circles, and Patañjali may therefore have heard some such story from non-Buddhists.

The name Śākaṭāyana poses another problem. It means "descendant of Śakaṭa" (by P. 4.1.99). But *śakaṭa* is also the word for 'cart' used in Patañjali's remark. This may not be coincidence. A more or less floating story about carts may have been attributed to Śākaṭāyana because of his name. If that is true, it is harder to believe that Patañjali was influenced here by the episode about Ārāḍa Kālāma in the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*. Unless, of course, we assume that Patañjali (or someone else) made up the story about Śākaṭāyana under the influence of the buddhist texts with which he supposedly was acquainted.[843]

Regarding possible buddhist influence on Patañjali, perhaps the following point can be added to the above: the *Mahābhāṣya* (under P. 1.2.52 vt. 4) mentions mount Khalatika, a mountain that is also mentioned in a buddhist inscription from Kanaganahalli (underneath a scene in which the Buddha figures); Khalatika is the name

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[839] See the *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden* (ed. Heinz Bechert), 4. Lieferung, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1981, p. 249-50, s.v. *ādi*.

[840] Hinüber 1985: 69-70, 71-73 (*Nidānasaṃyukta*; *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*); Pāsādika 1985: 185, with reference to an article by J. W. de Jong (*Daśottarasūtra*)

[841] Mahā-bh II p. 120, l. 20-23: *athavā bhavati vai kaścid api vartamānakālaṃ nopalabhate/ tad yathā/ vaiyākaraṇānāṃ śākaṭāyano rathamārge āsīnaḥ śakaṭasārthaṃ yāntaṃ nopalebhe/*

[842] MPS 28.18: *saṃjñī evāhaṃ ... samāno jāgran nāśrauṣaṃ pañcānāṃ śakaṭaśatānāṃ vyatikramamāṇānāṃ śabdam/.*

[843] Black (2011) suggests "that the Upaniṣads and the Ambaṭṭha Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya ... convey two versions of the same story, with the literary characters Śvetaketu and Ambaṭṭha sharing some striking similarities" (p. 137). He specifies, however: "merely because this story probably appeared in the Upaniṣads before it appeared in Buddhist literature does not necessarily mean that it was originally a Brahmanical tale." (p. 149)

of the hill where Aśoka donated caves to the Ājīvikas according to an accompanying inscription.[844]

Mention may further be made of Beckwith's recent (2012) theory about the *recursive argument method*. This method, he claims, is for the first time recognizable in certain northwestern Abhidharma texts — first the *Aṣṭagrantha* (or *Aṣṭaskandha*), then the *Vibhāṣā* — before it affected other texts, both east and west (ultimately affecting medieval Europe). It might be argued that Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* displays this same feature, being composed "in the form of dialogues in which take part a student (*śiṣya*) who questions the purpose … of rules and their formulations, an unaccomplished teacher (*ācāryadeśīya*) who suggests solutions which are not fully acceptable, and a teacher (*ācārya*) who states what is the finally acceptable view" (Cardona 1976: 253). This might then be construed to indicate that Patañjali underwent the influence of northwestern Abhidharma.[845]

Direct influence of buddhist philosophy on Patañjali is suggested by the following: Patañjali uses these two expressions: *guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam* (Mahā-bh II p. 366 l. 26, on P. 5.1.119 vt. 5) and *guṇasamudāyo dravyam* (Mahā-bh II p. 200 l. 13-14).[846] Both state that material objects are collections of qualities; the context makes clear that the qualities concerned are sound (*śabda*), touch (*sparśa*), colour (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*) and smell (*gandha*). There is no reason to believe that Patañjali himself accepted this position, yet its very mention proves that there were thinkers at the time of Patañjali who did. Who were they?

The Sāṃkhya philosophy is known to have accepted the position that material objects are collections of qualities during part of its history (Bronkhorst 1994a). There is however no reason to think that Sāṃkhya as a developed philosophy existed already at the time of Patañjali, because his *Mahābhāṣya* contains no clear indication that he was acquainted with this school of thought. But Sāṃkhya was not the only philosophy that accepted this position. Buddhist Sarvāstivāda accepted it well before Sāṃkhya (see Bronkhorst 2009: 101-102). Patañjali's remarks are most easily explained by the assumption that he was directly or indirectly acquainted with Sarvāstivāda Buddhism.

Patañjali on words and speech sounds

Buddhism also appears to have exerted an influence on Patañjali's linguistic thought. Some of the innovations that Patañjali introduced into the Pāṇinian grammatical tradition are most easily explained by the assumption of buddhist scholastic influence.

One of these is Patañjali's tendency to look upon words and speech sounds as independently existing entities. This betrays ontological concerns, concerns that Patañjali did not share with his grammatical predecessors. Ontological concerns were, on the other hand, at the very heart of the philosophical reflections of Patañjali's Buddhists contemporaries who were also, as we have come to think, his direct neighbours. Ontologically speaking, Patañjali realized, words and speech sounds constitute a problem, because they are sequences of elements that do not occur simultaneously. The sounds of the word 'cow' have to be pronounced in sequence, not simultaneously, to be

[844] Zin 2011: 17.
[845] See further Bronkhorst forthcoming b.
[846] Already Albrecht Wezler (1985) drew attention to these expressions.

understood. At no single moment, therefore, is there something one might call "the word 'cow'". The Buddhists, we know, had denied this, and claimed that there *is* a word 'cow': it is a dharma, and as such it is momentary, and exists quite independently of the constituent speech sounds. They made similar claims with regard to speech sounds and sentences.

Patañjali repeats their claim, be it with certain modifications. He, too, accepts the existence of words and sounds beside and independently of their constituent elements. He does not, of course, call these dharmas, nor does he accept that they are momentary. On the contrary, he considers these independent entities to be eternal:[847] "Words are eternal, and in eternal words there must be speech sounds that are lasting, unchangeable, not subject to loss, additions or modifications."[848] Patañjali does not present this claim as something new; he behaves rather as if his predecessors had always 'known' that Sanskrit was eternal, and therefore without beginning in time. In fact, he interprets a short statement (a *vārttika*) from his predecessor Kātyāyana in such a manner that it supports his own position as to the eternality of words.[849]

Let us now consider in further detail what Patañjali says about the ontological status of words and sounds.

In 1960 Erich Frauwallner published a short article about the infiltration of linguistic theory into the Indian philosophical systems ("Das Eindringen der Sprachtheorie in die indischen philosophischen Systeme").[850] Frauwallner argued that ideas about the nature of the word entered from grammar into the brahmanical systems. In this context he mentioned Mīmāṃsā in particular. This system looks upon the constituent speech sounds of words as being eternal, but denies the existence of a whole word different from the sounds. The eternality of speech sounds supposedly proves the eternality of the Veda. This, Frauwallner points out, is odd. Frauwallner tries to explain the difficulty with the help of the influence of Vaiśeṣika ideas on Mīmāṃsā. The idea of the sound as an eternal entity, he states, was borrowed from the grammarians. The grammarians, however, also accepted the word as an eternal entity. Philosophical ideas borrowed from Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, left no space for words as independent entities. As a result Mīmāṃsā accepted only speech sounds as independent and eternal entities.

Frauwallner was aware of the chronological implications of this view. It means that the doctrine of eternal sounds is relatively recent in Mīmāṃsā. And indeed, Frauwallner can adduce arguments that support the view that the Mīmāṃsā sūtras (MīmSū 1.1.6-23) in which this view is defended are a later insertion into the Sūtra text. If we remove these sūtras the remainder fits well together. Sūtra 1.1.5 establishes that the connection between word and meaning is natural (*autpattika*). Sūtra 1.1.24 takes up this

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[847] Holt (2012: 99) points out that "infinity is a very nice number, along with its opposite, zero. Neither infinity nor zero needs an explanation. Finite numbers do need explanations, however." It is true that not all Buddhists would agree that a single moment has zero length, the opposition momentary-eternal yet shares features with zero-infinity.

[848] Mahā-bh I p. 18 l. 14-15: *nityāś ca śabdāḥ/ nityeṣu ca śabdeṣu kūṭasthair avicālibhir varṇair bhavitavyam anapāyopajanavikāribhiḥ/.*

[849] On the eternality of words, cf. § II.4.2, above. Whatever the correct interpretation of Kātyāyana's *vārttika* here, the idea that words are eternal was not foreign to this author. See below.

[850] Frauwallner 1960a. The contents of this article are largely repeated and expanded in Frauwallner 1961.

same issue and raises the objection that if such be the case (*utpattau*), sentences would not naturally have a meaning. Frauwallner draws attention to the similarity in wording between the two sūtras: *autpattika* in the one, *utpatti* in the other. He finally points out that the so-called *Vṛttikāra-grantha*, which occurs in Śabara's *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* on MīmSū 1.1.5, ascribes the doctrine that words are nothing but their constituent sounds to Upavarṣa, an early commentator on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*.[851]

Frauwallner compares the eternal individual sounds of the Mīmāṃsakas with the *varṇasphoṭa* of the grammarians, and thinks that they owe their existence to this concept. The idea of a *varṇasphoṭa*, however, is according to Frauwallner derived from that of a *padasphoṭa*. This in its turn means that a development must have taken place within the grammatical tradition in the time before these ideas made their appearance in the Mīmāṃsā texts. Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* is unfortunately of little use for studying this development. In Frauwallner's opinion, Patañjali has no understanding whatsoever of linguistic theory and of philosophy.

Frauwallner's low opinion of Patañjali has been criticized by subsequent scholars,[852] but only in general terms. The question remains whether we can learn anything from the *Mahābhāṣya* about the problem that engaged Frauwallner, that is, about the nature of sound and word.

Regarding the nature of speech sounds we can be brief. It appears that Patañjali knew the idea of an individual sound conceived of as an entity, different from its particular pronunciation by various people in differing circumstances. His use of the word *sphoṭa* confirms this.

Patañjali uses the word *sphoṭa* at only two occasions, both times in connection with individual speech sounds. On P. 1.1.70 vt. 5 he distinguishes between the *sphoṭa*, which is the *śabda*, and the *dhvani*, which is a quality of the *śabda*.[853] It is true that the two passages in which Patañjali uses the term *sphoṭa* pose some difficulties of interpretation,[854] but these do not affect the main conclusion that for Patañjali the speech sound existed as an independent entity, different from the 'noise' that expressed, or perhaps rather: accompanied, it.

Patañjali is also aware of the notion of an eternal and unchanging speech sound (*varṇa*). We find it under *Śivasūtra* 1 vt. 12,[855] while under P. 1.1.70 vt. 5 Patañjali calls them fixed (*avasthita*).[856]

The relationship between speech sounds and words is perhaps most clearly discussed in the second Āhnika of the *Mahābhāṣya* (I, p. 30, l. 1 ff.). The question raised is whether individual sounds have meaning or not. A number of arguments support the view that they do, among them the observation that a collection (*saṃghāta*) of sounds has meaning. Other arguments are adduced to show that individual sounds have no meaning, which comes closer to Patañjali's own opinion that most single sounds have no meaning, while certain verbal roots, suffixes, nominal stems and particles which consist of one sound do have meaning. Somewhere in this discussion Patañjali makes the remark (I, p. 31, l. 10):

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[851] Frauwallner 1961: 121 (319); 1968: 38.
[852] Biardeau 1964: 31 n. 1; Staal 1967: 48-49 n. 19; Cardona 1976: 259.
[853] Mahā-bh I, p. 181, l. 19-20: *evaṃ tarhi sphoṭaḥ śabdo dhvaniḥ śabdaguṇaḥ*
[854] See Joshi 1967: 13 f.
[855] Mahā-bh I, p. 18, l. 14-15: *nityeṣu ca śabdeṣu kūṭasthair avicālibhir varṇair bhavitavyam anapāyopajanavikāribhiḥ*. See further Mahā-bh I, p. 75 l. 8-14 & p. 136 l. 12-14.
[856] Mahā-bh I p. 181 l. 14: *avasthitāḥ varṇāḥ.*

saṃghātasyaikatvam arthaḥ

This seems to mean: "The collection is one single [entity, and this] one-ness is the meaning."

This remark is noteworthy, because there was no need whatsoever for Patañjali to make it. It is made by way of explanation of an expression in a *vārttika* (*Śivasūtra* 5 vt. 13) that reads *saṃghātasyaikārthyāt* "because a collection has one single meaning". Patañjali here goes beyond the *vārttika* in stating that a collection is a single entity. He does not explain this any further, nor does it play a significant role in the discussion.

It is not hard to imagine why Patañjali postulates the existence of a collection of sounds as one single entity. Individual sounds do not occur simultaneously, not even in a single word. In another context[857] Patañjali points out that in the word *gauḥ* the sounds *au* and *ḥ* are not there while *g* is being pronounced, and similarly about the other sounds. For sounds disappear as soon as they have arisen (*uccaritapradhvaṃsinaḥ khalv api varṇāḥ*). No single sound is the companion of another sound (*na varṇo varṇasya sahāyaḥ*). Seen in this way it is hard to assign any form of existence whatsoever to words.[858]

Yet Patañjali looks upon words as existing entities and, what is more, as eternal entities. Part of a *vārttika* in the first Āhnika reads *siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe*; Patañjali analyzes this as *siddhe śabde 'rthasaṃbandhe ca* (Mahā-bh I, p. 6, l. 17) and interprets *siddha* to mean *nitya* 'eternal'. In Patañjali's interpretation therefore (which is almost certainly different from the one intended by the author of the *vārttika*) the word, its meaning (or denoted object), and the relation between the two are eternal. But for a word to be eternal it has to exist first, and this makes it all the more understandable that Patañjali postulates the existence of a collection of sounds as one single entity.

In order to understand what kind of entity a word is we return to the passage where Patañjali explained that the sounds of a word are not pronounced simultaneously. Having done this, he quotes a verse, then comments upon it in the following manner (Mahā-bh I, p. 356, l. 9-13):

buddhiviṣayam eva śabdānāṃ paurvāparyam/ iha ya eṣa manuṣyaḥ prekṣāpūrvakārī bhavati sa paśyaty asminn arthe 'yaṃ śabdaḥ prayoktavyo 'smiṃs tāvac chabde 'yaṃ tāvad varṇas tato 'yaṃ tato 'yam iti/

The first sentence seems to mean:

The sequence of sounds has the mind as its realm.

A more satisfactory translation would of course be possible if we could look upon *buddhiviṣayam* as a Tatpuruṣa compound. We could then translate:

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[857] On P. 1.4.109 vt. 10, Mahā-bh I, p. 356, l. 5 f.

[858] Compare this with what a modern neuroscientist says about the perception of the word *go*: "During audition, each successive sound reaches the ear at a later time. Before an entire pattern of sounds, such as the word GO, can be processed as a whole, it needs to be recoded, at a later processing stage, into a simultaneously available spatial pattern of activation. Such a processing stage is often called a working memory, and the activations that it stores are often called short-term memory (STM) traces." (Grossberg 1999: 2)

> The sequence of sounds is the object of the mind.

I am not, however, aware of *viṣaya* as a neuter word. The rest of the passage translates:

> A man who thinks before he acts, sees: "In this meaning that word must be used, in this word first this sound, then that one, and then that one."

S. D. Joshi, in the Introduction to his edition and translation of the *Sphoṭanirṇaya* (1967: 12), concludes from this passage that "the unity of words exists only in our mind". I fail to see how this conclusion can be drawn from the text. Rather it states that the mind creates the sequence of sounds while pronouncing a word. This is confirmed by the last quarter of the preceding verse, which has:

> *buddhau kuryāt paurvāparyam*
> [The wise one] produces the sequence in his mind.

The fact that the mind creates the sequence of sounds, does not imply that the real word, or the unity of words, exists only in the mind. A better interpretation would seem to be that the mind acts as an intermediary between the non-mental real word and the equally non-mental sounds.

Similar criticism could be directed against Joshi's remark (1967: 10) that "by the term *buddhinirgrāhyaḥ* 'grasped by the intellect' (on *Śivasūtra* 1 vt. 12) Patañjali indicates that word is a mental or psychical entity". Patañjali describes the word in the very same line as *ākāśadeśaḥ* 'situated in ether', which seems to prove that no mental entity can be meant.[859]

The mind is necessary if we assume that the collection (*saṃghāta*) is a single entity without a sequence of sounds in it. The fact that the mind intervenes between the *saṃghāta* and the sequence of sounds does not entail that this *saṃghāta* is of a mental nature. Patañjali, at any rate, does not say anything of the kind.[860]

The kind of *saṃghāta* that Patañjali seems to speak about can hardly be described as a 'collection'. If our interpretation up to this point is correct, it is rather an entity in its own right and no collection in the literal sense at all. The next question we have to turn to is whether or not Patañjali distinguished different types of verbal *saṃghāta*s.

We find the two expressions *padasaṃghāta* and *varṇasaṃghāta* under P. 3.2.49 vt. 3. The *vārttika* under which they occur reads: *karmaṇi sami ca*. It is explained by Patañjali in the following manner, correctly as it seems (II, p. 104, l. 2):

> *karmaṇy upapade saṃpūrvād dhanter aṇ vaktavyo 'ntyasya ṭo vā vaktavyaḥ*
> When [a word denoting] the grammatical object is *upapada*, [the suffix] *aṆ* must be prescribed after the root *han* preceded by *sam*; and *ṭ* must be prescribed as optionally [taking the place] of the final [sound of *han*].

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[859] Mahā-bh I, p. 18, l. 19-20: *śrotropalabdhir buddhinirgrāhyaḥ prayogeṇābhijvalita ākāśadeśaḥ śabda[ḥ].*

[860] The Vṛttikāra quoted in Śabara's *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* rejects the word as an existing entity, even though he accepts something mental, viz. *saṃskāra*, as an intermediary between sounds and understanding (Frauwallner 1968: 38-41). The entity rejected by the Vṛttikāra appears to be similar to the one accepted by Patañjali.

Patañjali then gives two examples:

> *varṇasaṃghāṭaḥ varṇasaṃghātaḥ/ padasaṃghāṭaḥ padasaṃghātaḥ/*
> [This explains] *varṇasaṃghāṭa* [besides] *varṇasaṃghāta*, *padasaṃghāṭa* [besides] *padasaṃghāta*.

The grammatical formation here given is peculiar, and has a direct bearing on the philosophical question we are investigating. Normally the word *saṃghāta* is derived with the suffix *GHaÑ* in the sense *bhāva* by P. 3.3.18 (*bhāve*). This is actually done e.g. by Jinendrabuddhi in his *Nyāsa* on P. 7.3.32 (VI, p. 37) and by Bhānuji Dīkṣita in his *Rāmāśramī* on *Amarakoṣa* 2.5.39 (p. 258-59). What is more, Patañjali himself uses the word *saṃghāta* often as a separate word, not being part of a compound, and therefore without a word denoting the grammatical object as *upapada*. In all these cases the above derivation is not valid, so that Patañjali himself must have derived the uncompounded word differently, most probably with the suffix *GHaÑ* as well. Why then does he derive *saṃghāta* differently in these two compounds?

One possible answer might be considered to lie in P. 2.2.14 *karmaṇi ca*. This rule forbids compound formation on the basis of an objective genitive; an example would be *varṇānāṃ saṃghātaḥ* and *padānāṃ saṃghātaḥ*. However, the *vārttika*s and Bhāṣya on P. 2.2.14 make clear that this prohibition is only valid where both object and subject are mentioned; it should not therefore prevent simple compounds like *varṇasaṃghātaḥ* and *padasaṃghātaḥ*.

There is another reason to reject the view that Patañjali merely wants to secure the compounding of *varṇānāṃ saṃghātaḥ* and *padānāṃ saṃghātaḥ* in spite of P. 2.2.14. The result in that case would be only *varṇa-* and *pada-saṃghāta*. As it is, also the forms *varṇa-* and *pada-saṃghāṭa*, with retroflex *ṭ*, are derived.[861] We cannot but conclude that Patañjali here derives some special compounds in some special meanings.

Turning to the meaning, we note that *varṇa-* and *padasaṃghāta* are derived with the kṛt-suffix *aṆ*. This suffix has the meaning ‘agent’ by P. 3.4.67 (*kartari kṛt*). Derived with *aṆ* the words *saṃghāta* and *saṃghāṭa* in, say, *varṇasaṃghāta* / *-saṃghāṭa* mean therefore "what collects (sound / sounds)". Derived with *GHaÑ*, on the other hand, the compound *varṇasaṃghāta* would mean "collection of sounds". The later grammarians agree with this distinction in meaning. The *Kāśikā* on P. 3.2.49, for example, explains the compounds derived with *aṆ* as follows (I, p. 221): *varṇān saṃhanti varṇasaṅghāṭaḥ, varṇasaṅghātaḥ/ padāni saṃhanti padasaṅghāṭaḥ, padasaṅghātaḥ//*.

What is the difference between "a collection of sounds / words" and "what collects sound(s) / word(s)"? Laddu (1971: 316) proposes to understand the forms derived with *aṆ* as "one who collects the sounds, a phonetician" and "one who collects or codifies words, a lexicographer" respectively. But he admits that no trace of such usage can be found in the surviving literature.

Another solution is possible. For Patañjali, as we have seen, a word is an entity in its own right, not just a collection of sounds; for him a word rather "collects sounds", or perhaps "joins a word together". We see that it is not yet clear whether a word is designated by the expression *varṇasaṃghāta* or rather by *padasaṃghāta*; we shall return

[861] This is not the place to discuss the peculiar form *saṃghāṭa*. Note however that Burrow (1971: 550) proposes to see in *saṃghāta* the non-cerebralized form of the root *ghaṭ*.

to this question below. At this point it is important to understand that for Patañjali a word is no collection in the strict sense of the term, but rather a 'collector'.

Let us now turn to the one and only passage in the *Mahābhāṣya* where one of the terms discussed is actually used. The expression *padasaṃghāta* occurs here as part of a larger compound, which does not fail to evoke problems in its own right. The context is as follows. In the Bhāṣya on P. 1.1.51 vt. 9 a discussion occurs in which the word *nārkalpi* figures. This word is derived from *nṛkalpa* with the suffix *iÑ*, by P. 4.1.95 (*ata iñ*). *Nṛkalpa* itself consists of the noun *nṛ* 'man' and the suffix *kalpaP*, prescribed by P. 5.3.67 (*īṣadasamāptau kalpabdeśyadeśīyaraḥ*). In the derivation of *nārkalpi* the *ṛ* in *nṛ* is replaced by *ā* (P. 7.2.117 *taddhiteṣv acām ādeḥ*), which is then followed by *r* (P. 1.1.51 *ur aṇ raparaḥ*). This results in

nā-r-kalpi.

The question is whether *r* is part of preceding *nā* or of following *kalpi*. If it is part of *nā* there is a difficulty. *Nṛ* in *nṛkalpa* is technically called a *pada*, by P. 1.4.17 (*svādiṣv asarvanāmasthāne*). But then *nār* in *nārkalpi* is a *pada* too. This would lead to the undesired consequence that *r* be replaced by a visarjanīya, by P. 8.3.15 (*kharavasānayor visarjanīyaḥ*), resulting in undesired **nāḥkalpi*.

Can this problem be solved by stating that *r* is rather part of following *kalpi*? Patañjali says no. He explains (I, p. 129, l. 5-6):

kalpipadasaṃghātabhakto 'sau notsahate 'vayavasya padāntatāṃ vihantum iti kṛtvā visarjanīyaḥ prāpnoti/

The commentators agree in interpreting *padasaṃghāta* here as *pratyayasamudāya* 'collection of suffixes'. This is understandable, for *kalpi* is the result of combining the two suffixes *kalpaP* and *iÑ*. This interpretation would justify the following translation:

> That [sound *r*, even though] part of the collection of suffixes *kalpi*, cannot do away with the fact that a portion [of this expression *kalpi*, viz. *r*] is the final [sound] of a *pada*. As a result [substitution of] visarjanīya would take place.

Yet this interpretation of *padasaṃghāta* is not acceptable, for various reasons. The first one is that *pada* means 'word', not 'suffix'. In order to appreciate the second reason we must turn to a number of passages in the *Mahābhāṣya* where Patañjali uses closely similar words and phrases. Take the Bhāṣya on P. 1.1.47 vt. 7, which reads (I, p. 117, l. 1-2):

saṃghātabhakto 'sau notsahate 'vayavasyegantatāṃ vihantum

We notice the close similarity of this sentence with the earlier one. Here the addition of the augment *nUM* in the nom. nt. dual of such *dvigu* compounds as *pañcāratninī* (from *pañcāratni* 'five cubits') is under discussion. The assumption has been made that *nUM* is part of what precedes it. Patañjali's statement here means:

> That [sound *n*, i.e., the augment *nUM*, though] part of the collection [*pañcāratni-n*], cannot do away with the fact that a part [of this collection, viz., *pañcāratni*] ends in a vowel [belonging to the pratyāhāra] *iK*.

The 'collection' here is the combination of the two parts that are relevant in the discussion, in this case of the part ending in *i*, i.e. *pañcāratni*, and of *nUM*.

Patañjali repeats the same sentence under P. 7.1.73 (I, p. 266, l. 5), where he makes the same point. Here the examples are *pañcatrapuṇā* and *pañcatrapuṇaḥ*. Here too the augment *nUM*, though part of the collection *pañcatrapu-n*, cannot do away with the fact that the part *pañcatrapu* ends in an *iK* vowel.

The expression *saṃghātabhakta* is used at a few other occasions, always in the following phrase:

> *asau* (or: *ayaṃ*) *saṃghātabhakto na śakyaḥ* (or: *aśakyaḥ*) X-*grahaṇena grahītum*

X varies with the circumstances. At one place the phrase indicates that the prefix *aṬ*, though part of the collection (*saṃghāta*), is not denoted by the term *dhātu* 'verbal root'.[862] The infix *mUK*, similarly, in examples like *pacamāna*, is not part of what is denoted by he expression *adupadeśa* "what is taught as ending in *a*".[863] Again, the prefix *aṬ* added to a verbal root belonging to the list *gadādi*, is part of the collection (*saṃghāta*), yet is not covered by the term *gadādi*.[864]

In all these cases Patañjali uses the term *saṃghāta* to refer to the collection of the two parts that are relevant in the discussion. If we now return to the original passage that contains the compound *kalpipadasaṃghātabhakta*, we see that the interpretation of the commentators will not do. They think that *saṃghāta* here refers to the collection of suffixes that constitutes *kalpi*, but that collection is not immediately relevant in the discussion. What is relevant is the collection *r-kalpi,* or, perhaps, *nā-r-kalpi*. The most natural interpretation of *kalpipadasaṃghāta* in the circumstances seems to me: "collection of *kalpi* with [the preceding] *pada*". If we accept this interpretation, Patañjali's statement comes to mean:

> That [sound *r*, even though] part of the collection of *kalpi* with [the preceding] *pada* (i.e., *nā-r-kalpi*), cannot do away with the fact that a portion [of this collection, viz., the sound *r*] is the final [sound] of a *pada*.

Of course, another interpretation is possible. One might urge that the collection under discussion is not *nā-r-kalpi*, but merely *r-kalpi*. Patañjali's *kalpipadasaṃghāta* would then have to be interpreted as: "the *padasaṃghāta* [which is] (*r-*)*kalpi*". This interpretation is open to the criticism that if Patañjali meant *rkalpi*, he might have said *rkalpi* rather than just *kalpi*. If, in spite of this criticism, this last interpretation is accepted, it must be concluded that *padasaṃghāta* is here used in a peculiar sense. *Kalpi*, and *rkalpi*, is no *pada* in Pāṇini's technical sense, but it can well be looked upon as a 'word' in some way. It is at least conceivable that Patañjali, knowing that the term *pada*

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[862] On P. 1.3.60 vt. 3 (I, p. 286, l. 1).
[863] On P. 6.1.186 vt. 3 (III, p. 112, l. 12); and on P. 7.2.82 vt. 1 and 3 (III, p. 303, l. 7-8 and l. 16-17).
[864] On P. 8.4.17 vt. 1 (III, p. 459, l. 7).

would be inappropriate here, chose a term which he knew was used in non-grammatical circles, a term which had not been narrowly defined like Pāṇini's *pada*, viz., *padasaṃghāta*.

In support of this interpretation one might adduce the fact that *nārkalpi* is not the only example which is discussed in this passage of the *Mahābhāṣya*. Other examples are *nārkuṭa* and *nārpatya*. The second halves of these examples are *pada*s, so Patañjali's choice of a non-technical synonym of *pada* in order to designate *kalpi* might be considered understandable. Note that this interpretation of Patañjali's use of *padasaṃghāta* presupposes that *padasaṃghāta* was in use primarily in non-grammatical circles, or at any rate had no technical grammatical meaning. It further makes only sense on the assumption that a *padasaṃghāta* is not a "collection of words", say a sentence, but rather a single word conceived of as an indivisible entity. On this assumption *varṇasaṃghāta* would refer to a single speech sound conceived of as a single undivided entity.

We must not conclude too much from this possible interpretation of Patañjali's use of *kalpipadasaṃghātabhakta*. This interpretation is far from certain, and, as we have seen, a more conventional interpretation is possible, in which *padasaṃghāta* does not refer to a single concept at all.

We can distinguish two distinct aspects in Patañjali's ideas. For him words are (i) entities with an independent existence, (ii) which are, moreover, eternal. Some authors, such as Joshi and Roodbergen (1986: xi, 114), concentrate on the second aspect, the eternality. They conclude that Patañjali attempts "to introduce the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the *nityatva* of the word". We have seen already that this position is chronologically not without difficulties, not to speak of the problem that in Mīmāṃsā not the independent word came to be looked upon as eternal, but rather the speech sounds which constitute it. Joshi and Roodbergen do not discuss these difficulties, and we may conclude that the connection with Mīmāṃsā is unlikely at best.

There is a passage in the *Mahābhāṣya* which seems to point in another direction. P. 1.2.45 vt. 11 reads:

> *saṃghātārthavattvāc ceti ced dṛṣṭo hy atadarthena guṇena guṇino 'rthabhāvaḥ*
> And if [you say that individual sounds have meaning] because collections (*saṃghāta*) have meaning, [the answer is no,] because subsidiary parts that do not serve a certain purpose are seen to constitute something that does serve that purpose.

The Bhāṣya explains the *vārttika* and then gives the following example (I, p. 220, l. 22-24):

> *yathā ... rathāṅgāni vihṛtāni pratyekaṃ vrajikriyāṃ praty asamarthāni bhavanti tatsamudāyaś ca rathaḥ samartha evam eṣāṃ varṇānāṃ samudāyā arthavanto 'vayavā anarthakā iti//*
> For example, the parts of a chariot when taken apart are not each of them fit for movement; their combination (*samudāya*), i.e. the chariot, is fit [for that]. In the same way the combinations of these sounds have meaning [even though] the parts have not.

This example does not add much to our understanding of the entities called *saṃghāta* by Patañjali, but it suggests an interesting connection with Buddhism: the buddhist *Milindapañha*, too, speaks of a chariot as a collection of its parts; in the case of Buddhism, this collection has no real existence, as we have seen. Interestingly, another passage from the Mahābhāṣya seems to say that a collection is nothing but its parts (*avayavātmakaḥ samudāyaḥ*).[865]

Patañjali on derivations

Another innovation of Patañjali that has a direct bearing on Grammar is the following. Certain Pāṇinian derivations require more information than merely what is available at the preceding stage. For example, in order to derive the 3rd person singular imperative of *bhū*, i.e. *bhavatu*, one needs to know that earlier in the derivation *loṭ* has been replaced by *ti*. There are other derivations where information of subsequent stages is required in order to proceed. A detailed study of Patañjali's treatment of such cases shows that he did not like either of these two possibilities. Patañjali admits only derivations in which all the information for the next step is present at the immediately preceding stage. Since many derivations are not like this, Patañjali subjects them to highly technical and complicated analyses, at the end of which he can somehow claim that they all follow his scheme.

A detailed demonstration of this observation can be found below. The question why Patañjali wanted to impose this kind of linearity on grammatical derivations is not, in itself, technical, and allows indeed of a simple and straightforward answer. Patañjali imposes on grammatical derivations the same scheme that the Buddhist scholiasts had imposed on reality: both consist of a succession of stages in which the step toward each next stage is fully determined by the immediately preceding stage. If we recall that a grammatical derivation for Patañjali is a mental event (see § IIA.4.2, above), and that mental events were looked upon by the Buddhist scholiasts as a succession of stages that characterizes reality in general, Patañjali's imposition of linearity on grammatical derivations is not even surprising.[866]

Patañjali does not, of course, admit that he has borrowed this scheme from his Buddhist neighbours. But then he does not admit even that Buddhists exist. As a traditional Brahmin he is bound to maintain that his knowledge, every bit of it, is ancient, and owes nothing to anybody whatsoever. (Remember that both the Sanskrit language and the Veda are eternal, i.e. beginningless.) But this pretence should not mislead us. The scheme Patañjali imposes on Pāṇinian derivations is the cause of endless complications that can only be resolved in the most ingenious ways, often through the introduction of principles and rules unknown to Pāṇini. There is no sensible explanation for this bizarre new requirement, except for the fact (which we assume is a fact) that Patañjali shared an intellectual world with Buddhist scholiasts who had just recently created a philosophy in which this kind of linear step by step thinking constituted a crucial ingredient.

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[865] Mahā-bh III p. 3 l. 15-16 (on P. 6.1.1 vt. 13): *avayavātmakaḥ samudāyaḥ/ abhyantaro hi samudāye 'vayavaḥ/ tad yathā/ vṛkṣaḥ pracalan sahāvayavaiḥ pracalati/.*

[866] Cf. Deshpande 1997: 104: "It is tempting to suggest that the emerging traditions of Buddhism may have forced Kātyāyana and Patañjali to think of new philosophical problems."

Let us now consider in some detail the way in which Patañjali tries to impose linearity on grammatical derivations.

Paul Thieme (1982: 18-19 [1185-1186]) is no doubt right in thinking that, from Patañjali's point of view, speakers 'put together' the units of speech each time a man is speaking Sanskrit. This, he proposes, emerges from a statement made by Patañjali, which states: *saṃskṛtya saṃskṛtya padāny utsṛjyante* "the words are ejaculated [in speaking] after being put together [in the mind] from their elements each time".[867] He could have also referred to another passage where Patañjali expresses himself as follows: "What is this transformation of the effect (mentioned in a *vārttika*)? The word 'effect' refers to concepts (*buddhi*). It is the concept that is transformed [and not the linguistic unit itself]. … [Referring to the suppletion of the root *as* by *bhū* taught by P. 2.4.52 (*aster bhūḥ*), Patañjali continues:] Here [initially] the root *as* is taught without any specification. Thus, he [= the user of the grammar] came to think that *as* occurs everywhere. Through P. 2.4.52, he comes to think of *bhū* instead of *as* [in certain specific contexts]. In its own context, the root *as* is [actually] permanent, and so is the root *bhū* permanent [in its own context]. However, [through Pāṇini's rule of suppletion] his [= student's] notion (*buddhi*) is transformed."[868]

I seems indeed clear that for Patañjali, grammatical derivations must follow an orderly sequence. Moreover, each step in this orderly sequence must be determined by the elements already in place. That is to say, in a derivation as envisaged by Patañjali it is not necessary to know what came before and what will come after. The elements in place must suffice to determine which next step will be taken. This, at any rate, is the ideal picture that Patañjali has of a grammatical derivation.

This picture can be applied without great difficulty to a large number of Pāṇinian derivations. A simple example is the derivation of *bhavati*, the third person singular present tense of the root *bhū* 'be, become'. The form *bhavati* is the end product of a number of steps, in each of which an operation takes place that is determined by the situation at hand:

bhū-lAṬ	
bhū-tiP	3.4.78 **tiptasjhisipthasthamibvasmas…**
bhū-ŚaP-tiP	3.1.68 **kartari śap**
bhū-a-ti	1.3.9 **tasya lopaḥ**
bho-a-ti	7.3.84 **sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoḥ**
bhav-a-ti	6.1.78 **eco 'yavāyāvaḥ**

The substitution of *av* for *o* in the last step can only take place here, and not earlier, for only here the sound *o* has made its appearance which can then be replaced by *av*. Similarly, the elision of markers can only take place once they have made their appearance; one might squabble about whether elision should take place immediately after the appearance of the marker or somewhat later, but this does not change the fact

[867] Mahā-bh I p. 39 l. 18; tr. Thieme.

[868] Mahā-bh I p. 137, l. 13-14 & 23-26: *kim idaṃ kāryavipariṇāmād iti/ kāryā buddhiḥ sā vipariṇamyate/ … evam ihāpy astir asmā aviśeṣeṇopadiṣṭaḥ/ tasya sarvatrāstibuddhiḥ prasaktā/ so 'ster bhūr bhavatīty astibuddhyā bhavatibuddhiṃ pratipadyate/ tataḥ sa paśyati buddhyāstiṃ cāpakṛṣyamāṇaṃ bhavatiṃ cādhīyamānam/ nitya eva ca svasmin viṣaye 'stir nityo bhavatir buddhis tv asya vipariṇamyate/*. Tr. Deshpande 1997: 103.

that this elision does not need to know what happened earlier or what is going to happen later. One may also wonder whether substitution of *o* for *ū* in *bhū*, so as to arrive at *bho*, must take place before or after *ŚaP* has been inserted; in both cases *bhū* is followed by a *sārvadhātuka* suffix, so that both situations fulfil the requirements of P. 7.3.84 **sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoḥ**. Whatever the answer to this question, it is clear that substitution of *o* for *ū* does not need to know anything about the earlier and later stages of the derivation.

As is well known, many of the technical discussions of Pāṇinian grammar concern issues like the ones just mentioned. Often they are about situations in which two or more rules apply simultaneously. The question that they try to resolve is: which of the two or three rules that apply takes precedence? The discussions are often complex, but a number of general principles stand out. I present them in a form that I have copied from a handout accompanying a lecture by S. D. Joshi and Paul Kiparsky during a presentation at the Pāṇini Workshop in honour of S. D. Joshi, held at Stanford University in March 2002:

a. Rules apply at any opportunity, unless something prevents it. If rule A can feed rule B (create new inputs to B), it does.
b. If more than one rule is applicable to a form, A supersedes B under the following conditions, in order of increasing strength:
   (1) if A follows B in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (A is *para*),
   (2) if A bleeds (eliminates inputs to) B, but not vice versa (A is *nitya*),
   (3) if A is conditioned internally to B (A is *antaraṅga*),
   (4) if the inputs to which A is applicable are a proper subset of the inputs to which B is applicable (A is *apavāda*).

This brief characterisation — point b of which can be considered a translation of Paribhāṣā 38 in Nāgeśa's *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*: **pūrvaparanityāntaraṅgāpavādānām uttarottaraṃ balīyaḥ** — shows that, according to the traditional view, decisions concerning the continuation of a grammatical derivation at any particular point are taken on the basis of the situation at hand. More specifically, no information about the earlier or later stages of the derivation is required to make a correct decision at any particular stage.

In reality this linear approach is often confronted with difficulties. Sometimes an awareness of what precedes in a derivation seems to be necessary. There are also derivations where knowledge of what will come later appears to be essential. We will consider a number of cases of both kinds, and study how Patañjali deals with them. We begin with some derivations of the first kind.

Knowledge of what precedes

George Cardona observed in 1970 (p. 53) that a rule such as P. 3.4.86 (**er uḥ** [**loṭaḥ** 85]) — which substutes *tu* for *ti* which is itself a substitute of *loṭ*, as in *paca-tu* derived from *paca-ti* — shows that Pāṇini considered the derivation history of elements pertinent to operations affecting them. This may be true, but there are reasons to think that Patañjali did not like looking back in the course of a derivation. The following is a discussion of all the passages where he uses the ‘notion of what came before’.

(i) Consider the derivation of *avadāta*, past passive participle of the root *daiP*, with marker *P*. The derivation can take the following form:

(1) *ava-daiP-Kta*
(2) *ava-dai-ta* 1.3.9 **tasya lopaḥ**
(3) *ava-dā-ta* 6.1.45 **ād eca upadeśe 'śiti**
avadāta

This derivation presents Patañjali with a problem. The verbal root *daiP*, once it takes the form *dā* in situation (3) by P. 6.1.45, should be called *ghu* by P. 1.1.20 **dādhā ghv adāp**. This in its turn would have the undesired consequence that *dad* must be substituted for *dā* by P. 7.4.46 **do dad ghoḥ**, so that the correct form *avadāta* would not be obtained. The common sense solution to this problem lies in the circumstance that the root *daiP*, and therefore *dā* in situation (3) of the derivation, cannot be called *ghu*, since the expression *adāp* in sūtra P. 1.1.20 **dādhā ghv adāp** prevents this. For Patañjali the situation is less simple. Since for him the elision of the marker *P* has already taken place in situation (2), nothing in situation (3) prevents the application of P. 1.1.20 **dādhā ghv adāp**. The form *dā* that appears in situation (3) is not therefore *dāP*, and nothing prevents it from being considered *ghu*.

At this point Patañjali proposes that wherever elements with markers are involved, the notion of what came before must be taken into account (*etac cātra yuktaṃ yat sarveṣv eva sānubandhakagrahaṇeṣu bhūtapūrvagatir vijñāyate/*).[869] As a result the marker *P* will not be forgotten in situation (3), and the form *dā* which occurs there will be known to have that marker, and therefore to be really *dāP*. The exception *adāp* in sūtra 1.1.20 **dādhā ghv adāp** will as a result prevent the form *dā* in situation (3) from being considered *ghu*.

Patañjali's proposal starts from the assumption that elision of the marker *P* (by 1.3.9 **tasya lopaḥ**) precedes the substitution of *ā* for *ai* (by P. 6.1.45 **ād eca upadeśe 'śiti**). To justify this particular order Patañjali adds the phrase: *anaimittiko hy anubandhalopas tāvaty eva bhavati.* This means no doubt: "For the elision of markers, being without cause, takes place first of all."[870]

All this agrees with, or comes close to, the common sense understanding of the derivation of *avadāta*. However, it has obliged Patañjali to postulate that knowledge of preceding stages in the derivation is needed in order to proceed correctly at a subsequent stage. And this is not to his liking. He therefore makes a different suggestion. He proposes acceptance of a special rule — which he claims Pāṇini "makes known" (*jñāpayati*) elsewhere in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* — that has the form **nānubandhakṛtam anejantatvam**. This rule lives on as Paribhāṣā 7 of Nāgeśa's *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*, and has been translated by Kielhorn (1874: 36) in the following way: "[A root which, when destitute of anubandhas, ends in either *e* or *o* or *ai*, must] not [be considered] to have ceased to end in either *e* or *o* or *ai*, when an anubandha has been attached to it." Patañjali's proposal only makes sense on the assumption that the derivation of *avadāta* will follow a different order this time, viz.:

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[869] Mahā-bh I p. 76 l. 10-11 (on P. 1.1.20 vt. 9).
[870] Cp. the French translation of Pierre Filliozat (1976: 89): "Car l'amuïssement, sans cause d'application, des indices se réalise en tout premier lieu."

(1) *ava-daiP-Kta*
(2) *ava-dāP-ta* 6.1.45 **ād eca upadeśe 'śiti**
(3) *ava-dā-ta* 1.3.9 **tasya lopaḥ**
avadāta

Elision of the marker *P* follows this time the substitution of *ā* for *ai*.

Patañjali does not explain how attribution of the technical designation *ghu* to *dā* is prevented at stage (3). Whatever may have been his answer to this question (which is not recorded in the *Mahābhāṣya*), it is clear that his second proposal is meant to circumvent the requirement of needing to know what happened earlier in the derivation.

It seems however that even this second proposal does not fully satisfy Patañjali, for he comes up with a third one: *avadāta* is not derived from the root *daiP*, but from *dāP*. We are not going to try to follow Patañjali in all this. For our purposes it is sufficient to note that Patañjali was obviously not happy with the idea that an awareness of earlier stages of a derivation might be required to bring it to a good end.

(ii) The elision of markers gives rise to difficulties elsewhere, too. Patañjali deals with the difficulties that occur in the derivation of *gomān*. The relevant part of the derivation of this form is:

go-matUP-sU
go-mat-s 1.3.9 **tasya lopaḥ** (3x)
go-māt-s 6.4.14 **atvasantasya cādhātoḥ**
go-mā-nUṬ-t-s 7.1.70 **ugidacāṃ …**
go-mā-n 8.2.23 **saṃyogāntasya lopaḥ** (2x)

Patañjali discusses this derivation under sūtra 6.4.14 **atvasantasya cādhātoḥ**. The first part of this sūtra, *atu*, covers suffixes like *ḌavatU* and *KtavatU*, but should also include *matUP*. This last suffix, however, contains *atUP*, not just *atU*. A *vārttika* therefore proposes that a special mention must be made of suffixes that have *P* as marker.

Patañjali disagrees and points out that once the marker *P* is elided by 1.3.9 **tasya lopaḥ**, what is left is *atU*, which is precisely the form mentioned in the sūtra. At that point the suffix is no longer *atupanta*, but has become *atvanta*. This proposed solution gives, of course, rise to the objection that in a similar manner the suffix will no longer be *atvanta* once the marker *U* is elided. Patañjali responds feebly that by taking into consideration the notion of what was there before (viz. *atU*), this last problem is solved, but this only leads to the reproach that this same procedure takes us back to *atUP*.[871]

It is not necessary to study the way in which Patañjali tries to solve the problem here. It is clear that here, at any rate, he plays with *bhūtapūrvagati*, the notion of what was there before, but does not in the end accept it.

[871] Mahā-bh III p. 183 l. 25 - p. 184 l. 4 (on P. 6.4.14 vt. 1): *tat tarhy upasaṃkhyānaṃ kartavyam/ na kartavyam/ pakāralope kṛte nātubantaṃ bhavaty atvantam eva/ yathaiva tarhi pakāralope kṛte nātubantam evam ukāralope 'pi kṛte nātvantam/ nanu ca bhūtapūrvagatyā bhaviṣyaty atvantam/ yathaiva tarhi bhūtapūrvagatyātvantam evam atubantan api/ evaṃ tarhy āśrīyamāṇe bhūtapūrvagatir atvantaṃ cāśrīyate nātubantam// na sidhyati/.*

(iii) This resistance on the part of Patañjali is confirmed by other passages in the *Mahābhāṣya*. The idea that the notion of what came before has to be taken into account pops up in Patañjali's comments on P. 1.1.56 vt. 21. Here the derivation of the form *āttha* is discussed. The relevant part of this derivation is as follows (cp. Joshi & Roodbergen 1990: transl. p. 105):

...
brū-si
āh-tha 3.4.84 **bruvaḥ pañcānām ādita āho bruvaḥ**
āth-tha 8.2.35 **āhas thaḥ**
āt-tha 8.4.55 **khari ca**
āttha

The difficulty which presents itself in this derivation is that P. 7.3.93 **bruva īṭ** prescribes the augment *īṬ* after *brū* and before a *sārvadhātuka* ending beginning with a consonant. Since *āh* is substituted for *brū*, it must be treated like *brū* by P. 1.1.56 **sthānivad ādeśo 'nalvidhau**. The ending *tha*, moreover, clearly begins with a consonant, so that the incorrect form **āhītha* seems hard to avoid. However, if one were to proceed like this, sūtra 8.2.35 **āhas thaḥ** would no longer have any use. The fact that this sūtra nevertheless has its place in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* obliges us to draw some conclusion. But which one exactly?

Here Patañjali (on P. 1.1.56 vt. 21) puts the following thought into the mouth of an opponent. This rule 8.2.35 **āhas thaḥ** has been formulated in order to let us know that the notion of what came before must be taken into account.[872] P. 8.2.35 prescribes substitution of final *h* of *āh* by *th*, if an ending beginning with a consonant included in the *pratyāhāra jhal* follows. After adding the augment *īṬ*, the ending will be *ītha* and will no longer begin with such a consonant. But at an earlier stage of the derivation the ending was still *tha*, and did begin with a consonant included in the *pratyāhāra jhal.* According to the opponent, therefore, P. 8.2.35 can be applied, presumably leading to some such incorrect form as **āthītha*.

Patañjali disagrees, of course. As a matter of fact, he uses the occasion to criticise the principle that the notion of what came before must be taken into account. If that principle were valid, not only the ending *tha*, but all endings before which *āh* is substituted for *brū* will have to be considered as beginning with a consonant included in the *pratyāhāra jhal*, for these five endings are substituted for *tiP*, *tas*, *jhi*, *siP* and *thas* respectively, each of which begins with such a consonant. That being the case, Pāṇini might as well immediately have substituted *āth* for *brū* in sūtra 3.4.84, which would then read: ***bruvaḥ pañcānām ādita ātho bruvaḥ**. The fact that Pāṇini has not formulated the sūtra in this manner shows that the opponent was wrong to begin with, and that the difficulty has to be resolved differently. It also shows that Patañjali, in this case too, has no sympathy for the idea that earlier stages of a derivation should be taken into consideration in subsequent ones.[873]

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[872] Mahā-bh I p. 139 l. 14: *asti hy anyad etasya vacane prayojanam/ kim/ bhūtapūrvagatir yathā vijñāyeta/.*
[873] Mahā-bh I p. 139 l. 15-16: *yady evaṃ thavacanam anarthakaṃ syāt/ āthim evāyam uccārayet/ bruvaḥ pañcānām ādita ātho bruva iti/.*

(iv) The *Mahābhāṣya* evokes the same principle in the context of P. 6.1.177 **nām anyatarasyām**, which optionally prescribes the udātta accent for the genitive plural ending *nām* in certain circumstances. This accent should, for example, be given to the final syllable *nām* of *agnīnām*, the genitive plural of *agni*. The relevant steps of the derivation are:

agni-ām	
agni-nUṬ-ām	7.1.54 **hrasvanadyāpo nuṭ**
agnī-nām	6.4.3 **nāmi**
agnī-nām	6.1.177 **nām anyatarasyām**

The difficulty in this derivation is that in 6.1.177 **nām anyatarasyām** there is *anuvṛtti* of *hrasvāt* (from 6.1.176 **hrasvanuḍbhyāṃ matup**). The ending *nām* in *agnīnām* does not however follow a short vowel. And a discussion brings to light that sūtra 6.1.177 cannot be applied to any example where *nām* does follow a short vowel. Patañjali therefore proposes that the notion of what was there before must be taken into account. The final *i* of *agni* was short, and this earlier circumstance has to be taken into account, so that sūtra 6.1.177 can be applied to *agnīnām*.[874]

Patañjali's subsequent discussion shows that, once again, he is not happy with the idea of taking into account earlier stages of the derivation. He settles for an interpretation of sūtra 6.1.177 in which the udātta accent is optionally prescribed for *nām* when it follows a word whose final vowel is short before the altogether different suffix *matUP*. Patañjali's interpretation raises serious questions as to his use of *anuvṛtti* — the nominative *matup* of the preceding sūtra appears here as the locative *matau* — but it is clear that he prefers this forced interpretation of 6.1.177 to making use of knowledge of earlier stages in the same derivation.[875]

The same derivation is at the centre of another discussion in the *Mahābhāṣya*, this one under P. 6.4.3 **nāmi**. The question here is why this sūtra is formulated **nāmi** rather than ***āmi**. It turns out that in the latter case, at the stage *agni-ām*, lengthening of *i* (by the modified sūtra 6.4.3 ***āmi**) would have precedence over adding *nUṬ* (by 7.1.54 **hrasvanadyāpo nuṭ**), because the former rule would be *nitya*. The discussion further shows that there would in that case be no use for sūtra 7.1.54. At his point Patañjali suggests that the notion of what was there before might have to be taken into account: *nUṬ* can then be added to *agnī-ām* because the *i* of *agni* was short at an earlier stage.

This time Patañjali does not explicitly reject this line of reasoning. That does not mean that he pronounces the rule 6.4.3 **nāmi** badly formulated. No, he passes on to another justification of the formulation given by Pāṇini: this particular formulation has been chosen in view of the later rule **nopadhāyāḥ**. It is hard to conclude with certainty whether or not Patañjali here accepted the reasoning based on the notion of what was there before as valid.

(v) Patañjali has occasion to invoke the principle under sūtra 6.3.66 **khity anavyayasya**. This sūtra prescribes shortening of the final vowel of a stem when followed by an

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[874] Mahā-bh III p. 109 l. 8-9: *āhāyaṃ hrasvāntād iti na ca nāmi hrasvānto 'sti tatra bhūtapūrvagatir vijñāsyate/ hrasvāntaṃ yad bhūtapūrvam iti/.*

[875] Mahā-bh III p. 109 l. 20-21: *athavā naivaṃ vijñāyate nāmsvare matau hrasvagrahaṇaṃ kartavyam iti/ kathaṃ tarhi/ nāmsvare matau hrasvād iti vartata iti//.*

uttarapada whose suffix has the marker *KH*. This accounts for forms like *kāliṃmanyā* "a woman who considers herself Kālī". The relevant part of the derivation is as follows:

kālī-man-KHaŚ	3.2.83 **ātmamāne khaś ca**
kālī-man-ŚyaN-KHaŚ	3.1.69 **divādibhyaḥ śyan**
kālī-mUM-man-ya-KHaŚ	6.3.67 **arurdviṣadajantasya mum**
kālim-man-ya-KHaŚ	6.3.66 **khity anavyayasya**
kāliṃmanyā	other rules

Patañjali does not tell us why he introduces *mUM* before considering shortening of *ī* in *kālī*, but we may assume that the fact that P. 6.3.67 comes after P. 6.3.66 and is therefore *para* with regard to the latter made him decide so.[876] The difficulty with this derivation is that *ī* is no longer the final vowel of *kālī* once the augment *mUM* has been added to it. Patañjali, after having explored some other possibilities first, proposes that the notion of what was there before should be taken into account.[877]

I am not sure whether I have fully understood Patañjali's remaining discussion on this sūtra. He concludes it with the statement: *tasmāt pūrvoktāv eva parihārau*, which I find particularly puzzling. This means something like "Therefore the two refutations mentioned earlier [must be accepted]". I have not been able to identify the two refutations mentioned earlier. However that may be, it seems clear that Patañjali's proposal to take into account the notion of what was there before is part of a line of argument which he subsequently abandons.

(vi) Sūtra 7.2.37 **graho 'liṭi dīrghaḥ** is meant to account for forms like *grahītā*, with long *ī*. This is only possible, it is objected, if there is *anuvṛtti* in this sūtra of *iṭaḥ*, the genitive singular of *iṬ*. This however is problematic, because the only *iṬ* used in the preceding sūtras is a nominative singular *iṭ* in P. 7.2.35 **ārdhadhātukasyeḍ valādeḥ**. The question therefore presents itself whether *anuvṛtti* of the two genitives *ārdhadhātukasya* and *valādeḥ* might suffice to arrive at the correct form. The derivation of *grahītā* passes through the following stages:

(1) *grah-tā*	
(2) *grah-iṬ-tā*	7.2.35 **ārdhadhātukasyeḍ valādeḥ**
(3) *grah-ī-tā*	7.2.37 **graho 'liṭi dīrghaḥ**

At stage (2) the root *grah* is indeed followed by an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix, but this suffix does not begin with a sound included in the *pratyāhāra val*, because it now begins with short *i*. However, at the preceding stage (1) the suffix began with *t*, which is included in *val*. Patañjali therefore suggests that the problem is solved by taking into account the notion of what was there before.[878]

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[876] This also appears to be Nāgeśa's position.

[877] Mahā-bh III p. 165 l. 22-23: *athavā khiti hrasvo bhavatīty ucyate/ khity anantaro hrasvabhāvī nāstīti kṛtvā bhūtapūrvagatir vijñāsyate/ ajantaṃ yad bhūtapūrvam iti//.*

[878] Mahā-bh III p. 294 l. 14-16 (on P. 7.2.37 vt. 6): *ārdhadhātukasyeti vartate/ grahaḥ parasyārdhadhātukasya dīrghatvaṃ vakṣyāmi/ ihāpi tarhi prāpnoti/ grahaṇam grahaṇīyam/ valāder iti vartate/ evam api grahītā grahītum atra na prāpnoti/ bhūtapūrvagatyā bhaviṣyati//.*

In what follows it is clear that Patañjali is not happy with this solution. In the end he accepts that *iṭaḥ* has to be understood in P. 7.2.37, to be explained by *anuvṛtti* with changed case-ending of *iṭ* from P. 7.2.35.

(vii) An equally hypothetical context is provided by the discussion of *daridrā* under sūtra 7.2.67 **vasv ekājādghasām**. This sūtra prescribes the augment *iṬ* before *vasU* after, among other things, a root having but one vowel. The formulation of this sūtra gives rise to doubts, for clearly the expression *ekāc* is meant to concern roots that have but one vowel after reduplication. It concerns forms like *pecivān*, not *bibhidvān*. Yet this special condition is not stated.

At some point in the discussion Patañjali proposes that the mention of *āt* in the sūtra shows that reduplicated roots are concerned, for there are no non-reduplicated roots in *ā* that have more than one vowel. This, an opponent points out, is not true. The root *daridrā* ends in *ā* and has more than one vowel. It is true that this *ā* is elided in the situation where P. 7.2.67 might apply. This elision, as P. 6.4.114 vt. 2 specifies, is *siddha* with regard to the prescription of suffixes. Patañjali on P. 7.2.67 adds that this elision is also *siddha* with regard to the prescription of the augment *iṬ*. All this means that *daridrā* cannot count in this context as a case of a root in *ā* that has more than one vowel. The opponent is not disheartened. He insists that, also in this specific context, it is a root in *ā* having more than one vowel if one takes into account the notion of what was there before.[879]

It is not clear to what extent Patañjali takes this argument seriously. He abandons the discussion of *daridrā* in order to concentrate on another indication which presumably shows that reduplicated roots with one vowel are intended in P. 7.2.67.

(viii) One more hypothetical context is evoked in the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 7.3.83 **jusi ca**. This sūtra is meant to account for the substitution of guṇa for *u* in the derivation of *ajuhavuḥ*. The relevant part of this derivation is as follows:

hu-lAṄ	
hu-jha	3.4.78 **tiptasjhi…**
hu-ŚaP-jha	3.1.68 **kartari śap**
hu-Ślu-jha	2.4.75 **juhotyādibhyaḥ śluḥ**
hu-hu-Ślu-jha	6.1.10 **ślau**
hu-hu-jha	1.1.61 **pratyayasya lukślulupaḥ**
hu-hu-Jus	3.4.109 **sijabhyastavidibhyaś ca**
aṬ-hu-hu-Jus	6.4.71 **luṅlaṅlṛṅkṣv aḍ udāttaḥ**
a-hu-ho-Jus	7.3.83 **jusi ca**
a-hu-hav-us	6.1.78 **eco 'yavāyāvaḥ**
a-ju-hav-us	8.4.54 **abhyāse car ca**
etc.	

[879] Mahā-bh III p. 300 l. 21-25 (on P. 7.2.67 vt. 1): *yat tarhy ākāragrahaṇaṃ karoti na hi kaścid akṛte dvirvacana ākārānto 'nekāj asti/ nanu cāyam asti daridrātiḥ/ na daridrāter iṭā bhavitavyam/ kiṃ kāraṇam/ uktam etad daridrāter ārdhadhātuke lopaḥ siddhaś ca pratyayavidhāv iti/ yaś cedānīṃ pratyayavidhau siddhaḥ siddho 'sāv iḍvidhau/ evam api bhūtapūrvagatir vijñāyate/ ākārānto yo bhūtapūrva iti/.*

For reasons that do not concern us at present, Patañjali proposes to read P. 7.3.83 as ***ajusi ca** and to understand in it *śiti* from 7.3.75 **ṣṭhivuklamucamāṃ śiti.** The problem in this case is that P. 7.3.83 would not then be applicable to forms like *ajuhavuḥ*, because *hu* is not followed by something that has the marker *Ś* at the stage where it is to be replaced by *ho*. But at an earlier stage of the derivation *hu* was followed by *Ślu*, which did have that marker. Patañjali therefore proposes to take into account the notion of what was there before. This then turns out to be in need of some further specification. In the end Patañjali abandons the idea of reading sūtra 7.3.83 in this strange manner, and with it his proposal to take into account the notion of what was there before.[880]

(ix) One passage remains which, though not actually using the expression *bhūtapūrvagati* like the preceding ones, appears to refer to the same idea. This passage presents itself in the form of a *ślokavārttika* under P. 7.1.9 **ato bhisa ais**, which prescribes the substitution of *ais* for *bhis* in the derivation of forms such as *vṛkṣais*, the instrumental plural of *vṛkṣa* 'tree'. The *ślokavārttika* concerned reads: *ettvaṃ bhisi paratvāc ced ata ais kva bhaviṣyati/ kṛta ettve bhautapūrvyād ais tu nityas tathā sati//.* Joshi & Roodbergen (2003: 29) translate this as follows: "If the substitution of *e* (for a stem-final *a* is applied) before *bhis* (by P. 7.3.103 [**bahuvacane jhaly et**]) because it is the later rule (in relation to P. 7.1.9), then (the question is) where will *ais* (by P. 7.1.9) have scope? Even if the substitution of *e* has been applied (first, still) *ais* (can be applied) on account of its coming earlier (than *e*). This being so, (P. 7.1.9 becomes) *nitya* 'invariably applicable'."

Joshi & Roodbergen then explain this passage in the following words (p. 29-30):

> [A]t the stage *vṛkṣa* + *bhis* two rules become applicable simultaneously, namely, P. 7.1.9 (*ais* in place of *bhis*) and P. 7.3.103 (*e* in place of the stem final *a*). This is a two-way conflict in the sense that whichever rule we apply first, the other rule will be debarred. The point is that P. 7.3.103 is conditioned by a suffix beginning with a *jhaL* sound (any consonant except a nasal). Once *bhis* has been replaced by *ais*, there is no *jhaL* sound any more. Now, to solve this conflict, suppose we invoke P. 1.4.2 [**vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam**], as is done by tradition. Accordingly, P. 7.3.103 will prevail over P. 7.1.9. The form derived will be *vṛkṣebhiḥ*, instead of *vṛkṣaiḥ*. The consequence is that now the substitution of *ais* is left without scope of application. In other words, P. 7.1.9 will be *anavakāśa*. Being *anavakāśa*, it must prevail. That seems to clinch the matter.
>
> In the second line, first *pāda*, of the *Ślokavārttika* another solution is offered. The argument turns on what is called *bhūtapūrvagati* 'the understanding of something that was there in an earlier stage. ... The something meant here is the stem final *a*, like in *vṛkṣa* + *bhis*. We will now assume that even after the application of P. 7.3.103 (*vṛkṣe* + *bhis*) that stem-final *a* is still there. Therefore P. 7.1.9 can be applied. But, as stated in the second line, second *pāda*, this amounts to assuming that P. 7.1.9 has the character of a *nitya* rule which is to be applied irrespective of any other rule.

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[880] Mahā-bh III p. 335 l. 12-14 (on P. 7.3.83 vt. 1): *evaṃ tarhi śitīti vartate/ evam api ajuhavuḥ abibhayur ity atra na prāpnoti/ bhūtapūrvagatyā bhaviṣyati/ na sidhyati na hy us śidbhūtapūrvaḥ/ us śidbhūtapūrvo nāstīti kṛtvosi yaḥ śidbhūtapūrvas tasmin bhaviṣyati// athavā kriyate nyāsa eva/ ...*

Once again, the use of *pūrvabhūtagati* is here completely hypothetical. The main interest of this passage lies in the circumstance that the device of looking backward is here not proposed by Patañjali, but by the author of a *ślokavārttika*. Since nothing is known about the authorship of the *ślokavārttika*s contained in the *Mahābhāṣya*, it is not easy to evaluate the significance of this fact.

The above analysis of all the passages of the *Mahābhāṣya* that use the expression *bhūtapūrvagati* "notion of what was there before" allows us to conclude with great likelihood that Patañjali never accepts as his own the point of view which permits the use of knowledge of what happened at earlier stages of a derivation. The temptation to do so is nevertheless great, as these discussions show. They also show that Patañjali was aware that such knowledge might be useful to assure the correct development of a derivation. Yet he is against it. On one occasion, as we have seen (iii), he goes to the extent of explicitly criticising this point of view.

Knowledge of what follows

To the extent possible, in Patañjali's opinion a derivation should only make use of the information that is available at each specific stage. Knowledge of what was there before is, where possible, avoided. The same is true for knowledge about following stages. One does not, in principle, need to know what form is being derived, nor indeed what future stages will have to be passed through, in order to carry out a correct derivation. The rules and meta-rules of grammar will all by themselves lead the derivation to the correct result.

This is Patañjali's ideal. This ideal is all the more interesting in that Joshi & Kiparsky have recently argued that "lookahead" — i.e., knowledge of future stages of a derivation — is required to obtain correct results. This is not the place to examine Joshi & Kiparsky's position. I will rather concentrate on some passages where Patañjali's attempt not to use lookahead is confronted with serious difficulties.

(i) Joshi & Kiparsky draw attention to the fact that the tradition did not manage to avoid lookahead altogether. They specifically cite in this connection Paribhāṣā 64 from Nāgeśa's *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*, which reads: **upasaṃjaniṣyamāṇanimitto 'py apavāda upasaṃjātanimittam apy utsargaṃ bādhate** "An *apavāda* supersedes, even though the causes of its (application) are still to present themselves, a general rule the causes of which are already present" (tr. Kielhorn). This Paribhāṣā is mentioned by Nāgeśa in the context of the discussion of the derivation of *dadhati* "they put". Joshi & Kiparsky contrast the in their view correct derivation of this word with a wrong one:

Correct derivation		Wrong derivation	
dhā-jhi		*dhā-jhi*	
dhā-ŚaP-jhi	3.1.68 **kartari śap**	*dhā-ŚaP-jhi*	3.1.68 **kartari śap**
dhā-(ślu)-jhi	2.4.75 **juhotyādibhyaḥ śluḥ**	*dhā-ŚaP-anti*	7.1.3 **jho 'ntaḥ**
da-dhā-jhi	6.1.10 **ślau**, etc.	*dhā-(ślu)-anti*	2.4.75 **juhotyādibhyaḥ śluḥ**
da-dhā-ati	7.1.4 **ad abhyastāt**	*da-dhā-anti*	6.1.10 **ślau**, etc.
dadhati	(other rules)	**dadhanti*	(other rules)

They conclude: "Application of 7.1.3-4 must be deferred until reduplication has taken effect. This crucially requires lookahead."

Paribhāṣā 64 agrees, and with it at least part of the traditional commentators. This does not however include the *Mahābhāṣya*. Paribhāṣā 64 does not occur in this text. Nāgeśa attributes it to the 'modern' (*navīna*) grammarians, which means, according to his commentator Pāyaguṇḍa, to [Bhaṭṭoji] Dīkṣita etc. The question that interests us at present is: How did the *Mahābhāṣya* deal with the difficulties connected with the derivation of *dadhati*?

The *Mahābhāṣya* does not discuss this derivation. In order to find out what Patañjali thinks about the kind of difficulties that arise in the derivation of *dadhati*, we must stay a little longer with Nāgeśa to study what more he has to say about it.[881] In dealing with the difficulties, Nāgeśa first introduces two other Paribhāṣās. These read:

Pbh. 62: **pūrvaṃ hy apavādā abhiniviśante paścād utsargāḥ**
Pbh. 63: **prakalpya vāpavādaviṣayaṃ tata utsargo 'bhiniviśate**

Kielhorn offers the following translation, which is however influenced by Nāgeśa's specific interpretation:

> "*Apavāda*s, it is certain, are considered first (in order to find out where they apply); afterwards the general rules (are made to take effect in all cases to which it has thus been ascertained that the *Apavāda*s do not apply.)"
> "Or (we may say that) first all (forms) which fall under the *Apavāda* are set aside, and that subsequently the general rule is employed (in the formation of the remaining forms)."

The newly created Paribhāṣā 64 is supposedly based upon these two Paribhāṣās.

The statements known as Paribhāṣās 62 and 63 in the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* occur a number of times in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, not however as Paribhāṣās but as ordinary sentences. They invariably occur together, and appear to be connected by the word *ca* rather than *vā*.[882] The resulting combined sentence is:

> *pūrvaṃ hy apavādā abhiniviśante paścād utsargāḥ/ prakalpya cāpavādaviṣayaṃ tata utsargo 'bhiniviśate/*

Joshi & Roodbergen (1981: 43) translate this as follows:

> "because special rules become effective first (and) general rules (only) afterwards, and after we have formed an idea of the domain of the special rule the general rule becomes effective".

Most contexts in which these sentences occur are of no particular interest for us at present, but the following passage is.

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[881] Cp. Bronkhorst 1986: 133-35.

[882] See Joshi & Roodbergen 1981: 43, fn. 156. Ashok Aklujkar has given a lecture about these two Paribhāṣās at the annual meeting of the American Oriental Society in 2003 (Nashville); he appears to prefer the reading *vā*.

Under P. 4.1.89 vt. 2 (Mahā-bh II p. 240 l. 24-25) we find, exceptionally, the sentences *pūrvaṃ hy apavādā abhiniviśante paścād utsargāḥ* and *prakalpya cāpavādaviṣayaṃ tata utsargo 'bhiniviśate* separated from each other. The case discussed here is not altogether dissimilar to that of *dadhati* studied above, as will become clear below. It concerns the derivation of forms like *gārgīyāḥ* 'students of the descendants of Garga'

The general rule here is P. 2.4.64 **yañañoś ca**, which prescribes *luk*-elision in the plural of the suffix *yaÑ* used in the formation of *gārgya* 'descendent of Garga'. The plural of *gārgya* is therefore *gargāḥ* 'descendents of Garga'. A difficulty arises in the formation of *gārgīya* 'student of a descendent of Garga', with the suffix *CHa* (= *īya*, by P. 7.1.2) prescribed by P. 4.2.114 **vṛddhāc chaḥ**. As long as one sticks to the singular there is no problem. However, in the formation of *gārgīyāḥ* 'students of descendants of Garga', P. 2.4.64 threatens to take away the suffix *yaÑ* by *luk*-elision, leaving *garga* instead of *gārgya*. *Garga*, unlike *gārgya*, is not called *vṛddha* (see P. 1.1.73 **vṛddhir yasyācām ādis tad vṛddham**), and cannot therefore take the suffix *CHa*. The situation is supposedly saved by P. 4.1.89 **gotre 'lug aci**, which prohibits *luk*-elision before certain suffixes beginning with a vowel, and which is therefore an exception to P. 2.4.64. This gives rise to the following scheme:

Correct derivation		Wrong derivation
gārgya		*gārgya*
gārgya-cha	4.2.114 **vṛddhāc chaḥ**	*gārgya-luk 2.4.64* ***yañañoś ca***
gārgya-īya	7.1.2 **āyaneyīnīyiyaḥ phaḍhakhachaghāṃ**	*garga*
gārgya-(aluk)-īya	4.1.89 **gotre 'lug aci**	*The suffix CHa cannot be added at this point*
gārgy-īya	6.4.148 **yasyeti ca**	
gārgīya	6.4.151 **āpatyasya ca taddhite 'nāti**	

If one accepts lookahead, application of 2.4.64 (with its exception 4.1.89) must be deferred until *CHa* (= *īya*) has been added. This is not however the way in which the Bhāṣyakāra explains the situation. Patañjali offers in fact three ways to deal with this derivation:
(i) By teaching *aluk* before a *taddhita* suffix beginning with a vowel, Pāṇini indicates that *luk* and *aluk* must apply simultaneously.[883]
(ii) *Aluk* takes effect at the point of the derivation where *luk* applies; in this way the suffix *CHa* connected with *aluk* is known.[884] Here Patañjali adds: *pūrvaṃ hy apavādā abhiniviśante paścād utsargāḥ.*
(iii) *Luk* waits for *aluk* to apply; in this way *aluk* before *CHa* is established.[885] Patañjali adds: *prakalpya cāpavādaviṣayaṃ tata utsargo.*

If we inspect Patañjali's words carefully, and take care to avoid reading these words in the light of their interpretation by later commentators, we do not find in them anything resembling lookahead. It is not suggested that we need to know **what** will

[883] Mahā-bh II p. 240 l. 21-22 (on P. 4.1.89 vt. 2): *yad ayaṃ bhūmni prāptasya luko 'jādau taddhite 'lukaṃ śāsti taj jñāpayaty ācāryaḥ samānakālāv etāv aluglukāv iti.*
[884] Mahā-bh II p. 240 l. 24-25 (on P. 4.1.89 vt. 2): *yadi vā lukaḥ prasaṅge 'lug bhavati tathāsya cchaḥ prasiddho bhavati.*
[885] Mahā-bh II p. 241 l. 2-3 (on P. 4.1.89 vt. 2): *lug vā punar alukaḥ prasaṅgaṃ yadi pratīkṣate tathāsya cche 'luk siddho bhavati.*

happen later in the derivation, merely that we do not use a rule until the circumstances have arrived that also give scope to its exception. In other words, Patañjali appears to treat this case on a purely step-by-step basis, without lookahead. And yet, a case very similar to this one — the derivation of *dadhati* — is cited both by Joshi & Kiparsky and by Nāgeśa and other late grammarians in support of lookahead.

(ii) Joshi & Kiparsky illustrate the need for lookahead with the help of two examples. The first one is the derivation of *seduṣaḥ*, the genitive singular of the perfect participle of *sad* 'sit' (nom. sg. *sedivān*). Since this derivation is not discussed in the *Mahābhāṣya*, we turn immediately to the second example, the derivation of *aupyata* "it was sowed". The correct derivation of this form is:

vap-laṄ	
vap-ta	(at this point one must choose 3.1.67)
vap-yaK-ta	3.1.67 **sārvadhātuke yak**
up-ya-ta	6.1.15 **vacisvapiyajādīnāṃ kiti**
ā-up-ya-ta	6.4.72 **āḍ ajādīnām**
aupyata	(other rules)

The following derivation is incorrect:

vap-laṄ	
vap-ta	(if we choose 6.4.71, the wrong form is derived)
a-vap-ta	6.4.71 **luṅlaṅlṛṅkṣv aḍ udāttaḥ**
a-vap-yaK-ta	3.1.67 **sārvadhātuke yak**
a-up-ya-ta	6.1.15 **vacisvapiyajādīnāṃ kiti**
**op-ya-ta*	(other rules)

In this derivation the augment must "wait" for the correct root form, which does not however present itself until after the affixation of *yaK*.

Patañjali recognises the problematic nature of the derivation of *aupyata* and resorts to a *ślokavārttika* that recommends various adjustments of Pāṇini's grammar so as to make the *vṛddhi*-substitution of *a-u* possible.[886] Interestingly, the *Kāśikā* under P. 6.4.72 offers a different solution, making use of Paribhāṣā 43 (counted as in Nāgeśa's *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*: **śabdāntarasya prāpnuvan vidhir anityo bhavati**). Patañjali knows and uses this Paribhāṣā, but not in the present context. It is however clear that both solutions for the derivation of *aupyata* — that of the *Mahābhāṣya* and that of the *Kāśikā* — try to propose a way in which the correct form will be obtained without lookahead.

(iii) Consider next the derivations of *āyan* "they went" and *āsan* "they were". Joshi & Kiparsky present these as demonstrating Pāṇini's awareness of lookahead. This derivation passes through the following steps:

i-laṄ	
i-anti	
i-an	(up to this point, the desired augment *ā* could be derived by 6.4.72 **āḍ ajādīnām**)

[886] Mahā-bh III p. 208 l. 17 ff. (on P. 6.4.74).

y-an 6.4.81 **iṇo yaṇ**
āyan 6.4.72 **āḍ ajādīnām** (in virtue of 6.4.22 **asiddhavad atrā bhāt**)

Joshi & Kiparsky explain:

> Before a consonant, 6.4.71 **luṅlaṅlṛṅkṣv aḍ udāttaḥ** requires a short augment *a-*. The desired *ā* could be derived prior to applying 6.4.81, but "lookahead" precludes that. To get *ā-*, both 6.4.81 and 6.4.72 have been put into a section where all rules are *asiddha[vat]* with respect to each other (the *ā bhāt* section 6.4.22 ff.). Accordingly we "pretend" that the root still begins with a vowel. There was no other reason for putting the rules into that section. This shows that Pāṇini assumed ... lookahead ... .

The derivation of *āsan* is similar:

as-laṄ
as-anti
as-an (up to this point, the desired augment *ā* could be derived by 6.4.72 **āḍ ajādīnām**)
s-an 6.4.111 **śnasor allopaḥ**
āsan 6.4.72 **āḍ ajādīnām** (in virtue of 6.4.22 **asiddhavad atrā bhāt**)

These two derivations are referred to several times in the *Mahābhāṣya*.[887] Under P. 6.4.22 **asiddhavad atrā bhāt** Patañjali rejects the notion that one purpose of this sūtra is to allow the formation of *āsan* (as maintained by Joshi & Kiparsky, as we have seen). On the contrary, according to Patañjali, Pāṇini's grammar contains an indication that shows that prefixing *ā* is stronger than dropping *a*, and therefore takes place before the latter spoils the derivation.[888] No lookahead is required if we accept Patañjali's solution. The same applies to the other 'solutions' which he offers in this context to account for *āsan*, *āyan* and other forms. In other words, Patañjali has found a way to avoid Joshi & Kiparsky's conclusion to the extent that the derivations of *āyan* and *āsan* show Pāṇini's awareness of lookahead.

(iv) Patañjali is less successful in warding off lookahead under sūtra 4.1.90 **yūni luk**. A problem arises in the derivation of *phāṇṭāhṛtāḥ* 'students of the *yuvan*-descendent of Phāṇṭāhṛti'.[889] Phāṇṭāhṛti is himself the (*gotra-*)descendent of Phāṇṭāhṛta,[890] but this is less important in the present context. The *yuvan*-descendent of Phāṇṭāhṛti is also called

[887] Mahā-bh I p. 143 l. 19 ff. (on P. 1.1.57); III p. 188 l. 5 ff. (on P. 6.4.22 vt. 5); III p. 209 l. 10 ff. (on P. 6.4.74 vt. 2).
[888] Mahā-bh III p. 188 l. 9-10 (on P. 6.4.22 vt. 5): *astilopas tāvan na prayojayati/ ācāryapravṛttir jñāpayati lopād āḍ balīyān iti yad ayaṃ śnasanor allopaḥ* [P. 6.4.111] *iti taparakaraṇaṃ karoti/*. Cp. Geiger 1909: 224.
[889] "[T]he word [*yuvan*] is given as a technical term in grammar in the sense of one, who is the son of the grandson or his descendant, provided his father is alive; the term is also applied to a nephew, brother, or a paternal relative of the grandson or his descendant, provided his elderly relative, if not his father, is alive; it is also applied to the grandson, in case respect is to be shown to him; cf. P. 4.1.163-167." (Abhyankar & Shukla 1977: 317 s.v. *yuvan*).
[890] "The word [*gotra*] is used by Pāṇini in the technical sense of a descendant except the son or a daughter; cf. ... P. 4.1.162." (Abhyankar & Shukla 1977: 144 s.v. *gotra*).

Phāṇṭāhṛta, formed with the suffix *Ṇa* by P. 4.1.150 **phāṇṭāhṛtimimatābhyāṃ ṇaphiñau**. The students of this last Phāṇṭāhṛta are called *phāṇṭāhṛtāḥ*; this word is formed through the *luk*-elision of *Ṇa* (by P. 4.1.90 **yūni luk**), and the subsequent adding of *aṆ* (by P. **iñaś ca**). The derivation unites in this way the following elements:

phāṇṭāhṛti-(luk of Ṇa)-aṆ

The difficulty is that *luk* of *Ṇa* takes place because a *prāgdīvyatīya* suffix beginning with a vowel follows (*anuvṛtti* of *aci* in 4.1.90 from the preceding rule). But the specific suffix *aṆ* — which does begin with a vowel — is conditioned by the fact that it is added to a stem in *iÑ*, which is not the case until *Ṇa* has been elided.[891] How does Patañjali solve this problem?

Patañjali proposes the following solution. The locative *aci* in P. 4.1.90 **yūni luk (aci)** is not a locative which makes known that a suffix beginning with a vowel (*ac*) follows (it is not a *parasaptamī*); it is rather a *viṣayasaptamī*, which means something like 'locative of scope'. When a suffix beginning with a vowel is the scope and *luk*-elision has been carried out, the suffix that obtains should be added.[892]

Patañjali does not clearly say what he means by all this. At first sight it would seem that here he does consider that later stages of the derivation have to be taken into account during an earlier one. In other words, it would seem that in this case Patañjali, perhaps under duress, accepts and uses lookahead.[893]

Before we draw this conclusion it will be wise to see how Patañjali uses the expression *viṣayasaptamī* elsewhere in his *Mahābhāṣya*. He does so on three other occasions. On one of those, the 'locative of scope' is the locative of the one word of P. 2.4.35 **ārdhadhātuke**. If this had been a *parasaptamī*, there would be a difficulty in the derivation of *bhavyam*, which would become *bhāvyam* instead. The crucial step is the substitution of *bhū* for *as* by P. 2.4.52 in which *ārdhadhātuke* is still valid from P. 2.4.35. This difficulty has been explained in detail by Joshi & Roodbergen (2000: 60-61), whom I quote here:

> [On the *parasaptamī* alternative], instead of *bhavyam* we would derive *bhāvyam* as follows:
>
> | | | | |
> |---|---|---|---|
> | A. | (1) *as-* | + *ṆyaT* | P. 3.1.124 |
> | | (2) *bhū-* | + *ya* | P. 2.4.52 |
> | | (3) *bhau* | + *ya* | P. 7.2.115 |

[891] Here we seem to be confronted with a case of circularity (or mutual dependence) which is not altogether dissimilar to what we found above in connection with the introduction of *pratyāhāra*s. The consequences of this for the 'extended *siddha*-principle' cannot here be explored.

[892] Mahā-bh II p. 242 l. 21-23 (on P. 4.1.90 vt. 2): *acīti naiṣā parasaptamī/ kā tarhi/ viṣayasaptamī/ ajādau viṣaya iti/ tatrāci viṣaye luki kṛte yo yataḥ pratyayaḥ prāpnoti sa tato bhaviṣyati/.*

[893] This would agree with Joshi & Roodbergen 1971: transl. p. 3 fn. 1: "Patañjali often raises the question whether a particular locative is *viṣayasaptamī* or *parasaptamī*. The difference is that in the first case the grammatical operation is applied even if the environmental factor is not present in the first stage of the *prakriyā*, but is added only afterwards. ... So *viṣayasaptamī* means: first apply the rule, then add the environmental element, ..." Note that Patañjali uses the expression *viṣayasaptamī* only four times in his *Mahābhāṣya*.

(4) *bhāv*	+ *ya*		P. 6.1.79
(5) (*bhāv*	+ *ya*)	+ *sU*	P. 4.1.2
(6) (*bhāv*	+ *ya*)	+ *am*	P. 7.1.24
(7) *bhāv*	+ *yam*		P. 6.1.107
bhāvyam.			

The point is that in this derivation the *ārdhadhātuka* suffix *ṆyaT* is added immediately in the first stage of the derivation. This is possible, because by P. 3.1.124 *ṆyaT* must be added after a verbal base ending in a consonant, in our case, the *s* of *as-*.

On the other hand, the assumption that *ārdhadhātuke* is a *viṣayasaptamī* leads to the desired result, as follows:

B.

(1) *as-*			
(2) *bhū-*			P. 2.4.52
(3) *bhū*	+ *yaT*		P. 3.1.97
(4) *bho*	+ *ya*		P. 7.3.84
(5) *bhav*	+ *ya*		P. 6.1.78
(6) (*bhav*	+ *ya*)	+ *sU*	P. 4.1.2
(7) (*bhav*	+ *ya*)	+ *am*	P. 7.1.24
(8) *bhav*	+ *yam*		P. 6.1.107
bhavyam.			

Here the point is that the verbal base substitution takes place before the *ārdhadhātuka* suffix is actually added. Now *ṆyaT* cannot be added in the second stage of the *prakriyā*, because *bhū-* does not end in a consonant. On the other hand, the suffix *yaT* is added by P. 3.1.97. This rule says that *yaT* is to be added after a verbal base ending in a vowel.

In the then following pages Joshi & Roodbergen give a detailed analysis of the *vārttika*s and Bhāṣya on P. 2.4.35. They conclude (p. 64): "Apparently, Kātyāyana is convinced that *ārdhadhātuke* is a *parasaptamī*. That is why he proposes to change the rule. The idea of *viṣayasaptamī* seems not to be known to Kātyāyana, or at least not under that name. ... Patañjali, on the other hand, is acquainted with *viṣayasaptamī* ..."

Joshi & Roodbergen then explain in more detail what the *viṣayasaptamī* position is believed to accomplish in the *Mahābhāṣya* passage under consideration (p. 64-65):

> Let us return to the difficulty to remove which Kātyāyana wants to rephrase the rule and Patañjali has recourse to *viṣayasaptamī*. The difficulty arises in the derivation of *bhavya* stated under ... A, above, which requires the substitution of *bhū-* for *as-*. By P. 1.1.56 *bhū-* is considered *sthānivat* 'like the original', except when a grammatical operation is conditioned by a speech sound. The addition of the *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes *ṆyaT* and *yaT* is conditioned by a speech sound, namely, a consonant and a vowel occurring in final position of the verbal base respectively. Since in this respect *bhū-* is not *sthānivat* and since it ends in a vowel, we can only add *yaT* by P. 3.1.97. This gives us the desired form, namely, *bhavya*. But the difficulty starts with the *parasaptamī* interpretation of

> *ārdhadhātuke*. This requires the presence of an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix before *as-* can be replaced by *bhū-*. Since *as-* ends in a consonant, this suffix can only be *ṆyaT*, by P. 3.1.124. Consequently, we derive the form *bhāvya*, which is not the desired form.
>
> The *viṣayasaptamī* interpretation of *ārdhadhātuke* intends to remove this difficulty by taking into account the *ārdhadhātuka* suffix required at a later stage in the derivation, namely, the suffix *yaT*. Thereby the introduction of a specifier *ārdhadhātuka* suffix in the first stage of the *prakriyā* is postponed. In other words, taking into account the change or changes required at a later stage, in our case, the *ajanta* quality of the verbal base, the *viṣayasaptamī* interpretation maintains that for the replacement of *as-* by *bhū-* the mere assumption of an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix is sufficient. Only later on, after the replacement of *as-* by *bhū-* has taken place, the *ārdhadhātuka* suffix is specified.

Joshi & Roodbergen's formulation is somewhat confusing, because it contains expressions suggesting lookahead ("taking into account the *ārdhadhātuka* suffix required at a later stage in the derivation, namely, the suffix *yaT*") beside others that don't ("the *viṣayasaptamī* interpretation maintains that for the replacement of *as-* by *bhū-* the mere assumption of an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix is sufficient"). Patañjali's precise formulation does not allow us to decide with certainty whether he here accepts lookahead or not. (Mahā-bh I p. 484 l. 6-7 (on P. 2.4.35 vt. 5): *asati paurvāparye viṣayasaptamī vijñāsyate/ ārdhadhātukaviṣaya iti/ tatrārdhadhātukaviṣaye jagdhyādiṣu kṛteṣu yo yataḥ prāpnoti pratyayaḥ sa tato bhaviṣyati/*) It is however clear that an interpretation of his words is possible in which lookahead is not required: the mere assumption of an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix is responsible for the substitution of *bhū-* for *as-*; the precise form of the *ārdhadhātuka* suffix is determined subsequently.

A similar reasoning can be applied to the third passage where Patañjali uses the expression *viṣayasaptamī*. It here concerns the word *ārdhadhātuke* in P. 3.1.31 **āyādaya ārdhadhātuke vā**.[894]

Perhaps Patañjali's most revealing use of the term *viṣayasaptamī* occurs under P. 3.1.26 **hetumati ca**. Here the question is raised whether the locative *hetumati* qualifies the meaning of the suffix to be added (*Ṇic*) or the meaning of the stem, i.e. the verbal root, to which it is to be added. The preliminary position is that, as a locative, it should qualify the meaning of the suffix; if it qualified the meaning of the stem, an ablative would have been required.[895] Patañjali rejects this argument in the following words:[896]

> "This is not the case. For here (in this grammar) *viṣayasaptamī*s, too, are [used]. For example, [one can say:] 'a nominal stem that expresses measure (*pramāṇe*)';

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[894] Mahā-bh II p. 41 l. 17-19 (on P. 3.1.31 vt. 4): *ārdhadhātuka iti naiṣā parasaptamī/ kā tarhi/ viṣayasaptamī/ ārdhadhātukaviṣaya iti/ tatrārdhādhātukaviṣaya āyādiprakṛter āyādiṣu kṛteṣu yo yataḥ pratyayaḥ prāpnoti sa tato bhaviṣyati/.*

[895] Mahā-bh II p. 31 l. 7-10 (on P. 3.1.26): *katham idaṃ vijñāyate/ hetumaty abhidheye ṇij bhavatīti/ āhosvid dhetumati yo dhātur vartata iti/ yuktaṃ punar idaṃ vicārayitum/ nanv anenāsaṃdigdhena pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇena bhavitavyaṃ yāvatā hetumatīty ucyate/ yadi hi prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇaṃ syād dhetumata ity evaṃ brūyāt/.*

[896] Mahā-bh II p. 31 l. 10-12 (on P. 3.1.26): *naitad asti/ bhavantīha hi viṣayasaptamyo 'pi/ tad yathā/ pramāṇe yat prātipadikaṃ vartate striyāṃ yat prātipadikaṃ vartata iti/ evam ihāpi hetumaty abhidheye ṇij bhavati hetumati yo dhātur vartata iti jāyate vicāraṇā/.*

> 'a nominal stem that denotes a woman (*striyām*)'. In the same way also here (in this grammar) [one can say:] 'when the meaning *hetumat* is to be expressed, there is [the suffix] *Ṇic*', 'a verbal root that is expressive of [the meaning] *hetumat*'. This is why a doubt arises."

In this passage Patañjali uses the expression *viṣayasaptamī* in order to refer to meaning conditions expressed by the locative. But if this is what the expression means here, its meaning in the three remaining cases where it is used cannot be very different.

On two occasions the *Mahābhāṣya* paraphrases a sūtra word in the locative by adding *viṣaye*. The word *saṃjñāyām* in P. 5.2.23 is paraphrased as *saṃjñāyāṃ viṣaye* (Mahā-bh II p. 375 l. 4). In view of the preceding passage this may be understood to mean "when a *saṃjñā* is to be expressed", or more generally "when it concerns a *saṃjñā*".[897] However, there is a subtle difference between the locative *hetumati* in P. 3.1.26 and *saṃjñāyām* in P. 5.2.23 and many other sūtras. The meaning *hetumat* belongs to the verbal root to which a suffix will be added; Patañjali specifies this quite cleary, saying: *hetumati yo dhātur vartate*. The term *saṃjñāyām*, on the other hand, does not apply to the stem, but to the result of combining stem with suffix. This is the reason why Patañjali makes a general statement about the way *saṃjñāyām* in sūtras is to be understood:[898] "In the [rules] which are prescribed *saṃjñāyām*, [this term] is not understood as *saṃjñāyām abhidheyāyām* 'when a *saṃjñā* is to be expressed', but rather as follows: 'if by [the stem] ending in the suffix a *saṃjñā* is understood'." In spite of initial appearances to the contrary, this passage *does* say that *saṃjñāyām* means "when a *saṃjñā* is to be expressed" (but not by the stem alone, of course), and this is clearly presented as equivalent to *saṃjñāyāṃ viṣaye*.[899] The paraphrase *chandasi viṣaye* (Mahā-bh II p. 64 l. 19) for the word *chandasi* understood in P. 3.1.85 (from 84) clearly means: "when it concerns Vedic usage".

Elsewhere in his *Mahābhāṣya* Patañjali speaks of the three kinds of location (*adhikaraṇa*), which is what is primarily expressed by the locative. Location, he states there, can be covering (*vyāpaka*), touching (*aupaśleṣika*), or *vaiṣayika*.[900] The term *vaiṣayika* is derived from *viṣaya*. The third kind of location therefore concerns the *viṣaya*, the scope. It is however interesting to note that Patañjali, in presenting these three kinds of location, evidently talks about the non-technical use of the locative. Patañjali's use of the expression *viṣayasaptamī*, too, may therefore refer to a non-technical use of the locative. Such a non-technical use of the locative — which can often be translated in English with the help of some such term as 'concerning' — is indeed well-known and frequently used in Sanskrit.

In view of these considerations, we may conclude that the word *ārdhadhātuke* in sūtras 2.4.35 and 3.1.31, being a *viṣayasaptamī*, means, in Patañjali's opinion, something like "when it concerns an *ārdhadhātuka* [suffix]". A meaning condition, too, can be

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[897] I propose no translation for the difficult term *saṃjñā*, but refer to Candotti (2006) for a detailed discussion.

[898] Mahā-bh II p. 68 l. 2-4 (on P. 3.1.112 vt. 3): *athavā ya ete saṃjñāyāṃ vidhīyante teṣu naivaṃ vijñāyate saṃjñāyām abhidheyāyām iti/ kiṃ tarhi/ pratyayāntena cet saṃjñā gamyata iti/.*

[899] Candotti (see above) draws attention to a passage in the *Kāśikā* on P. 5.1.62 which shows that this much later commentary clearly distinguishes between *abhidheyasaptamī* and *viṣayasaptamī*: *abhidheyasaptamy eṣā, na viṣayasaptamī.*

[900] Mahā-bh III p. 51 l. 8-9: *adhikaraṇaṃ nāma triprakāraṃ vyāpakam aupaśleṣikaṃ vaiṣayikam iti.*

expressed with the help of a *viṣayasaptamī*, because here, too, that particular non-technical use of the locative is involved. If our analysis of Patañjali's understanding of the term *viṣayasaptamī* is correct, this term is not used to indicate that this or that grammatical element will appear later on in the derivation. Patañjali rather falls back on this ordinary use of the locative where the technical grammatical interpretation of this case (the *parasaptamī*) confronts him with insuperable difficulties. This technical grammatical use of the locative confronts him with insuperable difficulties in certain cases, precisely because he insists that the following element has to be there at the moment the next step is taken. For those who accept that lookahead is an essential part of Pāṇini's grammar, no such requirement can be made.

It is open to question whether Patañjali's trick to return to the ordinary use of the locative solves his problems. More recent grammarians in the Pāṇinian tradition treat the *viṣayasaptamī* itself as something like a technical term, which is used when lookahead seems unavoidable to them. It is difficult to state with confidence what Patañjali may have thought about these for him difficult cases. It is, however, certain that he does not explicitly admit that lookahead is needed, even here. He suggests that the ordinary use of the locative, rather than its technical grammatical use, will do the job. We have seen that it doesn't.[901]

(v) In four passages Patañjali introduces the notion of 'future designation' (*bhāvinī saṃjñā*) in order to deal with difficulties similar to the ones which he resolves with the help of a *viṣayasaptamī*. All these passages contain the following comparison:[902]

> Take an example: Someone says to some weaver: "weave a cloth out of this thread". He (i.e., the weaver) thinks: if it is (already) a cloth, it is not (still) to be woven. But if it is (still) to be woven, it is not a cloth. (To say,) it is (still) to be woven and it is a cloth becomes contradictory. Certainly, what he means is a designation (viz., 'cloth') yet to come (*bhāvinī saṃjñā*). That, I think, is to be woven, which, when woven, becomes the (thing called) cloth.[903]

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[901] J. A. F. Roodbergen (1991, esp. p. 310 ff.) argues that *sārvadhātuke* in P. 1.3.67 may have been meant as a *viṣayasaptamī* by Pāṇini. Perhaps one should say that Patañjali does not use this expression in this context because he had more successfully succeeded in forcing the cases covered by this sūtra into his preferred scheme of derivations.

[902] Mahā-bh I p. 112 l. 10-13 (on P. 1.1.45 vt. 3); I p. 275 l. 6-8 (on P. 1.3.12 vt. 2); I p. 394 l. 13-16 (on P. 2.1.51 vt. 4); II p. 113 l. 18-21 (on P. 3.2.102 vt. 2): *tad yathā/ kaścit kaṃcit tantuvāyam āha/ asya sūtrasya śāṭakaṃ vayeti/ sa paśyati yadi śāṭako na vātavyo 'tha vātavyo na śāṭakaḥ śāṭako vātavyaś ceti vipratiṣiddham/ bhāvinī khalv asya saṃjñābhipretā sa manye vātavyo yasminn ute śāṭaka ity etad bhavatīti/*. Tr. Joshi & Roodbergen 1971: 35-36.

[903] Statements like this ("weave a cloth", "make a pot", etc.) occupied the minds of practically all philosophers of the early centuries of the Common Era, and led them to adopt various ontological and other positions, such as *satkāryavāda*, *śūnyavāda*, *ajātivāda*, *anekāntavāda*, etc. (see below, § III.4.2). The fact that Patañjali is clearly untouched by the presupposition (the 'correspondence principle') that underlies all those philosophical discussions pleads for an early date of Patañjali, before this shared presupposition managed to take hold of all thinkers: brahmanical, Buddhist and Jaina (and including Bhartṛhari).

This example is meant to illustrate Patañjali's position according to which it is common, and therefore justified, to use a designation before it becomes applicable. This is supposed to avoid difficulties, as in the following case.[904]

The *Mahābhāṣya* discusses under P. 2.1.51 the possibility of formulating a rule of the form *dvigusaṃjñā pratyayottarapadayoḥ* "The designation *dvigu* is conditioned by the presence of a (*taddhita*-) suffix or of a final member". Both a *vārttika* and Patañjali's commentary agree that this might result in mutual dependence: the addition of the *taddhita*-suffix or of the final member is conditioned by the designation *dvigu*, and the designation *dvigu* is conditioned by the *taddhita*-suffix of the final member.[905] A subsequent *vārttika* (no. 4) claims that the problem has been resolved, but does not tell us how. Patañjali makes some suggestions, among them the one in which the comparison with the weaver plays a central role. It states that the designation *dvigu* is formed, "when that follows to which [later on], when it has resulted, the designations *pratyaya* 'suffix' and *uttarapada* 'final member' apply".[906]

Kaiyaṭa, followed by Joshi & Roodbergen, explains that the Bhāṣya means to say that the form *pratyayottarapadayoḥ* is a *viṣayasaptamī*. This is however open to question. Patañjali's formulation clearly indicates that the suffix or final member are in place at the time when the designation *dvigu* is formed. Only the **designation** *pratyaya* or *uttarapada* will be applied later. The example of the weaver presumably shows that no lookahead is required for this postponed designating.

One may wonder whether the solution of a 'future designation' is very convincing in this case. Patañjali himself may not have thought so, for he immediately turns to another solution of the problems surrounding P. 2.1.51, in which Pāṇini's own formulation (with *taddhitārtha*-) is then shown to be acceptable. The 'future designation' plays a role in the middle of the debate, but appears to be ultimately abandoned.

Something similar can be said about two of the remaining three passages that invoke the comparison with the weaver (on P. 1.1.45 vt. 3 and on P. 1.3.12 vt. 2).

The last passage that makes use of the expression *bhāvinī saṃjñā* occurs under P. 3.2.102.[907] Here, too, there is a problem of mutual dependence: the technical term *niṣṭhā* must apply to the suffixes *Kta* and *KtavatU* that are already there (by P. 1.1.26 *ktaktavatū niṣṭhā*), and these same two suffixes are brought into existence by the technical term *niṣṭhā* (by P. 3.2.102 *niṣṭhā [bhūte]*).[908] Patañjali proposes as solution to look upon the term *niṣṭhā* as a "future designation" (*bhāvinī saṃjñā*): "Those two [suffixes] are used to express the past which, after having come into existence, will [later on] obtain the technical designation *niṣṭhā*."[909] Here, as elsewhere, one may wonder whether this circularity would have disturbed Pāṇini, or indeed whether this is really a case of

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[904] See Joshi & Roodbergen 1971: 22 ff. for details.

[905] Once again we are confronted with the question whether perhaps Pāṇini was not disturbed by this kind of circularity; see above.

[906] Mahā-bh I p. 394 l. 17-18 (on P. 2.1.51 vt. 4): *evam ihāpi tasmin dvigur bhavati yasyābhinirvṛttasya pratyaya uttarapadam iti caite saṃjñe bhaviṣyataḥ.*

[907] Cp. Scharfe 1961: 89-90.

[908] Mahā-bh II p. 113 l. 3-4: *satoḥ ktaktavatvoḥ saṃjñayā bhavitavyaṃ saṃjñayā ca ktaktavatū bhāvyete tad etad itaretarāśrayaṃ bhavati.*

[909] Mahā-bh II p. 113 l. 21-22: *tau bhūte kāle bhavato yayor abhinirvṛttayor niṣṭhety eṣā saṃjñā bhaviṣyati.*

circularity.[910] It is, however, clear that Patañjali was disturbed by this presumed case of circularity, and that he was determined to get rid of it, by hook or by crook.

Knowledge of the final outcome

At this point we must consider passages where Patañjali appears to opt for influence of the form to be derived on the shape of the derivation to be chosen.[911] I am referring to the passages where he interprets the word *para* in P. 1.4.2 **vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam** to mean *iṣṭa* 'desired'. In other words, at a stage of a derivation where two rules are in conflict, the operation that is desired must be carried out. The situation has been presented by Franz Kielhorn in the following manner (1887a: 129):

> In 1.4.2 Pāṇini prescribes that of two conflicting rules the subsequent (*para*) rule, in the order of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī,* shall take effect in preference to the preceding rule. Now Kātyāyana on various occasions shows that Pāṇini's rule is not universally true, and he points out a number of *pūrva-vipratiṣedha*s, i.e. instances in which the preceding rule must take effect in preference to the subsequent rule. According to Patañjali, on the other hand, the special rules given by Kātyāyana are unnecessary, and the objections of that grammarian only show that he has not fully understood the word *para* in P. 1.4.2. *Para*, amongst other things, also means 'desired' (*iṣṭa*), and what Pāṇini really teaches is, that of two conflicting rules it is the *desired* rule that should take effect ...

What is a desired rule? Kielhorn proposes the following explanation: "i.e. that rule, whatever be its position in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī,* the application of which will lead to correct words". He then adds his comments: "Here ..., then, we ought to possess a perfect knowledge of the language, if we would rightly apply the rules of Pāṇini's grammar."[912]

It is to be noted that Kielhorn's comments go well beyond what Patañjali explicitly states. According to Patañjali, in a number of situations the desired rule should take effect. He does not say by whom that rule is desired. Kielhorn concludes that it is the rule desired by the grammarian who desires to arrive at correct forms, but that is neither stated nor even suggested by Patañjali. It is much more in keeping with Patañjali's general approach to understand these remarks differently. The desired rule is the rule desired by Pāṇini. How do we know which is the rule desired by Pāṇini? From tradition. And how do we know which is the traditional position with regard to these specific derivations? By asking Patañjali.

Patañjali is never shy to impose the view which he considers traditional to solve otherwise irresolvable problems. This is most clearly the case where he cites the phrase **vyākhyānato viśeṣapratipattir na hi saṃdehād alakṣaṇam**. This is Paribhāṣā 1 in a number of treatises on Paribhāṣās, including Nāgeśa's *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*;[913] but it is first of all a Paribhāṣā that Patañjali frequently cites in his *Mahābhāṣya*. It means, in Kielhorn's translation (1874: 2): "The precise (meaning of an ambiguous term) is

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[910] See Scharfe 1961: 90.
[911] See also Scharf 2013.
[912] Similarly Cardona 1970: 61.
[913] Not in all, as Brill (2013) points out in her dissertation.

ascertained from interpretation, for (a rule), even though it contain an ambiguous term, must nevertheless teach (something definite).” The ‘interpretation’ in Kielhorn's rendering, which translates the Sanskrit *vyākhyāna*, is the traditional explanation, not just any explanation which a reader might feel like applying.[914]

Readers of Nāgeśa's *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* will remember that the Jñāpaka of the Paribhāṣā **vyākhyānato viśeṣapratipattir na hi saṃdehād alakṣaṇam** is the double use of the marker *Ṇ* in the *Śivasūtra*s. Without explanation this double use can only give rise to confusion, because the precise meaning of the *pratyāhāra*s *aṆ* and *iṆ* will be ambiguous. Pāṇini — according to Patañjali — has introduced this ambiguity in order to make clear to the users of the grammar that in case of doubt they depend on the traditional explanation. In this particular case they are informed that the *pratyāhāra iṆ* is to be understood with the second marker *Ṇ*, whereas *aṆ* must be understood with the first marker *Ṇ* except in the case of sūtra 1.1.69 **aṇudit savarṇasya cāpratyayaḥ**. For our purposes it is important to note that Patañjali does not reconstruct, on the basis of the desired outcome, what *aṆ* and *iṆ* should mean. Quite the contrary, he authoritatively provides the traditional interpretation of these two expressions, an interpretation which, as he suggests, comes directly from Pāṇini. In other words, the desired outcome of a derivation does not determine for Patañjali how a rule should be understood, neither here nor anywhere else.

Let us now return to Patañjali's proposed interpretation of *para* in P. 1.4.2 **vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam**. In certain cases, he maintains, *para* means *iṣṭa* ‘desired’. In view of Patañjali's general approach toward derivations, this cannot but mean that the choice of one rule at the expense of another that applies at the same time is *desired by Pāṇini*, and has nothing to do with the readers judgement as to what is the correct outcome.[915] When, therefore, Kielhorn states that that rule is desired, whatever be its position in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī,* the application of which will lead to correct words, he expresses a truism. But when he adds that we ought to possess a perfect knowledge of the language, if we would rightly apply the rules of Pāṇini's grammar, he is mistaken. We do not need to know the correct outcome of a derivation in order to correctly apply the rules of Pāṇini's grammar. On the contrary, we arrive at the correct outcome if we strictly follow his rules, along with the traditional explanation that comes along with them. This traditional explanation contains information as to which rules will have preference in specific situations.

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[914] Patañjali explains his understanding of the word *vyākhyāna* in the following passage (Mahā-bh I p. 11 l. 20-23; on Paspaśāhnika vt. 11): *na hi sūtrata eva śabdān pratipadyante/ kiṃ tarhi/ vyākhyānataś ca/ nanu ca tad eva sūtraṃ vigṛhītaṃ vyākhyānaṃ bhavati/ na kevalāni carcāpadāni vyākhyānaṃ vṛddhiḥ āt aij iti/ kiṃ tarhi/ udāharaṇaṃ pratyudāharaṇaṃ vākyādhyāhāra ity etat samuditaṃ vyākhyānaṃ bhavati/* “... the words are not just known from *sūtra* ‘the rules’. Then how (do we know them)? From *vyākhyāna* ‘explanation’ also. But isn't it true that this very *sūtra* ‘(body of) rules’, when divided up (into its constituent words) becomes the *vyākhyāna* ‘explanation’? The mere (separate) words resulting from *carcā* ‘(the process of) repeating (the words of a given text)’, as *vṛddhi*, *āt*, *aic* do not constitute *vyākhyāna* ‘explanation’. Then (in) what (does *vyākhyāna* consist)? (In) *udāharaṇa* ‘example’, *pratyudāharaṇa* ‘counterexample’, (and) *vākyādhyāhāra* ‘completion of the utterance (by supplying words)’. All of that taken together becomes the *vyākhyāna* ‘explanation’.” (tr. Joshi & Roodbergen 1986: 161-163.

[915] Cardona (1976: 191) understands Patañjali in the same way as Kielhorn, but disagrees with the former.

Consider next a few passages where Patañjali uses the device of interpreting *para* in the sense of *iṣṭa* 'desired'. A whole series of examples occurs under P. 7.1.95-96 vt. 10. We will consider two of these.

(i) The correct derivation of *jatune*, dative singular of the neuter word *jatu* 'lac', is essentially as follows:

jatu-Ṅe	4.1.2 **svaujas°**
jatu-nUM-e	7.1.73 **iko 'ci vibhaktau**
jatune	

The problem is that at the first stage another rule — 7.3.111 **gher ṅiti** — is applicable, which would substitute the *guṇa* vowel *o* for *u* of *jatu*. What is worse, 7.3.111 being *para* with regard to 7.1.73, it should have priority over the latter. To avoid this, P. 7.1.95-96 vt. 10 (*guṇavṛddhyauttvatṛjvadbhāvebhyo num pūrvavipratiṣiddham*) states that in this particular case the earlier rule has precedence. Patañjali is not of the opinion that such a special statement is necessary, for *para* here means *iṣṭa*.[916]

(ii) A similar problem arises in the formation of *atisakhīni*. Here the correct derivation

atisakhi-Jas	4.1.2 **svaujas°**
atisakhi-Śi	7.1.20 **jaśśasoḥ śiḥ** (and 1.1.42 **śi sarvanāmasthānam**)
atisakhi-nUM-i	7.1.72 **napuṃsakasya jhalacaḥ**
atisakhī-n-i	6.4.8 **sarvanāmasthāne cāsaṃbuddhau**

is jeopardised by sūtras 7.1.92 **sakhyur asaṃbuddhau** and 7.2.115 **aco ñṇiti**, which would substitute *vṛddhi* (= *ai*) for final *i* of *atisakhi*, instead of the addition of *nUM*. Once again the earlier rule has precedence according to Patañjali because *para* means *iṣṭa*.[917]

The same *vārttika* covers a number of further cases, all of which can be explained, Patañjali maintains, by understanding the word *para* in the sense *iṣṭa*. Patañjali cites this *vārttika* in advance under P. 1.4.2 **vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam**, and proclaims there already his view that in these cases the word *para* expresses the meaning *iṣṭa* (Mahā-bh I p. 306 l. 1-10; on P. 1.4.2. vt. 7).

Another example is the following. In the derivation of *vavṛte* from the root *vṛt* a dilemma presents itself. The relevant part of the derivation has the following shape:

vṛt - lIṬ	3.2.115 **parokṣe liṭ**
vṛt-vṛt-lIṬ	6.1.8 **liṭi dhātor anabhyāsasya**
vṛ-vṛt-lIṬ	7.4.60 **halādiḥ śeṣaḥ**
va-vṛt-lIṬ	7.4.66 **ur at**
va-vṛt-ta	3.4.78 **tiptasjhi…**
va-vṛt-eŚ	3.4.81 **liṭas tajhayor eśirec**

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[916] Mahā-bh III p. 275 l. 24 – p. 276 l. 5: *tatra guṇasyāvakāśaḥ/ agnaye vāyave/ numo 'vakāśaḥ/ trapuṇī jatunī/ ihobhayaṃ prāpnoti/ trapuṇe jatune// …// sa tarhi pūrvapratiṣedho vaktavyaḥ/ na vaktavyaḥ/ iṣṭavācī paraśabdaḥ/ vipratiṣedhe paraṃ yad iṣṭaṃ tad bhavatīti//*

[917] Mahā-bh III p. 275 l. 26 – p. 276 l. 1: *vṛddher avakāśaḥ/ sakhāyau sakhāyaḥ/ numaḥ sa eva* (i.e., *trapuṇī jatunī,* JB*)/ ihobhayaṃ prāpnoti/ atisakhīni brāhmaṇakulānīti// …* etc.

At this point two rules apply. P. 1.2.5 **asaṃyogāl liṭ kit** stipulates that the substitute for *lIṬ*, i.e. *eŚ*, has the marker *K*, which prevents substitution of *guṇa* or *vṛddhi* in *vṛt* by P. 1.1.5 **kṅiti ca**. On the other hand there is 7.3.86 **pugantalaghūpadhasya ca**, which prescribes substitution of *guṇa* for the vowel of *vṛt*. Patañjali on P. 1.2.5 points out that 1.2.5 is no exception (*apavāda*) to 7.3.86. The two rules therefore apply simultaneously, and contradict each other. If one applies in this situation P. 1.4.2 **vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam**, one would have to prefer 7.3.86 **pugantalaghūpadhasya ca** which occurs later in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and arrive at an incorrect form **vavarte*. In this situation Patañjali states that *para* means *iṣṭa* 'desired'. The desired rule in the situation is 1.2.5 **asaṃyogāl liṭ kit**, which leads to the correct form *vavṛte*.[918]

It is not necessary to consider all the passages where Patañjali uses this specific device. Sometimes it occurs in the middle of a debate in which it only plays a provisional role.[919] The main conclusion to be drawn is that Patañjali never explicitly states that we, the users of the grammar, are free to give precedence to the sūtra which we prefer. The 'desired' rule which has to be used in an ambiguous situation is the rule desired by Pāṇini, or perhaps one should say: by the tradition. This means that neither we nor indeed anyone else need to know which is the correct form to be attained at the end of the derivation. We simply must use, at each junction, the rule which is to be preferred, either because of some principle underlying Pāṇini's grammar, or because we know that that is the rule 'desired' by Pāṇini. The outcome will automatically be correct, and we do not need to worry about it.

Complications ignored

Patañjali does not always admit that the issue of linearity is open and can give rise to major complications. At times he proceeds as if the issue is resolved and a particular order is presupposed. An example is his mention of the forms *pradīvya* and *prasīvya* in his discussion of P. 1.1.56 **sthānivad ādeśo 'nalvidhau**. The correct derivation of these two forms, Patañjali claims, depends on the correct interpretation of that sūtra.[920] The correct derivation of *prasīvya* is as follows:[921]

pra-siv-Ktvā	3.4.21 **samānakartṛkayoḥ pūrvakāle**
pra-siv-LyaP	7.1.37 **samāse 'nañpūrve ktvo lyap**
pra-sīv-ya	8.2.77 **hali ca**
prasīvya	

Patañjali's concern is that *sthānivadbhāva* might treat the substitute *LyaP* like its substituend *Ktvā*, so that *iṬ* might then be prefixed to it by 7.2.35 **ārdhadhātukasyeṭ**

[918] Mahā-bh I p. 194 l. 14-16, on P. 1.2.5 vt. 2: *ihobhayaṃ prāpnoti/ vavṛte vavṛdhe/ paratvād guṇaḥ prāpnoti// idaṃ tarhy uktam iṣṭavācī paraśabdo vipratiṣedhe paraṃ yad iṣṭaṃ tad bhavatīti/.*
[919] The remaining passages are: Mahā-bh I p. 46 l. 14; p. 404 l. 26; II p. 237 l. 16; p. 279 l. 3-4; p. 337 l. 20; III p. 18 l. 1; p. 99 l. 12; p. 134 l. 16-17; p. 201 l. 5; p. 238 l. 10.
[920] Mahā-bh I p. 133 l. 13 f. (on P. 1.1.56).
[921] See Joshi & Roodbergen 1990: transl. p. 22 n. 89.

valādeḥ. The sūtra prescribes prefixing of *iṬ* to an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix beginning with *val*, i.e. with any consonant except *y*. The interpretation Patañjali proposes for P. 1.1.56 is meant to avoid this difficulty.

Patañjali does not mention that the same difficulty might occur at an earlier stage. Consider the following incorrect derivation:

pra-siv-Ktvā	
pra-siv-iṬ-Ktvā	7.2.35 **ārdhadhātukasyeṭ valādeḥ**
pra-siv-iṬ-LyaP	7.1.37 **samāse 'nañpūrve ktvo lyap**

This would give rise to incorrect **prasiviya*. By not mentioning this possibility, Patañjali avoids the issue.

Patañjali is equally taciturn in the case of the derivation of words like *yuṣmat*, the ablative plural of *yuṣmad*. Here the correct derivation is:[922]

yuṣmad-bhyas	4.1.2 **svaujas°**
yuṣmad-at	7.1.31 **pañcamyā at**
yuṣma-at	7.2.90 **śeṣe lopaḥ**
yuṣmat	

In this derivation there is no place for P. 7.2.86 **yuṣmadasmador anādeśe**, which prescribes substitution of long *ā* for final *d* of *yuṣmad* before an ending beginning with a consonant, except when the ending itself is a substitute. This accounts for forms like loc. pl. *yuṣmāsu*. However, at the first stage *yuṣmad-bhyas* there **is** an ending that begins with a consonant, viz. *bhyas*. How can P. 7.2.86 be prevented to apply here? Patañjali does not say a word about it.

The expression *anādeśe* in 7.2.86 **yuṣmadasmador anādeśe** needs to retain our attention somewhat longer. It would seem to imply that from Pāṇini's point of view substitution of a suffix has to precede any operations on the preceding stem.[923] That is to say, Patañjali might have used the presence of this expression *anādeśe* to argue that sūtra 7.2.86 cannot apply at the first stage *yuṣmad-bhyas*. Surprisingly, he does not do so. As a matter of fact, when commenting on this sūtra he states in so many words that the expression *anādeśe* is superfluous.[924] Elsewhere he tentatively suggests that this same expression makes known to us that substitutes are like their substituends.[925]

In practice, then, Patañjali's derivations are not always as smooth as he seems to pretend they are. Often he appears to contradict himself, as when he accepts or rejects a

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[922] Cf. Joshi & Roodbergen 1990: transl. p. 29.

[923] Alternatively, it might be understood as a confirmation of the importance of lookahead, as maintained by Joshi & Kiparsky.

[924] Mahā-bh III p. 304 l. 17-18 (on P. 7.2.89): *anādeśagrahaṇaṃ śakyam akartum/ katham/ halīty anuvartate na cānādeśo halādir asti// tad etad anādeśagrahaṇaṃ tiṣṭhatu tāvat sāṃnyāsikam//*. Renou (1942a: 334 s.v. *sāmnyāsika*) explains: "'conforme à la teneur originelle' du sū[tra] ... (dit d'un élément qui est à conserver, encore qu'on ne puisse le justifier)."

[925] Mahā-bh I p. 134 l. 2-4 (on P. 1.1.56 vt. 1): *evaṃ tarhy ācāryapravṛttir jñāpayati sthānivad ādeśo bhavatīti yad ayaṃ yuṣmadasmador anādeśe* (= P. 7.2.86) *ity ādeśapratiṣedhaṃ śāsti*.

paribhāṣā to suit his convenience.[926] But he tries to stick to his derivational model, whatever the difficulties.

Two linearities in conflict

It seems clear that Patañjali tries both to avoid looking back and looking ahead in explaining grammatical derivations. He is evidently determined to fit them into the straightjacket of linearity as he conceives of it. However, this brings him in conflict with a different principle of linearity, this one introduced by Pāṇini. The rules of the last three 'quarters' (*pāda*) of Pāṇini's grammar (P. 8.2.1 – 8.4.68) are ordered in such a way that these rules can only apply in order. This portion of the grammar is known by the name *Sapādasaptādhyāyī* ('Seven Adhyāyas plus one Pāda'), and the rule imposing rule ordering is P. 8.2.1: **pūrvatrāsiddham** "With regard to what precedes, each subsequent rule has not taken effect".[927] Patañjali comments also on this portion of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, and Małgorzata Sulich-Cowley has recently studied these in the doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Warsaw.[928] She comes to the conclusion that Patañjali was not interested in the precise meaning of the word *asiddha* and proposed alternative explanations of derivations, explanations that go against Pāṇini's intentions.

Rather than explaining the word *asiddha*, Patañjali reminds us under P. 8.2.1[929] what its purpose is: the word is here used *ādeśalakṣaṇapratiṣedhārtham utsargalakṣaṇabhāvārtham* "in order to prevent rules that depend on the substitute from taking effect, and to bring it about that rules that depend on the substituend take effect". This is in conflict with Pāṇini's intentions, as can be illustrated with the help of the derivation of *vakti*, Pres. 3. Sing. of *vac* 'speak'. The part of this derivation that interests us is: *vac-ti* > *vak-ti* (P. 8.2.30). P. 8.2.30 (**coḥ kuḥ**) prescribes, among other things, substitution of *k* for *c* when followed by a sound contained in the *pratyāhāra jhal*. However, P. 8.2.30 is not the only rule that finds the conditions for its application fulfilled in *vac-ti*. Another rule, P. 8.4.40 (**stoḥ ścunā ścuḥ**), does so too. It prescribes substitution of *c* for *t* on account of the preceding *c*. If we now follow Pāṇini's principle, there is no problem. In the situation *vac-ti* we apply P. 8.2.30, the first rule in the *Sapādasaptādhyāyī* that is applicable; this gives us *vak-ti*. P. 8.4.40, which comes later in that same section, is now no longer applicable, and *vakti* is and remains the final result.

Patañjali's interpretation of the principle (which he borrows from Kātyāyana) is less straightforward, and may even give incorrect results. In the particular case of *vac-ti* it does not tell us which rule should be applied first, P. 8.2.30 or P. 8.4.40. If we choose first to apply P. 8.2.30, there is no difficulty and the outcome is, here too, *vakti*. However, the situation is different if we first apply P. 8.4.40. This then leads to *vac-ti* > *vac-ci*. By Patañjali's principle, the next step should not depend on the substitute (*c* of *ci*), but rather on the substituend *t*. This allows P. 8.2.20 to apply, leading to *vak-ci*. The form **vakci* is incorrect, and certainly not the desired outcome of this derivation. And yet, its derivation is not in conflict with Patañjali's interpretation of the *asiddha*-principle.

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[926] See Ben-Dor 2012.
[927] See Bronkhorst 1980a; 1989c.
[928] Sulich-Cowley 2012.
[929] Mahā-bh III p. 386 l. 12-16, on P. 8.2.1. vt. 8. Patañjali here refers back to P. 6.1.86 vt. 1.

So far, so simple. Less simple is the question why Patañjali should abandon Pāṇini's principle and replace it with his own (and Kātyāyana's) far less satisfactory principle. The answer may, once again, and at least where Patañjali is concerned, lie in the way he thought about derivations.

For Patañjali, as we have seen, a derivation is a linear affair. What is more, each step in a derivation contains all the information needed to proceed to the next step. We may add that each step 'knows' all the Pāṇinian rules that it might need to proceed to that next step.

It is here that the shoe pinches for Patañjali. Pāṇini's *asiddha*-principle stipulates that certain rules are 'unknown' at specific stages of a derivation. The step *vac-ti* does not 'know' P. 8.4.40, so that its cannot proceed to *vac-ci*. This, it appears, is unacceptable to Patañjali. For him, the stage *vac-ti* should by itself be able to make a choice, choosing between the different options on the basis of the guiding principles of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Well, at this stage the application of P. 8.4.40 is among the available options.

A passage under P. 8.2.2 is interesting in this connection. This sūtra states, among other things, that the deletion of *n* by P. 8.2.7 is *asiddha* with respect to what precedes, before a *kṛt*-suffix, where technical terms are concerned.[930] P. 8.2.7 prescribed deletion of *n* that is the final sound of a stem that is also a *pada*.[931] Why should deletion of *n* be *asiddha* where technical terms are concerned? Patañjali discusses this question in the following passage:[932]

> *atha saṃjñāvidhau kim udāharaṇam/ pañca sapta/ pañca saptety atra nalope kṛte ṣṇāntā ṣaṭ iti ṣaṭsaṃjñā na prāpnoti/ asiddhatvād bhavati/*
> ***(vārttika 1:) saṃjñāgrahaṇānarthakyaṃ ca tannimittatvāl lopasyeti/***
> *saṃjñāgrahaṇaṃ cānarthakam/ kiṃ kāraṇam/ tannimittatvāl lopasya/ nākṛtāyāṃ ṣaṭsaṃjñāyāṃ jaśśasor lug na cākṛte luki padasaṃjñā na cākṛtāyāṃ padasaṃsaṃjñāyāṃ nalopaḥ prāpnoti/ tad etad ānupūrvyā siddhaṃ bhavati/*
> [Question:] And what is an example with regard to the occurrence of *saṃjñāvidhi* in P. 8.2.2?
> [Answer:] The words *pañca* and *sapta*. In *pañca* and *sapta*, once *n* has been deleted [by P. 8.2.7], the technical term *ṣaṣ* prescribed by [P. 1.1.24:] **ṣṇāntā ṣaṭ** would not apply. Since [P. 8.2.7] is suspended [by P. 8.2.2], [the technical term *ṣaṣ*] is applicable.
> ***Vārttika* 1: The mention of *saṃjñā* [in this sūtra] serves no purpose, because the deletion depends on it.**
> The mention of *saṃjñā* serves no purpose. Why? Because the deletion depends on it. Without applying the technical term *ṣaṣ* there is no deletion of [the case endings] *Jas* and *Śas*; without deletion the technical term *pada* does not apply; without applying the technical term *pada* there would not be deletion of *n*.
> That will be establish by means of the [correct] sequence.

This passage discusses the derivations of *pañca* and *sapta*. Since the two hardly differ from each other, we will concentrate on the derivation of *pañca* (and indeed only on the nominative plural form).

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[930] P. 8.2.2: *nalopaḥ supsvarasaṃjñātugvidhiṣu kṛti*.
[931] P. 8.2.7: *nalopaḥ prātipadikāntasya*.
[932] Mahā-bh III p. 387 l. 4-9.

In point of fact, two different derivations of *pañca* are referred to in this passage: the first one in Patañjali's words preceding the *vārttika*, the other one in and immediately following it.

According to the first of these two passages, the derivation of *pañca* passes through the following stages:

A1) *pañcan + Jas*
A2) *pañca-0 + Jas* (P. 8.2.7)
A3) *pañca + 0* (P. 7.1.22)
pañca

The step from A1 to A2 — the deletion of *n* by P. 8.2.7 — is suspended with regard to the step from A2 to A3. Because of this suspension, *pañca-0* is still considered to end in *n*, and is still called *ṣaṣ*. This allows for the deletion of *Jas*, which is prescribed after what is technically called *ṣaṣ* by P. 7.1.22 **(ṣaḍbhyo luk**).

The second derivation is as follows:

B1) *pañcan + Jas*
B2) *pañcan + Jas* (*pañcan* is now called *ṣaṣ*, by P. 1.1.24)
B3) *pañcan + 0* (P. 7.1.22)
B4) *pañcan* (*pañcan* is now called *pada*, because it has a (deleted) nominal ending)
B5) *pañca0* (*n* is deleted by P. 8.2.7 because it is the final of a *pada*)

In the first of these two derivations, a rule of the *Tripādī* (P. 8.2.7) is used before P. 7.1.22, which belongs rather to the *Sapādasaptādhyāyī*. This order of application is presumably only possible because P. 8.2.7 is *asiddha*.

In the second derivation, there is no need for suspension. The derivation of *pañca*, therefore, does not justify the presence of *saṃjñā* in P. 8.2.2, at least according to Patañjali.

Recall at this point that Pāṇini's *asiddha*-principle would never be necessary if the "correct" derivation were always chosen. In other words, derivation B does not show the superfluity of *saṃjñā* in P. 8.2.2, unless it can be shown that derivation A is impossible. This is indeed what Patañjali maintains. According to him, stage A2 cannot be reached from stage A1, because *pañcan* in A1 is not (yet) a *pada*, and "without applying the technical term *pada* there would not be deletion of *n*". In other words, stage A1 does not unite all the conditions to pass on to stage A2. Quite the contrary, stage A1 (which is identical with stage B1) unites the conditions to pass on to stage B2 and then B3.

[Patañjali presents here derivation B as a list of items that necessarily succeed each other in a derivation, and he does so in the following words: *nākṛtāyāṃ ṣaṭsaṃjñāyāṃ jaśśasor lug na cākṛte luki padasaṃjñā na cākṛtāyāṃ padasaṃsaṃjñāyāṃ nalopaḥ prāpnoti/*. The similarity with the standard formulation of the buddhist formula of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) is hard to miss. Its most general form is, in Pāli: *imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imass' uppādā idam upapajjati, imasmiṃ asati, idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati* "This being, that becomes; from the arising of this, that arises; this not being, that does not become; from the ceasing of this, that ceases".[933]]

[933] MN II p. 32; cp. CPD s.v. Paṭicca-samuppāda. The negative part is given in full e.g. at DN II p. 33-34: *jātiyā kho asati jarā-maraṇaṃ na hoti … bhave kho asati jāti na hoti … upādāne kho asati bhavo na hoti … taṇhāya kho asati upādānaṃ na hoti … vedanāya kho asati taṇhā na hoti … phasse kho asati vedanā na hoti … saḷāyatane kho asati phasso na hoti … nāma-rūpe kho asati*

This passage confirms, or at least is compatible with, our impression that derivations follow a linearity that may be incompatible with Pāṇini's linearity of rule application in the *Tripādī*.

III.4. Brahmanical philosophy

Brahmanism came to incorporate various rational philosophies, whose importance for its later development can hardly be exaggerated. It is important to realize that the earliest of these philosophies were not derived from the Veda, but must rather be understood as the result of the interaction of various factors, most of which had non-brahmanical origins. Rationality itself, and with it the tradition of rational debate, entered India from its Hellenized northwestern regions, and affected Brahmanism most probably through the intermediary of Buddhism: Brahmins who were obliged to defend their position against critical attacks by Buddhists has no choice but to present their views in a coherent shape and without inner contradictions. Furthermore, the most important early brahmanical schools — Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika — incorporated the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution, this too a factor that had non-brahmanical origins. Indeed, it is possible that Sāṃkhya itself — the philosophy that is inseparable from the mythological figure called Kapila — had its origin in Greater Magadha, and therefore outside brahmanical culture.[934] One factor, however, that was purely brahmanical in origin is the importance attributed to language. But even here, circumstances created a remarkable parallelism with Buddhism, with the result that the brahmanical philosophies were throughout coloured by buddhist thought. The present chapter will show this.

III.4.1. Vaiśeṣika

We have seen (§ IIA.4.3) that the individual words of Sanskrit came to be abandoned as reliable sources of knowledge for what exists in the world. Before this happened, this conviction had exerted a determining influence on the Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy, which is essentially an ontology, a presentation of what there is.[935] A brief sketch of the system as we find it in Praśasta's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (or *Praśastapādabhāṣya*), a text that may date from the sixth or seventh century CE, will show this.

The *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* presents a coherent system — or at least one that aspires to coherence — demonstrating several remarkable traits. It enumerates a certain number of 'categories' — the term most often used to translate the Sanskrit *padārtha* — supposed to encompass everything that exists. The number of categories accepted in the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* is six (other Vaiśeṣika texts accept seven or even ten categories). These categories cover all existent entities, and their enumeration is thus an enumeration of everything that exists. The six categories of the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* are substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), motion (*karman*), universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), and inherence (*samavāya*). This means that

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saḷāyatanaṃ na hoti … viññāṇe kho asati nāma-rūpaṃ na hoti … nāmarūpe kho asati viññāṇaṃ na hoti.

[934] See *Greater Magadha* p. 61 ff.

[935] Cf. Bronkhorst 2011b: 24 ff.

for Praśasta, the author of this text, everything that exists is either a substance, quality, or motion, or a universal, particularity, or inherence. Nothing exists beyond these six categories.

The categories admit of internal divisions, of course. There are, for instance, nine substances, twenty-four qualities, five motions, etc.; but this does not alter the fact that Vaiśeṣika offers in its six categories a catalogue of everything that exists. It covers not only ultimate constituents but also composite objects. But what interests us most at present is that Vaiśeṣika assumes a close connection between words and the objects of the phenomenal world.

Look again at the Vaiśeṣika list of categories. It is clear that the first three — substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), and motion (*karman*) — constitute its core. The designation 'object' (*artha*) is reserved for these three categories,[936] with the other categories not counting as 'objects'. Their role is clearly subordinate to that of the three main categories. A universal (*sāmānya* / *jāti*) groups together a certain number of objects, while particularity (*viśeṣa*) distinguishes them from one another, and inherence (*samavāya*) is responsible for their interaction. While the secondary role of these last three categories does not prove that they were added at a later time to an original list containing only substance, quality, and motion, we should not rule out this possibility. What is important for us is to note the foundational role of the first three categories in the system.

These first three categories — substance, quality, and motion — correspond to the three principal types of words in Sanskrit: nouns, adjectives, and verbs. This observation was made in 1918 by the Dutch scholar B. Faddegon, and has been repeated numerous times after him.[937] It would be a mistake to conclude that this classification into three categories imposed itself inevitably on Indian thinkers. On the contrary, many did not accept it, including the Buddhists and the Sāṃkhyas. We must rather consider that the Vaiśeṣikas consciously accepted the classification, as well as the correspondence between these categories and the three types of Sanskrit words. I do not know of any passage in their own texts that makes this point explicit, but we have already seen that they could draw inspiration from Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* in this respect. Moreover, the Vaiśeṣika belief concerning the close connection between words and things finds expression in other ways. We shall turn to these now.

Among the three categories of substance, quality, and motion, the first one, i.e. substance, is, in a certain sense, the most important. It is substance that supports the other two, which are in turn largely determined by the substances in which they inhere. In a complete enumeration of all that exists, a specification of substances is therefore essential. This specification occurs in two stages. First, a list of nine substances is presented. Five of these are the elements (*bhūta*): earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*ap*), fire (*tejas*), wind (*vāyu*), and ether (*ākāśa*); this list reflects then current views on the composition of matter. The other four are time (*kāla*), space (*diś*), soul (*ātman*), and mind (*manas*). Obviously, Vaiśeṣika did not claim that there were only nine, or even five, substantial objects in the world, so a further specification is needed. The number of substantial objects is quite considerable, but Vaiśeṣika texts make no effort to list them all. Why is this? Further, how can one claim to present a complete enumeration of everything that exists without providing a criterion for determining which objects are substances?

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[936] See WI p. 3 §§ 14 and 15; VS(C) 2.2.24-25.

[937] Faddegon 1918: 107; cf. already Müller 1852: 10-11, 32.

The answer is simple: in principle, a list of Sanskrit nouns is sufficient to delimit the domain of substances. One must be careful, of course, since some nouns denote qualities, or motions, or something else, but the principle remains sound. Indeed, the existence of certain nouns attests to the presence of substances whose existence is less than evident. The same applies to personal pronouns. The personal pronoun 'I', for instance, indicates the existence of a soul (conceived of as a substance by the Vaiśeṣikas). The fact that this pronoun does not enter into apposition with the word 'earth', etc. (as in "I am earth"), proves that the soul is different from the body (which is, in the case of human beings, a form of earth). The substance 'time' (*kāla*), again according to the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, is the cause of the origin, preservation, and destruction of all produced things, and this because linguistic usage tells us so. The commentators gloss this in the following manner: we say that a certain object is produced at this or that moment, etc. This same substance 'time' is also responsible for our use of words referring to various durations, such as 'day', 'month', 'year', etc.

One encounters a good number of arguments of this sort, intended to prove the existence of various qualities. Pleasure, for instance, is a quality of the soul, because we say: "I am pleased." The qualities 'distance' (*paratva*) and 'nearness' (*aparatva*) are responsible for our use of the words 'distant' and 'near', respectively.

In general terms one can state that in the Vaiśeṣika system language structures reality. Language does this, first, by means of the semantic relationships between words. Temporarily setting aside the categories of *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, and *samavāya*, we arrive at a position according to which everything that exists is either *dravya*, *guṇa*, or *karman*. Substances (*dravya*) are divided into numerous sub-categories; Vaiśeṣika, we have seen, recognizes nine. The first of these sub-categories — 'earth' (*pṛthivī*) or "that which is made of earth" (*pārthiva*) — is in its turn divided into innumerable objects, such as trees, pots, etc. Now, trees themselves have sub-species, such as the Śiṃśapā, Palāśa, etc. The result can be schematized as follows:



This scheme is at least in part imposed by language, with some support from generally accepted notions of the period. The division into three types of existent things corresponds, as we have seen, to the three most important types of words: nouns, adjectives, and verbs. The presence of the five elements among the nine types of substances is due to widely recognized views of the period. The division of earthen things

into trees, pots, etc., seems natural, given that Vaiśeṣika maintained that an object can only be composed of one substance at a time, a subject we shall return to in a moment.

The scheme is ontological in nature: each of its elements represents a universal that is more encompassing than those represented by the elements below it. All of the elements — i.e., all existent things — are characterized by the universal 'existence' (*sattā*). Other universals characterize different portions of this totality. Thus, the universals *sattā*, *dravyatva*, *pārthivatva*, and *vṛkṣatva* all inhere in the element 'tree'. On the other hand, we cannot say that everything that exists, or is a substance, or is made of earth, is also a tree, a bearer of the universal *vṛkṣatva*. The existence of all these universals, each connected to sets of objects that either include other sets or are included in them, confers on the scheme its ontological dimension. In other words, this structure corresponds to reality and not just to the use of words.

Universals by their nature are always connected to sets of objects that either include or are included within other sets; there is no overlap. Were this not the case, there would then be *saṃkara*, 'mixture', which authors of the school identify as "destructive of universals" (*jātibādhaka*).[938] This indicates that reality does indeed have the structure just described, namely, that of a genealogical tree without any 'contamination', if I may borrow an expression used in establishing a stemma of manuscripts. This elegant structure brings with it some rather surprising consequences. To take an example from our diagram: trees — all trees — pertain to the element earth and not to water, because water occurs alongside earth and not directly above trees. As a result, Vaiśeṣika found itself obliged to consider trees as composed exclusively of earth. Water, which is undeniably found in trees, is therefore not actually part of a tree; it is connected to the tree without being one of its constituents.

This short presentation of Vaiśeṣika philosophy should suffice to show that this ontology is, in an important measure, the outcome of an attempt to uncover the structure of reality based on the assumption of a close connection between words and things. However, Vaiśeṣika is not *only* based on the assumption that there is a close connection between words and things. It also underwent, presumably already in its formative phase, the influence of buddhist Abhidharma philosophy. To show this, we must refer back to the brief presentation of earliest buddhist systematic philosophy given in § III.3.1, above. We can learn from this presentation, among other things, that northwestern buddhist Abhidharma was characterized by the following features:

-It claimed to have an exhaustive enumeration of all there is in the form of its list of dharmas.
-It presented an atomistic view of reality.
-It rejected the existence of composite objects.
-It held that ordinary reality (which is not 'real') corresponds to the words of language.

These same four features characterize Vaiśeṣika, either directly or through inversion:

-Vaiśeṣika presents an exhaustive enumeration of all there is in its six (or seven, or ten) categories.
-Vaiśeṣika insists on the atomic nature of reality (even though its atoms are different from those in Abhidharma).

[938] See WI p. 70 (§ 334); Ki. p. 23 l. 3-4; Shastri 1976: 323 ff.

-Vaiśeṣika accepts rather than rejects the existence of composite objects; these composite objects exist beside their constituent parts: a pot and its two halves are three different entities.
-Vaiśeṣika accepts the correspondence between words and things, but differs from Abhidharma in that it looks upon the objects of ordinary reality as really existing.

Note that the third position of Vaiśeṣika is the exact opposite of the third position of northwestern Abhidharma. Both schools are preoccupied by the relationship between a whole and its parts, but occupy opposite extremes in this matter.

The four points enumerated above can be considered fundamental features (or 'axioms') of the Vaiśeṣika system. Their close correspondence to four essential characteristics of northwestern Abhidharma is too striking to be attributed to chance. It entitles us to conclude that Vaiśeṣika was created under the influence of buddhist Abhidharma.

III.4.2. Self-contradictory sentences[939]

Brahmanism and Buddhism on language

Brahmanism and Buddhism had different attitudes with respect to language. For Brahmanism, Sanskrit is the one and only eternal language that, by its nature, is close to reality. Buddhism's link to language was different. During its early centuries it had no special connection with Sanskrit, and no special connection with any particular language for that matter. But once Buddhism developed its first systematic philosophy in northwestern India, language came to play a central role. A crucial aspect of this philosophy was that the traditionally handed down lists of dharmas now came to be looked upon as lists of what there is: only dharmas exist, and composite objects (such as houses, chariots, or persons) do not really exist. However, our (incorrect) conviction that such composite objects do exist is due to the fact that we have words for them: King Milinda's chariot, the king is told in the *Milindapañha*, is nothing but a word.[940]

These independent developments in Brahmanism and Buddhism led to the amazing coincidence that, from an early date onward, both Brahmins and Buddhists believed that our commonsense world, the world of our everyday experience, is deeply and fundamentally connected with the language we use to describe it. There is an important difference, of course. For Brahmanism — at least until some of its members started rethinking the world under the influence of Buddhism — language corresponds to the world as it really is. For Buddhism, on the other hand, it corresponds to our commonsense world, which ultimately does not exist. A further difference is that for Brahmanism the language concerned is Sanskrit, the only real language from their point of view. Buddhism did not specify any specific language, and even though in the course of time it came to give preference to some, its conviction that language and commonsense reality are in close correspondence never appears to have been linked to any language in particular.

The partially overlapping convictions of Brahmanism and Buddhism with regard to language allowed thinkers from both traditions to interact and indeed borrow from

[939] This chapter deals with issues that have also been dealt with in Bronkhorst 2011b.
[940] See § III.3.1, above.

each other. It is probably safe to say that, as a whole, Brahmanism found itself most often in the role of borrower, and Buddhism in the role of provider of new ideas.

This can be illustrated with a problem that the two movements came to share. The problem involved is evoked by sentences of the type "the potter makes a pot". Such sentences were felt to be self-contradictory because of the universally held belief that there is a close correspondence between the words of a true statement and the items constituting the situation described. The realization that such sentences constitute a problem was probably more serious for brahmanical thinkers than it had been for most Buddhists, who perhaps had first drawn attention to it. For until approximately the middle of the first millennium CE, Buddhist philosophers were of the opinion that our common sense world is not ultimately real, brahmanical philosophers were convinced that it is. During a number of centuries, all Buddhist philosophers denied the reality of the world of our every-day experience, and all Brahmin philosophers accepted it. This distinction is striking enough to warrant a brief discussion of its raison d'être.

Nothing in the teaching of the Buddha as traditionally handed down suggests that ordinary reality does not exist. This idea was introduced later into the buddhist tradition and subsequently preserved; brahmanical philosophical schools did not initially adopt this idea, and the idea did not find entrance into some of these schools until much later. Why this opposition? Were there perhaps non-philosophical reasons behind the brahmanical attachment to ordinary reality, and for the buddhist inclination to do away with it? Why were these Buddhists so determined to prove the illusory nature of ordinary experience, and the Brahmins committed to its reality?

It seems indeed that more than only philosophical reasons were behind this great divide. Before exploring possible explanations, however, it will be necessary to establish that this divide existed. To do so, recall some known facts about the early history of Indian philosophy.

To begin with Brahmanism: it is well known that the first mention of Vedānta (or Vedāntism) as a philosophical school dates from the 6th century CE, when it is referred to by the Buddhist thinker Bhavya. Before that time, other philosophical schools debated with each other, but Vedānta did not participate in these debates, nor was it criticized by others. The only sensible conclusion one can draw is that Vedānta did not exist as a philosophical school at that time. (This does not necessarily mean that ideas similar to those we associate with Vedānta did not exist. It only means that we have no evidence that those ideas had been systematized and used in the inter-school debates of that time.)

Other brahmanical philosophical schools did exist during that period. Two ontologies in particular were widely discussed: Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya. Variants of these were used in the texts of Nyāya and Yoga respectively. We cannot enter into details here, but note that these two ontologies looked upon the world and the objects it contains as really existing entities.[941]

In this respect these two ontologies were in striking contrast with buddhist ontology. The earliest buddhist ontology was developed in northwest India, probably by the Sarvāstivādins.[942] This ontology recognized the existence of constituent dharmas, but not that of things composed of dharmas. The objects of our every-day experience, such as

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[941] Faxian (around 400 CE) "was ... a witness of … the mushrooming of apparently Brahmanical schools (ninety-six, according to him), believing in the real existence of this and the next world" (Verardi 2011a: 132; with references to Deeg 2005: 540 and Giles 1923: 35).

[942] See § III.3.1, above.

houses and chariots, have as little existence as human beings who, too, are thought of as accumulations (and successions) of dharmas. Subsequent Buddhist thinkers — most notably Nāgārjuna — developed proofs to show that the world of our experience does not exist. These proofs had the further consequence of showing that dharmas do not exist either. A further noteworthy development in Buddhism was the idealism that we associate with Vasubandhu and other thinkers of the Yogācāra school. Whatever the differences between the various Buddhist thinkers, all of them agreed that the world of our experience does not exist as such.

This shows that there was indeed, roughly until the middle of the first millennium CE, a fundamental difference between buddhist and brahmanical thought. In spite of all the internal differences and disagreements, all Buddhist philosophers rejected the existence of the commonsense world, and all brahmanical philosophers accepted it. Why?

I stated above that the answer to this question may not be philosophical, or not only philosophical. Brahmins and Buddhists were in competition. One of the ways in which this competition manifested itself was the debate.[943] It goes without saying that the possibility of open debate gave rise, here as elsewhere, to internalized debate. These debates — whether real or imagined — were fundamental to the development of Indian philosophy, and were to a considerable extent responsible for the different positions elaborated.

The most important debates took place, at least ideally, at the royal court.[944] Debates were therefore more than just philosophical events; they were also political events in the sense that the winner of a debate and his school might profit greatly from the victory, while the loser might lose all including his life.

The court, then, played a central role (whether real or imagined) in the development of Indian philosophy. What was the role of Brahmins and Buddhists at the royal court? Asking this question brings to light another asymmetry with regard to these two groups.

To begin with, the Brahmins had a long tradition of offering services to kings. These services took primarily two forms: ritual support and political advice. It is not necessary to enter into details here. Vedic ritual offered the kind of magical protection that no king would wish to do without. And the political advice that we find in brahmanical works like the *Arthaśāstra* and the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*[945] — not to speak of numerous other texts, among them the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa* — was presumably of the greatest utility for rulers.[946]

The Buddhists had nothing comparable on offer. They had very little in terms of ritual, and even less in terms of useful political advice. The few buddhist texts of political advice that have survived — ascribed to the likes of Mātṛceṭa and Nāgārjuna — are totally impractical, and do little beyond counselling the king to be good, and if that does not work, to become a monk.

The Buddhists of that time were obviously aware of their shortcomings in the realm of political counselling, because they left this job to Brahmins. Buddhists began to depict society and their own history in brahmanical terms. This is clear from the fact that,

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[943] See § III.2.1, above.
[944] Bronkhorst 2007a.
[945] McClish (2014) shows that the seventh chapter of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* was composed under the influence of the *Arthaśāstra*.
[946] See *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism* p. 39 f.

from the time they started using Sanskrit (itself a major concession to Brahmanism), Buddhists started depicting the good kings of their own past — the father of the Buddha, the Buddha himself in earlier lives — as ideal *brahmanical* kings.[947]

Buddhists might henceforth still be heard at the royal courts, but hardly in order to solve problems connected with the daily running of a kingdom. Theirs was a different domain, the domain of spiritual wellbeing, rebirth and ultimately liberation, and they accepted this.

In this situation it would hardly have been appropriate for Brahmins to argue that the everyday world of the king, the world in which he had to stay in control, in which he might have to combat neighbouring kingdoms or survive revolts, did not really exist. On the contrary, the Brahmins were there to advise him in the world of political reality, to keep him in power, and to allow him to extend his sovereignty. Their philosophy, if they had to engage in philosophical debate, was a philosophy that was solidly anchored in the reality of the ordinary world, because that was the world in which Brahmins made themselves useful. The Buddhists, on the other hand, played on the spiritual sentiments of the ruler, his fear of death, his concern about future lives. They defended positions in which the reality of the present world was denied, and in which thinkers were led to abandon — at least in thought — this everyday world.

In the brahmanical philosophies of those days, then, the world of our experience corresponds to reality. The belief in the close correspondence between words and things had always been dear to Brahmins, and we have seen that it was not without difficulty that the idea of something corresponding to each and every word — including words like 'heaven', 'deity' and *apūrva* — was abandoned for reasons that may at least in part have been social. Brahmanical thinkers were in no hurry to abandon the conviction that true statements and situations in the real world were deeply connected. It was therefore vital for them to find explanations for the contradictions that marred statement like "the potter makes a pot". They came up with a variety of explanations. We will consider some of these; they are known by the names *satkāryavāda*, *ajātivāda*, and *asatkāryavāda*.

satkāryavāda

Satkāryavāda is the "doctrine of the effect pre-existing in the cause". There are good reasons to think that it was developed to face the difficulties believed to be associated with statements such as "the potter makes a pot". Indeed, if we accept that the pot (the effect) is already present in the clay (the cause), this statement is no longer problematic, for there is in that case a pot present while the potter makes one. It is also clear that the *satkāryavāda* has much in common with the *sarvāstivāda* of certain Buddhists: in both cases the future object exists already in the present.

The *satkāryavāda* became part of Sāṃkhya philosophy, but was not yet part of it in its earliest phases. Indeed, several authors (Franco 1991: 127; Larson 1979: 165; Johnston 1937: 25; Liebenthal 1933: 9 n. 11) have drawn attention to the fact that *satkāryavāda* is without clear precedents in the earlier literature, and must be a relatively late development in Sāṃkhya. Regarding the origin of this doctrine we may recall Liebenthal's (1933: 4) question: "[Wir] dürfen ... fragen, ob nicht vielleicht satkārya ... nur ein Aspekt einer Diskussion mit Mādhyamika-Buddhisten ist". We know that this

[947] See on all this *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism*, esp. Chapter Three.

doctrine as part of Sāṃkhya was known to Āryadeva,[948] a younger contemporary of Nāgārjuna,[949] and to Mallavādin (DNC I p. 271). It was subsequently adopted in certain other schools.

The Sāṃkhya school of philosophy appears to have been the first to have adopted the *satkāryavāda*. One of its surviving texts is the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, a collection of some seventy verses. Evidence derived from the commentary called *Yuktidīpikā* suggests that Īśvarakṛṣṇa was a younger contemporary of Vindhyavāsin, and may therefore have lived in or soon after 400 CE.[950]

Sāṃkhyakārikā 9 deals with this *satkāryavāda*:

> The effect pre-exists in the cause, because one cannot make what does not exist, because one always grasps a material cause, because not everything is produced from a given cause, because something can only make that which it is capable of producing, and because a cause is a cause.

Various explanations of this dense stanza are provided in a number of commentaries. The most significant among these is the *Yuktidīpikā*. From among the arguments presented in the verse, the first and the last one are of most interest to us. The first one ("because one cannot make what does not exist") takes us back to the potter and his pot: When a pot is produced, does it exist or does it not exist? An opponent takes the position that a pot that already exists cannot be produced; the *Yuktidīpikā* argues against it.[951]

The end of *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 9 offers the following justification of the *satkāryavāda*: *kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam*. This phrase is ambiguous. It can mean "and because [the cause] is a cause, the effect exists" or "and because [the effect] is [identical with] the cause, the effect exists".[952] The former of these two interpretations reminds us of the following verse of Nāgārjuna: "A cause of something non-existent makes no sense; a cause of something that exists already makes no sense either. Which non-existing thing has a cause? And what could be the purpose of a cause for something that exists?"[953] It tells us that effect and cause depend upon each other, and must therefore coexist. Stated differently: where there is a cause, there must be an effect; or: because the cause is a cause, the effect exists. The second interpretation is different, and has no direct link with the type of arguments we find in Nāgārjuna's work. Which of these two interpretations is correct, i.e., original?

A glance at the commentaries shows that all but one of them have chosen the second interpretation. The possible exception is the *Yuktidīpikā*, which explains:[954] *ihāsati kārye kāraṇabhāvo nāsti*. This is of course still ambiguous, because we can translate "if the effect does not exist, [the cause] is not a cause" or "if the effect does not exist, [it (i.e., the effect)] is not a cause". Technically both interpretations are possible, but I fail to see what could be the point of the second one. The first interpretation, on the other hand, fits in well with the argument of Nāgārjuna just considered: since cause and effect depend

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[948] E.g., *Catuḥśataka* ch. 11 (Lang 1986: esp. p. 106 f.). See further Honda 1974.
[949] Bronkhorst 2009: 185-186.
[950] Larson & Bhattacharya 1987: 135 f.
[951] YD (WM) p. 112 l. 8-11 & p. 122 l. 3-17.
[952] The first part could also be translated "on account of the existence of the cause". This does not however lead to an intelligible interpretation.
[953] MadhK(deJ) 1.6.
[954] YD (P) p. 54 l. 32; (WM) p. 124 l. 7.

upon each other, they must co-occur. As a result, there is no cause without effect. Otherwise put, the cause is no cause, when there is no effect present.

This interpretation of the end of *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 9 is confirmed in another way, too. The **Śataka* of Āryadeva is no doubt one of the earliest texts that testifies to the existence of the *satkāryavāda* among the followers of Sāṃkhya. It has been preserved in Chinese translation. Giuseppe Tucci translates the words which this text puts in the mouth of the defender of Sāṃkhya in the following manner:[955]

> The effect pre-exists in the cause, on account of the existence of the cause.

In this form these words do not seem to communicate anything intelligible. But it is easy to see that Tucci's "on account of the existence of the cause" corresponds to Sanskrit *kāraṇabhāvāt* — exactly the expression which we also find in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. I believe that the Chinese translation agrees with this interpretation. The correct translation should therefore be:

> The effect pre-exists in the cause, because it is a cause.

This statement is, of course, still ambiguous, because it does not say explicitly which of the two — the effect or the cause — is a cause. However, the commentator Vasu gives an explanation which, at last, removes the ambiguity. I offer once again Tucci's English translation:[956]

> If the pot does not pre-exist in earth, then earth could not become the cause of the pot.

This remark by Vasu looks like a paraphrase of the explanation in the *Yuktidīpikā* which we considered above, and which reads:

> if the effect does not exist, [the cause] is not a cause

or

> if the effect does not exist, [it (i.e., the effect)] is not a cause

But whereas the *Yuktidīpikā* passage remained ambiguous, Vasu's passage specifies that it is the cause (in the example used: the earth) which cannot be (or become) a cause, if the effect (the pot) is not present.

It is not possible here to discuss the complicated question of the relationship between the *Yuktidīpikā* and Vasu's commentary on Āryadeva's **Śataka*. Nor do I wish to impose an interpretation on the *Yuktidīpikā* borrowed from Vasu's commentary. It seems however clear that in the earliest documents justifying the *satkāryavāda* in connection with the Sāṃkhya philosophy, a Nāgārjuna-like argument was used. This implies, I would propose, that this argument, and the correspondence principle on which it was

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[955] TI 1569, vol. 30, p. 177b l. 26; tr. Tucci 1981: 61.
[956] TI 1569, vol. 30, p. 177b l. 26-27; tr. Tucci 1981: 61.

based, played a role in the justification, and presumably also in the introduction of the *satkāryavāda* in Sāṃkhya.

The *satkāryavāda* was not limited to Sāṃkhya. The same position is taken in Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, which justifies it as follows:

> If the effect did not exist prior to its coming into being, the coming into being would be without agent and empty. For coming into being is an activity, and must therefore have an agent, like such activities as going etc. It would be contradictory to say that something is an activity, but has no agent. It could be thought that the coming into being of a pot, though mentioned, would not have the pot as agent, but rather something else. ... If that were true, one would say "the potter and other causes come into being" instead of "the pot comes into being". In the world however, when one says "the pot comes into being" no one understands that also the potter etc. come into being; for these are understood to have already come into being.[957]

This passage, and the underlined sentence in particular, show the close link between *satkāryavāda* and language in Śaṅkara's mind.

Another early Sāṃkhya text, the *Yogaśāstra*, may here briefly be considered. Its colophons attribute it to someone called Patañjali. It consists of two parts, the *Yogasūtra* (a number of aphoristic statements) and the *Yogabhāṣya*, which comments on them. The colophons also state that this text propounds the Sāṃkhya philosophy, but, rather than adopting the *satkāryavāda* in order to find a solution to the difficulties that the new linguistic analysis had given rise to, the *Yogaśāstra* remains close to the buddhist *sarvāstivāda*. This illustrates the proximity of *satkāryavāda* and *sarvāstivāda*. Indeed, since there is no further specification in the text, it can be read as an expression either of *sarvāstivāda* or of an extended *satkāryavāda*. But whatever the choice we make, it is clear that the author of the *Yogaśāstra* had an answer to the difficulties associated with "the potter makes a pot". For "the cause of an already existent fruit is capable of making it present, but not of creating something new". Since the pot (i.e., the fruit) is already existent in the clay (i.e., the cause), the latter is capable of making the former present.

ajātivāda

A different solution to the same problem is the *ajātivāda*, "the doctrine according to which there is no arising". This is a more radical response to the question whether something existent or something non-existent is produced: the pot that is produced, does it exist or not? The radical response that goes by this name cuts the knot by stating that, since this question cannot be answered, nothing is produced at all.

The most famous text that takes this position is the *Āgamaśāstra*, a work in four chapters that is attributed to an author called Gauḍapāda, but may in reality be a collection of chapters by different authors. It is certain that the later chapters show strong buddhist influence, and may in origin be buddhist texts. Nevertheless, the text as a whole is considered a work of Vedānta philosophy, and legend has it that Gauḍapāda was the

[957] Śaṅkara on BraSū 2.1.18, ed. Shastri p. 389, ed. Joshi p. 469; cited and discussed in Bronkhorst 2011b: 66-67.

teacher of the teacher of Śaṅkara. The *Āgamaśāstra* states in so many words that nothing arises.

The *ajātivāda* is much closer to the buddhist position than the *satkāryavāda*. While the *satkāryavāda* tries to save the phenomena by insisting that there are objectively real things corresponding to, say, the pot in "the pot is produced", the *ajātivāda* abandons hope and states that "the pot is produced" cannot possibly correspond to objective reality: all the items in this sentence are nothing but words.

asatkāryavāda

Asatkāryavāda is the "doctrine of the non-existent effect". As its name shows, it is the opposite or even denial of the *satkāryavāda*. That is to say, the situation described in "the potter makes a pot" does not contain a pot. This doctrine was most notably adopted by the Nyāya school of philosophy. A consideration of some passages of one of its classical text, Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya*, reveals some of the ideas it contains.

The example "He makes a mat" occurred in one of these passages. Here the word 'mat' was claimed to give expression to the intention of the agent, his intention to make a mat. The absence of a mat in the situation depicted presented therefore no difficulty to Vātsyāyana.

The *Nyāyabhāṣya* has more to say about the production of new entities. In one passage it states that words expressive of grammatical actors (i.e., the agents, objects, etc. of a sentence) can refer to the past and the future; they do not have to designate something that is present in the situation depicted. In another one it claims that the pot, in "the potter makes a pot", is "established in (or by) the mind"; the word 'pot', therefore, refers to a mental pot, not to a pot made of clay.

But Vātsyāyana's final solution is different. Following *Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.65(66), he holds that the meaning of a word covers all of the following three: individual, form and universal. The third of these three is particularly useful for the problem at hand. The universal 'pot-ness' being existent and eternal, it is already there when the pot comes into being, or is made. Schools like Nyāya did not therefore have to accept the *satkāryavāda*, and chose rather the opposite position, the *asatkāryavāda*: the pot is not yet there when it is being made.

Vaiśeṣika, too, does not accept that the pot is already there before it comes into being. And its ontology, too, allows for universals. One would therefore, here too, expect a solution of the kind that the word 'pot' denotes — perhaps along with other things — the universal. The word 'pot' in "he makes a pot" will in this way have something to refer to, and the problem will be solved.

From a certain date onward Vaiśeṣika authors do indeed opt for this solution. The *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, or *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, does not however deal with this problem, and nor does the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. Since we have practically no other texts for the early period, one might be tempted to conclude that Vaiśeṣika authors chose this solution right from the time they became aware of the problem of origination. This expectation is however belied by some passages describing Vaiśeṣika points of view preserved in the works of non-Vaiśeṣika authors, which inform us about the period before the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*.

A passage from the *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, a commentary on the *Abhidharmadīpa*, a text of the buddhist Sarvāstivāda school, attributes the following position to the Vaiśeṣikas:[958]

> The Vaiśeṣika thinks [as follows]: The substance 'pot', which is not present in the potsherds [out of which it will be constituted], and the substance 'cloth', which is not present in the threads [out of which it will be constituted], come into being as a result of the contact between the potsherds and that of the threads [respectively]. And through secondary thought (*gauṇyā kalpanayā*) one speaks of the existence of the agent of coming into being, [existence] which has as object a state [of the pot] which is opposite [to the present].

Mysterious as this passage may be, it states quite clearly that the pot exists prior to its coming into being, thanks to a secondary thought. No further details are provided.

The position here attributed to Vaiśeṣika is confirmed in the *Vyomavatī* of Vyomaśiva, a commentary on the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* also known as the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. In a critique of the Sāṃkhya position, Vyomaśiva makes the following observation:

> One should consider the designation ['sprout' in] "the sprout arises", as well as ['pot' in] "make a pot", to be metaphorical, because there exists an obstacle to primary [denotation]. To explain: if one regarded the already existent pot as the object [of the act of making], and the [already existent] sprout as the agent [of the act of arising], arising would be contradicted, and the action of the actants (*kāraka*) would be useless, because [the pot and the sprout] would already exist. … It follows that, as something existent cannot be the thing that arises, the sprout is metaphorically the agent of its own arising, and [the pot] the object [of the act of making]. In this way [these] designations are differently established.[959]

Metaphorical existence, we will see below, is a notion that may have been introduced in this discussion by Bhartṛhari.

A discussion in the *Dvādaśāranayacakra* of Mallavādin and in its commentary the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* of Siṃhasūri provides further material to think about. We learn here that in Vaiśeṣika things that have come into being are called 'existing' because of a connection with the universal 'existence' (*sattāsambandha*). This connection with the

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[958] Abhidh-d ad kārikā 310, p. 274 l. 5-7: *vaiśeṣiko manyate: kapāleṣv avidyamānaṃ ghaṭadravyaṃ tantuṣu cāvidyamānaṃ paṭadravyaṃ kapālatantusaṃyogād utpadyate/ gauṇyā ca kalpanayā viprakṛtāvasthāviṣayā janikartṛsattā vyapadiśyata iti/.* The word *viprakṛta* is obscure. The editor, Padmanabh S. Jaini, suggests an emendation into *viprakṛṣṭa* 'distant', but this does not improve much. Apte's dictionary gives *viprakṛta*, among other meanings, the sens 'opposed' which seems to fit more or less both here and two lines further down where the word is used a second time.

[959] Vyomaśiva's *Vyomavatī,* vol. 2 p. 129 l. 19-27: *yac cāyaṃ vyapadeśo 'ṅkuro jāyate, ghaṭaṃ kurv iti ayam api mukhye bādhakapramāṇasadbhāvād bhākto draṣṭavyaḥ/ tathā hi, yadi vidyamānasyaiva ghaṭasya karmatvam aṅkurasya ca kartṛtvam iṣyetotpattir vyāhatā syāt, vidyamānatvād eva kārakavyāpāravaiyarthyañ ca/ …/ tasmād vidyamānasya utpattyarthāsambhavād upacaritam aṅkurādeḥ svajanikartṛtvaṃ karmatvañ ceti vyapadeśasyānyathāsiddhatvam/*

universal ‘existence’ takes place at the moment of, or immediately after, their completion; it is the reason of the denomination and of the idea of the things concerned.[960]

Here the following question arises: Are objects completely non-existent before this connection with the universal ‘existence’ takes place? According to Mallavādin, the Vaiśeṣikas give a negative answer to this question. Things do exist in a certain way before they come into being. True, they have no connection with the universal ‘existence’ at that moment, but they have some kind of essence (*astitva*, *svabhāva*, *svabhāvasattā*), which allows them to come into being. This means that even without connection with the universal ‘existence’, a substance (or, for that matter, a quality or a movement) has an identity. The Vaiśeṣika, according to Mallavādin, goes to the extent of reinterpreting the expression *asat*, which normally means ‘non-existent’. The Vaiśeṣika takes it as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, and interprets it to mean "that which does not have ‘existence’". The expression *asatkāryavāda*, seen this way, does not say that the effect is not there before it comes into being; it only says that is has no connection with the universal ‘existence’ as yet.[961]

The main discussion takes place in the seventh chapter (lit. spoke, *ara*) of the *Dvādaśāranayacakra*. The *asatkāryavāda* of Vaiśeṣika is attacked right from the very first line:[962] "If the effect is not present [in its causes], it would not come into being, for there would be no agent of the operation [of coming into being] at hand, just as [in the case of] a sky-flower. Or [alternatively,] also a sky-flower would come into being, because there would be no agent of the operation [of coming into being] at hand, just as [in the case of] an effect."

This is, of course, the familiar problem of origination. The Vaiśeṣika recognizes the problem, and maintains that the effect does not exist before it comes into being. However, there are two kinds of existence. The effect has no connection with the universal ‘existence’ (*sattā*) before it comes into being; but it is there, in a certain way — it has *astitva*. This is why the Vaiśeṣika answers:[963] "Unlike the sky-flower, the effect, having come into being through its own *astitva* becomes, even without the relationship of inherence with [the universal ‘existence’], a support [for that universal]."

The opponent of the Vaiśeṣika then raises the question whether the universal ‘existence’ (*sattā*) makes existent that which exists, or that which does not exist, or that which exists and does not exist.[964] It is here that the Vaiśeṣika observes that one can deny

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[960] DNC vol. 2, p. 459 l. 8-9: ... *sattāsambandho ’bhidhānapratyayahetuḥ.* Cp. ibid. p. 512 l. 2 (*niṣṭhāsambandhayor ekakālatvāt*) and the two interpretations of this *vākya* discussed there.

[961] DNC vol. 2, p. 462 l. 3-5: *nanu asat ity atra naña uttarapadābhidheyanivāraṇārthatvāt satpratiṣedhārthatvāt katham asya sātmakatvam? na, anekāntāt, aputrabrāhmaṇavad aguṇaguṇavat/ yathā nāsya putro ’stīty aputro brāhmaṇaḥ nāsya guṇo ’stīty aguṇo guṇaḥ tathehāpi nāsya sad ity asat/;* cp. Siṃhasūri, DNC p. 460 l. 10-11.

[962] DNC vol. 2, p. 455 l. 1-2: *yady asat kāryaṃ notpadyeta asannihitabhavitṛkatvāt khapuṣpavat/ khapuṣpam api votpadyeta asannihitabhavitṛkatvāt kāryavat/*

[963] DNC vol. 2, p. 456 l. 1-2: ... *āśrayisamavāyād ṛte ’pi kāryaṃ svenaivāstitvenotpannam āśrayo bhavati khapuṣpavaidharmyeṇa ...*

[964] DNC vol. 2, p. 459 l. 1-2: *iha prāk sattāsambandhāt satāṃ vā asatāṃ vā sadasatāṃ vā dravyādīnāṃ satkarī sattā?* Similar criticism in the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* and *Tarkajvālā* of Bhāvaviveka; see Tachikawa 1994: 898. (Note that the name *Tarkajvālā* is used both for the commentary on the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* and for the verses alone; see Krasser 2011: 50 n. 1.)

that substances etc. have a connection with the universal ‘existence’, but not their existence through their own form; the universal ‘existence’ does not, therefore, make non-existent things existent.[965]

I will cite one more sentence from the *Dvādaśāranayacakra*, which Mallavādin ascribes to the Vaiśeṣika:[966] "And the [object which is *asat*] is not[, for that matter,] without identity, like a hare's horn. Even without connection with *sattā*, it is in our system (*iha*) like in another one, where *pradhāna* etc. have an identity." Elsewhere in the discussion the Vaiśeṣika recalls that *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* — all Vaiśeṣika categories — exist without having connection with *sattā*. But the comparison with the *pradhāna* of Sāṃkhya — for there can be no doubt that a comparison with the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy is here made — is remarkable. For Sāṃkhya adheres to the *satkāryavāda*, and is therefore in many ways the exact opposite of Vaiśeṣika with its *asatkāryavāda*. The comparison shows that the Vaiśeṣikas to whose writings Mallavādin had access came dangerously close to the position of the Sāṃkhyas where they tried to solve the problem of origination.

A very important question remains. If the Vaiśeṣikas maintained that things exist in a certain way before they come into being, can one determine the beginning of this ‘half-existence’? Are they there from beginningless time, as the Sāṃkhyas believed? To my knowledge, Mallavādin’s and Siṃhasūri's discussions offer no answer to this question. We may find the answer in another early text, the *Yuktidīpikā*, which comments upon the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Around kārikā 9 this text contains a discussion with a Vaiśeṣika on the *satkāryavāda*. Where it presents the argument that one cannot make something that is not there — an argument with which we are familiar — it puts the following words in the mouth of the Vaiśeṣika:[967] "But the effect is made by the agent etc. in the intermediate time. Which is this intermediate time? The answer is (follows a verse): They call ‘intermediate time’ the time during which the causes have started to do the work, until the production of the effect."

I conclude, be it with much caution, that the ‘preexistence’ of something that is going to come into being is not without beginning. This passage from the *Yuktidīpikā* suggests rather that this "preexistence" starts when the different factors that contribute to produce the effect, i.e., to make the pot, start fulfilling their various functions. The intermediate time is neither without beginning, nor momentary.

At this point a short discussion of the early literary history of Vaiśeṣika is required. Which were the Vaiśeṣika texts in which the positions outlined above found expression?

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[965] DNC vol. 2, p. 460 l. 1-2: *... dravyādīnāṃ sattāsambandhaḥ pratiṣidhyate na tu svarūpasadbhāva iti sattā naivāsatāṃ satkarī.*

[966] DNC vol. 2, p. 462 l. 6-7: *na ca tad api nirātmakaṃ śaśaviṣāṇavat, sattāsambandhād ṛte ’pi yathā parapakṣe pradhānādīnāṃ sātmakatvaṃ tathehāpi syāt.*

[967] YD (P) p. 52 l. 16-21; (WM) p. 118 l. 9-15: *āha, nanu ca madhyame kāle kartrādibhiḥ kāryaṃ kriyate/ kaḥ punar asau madhyamaḥ kāla iti? āha:*

ārambhāya prasṛtā yasmin kāle bhavanti kartāraḥ/
kāryasyāniṣpādāt taṃ madhyamaṃ kālam icchanti// iti

yadā hetavaḥ pravṛttārambhā bhavanty uddiśya kāryaṃ na ca tāvan naimittikasyātmalābhaḥ saṃvartate sa madhyamaḥ kālaḥ/ tasmin kriyate kārakaiḥ kāryam iti/. Cp. Motegi 1994: 815 f.; Motegi draws attention to the fact that the reading *kāryasyāniṣpādāt* in the verse is an emendation which deviates from the manuscripts. YD (WM) has here: *kāryasyā niṣ<ṇ>ātās*

The oldest clearly understandable and unitary Vaiśeṣika text that we possess is the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* of Praśasta, mentioned earlier. This text may belong to the sixth century of the Common Era. Beside the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* we have a short text that has only survived in Chinese translation, and which may have been called *Daśapadārthī*; it is too short to derive much information from. And then there is, of course, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* is the oldest Vaiśeṣika text we possess, and it may well be the earliest Vaiśeṣika text that ever existed. It, or rather its earliest version, must date back to the early centuries of the Common Era, for Vaiśeṣika is already referred to in the buddhist *Vibhāṣā*.[968] Unfortunately the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* that is known to us is not identical with its earliest version. Five versions have been preserved,[969] all of which share features that belong to a time well after the beginning of the system. Sūtras have been added and removed, and even the order of the sūtras appears to have occasionally been changed so as to allow of a different interpretation.[970]

It is not clear until what date modifications were still introduced into the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. It is certain that a long time separates the earliest version of this text from the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*. And it is also becoming ever more obvious that during this period much happened to the system. The sūtra that enumerates qualities, for example, has just seventeen of them. *The Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, on the other hand, enumerates twenty-four qualities. Among the added qualities we find sound, and there is indeed evidence that early Vaiśeṣika looked upon sound, not as a quality, but as a substance, a form of wind. Another example concerns the creator god: the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* contains no trace of a creator god, in the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* he has assumed his position. We even have evidence from the *Yuktidīpikā* and from Śaṅkara to the extent that early Vaiśeṣika did not accept a creator god, whereas later thinkers of the school did.[971]

Most of these changes were not introduced into the system by Praśasta. The idea of a creator god may be an exception and there is some reason to assume that Praśasta himself may have played a crucial role. Most of the other developments must have found their earliest expression in a number of texts that existed during the long time that separates the original *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* from the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*. Of most of these texts even the names will probably remain forever unknown to us. About a few of them, however, we have some information. One is a commentary (*Ṭīkā*) written by Praśastamati, who must be the same person as Praśasta, the author of the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*. The other is the text on which he wrote a commentary, and which appears to have been wellknown in its time. From the various testimonies in the texts of other schools, it appears that this text was called *Kaṭandī*, and that its author was known by the name Rāvaṇa. The *Kaṭandī* was itself a commentary, on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, and it was written in the so-called Vārttika-style, which explains that we sometimes find references to *vākya*s and *bhāṣya*s; the Vārttika-style is characterized by the presence of short nominal *vākya*s followed by somewhat more elaborate explanations called *bhāṣya*s.[972]

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[968] Ui 1917: 38 f.

[969] Three versions were known, accompanied by the commentaries of Candrānanda, Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra and Śaṅkara Miśra respectively; two more have been brought to light in Harunaga Isaacson's doctoral dissertation (1995).

[970] See Bronkhorst 1993a: 80 f.; 1995.

[971] See Bronkhorst 1993a (on sound); 1996b (on God).

[972] Bronkhorst 1990; 1992; 1993c.

This *Kaṭandī* (or whatever may have been its name) appears to have been an authoritative text for quite some time. It is indeed the text to which Mallavādin constantly refers while describing and criticizing the Vaiśeṣika position. It appears that also the other texts we have referred to — the buddhist *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* and the Sāṃkhya *Yuktidīpikā* — based their information concerning Vaiśeṣika on this text. However this may be, it seems likely that the problem of origination did not play much of a role, if any, during the time of composition of the original *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, and that it came up at a later time, perhaps for the first time in the *Kaṭandī*.

I have already pointed out that later Vaiśeṣika came to adopt a solution to the problem of origination that was quite different from the one offered in the *Kaṭandī.* Later Vaiśeṣikas joined the Naiyāyikas in thinking that the fact that words refer to universals solved that problem. Once this solution is accepted, the complicated distinction between two forms of existence, and the attempt to use it in order to answer the question how something can come into being, became superfluous, and the weaknesses of the earlier solution, such as its vagueness (when exactly does the pre-existence of a pot begin?), could not but contribute to its decline. The earlier solution was not just refuted; worse, it was forgotten, and no one talked about it any more. It is not impossible that this change of position of the Vaiśeṣika thinkers is responsible for the fact that the *Kaṭandī* and its commentary by Praśasta, once the main works of the school, stopped to be handed down. Praśasta's *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, on the other hand, does not touch the question of origination; is this the reason that it continued to be handed down in a fairly large number of manuscript copies until today? It is hard to prove these suspicions, but I would like to suggest that the loss of philosophical texts may in certain cases have been occasioned by the fact that points of view changed. It may be significant that among the later authors on Vaiśeṣika, only one, Vyomaśiva, retains some traces of the earlier discussion by defining the effect (*kārya*) as *svakāraṇasattāsaṃbandha*. All others define this term differently, as was pointed out by Masanobu Nozawa (1993).

III.4.3. Language or grammar?

We have seen that language and ideas about language exercised a strong influence on brahmanical philosophy in many of its expressions. In spite of that, it has been claimed that it is grammar, and more in particular the Sanskrit grammar of Pāṇini, rather than general ideas about language, that was the primary influence. The two claims do not necessarily contradict each other; they might both be true. And yet, we will see that the influence of grammar on Indian thought is less strong than is often claimed.

Let us look first at the influence that grammar is supposed to have exerted on Indian philosophy. The importance of traditional Sanskrit grammar cannot be doubted. Pāṇini's grammar and its commentaries, or its more or less close imitations by others, have allowed Sanskrit to impose itself as language of scholarly communication. Most classical text of Indian philosophy have been composed in Sanskrit, and this was only possible because its authors studied Sanskrit grammar. Pāṇini's method and that of his earliest surviving commentators — especially Kātyāyana and Patañjali — is in this way the first method with which young scholars had to familiarize themselves, and it goes without saying that this would leave traces in their intellectual output. Patañjali already

stated that grammar is the most important auxiliary science of the Veda.[973] Bhartṛhari, a grammarian and philosopher living in the fifth century CE, describes grammar as "the supreme science, purifying filtre of all sciences".[974] And Ānandavardhana, a celebrated author on poetics belonging to the ninth century, adds that grammarians are the most excellent scholars because all sciences are based on grammar.[975]

A number of modern scholars follow in the footsteps of these authors. Consider first Louis Renou. In the second volume of *L'Inde classique*, he states: "Adhérer à la pensée indienne, c'est d'abord penser en grammairien" (Renou 1953b: 86). Already in 1942, he had said: "La pensée indienne a pour substructure des raisonnements d'ordre grammatical" (Renou 1942: 164 [468, 370]).[976]

For a correct appreciation of these remarks, we must take into consideration what Renou had said just before the above quote from *L'Inde classique*. Here he says the following about grammar (Renou 1953b: 86): "Servante de la théologie à l'origine, elle est demeurée dans l'Inde classique l'instrument privilégié de l'interprétation: on l'appelle 'le premier des membres du Veda', 'le Veda des Veda', 'la voie royale'. Tous les commentaires y recourent, même les commentaires philosophiques où la mīmāṃsā en particulier a instauré sur des bases grammaticales une herméneutique ritualiste." This passage shows that Renou does not claim that Indian philosophy is based on grammar in the sense that the former has taken its fundamental ideas from the latter. On the contrary, grammar is a tool in the hands of philosophers and others in cases where they are confronted with the task of interpreting textual passages. Interpreting texts is primarily the task of Mīmāṃsā, a school that is basically not a philosophical school but rather a school of vedic hermeneutics. Mīmāṃsā uses grammar as a tool, but the various philosophical positions it adopts in the course of its history are not based on or derived from grammar.

In his article "Grammaire et vedānta" (1957) Renou confirms what has just been said. As an example, he takes Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*. This commentary presents Vedānta as a form of Mīmāṃsā; it distinguishes itself from ritual Mīmāṃsā by designations such as Brahmamīmāṃsā, Śārīrakamīmāṃsā and, several centuries later, Uttaramīmāṃsā. As a result, Śaṅkara's commentary frequently interprets vedic, and more in particular Upaniṣadic passages. Nowhere does Renou suggest that the fundamental ideas of his school are derived from grammatical thought. On the contrary, Renou tries to "voir l'usage que fait Ś[aṅkara] de notions ou de formes de raisonnement émanant ou susceptibles d'émaner des écoles grammaticales" (p. 121 [470, 407]). One finds here "des emprunts à la Grammaire, valables pour des besoins limités, pour alimenter des gloses particulières", as well as procedures that "se retrouvent dans les commentaires sur la mīmāṃsā, parfois aussi dans ceux sur le nyāya". With regard to these borrowings and procedures, "on ne peut strictement démontrer qu'ils aient pris naissance chez les grammairiens, sauf là où le contenu est nettement grammatical." Renou adds: "Là même où l'on pense atteindre un élément grammatical, c'est à travers la

[973] Mahā-bh I p. 1 l. 19
[974] Vkp 1.14.
[975] Bhattacharya 1985: 7; 1996: 172. Cp. Torella 1987: 152 n. 6.
[976] Compare further Renou 1940: 35, on grammatical philosophy: "Il y a là un courant d'échange qui a été profond et efficace pour le développement de la pensée indienne." and (p. 36): "Le terme de la pénétration des notions grammaticales dans les cercles philosophiques peut être figuré par l'érection de l'*Aṣṭādhyāyī* en darśana, au XIVe s., telle que la présente le *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*."

mīmāṃsā qu'il a pu parvenir à Ś[aṅkara].” (p. 124 [472, 410]). In other words, Śaṅkara certainly knew Pāṇini's grammar, but apart from purely grammatical questions, an influence of grammar on his thought is not evident. Nor is such an influence evident in ritual Mīmāṃsā.

In his article “Les connexions entre le rituel et la grammaire en sanskrit” (1942), Renou brings to light several parallels between ritual para-vedic literature and grammar. He reminds us that both arose in the same social milieu at about the same time. He draws attention to the use of the Sūtra style both in Pāṇini's grammar and in the Śrautasūtras, to the use in both of general interpretative rules (*paribhāṣā*), and to an often shared vocabulary. He resumes this part his article in the following passage (Renou 1942: 160 [466-67, 366]):

> Cette série de concordances entre les habitudes linguistiques du rituel et de la théorie grammaticale atteste qu'on a affaire à des disciplines issues des mêmes milieux, répondant à des besoins complémentaires. L'une et l'autre ont pour norme la pratique des *śiṣṭa*, des spécialistes ... . En présence de ce mot particulier, il n'est pas aisé de reconnaître s'il sort des cercles de grammairiens ou des cercles de ritualistes : l'absence de toute chronologie textuelle, le parallélisme général des techniques dans l'Inde ancienne, rendent cette recherche aléatoire. Dans beaucoup de cas cependant il est visible que le point de départ est dans les textes religieux, la valeur grammaticale apparaissant comme une spécialisation à l'intérieur d'une acception rituelle mieux articulée. La masse, l'importance de la littérature religieuse, l'indéniable priorité des mantra et des formes liturgiques qu'ils présupposent, invitent à voir de ce côté l'origine.

According to Renou, then, Sanskrit grammar at its beginning used and refined elements from ritual literature, a literature that came into existence roughly at the same time. Influence of grammar on this literature is therefore uncertain or even improbable.

Renou does not only talk about ancient ritual literature. Throughout his discussion he shows how Mīmāṃsā continues the features that ancient ritual literature has in common with grammar. And toward the end of his article, immediately after the sentence cited above (“La pensée indienne a pour substructure des raisonnements d'ordre grammatical” [p. 164 (468, 370)]), he continues: “La mīmāṃsā, en tant que prolongement et pour ainsi dire jurisprudence du rituel, implique une masse de données philologiques qui remontent en fin de compte à la grammaire”. He gives various examples of discussions in Mīmāṃsā that could betray influence from the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali and a familiarity with Pāṇini's grammatical analysis. Turning next to Vedānta, he makes the following remarks: “Le vedānta semble à première vue bien éloigné de ces problèmes. Mais il suffit de lire attentivement Śaṅkara ou Rāmānuja pour constater que leur pensée est constamment étayée et nourrie de raisonnements grammaticaux.” We have already seen that Renou, some fifteen years later, dedicates an article to the use Śaṅkara makes of grammar.

Having considered the way in which Louis Renou justified the position that finds expression in observations like “Adhérer à la pensée indienne, c'est d'abord penser en grammairien” or “La pensée indienne a pour substructure des raisonnements d'ordre grammatical”, we are obliged to conclude that Renou's “la pensée indienne” does not correspond to most of what we call Indian philosophy. Only Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta can illustrate his thesis. This is hardly surprising in that these two schools do not present

themselves as philosophical schools but rather as schools of interpretation. It is true that Mīmāṃsā subsequently acquired a philosophical superstructure by borrowing ideas from other schools, but no one claims that those philosophical ideas were inspired by grammar. The Vedānta school of thought had a doctrinal side from the beginning, to be sure, but it claims to find this doctrine in the texts it interprets. Grammar helps in the interpretation of those texts, but does not contribute to the resulting doctrine.

Let us now consider the opinions of Daniel H. H. Ingalls (1954a) and Frits Staal (1960; 1963; 1965; 1993). Ingalls — in an article called "The comparison of Indian and Western philosophy" — made the following interesting observation (1954a: 4): "In philosophizing the Greeks made as much use as possible of mathematics. The Indians, curiously, failed to do this, curiously because they were good mathematicians. Instead, they made as much use as possible of grammatical theory and argument." This observation should not — as goes without saying in our day and age — be read as a description of the Indian 'genius' as opposed to that of the Greeks (at least not in some absolute sense), but as a reminder of the important roles that mathematics and linguistics have played as methodical guidelines in the development of philosophy in Greece and in India respectively. Ingalls appears to have been the first to draw attention to this important distinction.

He was not the last. Ingalls's observation has been further elaborated by J. F. (= Frits) Staal in several publications (1960; 1963; 1965).[977] Staal focuses the discussion on two historical persons in particular, Euclid and Pāṇini, both of whom — as he maintains — have exerted an important, even formative, influence on developments in their respective cultures.[978] Staal also broadens the horizon by drawing other areas than only philosophy into the picture. To cite his own words (1965: 114 = 1988: 158):

> Historically speaking, Pāṇini's method has occupied a place comparable to that held by Euclid's method in Western thought. Scientific developments have therefore taken different directions in India and in the West. Pāṇini's system produced at an early date such logical distinctions as those between language and metalanguage, theorem and metatheorem, use and mention, which were discovered much later in Europe. In other Indian sciences, e.g., in mathematics and astronomy, as well as in later grammatical systems of Sanskrit, Prakrit, and Tamil, systematic abbreviations are used which not only are ingenuous but also constitute new adaptations of the same method.

The statement "Scientific developments have therefore taken different directions in India and in the West" is of particular interest. It suggests that there are methodical differences between Euclid's *Elements* and Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī.* Staal does not tell us which they are. On the contrary, he emphasizes the common features of these two works, as in the following passage (1965: 113 = 1988: 157)

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[977] Filliozat (1995: 40) observes: "Obviously in the mind of the Indian learned men the study of language held the place which mathematics held in the mind of the ancient Greek philosophers." See also Ruegg 1978.

[978] Note Lloyd's (1990: 87 f.) observation that the influence of Euclid's *Elements* on the development of Greek science was not only positive. Lloyd draws attention in particular to medicine and physiology, certain areas of mathematics itself, and to the extent to which problems in physics and elsewhere had a tendency to be idealized (exactness may be obtained only at the cost of applicability).

> When comparing Pāṇini's system with Euclid's *Elements*, a characteristic of the latter, i.e., deduction, appears absent from the former. It is true that there is a kind of deduction in Pāṇini's grammar: *dadhyatra* is deduced from *dadhi atra*, and other forms are similarly deduced with the help of rules. But such deductions do not seem to attain the same degree of generality as Euclid's proofs. However, the difference reflects a distinction of objects, not of structure. In Euclid's geometry, propositions are derived from axioms with the help of logical rules which are accepted as true. In Pāṇini's grammar, linguistic forms are derived from grammatical elements with the help of rules which were framed *ad hoc* (i.e., *sūtras*). Both systems exhibit a structure of logical deduction with the help of rules, and both scholars attempted to arrive at a structural description of facts. In both systems, contradictions and unnecessary complications are avoided. In both cases, the aim is adequate and simple description.

In the immediately following paragraph Staal does mention that there are differences ("More detailed investigations into the methods of Euclid and Pāṇini would throw light on points of difference as well"), but he does not say which ones they are. Instead he mentions one more common feature: "Another common characteristic is the above-mentioned desire to shorten principles (where Euclid pays attention to minimum number, Pāṇini to minimum length), while disregarding the length of derivations." One looks in vain for a specification of the methodical differences between Euclid and Pāṇini which might explain that 'therefore' scientific developments have taken different directions in India and in the West.

Thirty years later Staal still emphasized the importance of Euclid and Pāṇini, and invoked them as typical examples of the scientific developments in their respective cultures. About Euclid he says (1993: 7): "The ancient Greeks developed logic and a notion of rationality as deduction best exhibited by Euclid's geometry. These discoveries contributed substantially to the development of Western science." About India he observes (1993: 22): "Ancient Indian civilization was an oral tradition and the oral transmission of the tradition became the first object of scientific inquiry. Thus arose two human sciences, closely related to each other in their formal structure: the sciences of ritual and language." The science of ritual, he points out, formulated ordered rules which express the regularities of vedic ritual. He then continues (p. 23-24): "The Sanskrit grammarians used rules of precisely this form and demonstrated in a similar manner why many of them have to be ordered. In consequence of metarules, rule-order and other formal properties of rules, Pāṇini developed Sanskrit grammar as a derivational system in some respects more sophisticated than the deductive system of Euclid ..." But when one searches in this later publication for a specification of the methodical differences between Pāṇini and Euclid, one is once again disappointed. Here, too, one finds rather an emphatic statement to the effect that the two are essentially similar (1993: 24):

> Science is universal and its main branches developed in all the great civilizations. ... The great traditions of Eurasia are basically similar but there are differences between them in character and emphasis. West Eurasian science is characterized by an emphasis on nature and punctuated increases and decreases in theoretical and empirical sophistication; ... Indian science by formal analysis and an emphasis on human theory.

The ‘therefore’ of “Scientific developments have therefore taken different directions in India and in the West” still remains shrouded in mystery.

A way to lift the veil might be to find out whether and to what extent grammatical influence is noticeable in Indian mathematical literature, and the extent to which Pāṇini's work may have provided a methodical guideline for the authors of mathematical texts. This question will gain in importance if we concentrate on the portions on geometry in Indian mathematical texts, because here we will be able to make a direct comparison with Euclid. If we find obvious differences in method between Euclid and classical Indian geometry, we may then ask whether and to what extent these differences are due to the influence of Pāṇini. The fact that the geometry of Indian mathematical astronomy may ultimately derive from Euclidean geometry will make this question all the more poignant.[979]

Let me cite a second time the following passage from Staal's article "Euclid and Pāṇini": "When comparing Pāṇini's system with Euclid's *Elements*, a characteristic of the latter, i.e., deduction, appears absent from the former. It is true that there is a kind of deduction in Pāṇini's grammar: *dadhyatra* is deduced from *dadhi atra*, and other forms are similarly deduced with the help of rules. But such deductions do not seem to attain the same degree of generality as Euclid's proofs. However, the difference reflects a distinction of objects, not of structure."[980] This statement claims that the fact that deductions of a certain type are present in Euclid and absent in Pāṇini is due to the distinction between the objects that these two sciences are dealing with. It suggests that a competent scholar in classical India who dealt with geometry rather than with grammar would use the same kind of deductions as Euclid.

This, of course, is a testable suggestion, and we can draw conclusions from evidence provided by Bhāskara's commentary on Āryabhaṭa's *Āryabhaṭīya*, one of the earliest texts that provide first-hand information about classical Indian geometry in practice.[981] The outcome of this test is uncertain: There is no proof for the claimed methodical guidance of Pāṇini's grammar with respect to classical Indian geometry, except perhaps where completely external features of presentation are concerned.[982]

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[979] On the Greek influence on Indian astronomy, see Pingree 1971; 1993. On the extent to which Greek geometry influenced Indian geometry, see also Shukla's remark cited below.

[980] Cp. Joseph 1991: 217-219: “An indirect consequence of Panini’s efforts to increase the linguistic facility of Sanskrit soon became apparent in the character of scientific and mathematical literature. This may be brought out by comparing the grammar of Sanskrit with the geometry of Euclid — a particularly apposite comparison since, whereas mathematics grew out of philosophy in ancient Greece, it was, as we shall see, partly an outcome of linguistic developments in India. The geometry of Euclid's Elements starts with a few definitions, axioms and postulates and then proceeds to build up an imposing structure of closely interlinked theorems, each of which is in itself logically coherent and complete. In a similar fashion, Panini began his study of Sanskrit by taking about 1700 basic building blocks — some general concepts, vowels and consonants, nouns, pronouns and verbs, and so on — and proceeded to group them into various classes. With these roots and some appropriate suffixes and prefixes, he constructed compound words by a process not dissimilar to the way in which one specifies a function in modern mathematics. Consequently, the linguistic facility of the language came to be reflected in the character of mathematical literature and reasoning in India.”

[981] For details, see § III.2.2, above.

[982] There *is* proof that Bhāskara was thoroughly acquainted with Pāṇinian grammar; see Appendix IX, below.

Contentwise, classical Indian geometry contrasts as sharply with Euclidean geometry as do other pre-modern geometries — in China, Babylonia and Egypt — which had no knowledge of Pāṇini's grammar. Like these other pre-modern geometries, classical Indian geometry did not use proofs. The most noteworthy distinguishing feature of classical Indian geometry is that, unlike the other pre-modern geometries, it developed in surroundings where the notion of proof was wellknown. It is not immediately clear whether this lack of susceptibility to the notion of proof on the part of classical Indian geometry is in need of an explanation. If so, Pāṇini's grammar might conceivably be enumerated among the factors that played a role. In that case one may have to consider the possibility that the influence of Pāṇini's grammar, far from encouraging the development of an abstract geometry, had the opposite effect.

While, then, Pāṇini's grammar *may* have exerted an influence on the development of geometry in India, the influence it exerted on the development of philosophy has no doubt been overstated. This misunderstanding is understandable, because ideas about language different from grammar deeply influenced the development of Indian philosophy, as we have seen. It is true that one Indian philosopher, Bhartṛhari, explicitly used grammar in creating his system of philosophy. But even Bhartṛhari was strongly influenced by general ideas about language that had nothing to do with grammar in particular.

III.5. The origins of the Indian theater

In a discussion of the origins of the Indian theater the name of Sylvain Lévi must occupy a central position. Lévi was neither the first nor the last to be interested in the origins of the Indian theater. However, the way in which he dealt with the question in *Le théâtre indien* (1890), his doctoral dissertation, has exerted a major influence on the subsequent debate, and has to a large extent determined its outcome.

Let us look at this debate in its broadest outline. Lévi dedicates a chapter of his book to the question whether the Indian theater had undergone Greek influence; this had been the position of some scholars before him. Lévi rejects this position after an in-depth discussion. And this is in essence the end of the debate in Indian studies. Outside of Indian studies, there are still a few attempts to uphold the thesis of Greek influence (Reich 1903: 694 f.), but no Indologists are convinced. Renou states in 1936 (1936/1937: XVI) that the question remains open. In 1953 (Renou, 1953a: 261 [§ 1849]) he observes that “la question irritante des rapports avec le drame grec ... paraît en sommeil aujourd'hui, comme tant de problèmes de l'indianisme”. Renou's *sleep* (‘sommeil’) is a euphemism, for most Indologists consider henceforth the problem solved. This is true of Sten Konow (1920: 40 f.), A. Berriedale Keith (1924: 57 f.), Jan Gonda (1943: 329 f. [350 f.]), Indu Shekhar (1960: 54 f.), and others. In 1963 (p. XIV) Renou notes “la question n'a plus été reprise qu'à de rares intervalles ultérieurement à 1890 [year in which *Le Théâtre indien* was published; JB]: comme tant d'autres, elle tombe au point mort quand les promoteurs ne sont plus là pour défendre leur thèse.” Three years later Paul Thieme (1966) does not even find it necessary to mention the question of the possibility of Greek influence in an article that is yet called “Les origines du théâtre indien”.[983] F. B.

[983] Thieme dealt with the question in another article — this one in German — that came out in the same year (“Das indische Theater”; 1966a).

J. Kuiper (1979: 110), to conclude, does not hesitate to claim that the old idea of a Greek origin has been definitely refuted, without mentioning when and by whom it has supposedly been refuted. Kuiper's publication is to my knowledge the most recent one that deals with the question in detail.[984]

An analysis of the arguments presented by the Indologists concerned (to the extent that they presented any) shows that they do little beyond referring to each other. Apart from some individual elaborations and additions,[985] the whole argumentative structure that is supposed to legitimate the generally accepted position today — viz., that the hypothesis of Greek influence on the beginnings of the Indian theatre can be ignored — rests on the arguments Sylvain Lévi had given in his *Théâtre indien*.[986] It has for this reason been possible to say that Lévi's criticism "constituent dans l'ensemble ... la plus formidable ligne de défense qui ait jamais été dressée contre l'hypothèse de toute influence externe".[987] In what follows I will therefore concentrate on his arguments.

Recall to begin with that Sylvain Lévi was not the first to address the question of Greek influence on the Indian theatre in 1890. Lévi knew well the positions of his predecessors. He quotes Richard Pischel in particular:[988] "S'imaginer que le théâtre grec ait exercé une certaine influence sur la formation du théâtre indien, c'est témoigner une égale ignorance du théâtre grec et du théâtre indien."

If Richard Pischel represented one extreme, his compatriot Ernst Windisch represented another. Windisch published in 1882 a book on Greek influence on the Indian theater: *Der griechische Einfluss im indischen Drama*.[989] This books, as Lévi observes, reads like a defence of such influence. Lévi takes this book as point of departure for his discussion. He examines all of its arguments, which he rejects one by one, so that he arrives at a conclusion that is similar to that of Pischel, with this difference that his conclusion is based on a detailed argumentation.

It is important to understand how Sylvain Lévi arrives at his conclusion, because the method determines in a way its content. Lévi's position in his *Théâtre indien* is the antithesis of Windisch's position in the latter's *Der griechische Einfluss im indischen*

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[984] Bansat-Boudon (1992: 67 f.; also 1995; 1998) returns to some of the questions raised by Kuiper.

[985] On the claimed references to the theater in the ancient grammarians, see Renou 1963: XV: "Au sujet des grammairiens, S. Lévi avait vu l'essentiel: la mention des naṭasūtra's ou « Aphorismes sur l'art scénique » chez Pāṇini, celle des śaubhika's, mi-acteurs, mi-récitants, chez Patañjali. Il était réservé à l'enquête ultérieure de pousser plus loin l'argument, sans réussir toutefois à lui enlever son caractère hypothétique."

[986] The claim by M. Christopher Byrski (1974: 14) to the extent that a book by A. Gawroński (written in 1916, published thirty years later) "is the first scholarly refutation of the theory of Greek influence on Indian drama", cannot therefore be correct. I have had no access to Gawroński's book.

[987] Bernard 1976: 320.

[988] French translation of Pischel 1875: 19.

[989] Windisch 1882. Windisch (1920: 400) observes that similar statements had been made before him by E. Brandes in a publication (1870) that had remained unknown to him. Opposition to Windisch's thesis was immediate: Schroeder (1887: 598) mentions the criticisms of H. Jacobi and R. Pischel during its first presentation, and adds his own. But others, among them Vincent A. Smith (1889: 184 sq.), accepted his thesis. (Note that in his *Oxford History of India* [first edition 1919] Smith has changed his mind: "it may be said that Greek or Hellenistic influence upon India was slight and superficial, much less in amount than I believed it to be when the subject first attracted me" [Smith 1958: 159].)

Drama. However, Windisch had not been content to say that there is Greek influence on the Indian theater. He had presented a *specific* thesis that went well beyond the *general* thesis according to which there was Greek influence on the Indian theater. When Sylvain Lévi criticizes the position of Ernst Windisch, some of his arguments concern the general thesis, and others concern the specific thesis. The arguments that show that the specific thesis is indefendable show nothing with respect to the general thesis. And yet, the rejection of the specific thesis created the impression that now also the general thesis had been refuted, not only in Sylvain Lévi, but also in his successors.

We will turn to the specific thesis of Windisch in a while. Let us first look at the general thesis as it had been formulated by Albrecht Weber. Lévi refers to this general thesis in the very beginning of his chapter on Greek influence. The passage concerned deserves to be quoted in full (1890: 343-344):

> Entre les peuples qui sont entrés en contact avec l'Inde aux temps lointains de son histoire, les Grecs seuls ont une littérature dramatique.[990] Est-ce donc la Grèce qui a donné à l'Inde son théâtre? M. Weber, qui s'est signalé par son opiniâtreté à rechercher les traces de l'influence grecque sur la civilisation brahmanique, a posé hardiment la question dans son admirable *Histoire de la Littérature Indienne*.
>
> « Le drame indien atteint sa perfection dès les premières oeuvres que nous en connaissons. La plupart des prologues, il est vrai, présentent la pièce en question comme nouvelle par rapport à celles des poètes antérieurs, mais nous n'avons rien conservé d'eux, non plus que des débuts de la poésie dramatique. On peut dès lors se demander si la représentation des drames grecs à la cour des rois grecs en Bactriane, au Penjab et en Guzerat (car la puissance grecque s'est étendue jusqu'à ces régions) n'a point provoqué l'esprit d'imitation des Indiens, et si elle n'a point été ainsi la *cause originelle* (Ursache) du drame indien. Sans doute il n'y a pas de preuves à en fournir, mais du moins les données de l'histoire rendent incontestablement cette hypothèse possible, d'autant que les plus anciens drames indiens ont été composés dans l'ouest de l'Inde. Du reste, il n'y pas de rapport interne entre le théâtre des deux peuples[991]. »

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[990] This appears indeed to be the case. Roger Darrobers writes, in 1995 (p. 3): “La formation du théâtre peut sembler relativement tardive en Chine, pays de tradition écrite plurimillénaire: les pièces ne sont pas antérieures au XIIe siècle, et les plus anciens livrets en notre possession remontent à l'époque mongole (1279-1367). Les premiers dramaturges sont postérieurs de plus d'un millénaire et demi à Sophocle, Eschyle ou Euripide. La Chine antique n'a pas produit un théâtre tragique et mythologique équivalent à celui qui s'est épanoui en Grèce, ni un théâtre satirique et social semblable à celui d'Aristophane à Athènes ou de Plaute et Térence à Rome.”

[991] French translation of Weber 1852: 192: “Aus dem Bisherigen hat sich ergeben, das uns das Drama gleich vollendet und mit seinen besten Stücken entgegentritt : es wird denn auch fast in allen Prologen das betreffende Werk als neu im Gegensatze zu den Stücken der früheren Dichter dargestellt : von diesen aber, also den Anfängen der dramatischen Dichtkunst, ist uns nicht das Geringste erhalten. Es ist sonach die Vermuthung, ob nicht etwa die Aufführung griechischer Dramen an den Höfen der griechischen Könige in Baktrien, im Penjab und in Guzerate (denn so weit hat sich ja eine Zeitlang die griechische Macht erstreckt) die Nachahmungskraft der Inder geweckt habe, und so die Ursache zum indischen Drama geworden sei, zwar vor der Hand durch nichts direkt zu beweisen, aber die historische Möglichkeit dafür ist wenigstens unläugbar : zumal da die älteren Drama fast alle in dem **Westen** Indiens gehören. Ein **innerer** Zusammenhang mit dem griechischen Drama übrigens findet nicht Statt.” The French translation of Alfred Sadous has (Weber 1859: 326-27): “le drame s'est présenté à nous tout achevé et avec ses meilleures pièces :

> Exprimées avec ces réserves, l'hypothèse a paru cependant trop exclusive encore à M. Weber; il l'a corrigée dans un travail postérieur[992] : il efface l'expression de « cause originelle », et il y substitue « une certaine influence sur le développement du théâtre indien ».

Lévi quotes this long passage from Albrecht Weber, including even the correction that the latter had subsequently added. Against this general thesis he has but one single argument. It is the enormous time-interval that, according to him, separates the disappearance of the Greeks from India during the first century before the Common Era and the first manifestations of the Indian theater in the masterpieces of Kālidāsa, five or six centuries later.

This argument is weak, and has been further shattered by more recent discoveries, which we will return to below. Most of Lévi's chapter on Greek influence deals with Windisch's specific thesis. The German scholar had discussed an influence from the side of the New Attic Comedy, and maintained that this influence had reached India through concrete performances rather than through hear-say.[993] Lévi cites the following passage from Windisch's book:[994] "C'est elle [i.e., the New Attic Comedy; JB] qui pouvait trouver un écho partout, à Rome aussi bien qu'à Ujjayinī, car elle s'occupe de la vie ordinaire des hommes, et avec son ton local, elle contient bien des choses qui ont trait à l'humanité en général."

At the end of a long and detailed analysis, Lévi concludes (p. 364): "Les arguments recueillis à l'appui de l'hypothèse grecque se retournent contre elle" and (p. 365): "Le raisonnement, comme les faits, dément l'hypothèse de l'influence grecque". This conclusion does not distinguish between Windisch's general and his specific thesis. The refutation of the *specific* thesis is presented as if it were a refutation of the *general* thesis. But we have seen that Lévi had but one single argument against the general thesis, an argument whose force has been reduced by subsequent discoveries.

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de plus dans presque tous les prologues l'ouvrage en question est montré comme nouveau en opposition avec les pièces des poètes antérieurs : mais de ces dernières pièces, et par conséquent des commencements de l'art dramatique, il ne nous est absolument rien resté. Ainsi l'on ne peut jusqu'à présent prouver par aucun argument direct cette supposition, à savoir que la représentation de drames grecs à la cour des rois grecs dans la Bactriane, le Penjab et le Guzzerat (car c'est jusque là, comme on le sait, que pendant un temps s'est étendue la puissance grecque) n'a point éveillé l'instinct d'imitation des Indiens, et n'a pas été ainsi la source du drame indien, mais on ne peut en nier du moins la possibilité historique: d'autant plus que les drames anciens appartiennent presque tous à l'ouest de l'Inde. Du reste un lien plus intime avec le drame grec n'existe pas."

[992] Reference to Weber 1876: 194 n. 2: "jetzt sage ich also: auf die **Entwickelung** des indischen Drama's einen **gewissen Einfluss** geübt habe". Cp. Weber 1890: 24 [920]: "Zwischen den ... einfachen und grotesken Anfängen ... bis zu dér Vollendung, welche das indische Drama bei Kālidāsa ... zeigt, muss eine lange Stufenfolge von Zwischenstadien angenommen werden, und híerbei ist es denn, wo dem etwaigen Einfluss des griechischen Drama's Thür und Thor offen steht."

[993] Windisch 1882: 16 [111]: "Griechische **Aufführungen**, nicht blosse Berichte, müssen es gewesen sein, von denen indische Dichter sich beeinflussen liessen."

[994] Lévi 1890: 346; cited from Windisch 1882: 16 [111]: "Die neuere attische Komödie konnte aber überall Anklang finden, in Rom wie in Ujjayinî, da sie sich mit dem gewöhnlichen Leben der Menschen beschäftigt, und dieses bei allem Localton doch sehr viel allgemein Menschliches enthält."

Let us look one more time at the question regarding a specific thesis. There are two specific theses, one by Windisch and one by Reich. Both have been criticized by Indologists. Unfortunately, these Indologists have repeated Lévi's mistake, thinking that the refutation of specific theses amounts to a refutation of the general thesis, i.e. of Greek influence in whatever form. It is in this manner that Paul Regnaud (1898: IX f.) criticizes the position of Windisch without worrying about the general thesis. Hermann Oldenberg (1903: 241 f.) mentions the theses of Windisch and Reich, characterizes them and improbable, and seems to believe that this suffices to express doubts as to Greek influence in general.[995] Moriz Winternitz (1920: 174 f.) reduces the question of Greek influence to an evaluation of the thesis of Reich, with respect to which he cannot make up his mind.[996] Sten Konow (1920: 40-41) does not have this problem: he refutes the theses of Windisch and Reich, and does not leave space for a more general thesis. A. B. Keith (1924: 68), after a balanced discussion, holds that certain considerations plead against borrowing. His use of the word *borrowing* reveals that his argument has moved, perhaps unconsciously, from the idea of an influence in the broadest sense to the idea of a specific influence, viz. borrowing. Jan Gonda characterizes in 1943 (p. 330 [351]) the ideas of Windisch and Reich as being outdated, and seems to believe that that claim is enough to dismiss the possibility of Greek influence in whatever form. Indu Shekhar (1960: 57) puts forward the argument that Indian dramatic literature is in several respects fundamentally different from Greek dramatic literature. Once again, absence of Greek influence in these respects is considered to annul the possibility of Greek influence in general.[997] Kuiper, in 1979, does not even specify any longer which arguments supposedly refute the old idea of Greek influence, or even what old idea he is precisely referring to. And yet, the arguments one finds in the secondary literature concern almost exclusively specific theses, primarily those of Windisch and Reich. The way in which Kuiper formulates his rejection — he says (Kuiper 1979: 110): "The old idea of a Greek origin and that of the Greek-Roman pantomime being the source of the (North-)Indian drama have definitely been refuted" — betrays that he, too, confused the specific thesis of Reich and the general thesis of Greek influence.

It is possible that Sylvain Lévi was aware that his treatment of the problem had left the general thesis virtually untouched. Indeed, in a subsequent study, where he suggests that the Sanskrit theater must have come about under the Kṣatrapas of western India, he makes the following remark (1902: 124): "Si le théâtre sanscrit est né à la cour des Kṣatrapas, la théorie de l'influence grecque semble gagner en vraisemblance. Le pays des Kṣatrapas était sans doute le plus hellénisé de l'Inde, puisqu'il était le marché le plus

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[995] Oldenberg 1903: 242-43: "Dass diese Hypothese direkt widerlegt werden kann, glaube ich nicht; wie ein Beweis aussehen sollte, der die Unmöglichkeit derartiger Zusammenhänge dartäte, wird sich schwer vorstellen lassen. Aber ich halte doch dafür, dass nicht nur kein wirklicher Beweis für jene Theorie erbracht ist, sondern dass wir auch Grund haben, sie eher unwahrscheinlich als wahrscheinlich zu finden."

[996] According to La Vallée-Poussin (1930: 300), "Winternitz a raison de penser que H. Reich dans son Der Mimus (1903) signale des faits fort intéressants". La Vallée-Poussin (p. 298) also quotes remarks from E. Senart "qu'il faut retenir et méditer", remarks that on one hand accept in India usages "qui forment un premier embryon de création dramatique", but which also raise the following question: "Ne serait-ce pas à une impulsion venue du dehors qu'elle devrait l'idée de son drame littéraire?"

[997] This same observation is behind Lyne Bansat-Boudon's following remark (1992: 11): "All those features prove original enough to make the hypothesis of a Greek influence unacceptable."

important du commerce hellénistique."[998] This reflection should have opened the way to a resurrection of the general thesis. But no, Lévi rejects the general thesis once again on the basis of a specific thesis, stating: "Rien ne donne à croire cependant que l'influence des Grecs ait pu s'étendre jusqu'à la littérature: les caractères grecs tracés sur les monnaies des Kṣatrapas résistent encore aux essais d'interprétation, et semblent prouver que l'hellénisation restait très superficielle." In other words, the general thesis of Greek influence on the Sanskrit theater is inseparably connected, in Lévi's mind, with a specific thesis according to which no such influence would have been possible without an advanced degree of hellenization, so much so that Indian scholars would have familiarized themselves with Greek literature.

In passing it may be said here that, in spite of the above, Sylvain Lévi invokes the possibility of Greek influence, not this time in connection with the Sanskrit theater, but rather to explain the appearance of Mahāyāna in Buddhism: the role of stains and their cleansing in the thinking of the Buddhist Asaṅga might be a reflection of Manichaism; the doctrine of dharmas that is characteristic of the school of Asaṅga recalls the Intelligibles taught by the Neoplatonics from the third century onward; etc. (Lévi 1911: Introduction, p. 17 f.). None of this plays much of a role in the reflections of Buddhologists today.[999] But these speculations clearly show that Lévi did not in principle discard the idea of a possible Greek influence on India.

Let us return to our main theme. The history of Indology since the 1880s is full of discussions of specific theses about a possible Greek influence on the Indian theater. These discussions are no doubt responsible for the fact that well before Windisch another Indologist of great repute had formulated the general thesis as to Greek influence on the Indian theater. The subsequent confusion has completely overshadowed the form that had been given to this thesis. Its author is, of course, Albrecht Weber, and we have already seen that Sylvain Lévi knew his position very well. He cited a long passage from his work, reproduced above, but surprisingly he does not comment upon it. Lévi quotes the impetuous reaction of Richard Pischel, who claimed that the thesis of Greek influence on the Indian theater cannot be based on ignorance of both traditions. He then passes on to the ideas of Ernst Windisch. All Indologists after him have done the same, and the ideas of Albrecht Weber have been all but forgotten.

And yet, Lévi's only argument against Weber was the long interval of time that he believed separated the first Sanskrit dramas from the Greeks. We have seen that Lévi himself suppressed this argument in 1902, by playing with the suggestion that the Sanskrit might have begung with the western Kṣatrapas. The discoveries of fragments of buddhist dramas belonging to the very first centuries of the Common Era (Lüders 1911), of the so-called dramas of Bhāsa[1000] (Gaṇapati Sāstrī 1912), and the dating of the kernel of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* to roughly the first century (e.g., Feistel 1969: 136 sq.), deprive this argument of all its remaining credibility.

Other considerations further weaken Lévi's initial thesis. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* presents the theater as something that has its place — primarily or even exclusively — at

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[998] This observation should not make us forget that the culture of the Kushana Empire, too, betrays much that is of Greek inspiration; see Holt 1999: 136 f.

[999] Exception: Vassiliades 2000: 70.

[1000] The "controverse inépuisable" (voir Renou 1963: XVIII n. 29) that has come to surround the dramas attributed to this author is not relevant in the present context, especially since Sylvain Lévi considered their authenticity indisputable (Lévi 1914: II).

the royal court.[1001] To suppose that the court of certain kings continues, or is inspired by, another court is therefore neither surprising nor improbable. The supposition becomes even more probable in view of the fact that orthodox brahmanical texts express a negative view regarding all that has to do with dance, singing and music.[1002] Regarding the typically Indian character of the Sanskrit drama, it is useful to recall the following words of La Vallée-Poussin (1930: 242): "Il y a bien des siècles qu'Albirouni écrivait : 'Dites quelque chose à un Hindou : il vous répétera demain votre leçon en indien et vous n'y reconnaîtrez pas grand chose.' Rien n'a été emprunté par l'Inde qui n'ait été vite hindouisé."

We know that the Greeks of northwestern India cultivated the Greek theater. The excavation in Ai-Khanoum have brought to light a very big amphitheater, with places for some 6'000 spectators. Unsurprisingly, the person responsible for these excavations, Paul Bernard (1976: 314 f.), points out that time has much changed the data bearing on the problem of a possible Greek influence on the Indian theater (p. 320). Bernard's remark, as far as I can see, has fallen on deaf ears in the Indological community.

It is true that all Indian dramas that have survived, and Bharata's old treatise, are completely Indian. Several theories have therefore been proposed regarding the links between the classical theater and earlier Indian elements, often vedic; there is no reason to abandon all of them in favor of an exclusively Greek origin. But let us not forget that influence does not have to be exact borrowing. Paul Bernard, in the article referred to above, recalls that influence can adopt several forms. He writes (Bernard 1976: 321-22):

> Si une influence de cette sorte s'est jamais produite, elle aurait pu s'exercer de trois façons différentes, selon l'intensité plus ou moins grande qu'on lui suppose : soit par des emprunts délibérés : c'est la thèse de l'imitation directe soutenue par Windisch et par Reich ; soit que la Grèce n'ait fait que donner l'impulsion au génie propre de l'Inde, lui transmettant simplement l'idée du genre théâtral : c'est la thèse de la cause originelle, de l' « Ursache », avancée par Weber ; soit enfin que la présence d'un théâtre grec en Asie centrale et dans l'Inde du Nord-Ouest ait favorisé et accéléré, à la manière d'un catalyseur, l'élaboration déjà en cours du théâtre indien dont les origines devraient, dans ces conditions, être considérées comme purement nationales.

Since Sylvain Lévi, criticism has targeted the first of these three possibilities, which we now know is untenable.[1003] Options two and three, on the other hand, do not endanger researches regarding the Indian roots of the Sanskrit theater. They are not therefore affected by the criticism.

Apart from the absence of arguments against Greek influence on the Sanskrit theater, one may also think of factors that rather plead in its favour. It is beyond contest that Greek influence plays in other domains of Indian culture, as in astronomy and the

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[1001] See Kuiper 1979: 114.

[1002] Horsch 1966: 324 sq.

[1003] I am aware of only one exception. Chr. Lindtner (2002: 199), in a review of Windisch's *Kleine Schriften* de Windisch, remarks: "Very important still is the long paper on the Greek influence on the Indian drama ..., with which I concur ..." Cp. also Simson 2002: 308: "Es lohnt sich jedenfalls, Windischs Gründe genau zu studieren, bevor man sich eventuell der ablehnenden Haltung Pischels, v. Schroeders, Lévys (*sic*) und anderer anschliesst."

plastic arts. In the case of astronomy this influence has taken the form of material borrowings.[1004] This means that it is not the idea of astronomy as such that entered Indian thought from the Hellenistic world; in fact, there was astronomy in India well before there were any contacts with the Greek or Hellenistic world.[1005] It is rather specific conceptions — which constituted so to say the content of Hellenistic astronomy — that have been borrowed by Indian astronomy.[1006] But material borrowings are not the only form under which there can be influence. It is at least conceivable that a general idea passes from one culture to another without the specific conceptions that are associated with it. It is possible, even likely (see § III.2.1, above), that the tradition of critical debate that accompanied Hellenistic kings wherever they installed themselves is at the basis of the development of systematic philosophy in India. In this case, a general idea, or even a simple custom, entered Indian culture from the Greeks in the Northwest, without there being any specific idea of Greek philosophy that, as far as we can tell, ever entered into the different traditions of Indian thought. Critical debate being a relatively public affair, it may have influenced even those who were not familiar with, or did not understand, its contents. The situation may have been similar in the case of the theater. The construction in Ai Khanoum of an amphitheater that could accommodate at last 6'000 persons (Bernard 1978: 432), could not hide from contemporary visitors that the Greeks had a taste for this kind of amusement.[1007] It seem improbable that Greek settlers who moved more toward the east, closer to the centre of Indian culture, succeeded any better in hiding this aspect of their cultural life.[1008] Add to this that the western Kṣatrapas, according to Sylvain Lévi the most hellenized rulers in India, may very well have been sensitive to the dramatic genre, even if no one in their entourage could read Greek or even knew that Greek theatrical literature existed.[1009]

How do we explain that for more than a century since Sylvain Lévi, Indologists have not noticed the logical defect in their arguments?[1010] One after the other they have

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[1004] See, e.g., Pingree 1971; 1993.

[1005] According to Falk (2002: 82), there were no chronological eras in India; these were introduced by the Greeks from Bactria, or under their influence.

[1006] Curiously, this fact is used as argument against Greek influence on the Indian theater by S. K. De (Dasgupta & De 1947: 652): “Against the possibility of any foreign influence we may say that it is remarkable that in Indian drama as we find it the characters are peculiarly of Indian national type. When Indian astronomy and Indian sculpture let themselves to be influenced by Greek ideas the matter can be detected very easily. But in the development of the Indian drama we find essentially the Indian spirit and Indian life. As it now stands, the development of Indian drama seems to be quite independent of Greek influence.”

[1007] Cf. Holt 1999: 38: "These [i.e., the theater and the gymnasium in Ai Khanoum] constituted the defining institutions of Greek civic life, as essential as the olive and the grape to the sustenance of Hellenic civilization."

[1008] On the Hellenistic element in the old city of Taxila (Sanskrit: Takṣaśilā), see Karttunen 1990.

[1009] Jean Filliozat's following remarks are interesting in this context (1947: 244, § 463): “le Nord-Ouest était une des régions où le sanskrit était le plus cultivé ..., ce qui le destinait à être adopté comme langue littéraire et scientifique. C'était aussi la région des invasions et par conséquent des idées antitraditionnelles, donc la région où l'on pouvait avoir le moins de scrupules à le profaner. ... Les satrapes d'Ujjayini semblent avoir contribué tout spécialement à achever de dégager le sanskrit de l'usage strictement brahmanique ... Il est probable que les souverains étrangers ont consacré la vogue du sanskrit littéraire plutôt qu'ils ne l'ont suscitée.”

[1010] Honesty obliges me to mention some partial exceptions: Keith 1924: 68 (“We cannot assuredly deny the possibility of Greek influence, in the sense that Weber admitted the

repeated the conclusion that the general thesis of Greek influence on the Indian theater must be rejected, even though they criticized, not the general thesis, but one or more specific theses. Non-Indologists — such as Paul Bernard, or before him W. W. Tarn[1011] — have noticed the error. Were the Indologists themselves unable to discern it?

In their defence one might observe that the Indologists concentrated their efforts most often on other possible explanations for the appearance of the Sanskrit theater. Some even added in so many words that, if the appearance of the Sanskrit theater can be explained on the basis of elements found in the earlier culture of India itself, it is not justified to resort to elements external to Indian culture.[1012] Once again, the logical force of this assertion is not clear. Since it is known that a literary theater existed on Indian soil during the period preceding the Sanskrit theater, it is hard to understand why this fact should be discarded as being 'external', and why it is not allowed to play a role in the appearance of the Sanskrit literary theater.

Several theories have been proposed in the hope of identifying the indigenous origins of the Sanskrit theater. Inevitably, many researchers have tried to find these origins in vedic literature. Sylvain Lévi himself, in his *Théâtre indien*, went in this direction when re-interpreting an observation by Hermann Oldenberg regarding the subject matter of certain dialogue hymns of the *Ṛgveda*. According to Lévi, they display a kind of dramatic spectacle (p. 307). This suggestion has later been elaborated and commented by more recent Indologists, but has also evoked opposition. Other Indologists rather look for the origins of the Sanskrit drama in popular layers of the population of ancient India, or in a combination of vedic and popular elements.[1013]

One thing is certain in all this: so many years of research have not produced anything like a consensus. As Louis Renou (1963: XII-XIII) put it: "On n'a que l'embarras du choix,

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probability"); Horsch 1966: 340 ("das indische Theater [ist] vom mimisch-formellen wie vom inhaltlichen Standpunkt autochthon ..., was eine sekundäre Beeinflussung in Einzelheiten nicht ausschliesst"); Thieme 1966a: 50-51 ("Wenn also das Mitspielen griechischer Vorbilder bei der Entwicklung des indischen 'Mimus' vorläufig nicht sicher nachweisbar ist, so muss doch andererseits zugegeben werden, dass es sich auch nicht ausschliessen lässt").

[1011] Cp. Tarn 1951: 381-82: "The days when it could be suggested that the classical Sanscrit drama of the Gupta period was in any sense derived from the Greek drama are long past; no one now doubts that the Indian drama was a native growth precisely as the Greek drama was, though it may be matter of debate whether its origin was religious or secular, and what part was played by different elements. But the much-canvassed question of whether, during its formative period, it underwent any or what Greek influence is another matter." Tarn is perhaps too generous with respect to the Indologists, by only retaining Bernard's third option, without taking the second into consideration.

[1012] E.g. Thieme 1966a: 51: "Nach Lage der Dinge muss die Last des Beweises bei denen ruhen, die griechischen Einfluss behaupten."

[1013] For an overview and discussion of some positions, see Horsch 1966: 307-357. Renou (1963: XII) comments: "Éclairer l'évolution préhistorique du théâtre sanskrit par le folklore peut amener des comparaisons intéressantes: l'inconvénient est que l'originalité d'un art savant se trouve diluée dans l'anonymat des structures élémentaires. Le fait sanskrit, ici comme ailleurs, est d'abord un fait singulier." Malamoud (1998) asks questions "non sur les traits védiques du théâtre mais sur la présence d'éléments spectaculaires, et, plus précisément, d'éléments dramatiques dans le rituel védique" (p. 27).

fait qui commande ... la prudence".[1014] One has the impression that the debate has nowadays more or less come to an end, through exhaustion, without there being and definite result.

This takes us back to the question why Indologists have been almost unanimous in rejecting, or avoiding, the thesis of Greek influence. Here one can only speculate. Since the West tends to identify with early Greek culture, finding Greek influence in ancient India may be frowned upon as an expression of a colonial attitude. Moreover, many Indologists have a tendency to defend, or even proclaim, the originality of the culture they study.

Sylvain Lévi did not have this tendency. In 1890, the very year in which his *Théâtre indien* came out, he published and article called "Abel Bergaigne et l'indianisme". Here he says the following about western influence on India (1890a: 11): "La vanité de l'Inde essaye en vain de dissimuler ses emprunts : l'astronomie porte la marque irréfragable des Grecs; la littérature et la religion laissent soupçonner une action profonde, mais difficile à préciser."[1015] We have already seen that in 1902 Lévi evoked, without hesitation, Greek influence to explain certain developments in Mahāyāna. Ten years later he had all the elements at hand to reevaluate his initial rejection of Greek influence on the Indian theater. Unfortunately we only know approximately what conclusions he drew from them. In a short preface that he wrote in 1914, he refers to the new discoveries and says (p. V): "Le problème souvent discuté des rapports entre le théâtre grec et le théâtre indien se pose ... sous un aspect nouveau, maintenant que nous trouvons le drame sanscrit fixé dans son cadre définitif longtemps avant Kālidāsa." At this occasion he said no more. However, in a course that he gave in 1919-1920 but which was not published until after his death (1938: 80 f.), he made some statements that should make us reflect. He mentions here the problem of Greek influence on India, and of Indian influence on Greece, then states that, "puisqu'il s'est trouvé dans l'Inde même un roi grec pour adhérer au bouddhisme, puisqu'il s'est trouvé dans l'Inde même un ambassadeur grec pour adhérer au bhāgavatisme, puisqu'il a existé dans l'Inde même des interprètes officiels de chancellerie en possession d'un vocabulaire gréco-indien fixe et consacré, il est bien permis de se demander, comme l'ont fait de bons esprits et des savants éprouvés, si ... le théâtre indien ne [doit] pas [sa] naissance à des modèles grecs ...". He then continues: "La discussion du problème nous entraînerait bien loin, je m'y suis mêlé autrefois avec la fougue de la jeunesse. Dans les deux camps, on a peut-être manqué de mesure; les uns ont trop affirmé, les autres trop nié." A few lines further down he explains: "l'Inde a pu avoir, même dès l'époque védique, des cérémonies, des rites, des fêtes où l'art dramatique avait une part, avec des acteurs chargés d'un rôle divin, héroïque, comique, avec des dialogues, des gestes, des danses, sans arriver jamais par elle-même à en dégager le drame, c'est à dire le développement dans un cadre régulier d'une action suivie, découpée dans un nombre fixe de portions en équilibre." These lines show that by that time Lévi no longer supported as rigidly as before his own initial refutation of Greek influence on the Indian theater.

[1014] Elsewhere in the same publication, Renou (1963: XVII) thinks that one should by all means leave aside the prehistory of the theater.

[1015] He continues (1890a: 11): "En retour, la philosophie et la religion de l'Occident reçoivent manifestement l'empreinte des doctrines orientales. Plotin, Porphyre, l'école des néoplatoniciens reflètent la métaphysique de Kapila et de Patañjali; Manès et les gnostiques introduisent dans le christianisme l'esprit du brahmanisme et du bouddhisme, tandis qu'une colonie de Nestoriens apporte l'Évangile à l'Inde."

We learn from Louis Renou (1936: XVI) that Lévi, toward the end of his life, seemed ready to take on a second edition of his *Théâtre indien*. This second edition was not completed during his lifetime. According to Renou, Lévi would have added an annex on the dramas attributed to Bhāsa that were discoverd in 1910, and perhaps a second one on the fragments of buddhist dramas exhumed in 1911 by von Le Coq and published by Heinz Lüders. Renou does not mention a new reflection on Greek influence, and we have no clear indication to believe that Sylvain Lévi had thought of it. It is nonetheless attractive, and probably correct, to think that Lévi had realized that his only argument against the thesis of Albrecht Weber had been completely annihilated by the new discoveries, and that, in the form which Weber had given to it, the thesis of Greek influence on the Sanskrit theater still awaits its first serious criticism.

IV. CONCLUSIONS: HOW DID THE BRAHMINS WIN?

In an article that came out in 1990, Sheldon Pollock — who speaks of 'Sanskrit discourse' where we might prefer 'Brahmanism' — discusses some of its 'concrete modes of domination', "such … as caste hierarchy, untouchability, and female heteronomy" (p. 335). He then continues: "However, these may be surface ripples from deeper currents. It may be in a more intimate domain of general social and cultural practice that the real force and durability of Sanskrit discourse is located …" The 'real force and durability' of brahmanical ideology is indeed an interesting and important subject for discussion, but the present book does not deal with it, at least not primarily. Here we have rather tried to address the question how this ideology succeeded in establishing itself, not how it subsequently succeeded in staying in place. Perhaps it would be justified to speak of the *invention of a tradition* — borrowing the expression from Hobsbawm & Ranger's book (1983) — as opposed to the forces that kept it going.

The establishment and spread of brahmanical ideology was intimately linked to the transition from Vedism to Brahmanism and to the formative period of the latter. In this respect, the preceding chapters suggest the following tentative reconstruction (some parts more tentative than others).

It appears that the last century or two preceding Alexander's incursion into the subcontinent saw attempts, mainly concentrated in its northwestern regions, to re-organize vedic texts and rituals as well as the structure of society. Among the results we may count the creation of the Padapāṭha of the *Ṛgveda*, the composition of the Śrautasūtras, and the imposition of the notion of four caste-classes (*varṇa*). Concerns with the preservation of the sacred language gave rise to the Sanskrit grammar of Pāṇini and to Yāska's *Nirukta* (even though this last work appears to be younger than Pāṇini and may therefore be more recent than Alexander).

Alexander's visit initiated important changes. Brahmins lost their privileged positions and became in some cases targets of persecution: Alexander killed many of them, Aśoka may have done the same, and invaders after the collapse of the Maurya Empire made life so miserable for Brahmins that some thought the end of time was near. Others were luckier, especially if they lived in one of the polities that, after the disappearance of the empire, were sympathetic to Brahmanism. The result is that the same centuries that brought misery to many Brahmins, especially those following the collapse of the Maurya Empire, also saw an upswing of brahmanical literary production. Ritual was still central in part of this literature, but since traditional sponsoring had disappeared, the kind of ritual that was now discussed was different, too.

Globally speaking, it seems justified to say that Brahmanism as it then appeared was much more self-centered than its predecessor had been. It emphasized the self-sufficient nature of Brahmins, the private rituals they engage in, the isolated lifestyle they choose for themselves if they can, and the beginninglessness of all that relates to Brahmanism: the institution itself, the Veda from which they derive their authority, and the language of the Veda, which is also their means of communication. The brahmanical vision of society and the state can be looked upon as an extension of this self-representation: Society and the state should be such that Brahmins can live the lives they are supposed to live. The supernatural powers that Brahmins claimed to possess provided extra encouragement for others to comply.

At this point we have to return to the question from which we began: How *did* the Brahmins win? Why did anyone pay attention to them and their self-imposed lifestyle, to

their claims of superiority and notions about the correct order of society? After all, they did not have the military means to impose themselves. Nor was their success limited to areas where they had a history of respect going back to the time they were priests with close links to the court. Indeed, the contrary is true: most of the regions in South and Southeast Asia had been without Brahmin priests and had no local traditions that reserved a special position for them in society. Why weren't they, and with them their peculiar habits and ideas, simply ignored?

The first question to consider is how Brahmins actually spread over South and Southeast Asia. How much do we know about this process? Very little, as it happens. But titbits of information can be culled from various sources, and our first task is to briefly consider what picture can be derived from those sources.

Brahmins figure regularly in buddhist canonical Sūtras. This may be taken as an indication that they did sometimes — perhaps frequently — settle in regions that were not brahmanized, i.e., in regions where the brahmanical vision of society was not generally recognized. For our present purposes it is interesting to see that some of these Brahmins stayed in Brahmin villages (Pāli *brāhmaṇagāma*), while others had received a village, a *brahmadeyya*. Both are sometimes mentioned in the same passage — as in the *Ambaṭṭha Sutta* and its Chinese parallels[1016] — and it is clear that the two expressions are not synonymous and do not normally both refer to the same village: in the *Ambaṭṭha Sutta* a *brāhmaṇagāma* named Icchānaṅkala is mentioned, and a *brahmadeyya* named Ukkhaṭṭha. The *brahmadeyya*, in this particular case, was a gift of King Pasenadi of Kosala. Brahmin villages (*brāhmaṇagāma*) are very often referred to in the Sūtras, *brahmadeyya*s less often.

There are good reasons to think that passages that refer to *brahmadeyya*s are relatively late in the buddhist canon.[1017] We cannot take them as depicting the situation as it prevailed at the time of the Buddha; they must indeed be assigned to a much more recent date. Brahmin villages, on the other hand, appear to have existed, at least in that part of the subcontinent, much before any king would gift land or a village to Brahmins. At that time Brahmins apparently settled in villages of their own. The suggestion is that, when moving into other regions, Brahmins did not mix with the local population in the sense of finding a place to live in existing villages or towns. On the contrary, they somehow created villages for their own exclusive use. We do not know how Brahmins in their villages in foreign territory made a living: they may have worked the land or survived by other means. This issue does not concern us at present. For our present purposes it suffices to conclude that Brahmins, when they were not *invited* to a far-away region, clustered together in villages they created for themselves. This is, of course, in perfect agreement with the isolationist tendency that characterized Brahmanism, as we saw in Part IIA.

Some additional information about the spread of Brahmins can be derived from vedic literature. Perhaps most striking is the story of King Māthava the Videgha told in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (see *Greater Magadha* p. 6-7). At first sight it seems to tell us how King Māthava conquered an eastern region, but closer inspection reveals that it does no such thing. Here is what Witzel (1995b: 23) says about it:

[1016] See McGovern 2013: 498 f.

[1017] *Greater Magadha* p. 353 ff. (Appendix VI); McGovern 2013: § IV.4.3.

> The famous Videgha Māthava legend of [*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*] 1.4.1.10 sqq. tells the story of the 'civilization process of the East' in terms of its Brahmanical authors, and not, as usually termed, as the tale of 'the Aryan move eastwards'. For it is not only Videgha Māthava, a king living on the Sarasvatī, but also his priest Gotama Rāhūgaṇa who move towards the east. Not only is the starting point of this 'expedition' the holy land of Kurukṣetra; the royal priest, Gotama Rāhūgaṇa, is a well known poet of Ṛgvedic poems as well, — and thus, completely anachronistic. Further, the story expressively mentions the role of Agni Vaiśvānara, the ritual fire, in making the marshy country of the East arable and acceptable for Brahmins. All of this points to Sanskritization (or rather, Brahmanization) and Kṣatriyazation rather than to military expansion.
>
> The Māthavas, about whom nothing is known outside the [*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*], may be identical with the máthai of Megasthenes (c. 300 B.C.), who places them East of the Pazálai (Pañcāla), at the confluence of the Erénnesis (Son) with the Ganges. The movement of some clans, with their king Videgha and his Purohita, eastwards from the River Sarasvatī in Kurukṣetra towards Bihar thus represents the 'ritual occupation' of Kosala(-Videha) by the bearers of orthoprax (and orthodox) Kuru culture, but does *not* represent an account of the first settlement of the East by Indo-Aryan speaking tribes which must have taken place much earlier ...

What we learn from this is that Brahmins were hesitant to move to 'impure' regions. A legend like the one of King Māthava facilitated the process.

Better than a legend would be local rulers who made sure that the region of destination would fulfill all requirements. This may have frequently happened. It appears that ruler often invited Brahmins to a more or less remote kingdom. This accounts to a large extent for the spread of vedic schools, and for the arrival of Brahmins in remote parts of the subcontinent and in Southeast Asia. But this takes us back to our initial question: Why should rulers be interested in Brahmins?

No simple and straightforward answers to questions like these are possible, of course. Historical developments are complex and unpredictable in the best of circumstances. The scarcity of detailed historical data in the case of Brahmanism adds to the difficulties that face those who wish to confront such questions.

And yet, one cannot observe a phenomenon like the spread of Brahmanism without asking how this could possibly happen. In spite of the risks this involves — and to avoid leaving this study incomplete — we will therefore briefly address the question: How could Brahmanism spread the way it did? What features of Brahmanism account for its incredible success? As stated above, full and complete answers to these questions are well beyond what we can reasonably expect. However, with a bit of luck we may be able to identify some of the mechanisms that played a role.

The first thing to observe is that royal courts appear to have played a central role in the spread of Brahmanism. This justifies us to return once again to a comparison with Christianity, in whose early spread, too, a royal or rather imperial court played a central role. Christianity was imposed onto the Roman Empire as a result of the conversion of its emperor, Constantin. Brahmanism was frequently introduced from above, but here the similarity ends. Brahmanism did not 'have' one single empire, nor did it have its 'Constantin'. On the contrary, Brahmanism was introduced in numerous kingdoms of relatively limited size. And there is a further difference: Constantin converted to

Christianity, but no king needed to convert to Brahmanism. Brahmanism is not the kind of thing you can convert to. Calling it a religion, as we know, is stretching the meaning of this term. It makes more sense to call it a socio-political ideology with a variable religious dimension. Indeed, a ruler, or anyone else, might combine sympathies for Brahmanism and, say, Buddhism. Inscriptions confirm that rulers could have such combined sympathies.

If kings did not convert to Brahmanism, why did they bother to invite Brahmins and promote their vision of society? Why should they accept the claim that Brahmins are superior to everyone else, including the king himself? Why should they give gifts to Brahmins, often in the form of *agrahāra*s? What were such gifts expected to bring the donors? An answer that the inscriptions themselves propose is increase of merit. To some extent this begs the question. Why should a ruler wish to obtain the kind of merit that Brahmanism promises? They may have hoped for a good afterlife, to be sure. But clearly they had to believe first that gifts to Brahmins were the way to attain this. As usual with claims about the afterlife, there was no way to verify them. We may assume that rulers also expected more visible results from their largesse, such as magical protection for their kingdom and kingship. But even such practical expectations were built, and had to be built, on a reputation that preceded the Brahmins. Somehow it should be 'known' that the presence and support of Brahmins was good for a kingdom before a ruler would get involved with them.

How did Brahmins succeed in building such a reputation for themselves? The details of this process will probably forever remain hidden from us. We may surmise that pure chance played a role, followed, after initial successes, by a snowball effect. The early buddhist texts create the impression that there were Brahmins traveling beyond their core area who put effort into promoting their vision of society to whoever was ready to listen. Most of the discussions of Brahmins with the Buddha — if the texts are to be believed — turned around the superiority of Brahmins. These Brahmins combined this missionary activity with certain services they provided to the population: the sages who predicted the future of the newly born Bodhisattva, for example, were Brahmins. Also other services that involved access to higher knowledge and higher powers were no doubt part of their arsenal.

The physical presence of Brahmins in regions that were not yet brahmanized may have been an essential contribution to the creation of a reputation that permitted their subsequent successes. But to some extent this still begs the question. Why should Brahmins who had immigrated be given a special welcome if the locals had never heard of Brahmins? Somehow their reputation must have preceded their arrival.

Reputations can spread in various ways. One of these seems to me particularly important here: through stories. Stories — as McComas Taylor (2007: 183), citing Sheldon Pollock, reminds us — can present a world ordered by the discourse that renders social phenomena 'permanent, predictable, and commensensical'. The 'social effect' of such narrative, Taylor continues, is to strengthen these very perceptions. We know that already during the period dealt with in this book Brahmins succeeded in bringing many such stories into circulation. Many of these stories were, or became part of the Sanskrit epics, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. These are epics about warriors and fighting, but one cannot read or hear them without being struck by the powerful brahmanical figures in them. Stories that illustrate this brahmanical power are numerous. One example must suffice. A story in the *Rāmāyaṇa* (2.84 ff.) tells how the brahmanical sage

Bharadvāja entertains King Bharata and his army.[1018] To cut a long story short, Bharadvāja, with the help of some gods, offers the soldiers the best meal they ever ate, including meat and alcoholic drinks. Following that, there are pleasures for all the senses, including music and, last but not least, beautiful damsels: fifteen for each man. Not surprisingly, the soldiers have the time of their life, and express their intention never to return to the capital, nor to move on, saying: "This is heaven." Bharata only gets his army back because Bharadvāja's hospitality comes to an end the next day.

There are numerous other stories in the Sanskrit epics and elsewhere that emphasize brahmanical power.[1019] What Taylor (2007: 187) said about the *Pañcatantra* can, with the same or even more right, be said about the Sanskrit epics: "[They are] an emanation of brahmancial power, a social manifesto, at once the product and the producer of orthodox tradition, one of whose effects is to perpetuate the privileged position of one section of society to the disadvantage of another. [Their] effect is to ensure that the cultural world in which it circulates remains 'permanent, predictable and commonsensical'. The effect of the regime of truth is to render invisible those practices which it employs to those ends." The *Mahābhārata*, another author observed, "was a major and self-conscious intervention in the public imagination".[1020] But, contrary to what that author suggests, this intervention in the public imagination did not only concern 'past and place in early South Asia'. Part of the collective imagination it imposed concerned the hierarchical nature of society along brahmanical lines, and the special powers that inhere in Brahmins. This, no doubt, corresponded very much to the intentions of the authors and creators of these stories and epics.

Stories of the kind we find in the Sanskrit epics must be assumed to have spread. They must have been appreciated, and must have left in those who heard them the conviction that one should not cross Brahmins, and that it was always better to have them on one's side. Stories imprinted (and "rendered invisible"), in the minds of those who heard them, ideas about Brahmins even if they had never met any. And the fact that great powers were imputed to Brahmins would not be lost on rulers, who would understand that supporting Brahmins could only be to their advantage.

There was another circumstance that could only strengthen this understanding. Brahmanism in its own self-understanding was no new phenomenon, and had never been. Brahmanical literature is at pains to point out that it had been around for a long time. Theoreticians came to claim that, like the Veda and the Sanskrit language, the world had always been there, with Brahmins and all. The main events of the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa*, moreover, are situated in an imprecise but remote past. Quite apart from the main story, the *Mahābhārata* reminds its readers and listeners on numerous occasions that a Brahmin (Paraśurāma) had killed off all warriors, i.e. kings, seven times over because they had misbehaved. This presumably took place well before the main events of the *Mahābhārata*. Clearly brahmanical power was superior to royal power, both in the past and in the present. It was in the interest of all to maintain good relationships with Brahmins.

[1018] See *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism* p.93-94. Bharata is of course only a temporary replacement king.

[1019] See especially Danielle Feller's forthcoming article "The epic hero: between Brahmin and warrior", to appear in the proceedings of the conference "Patterns of bravery" held in Cagliari, 14-16 May 2015.

[1020] Hegarty 2012: 189.

What anyone could learn from these stories is that Brahmins pose a threat when crossed. But they can also be of great help. Once again history as presented by the Brahmins can illustrate this. The great Maurya Empire — which the modern historian may think of as a disaster for Brahmanism — had really been created by a Brahmin. The founder of this empire, Candragupta, had only succeeded in creating it by closely following the advice of his brahmanical counsellor, Cāṇakya.[1021] What is more, this same Cāṇakya, for all practical purposes the creator of the Maurya Empire, was also thought of as the author of the classical Sanskrit text on statecraft, the *Arthaśāstra*. The brahmanical wisdom contained in this work, and much else, was at the disposition of rulers who were ready to appoint a Brahmin as chief advisor.

Clearly, risks could be avoided and advantages gained by pleasing Brahmins. To this one further advantage must be added: At least in theory, brahmanical advisors do not aspire to kingship. Brahmins are therefore not only the most competent and most powerful advisors, they are also safe in the sense that they will not try to replace the king they advise.

Our reflections so far explain more or less why a king might wish to be assisted by brahmanical advisors. It does not yet explain why he would reward Brahmins with *agrahāra*s, sources of steady income away from the capital. Clearly *agrahāra*s were often rewards for services rendered, but not only that. Many *agrahāra*s, it appears from the inscriptions, were given to Brahmins who were not involved in the running of the state, but who excelled in this or that aspect of traditional brahmanical learning. The recipients of *agrahāra*s were supposed to live lives dedicated to ritual practice and brahmanical learning, following the example of the brahmanical sages in their hermitages (*āśrama*) depicted in the epics and elsewhere. This, as we have seen, was deemed to increase the merit of the donor or of those close to him. We may conjecture that kings somehow felt they could harness brahmanical power in this way (even though I am not aware of any texts that explicitly put it this way).

All of this information could reach rulers (and others) through the stories that were presumably created by Brahmins but may subsequently have been told and retold by others. "The world's priests and shamans knew what psychology would later confirm: if you want a message to burrow into a human mind, work it into a story."[1022] Referring to Hakemulder 2000, Gottschall (2012: 135) observes: "when it comes to moral law, Shelley seems to have had it right: 'Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.'" We might speak, with Hogan (2009: *passim*), of *emplotment*, and recall his observation (p. 201): "[T]he most revealing and perhaps most socially consequential cases of emplotment are implicit rather than explicit, in part because those cases are not as readily open to self-conscious evaluation and inhibition. In other words, when we are unaware of the sources of our inferences, it is more difficult for us to be critical of those sources." Through implicit emplotment, brahmanical values found there way into the classical stories and treatises of Brahmanism, and through them into the minds of listeners.

Stories thus paved the way for Brahmins who moved to other regions, either invited by the king or simply on their own initiative. The stories emphasized the pure and restricted lifestyle of Brahmins, and newly arriving Brahmins could and would be identified on this basis. Shared stories can embody the fundamental values of a society,

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[1021] On the possible historical root of this story, see § I.1.1, above.
[1022] Gottschall 2012: 118.

and stories that come to be shared are likely to shape the values of a society.[1023] Brahmanical stories — primarily the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, but not only these — spread far and wide in the Indian subcontinent and in Southeast Asia. [1024] Modern Christian missionaries are not without knowing that telling a story — the story of Jesus, in this case — is a preferred way to make converts.[1025] Stories, once shared, play a role in developing a moral sense.[1026] If the morality expressed in the stories is brahmanical morality, the brahmanical vision of society is likely to gain a foothold and spread among those who listen to them. This is what happened in South and Southeast Asia, and its effects on the political, cultural and religious history of those regions was extraordinary.

[1023] Gottschall 2012: 137-138: "Story … continues to fulfill its ancient function of binding society by reinforcing a set of common values and strengthening the ties of common culture. Story enculturates the youth. It defines the people. It tells us what is laudable and what is contemptible. … Story — sacred and profane — is perhaps *the* main cohering force in human life." "[F]iction seems to be more effective at changing beliefs than nonfiction" (p. 150). "If the research is correct, fiction is one of the primary sculpting forces of individuals and societies" (p. 153).
[1024] The scholarly literature is extensive. The following barely scratches the surface: Thomas 1929; Balbir 1963; de Jong 1971; 1977; Raghavan 1980; 1998; Smith 1988; Richman 1991; Thiel-Horstmann 1991; Sachithanantham 2004; Filliozat 2007; Stasik 2009; Acri et al. 2011. Most of these publications deal with the spread of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. On the *Mahābhārata*, see Sumitra Bai & Zydenbos 1991; Hegarty 2012: ch. 5.
[1025] See the Keynote address to the Asian Mission Congress by Bishop Tagle (2006), and his reference to Pope John Paul II's *Ecclesia in Asia*; further Naugle 1999.
[1026] Boyd 2009: 197.

APPENDIXES

Appendix I: Brahmins and Śramaṇas

Aśoka's thirteenth Rock Edict states that "there is no country where these (two) classes (*nikāya*), (viz.) the Brahmins and the Śramaṇas, do not exist, except among the Greeks (*yona*)".[1027] Can we conclude from this that there were Brahmins as well as Śramaṇas in all 'countries', i.e., presumably, in all parts of Aśoka's empire?

Such a conclusion may not be justified. It appears that the expression 'Brahmins and Śramaṇas', or 'Śramaṇas and Brahmins', was used as a single expression that referred to all those who were either Brahmins or Śramaṇas.[1028] In concrete terms, this would mean that Aśoka's statement implies that there were either Brahmins or Śramaṇas in all parts of his empire, but not necessarily both at the same time. Conceivably there were 'countries' with Brahmins but without Śramaṇas, and others with Śramaṇas but without Brahmins. Clearly, Aśoka's testimony must be dealt with with much care.

What reason is there to look upon the expression 'Brahmins and Śramaṇas' in this manner? Note to begin with that Aśoka's inscriptions often refer to Brahmins and Śramaṇas together, but never to Śramaṇas separately, and only occasionally to Brahmins.[1029]

Then there is the observation by the grammarian Patañjali (after 150 BCE) that the two terms form a singular neuter compound *śramaṇabrāhmaṇam*, presumably because they are in constant opposition to each other.[1030] For our present purposes the crucial fact is that, also in Patañjali's time and culture, Brahmins and Śramaṇas were apparently frequently referred to together, so much so that this specific compound had come into existence.

This same compound, but not this time in the singular neuter but rather in the plural masculine (*samaṇabrāhmaṇā / samaṇamāhaṇā*), is frequent in the Pāli buddhist and in the Śvetāmbara jaina canons. This confirms once again that the two, Śramaṇas and Brahmins, were often thought of together, as together constituting one group. Here, as in the case of the inscriptions of Aśoka, the question comes up: do references in the Pāli canon to 'Śramaṇas and Brahmins' necessarily concern collections of individuals among which there are at least some Śramaṇas and some Brahmins? At least one passage in the Pāli canon shows that they do not.

[1027] In the Kalsi version: *natthi cā ṣe janapade yattā natthi ime nikāyā āna(ṃ)tā yoneṣu baṃhane cā samaṇe cā* (Bloch 1950: 128). Tr. Hultzsch 1925: 47, modified; cp. Schneider 1978: 73. See further Falk 2006: 124-126.

[1028] Anālayo (2009: 155) quotes Dutt (1962: 49): "Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa, in Asoka's edicts it appears as Brāhmaṇa-samaṇa, a plausible explanation of which is that ... those who belong themselves to the Samaṇa class ... wished to give it precedence [in their texts], while the Brāhmaṇa is put first in the edicts". Anālayo himself thinks "that the sequence of such listings may not always have been invested with as much importance as nowadays assumed". Note further that Patañjali, a brahmanical author, cites the compound as *śramaṇa-brāhmaṇa*, in this order; see below.

[1029] Brahmins on their own are mentioned in Rock Edict 5 (Bloch 1950: 104) and in an isolated Minor Rock Edict in Eṛṛaguḍi (Bloch 1950: 151).

[1030] Mahā-bh I p. 476 l. 9 (under P. 2.4.12 vt. 2): *yeṣāṃ ca virodha ity asyāvakāśaḥ/ śramaṇabrāhmaṇam/*; l. 11-12: *cakārakaraṇasya prayojanaṃ yeṣām ca virodhaḥ śāśvatikas teṣāṃ dvandva ekavacanam eva yathā syāt.*

This passage occurs in the *Devadaha Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*. Here the Buddha is presented as attributing to 'some Śramaṇas and Brahmins' a position which no Brahmin at the time is likely to have held, but which the passage itself attributes to Jainas. Jaina ascetics certainly were Śramaṇas, they were not Brahmins. The passage reads as follows:[1031]

> *Santi, bhikkhave, eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃ-vādino evaṃ-diṭṭhino: yaṃ kiñcāyaṃ purisapuggalo paṭisaṃvedeti, sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vā, sabban taṃ pubbekatahetu; iti purāṇānaṃ kammānaṃ tapasā vyantībhāvā, navānaṃ kammānaṃ akaraṇā āyatiṃ anavassavo, āyatiṃ anavassavā kammakkhayo, kammakkhayā dukkhakkhayo, dukkhakkhayā vedanākkhayo, vedanākkhayā sabbaṃ dukkhaṃ nijjiṇṇaṃ bhavissatī'ti. Evaṃvādino, bhikkhave, Nigaṇṭhā.*
> Bhikkhus, there are some Śramaṇas and Brahmins (*samaṇabrāhmaṇā*) who hold such a doctrine and view as this: "Whatever this person feels, whether pleasure or pain or neither-pain-nor-pleasure, all that is caused by what was done in the past. So by annihilating with asceticism past actions and by doing no fresh actions, there will be no consequence in the future. With no consequence in the future, there is the destruction of action. With the destruction of action, there is the destruction of suffering. With the destruction of suffering, there is the destruction of feeling. With the destruction of feeling, all suffering will be exhausted." So speak the Nigaṇṭhas, bhikkhus.

The 'Śramaṇas and Brahmins' referred to in this passage are, as is clear from the passage itself, Jainas.

Another interesting passage is the question addressed by the wanderer (*paribbājaka*) Subhadda to the dying Buddha, which has the following shape:[1032]

> *ye 'me bho Gotama samaṇabrāhmaṇā saṃghino gaṇino gaṇācariyā ñātā yasassino titthakarā sādhusammatā ca bahujanassa, seyyathīdaṃ Pūraṇo Kassapo, Makkhali Gosālo, Ajita-Kesakambalī, Pakudho Kaccāyano, Sañjayo Belaṭṭha-putto, Nigaṇṭho Nāthaputto, sabbe te sakāya paṭiññāya abbhaññaṃsu, sabbe 'va na abbhaññaṃsu, ekacce abbhaññaṃsu ekacce na abbhaññaṃsūti?*
> Venerable Gotama, all those Śramaṇas and Brahmins (*samaṇabrāhmaṇā*) who have orders and followings, who are teachers, well-known and famous as founders of schools, and popularly regarded as saints, like Pūraṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita Kesakambalī, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta and the Nigaṇṭha Nāthaputta — have they all realised the truth as they all make out, or have none of them realised it, or have some realised it and some not?

The names enumerated are those of the six heretics frequently mentioned in the Pāli canon, and prominently in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (DN I p. 47 ff.).[1033] Sāmañña means Śramaṇaship, so that it is clear that the teachers figuring in it are Śramaṇas. In other words, there are once again no Brahmins among the "Śramaṇas and

[1031] MN II p. 214. Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 1995: 827, modified.
[1032] DN II p. 150-51. Tr. Walshe 1987: 268, modified.
[1033] See, e.g., Basham 1951: 10 ff.

Brahmins" of this passage. Why then are they called 'Śramaṇas and Brahmins'? Clearly this expression globally refers to wanderers, without any guarantee that there are Brahmins among them.

The beginning of the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* is interesting in the present context. King Ajātaśatru is here presented as expressing the wish to visit a Śramaṇa or a Brahmin.[1034] Only Śramaṇas figure in the remainder of the Sutta.

Of the three passages from the Pāli canon considered above, the first one is crucial in the present context, because it ascribes to 'Śramaṇas and Brahmins' a position which, to the best of our knowledge, no Brahmin held at that time.

So what can we conclude from the Aśokan inscription cited above? We cannot conclude from it that there were *both* Brahmins and Śramaṇas in all parts of the Maurya Empire. This is interesting, because it implies that we cannot conclude from this inscription that there were Brahmins in all parts of the Maurya Empire. Indeed, there are good reasons to think that Brahmins did not reach certain parts of this area until late, often later than the arrival of Buddhism and/or Jainism. The Aśokan inscription could, in this respect, be a source of confusion. We now know that it should not be.

The inscription further states that there were *neither* Śramaṇas *nor* Brahmins among the Greeks at the time of Aśoka. We may assume that the Greek parts of the Maurya Empire were meant, or perhaps the Hellenistic kingdoms to its west. Aśokan inscriptions in Greek have been found in Kandahar.[1035] It is hard to believe that Gandhāra (or 'Greater Gandhāra') was considered Greek by Aśoka.[1036] This region had been a centre of brahmanical culture not long before Aśoka, and presumably continued to be one under his rule. Moreover, Buddhists are believed to have settled in this region under Aśoka. In other words, there may have been *both* Brahmins *and* Śramaṇas in Gandhāra at that time. Furthermore, under Maurya rule Gandhāra was not Greek in a political sense.

Appendix II: Vedic and para-vedic texts on the Śunaskarṇa sacrifice

The *Pañcaviṃśa* (or *Tāṇḍya Mahā*) *Brāhmaṇa* contains the following passage (17.12.1 & 5-6):

[1034] DN I p. 47: *Kaṃ nu kh'ajja samaṇaṃ vā brāhmaṇaṃ vā payirupāseyyāma, yaṃ no payirupāsato cittaṃ pasīdeyyāti*. "Can we not today visit some Śramaṇa or Brahmin, to visit whom would bring peace to our heart?" tr. Walshe 1987: 91, modified.

[1035] Falk 2006: 242 ff.

[1036] Karttunen (1997: 31) observes: "we may suppose that the settlers in Alexander's probably small Indian foundations were no happier than those in Bactria. In the end, Bactria and Arachosia remained Greek (in the sense that they contained a sedentary Greek population), but we have no corresponding evidence for India. In later times Bucephala seems to have existed, but it might well have been a refoundation by the Indo-Greeks." A recent genetic analysis also covers the Kalash in northwestern Pakistan, "whose strongest signal suggests a major admixture event (990 to 210 BCE) from a source related to present-day Western Eurasians, although we cannot identify the geographic origin precisely. This period overlaps that of Alexander the Great (356 to 323 BCE), whose army, local tradition holds, the Kalash are descended from ..., but these ancient events predate recorded history in the region, precluding confident interpretation." (Hellenthal et al 2014: 751).

trivṛd agniṣṭomaḥ sa sarvasvāro yaḥ kāmayetā 'nāmayatā 'muṃ lokam iyām iti sa etena yajeta (1)
...
ārbhavapavamāne stūyamāna audumbaryā dakṣiṇā prāvṛto nipadyate tad eva saṃgacchate (5)
sa eṣa śunaskarṇastoma etena vai śunaskarṇo bāṣkiho 'yajata tasmāc chunaskarṇastoma ity ākhyāyate (6)

Caland (1931) translates this as follows:

A nine-versed agniṣṭoma; this is throughout circumflected. He who wishes: 'May I go to yonder world not through any disease',[1037] should perform this (rite). (1)
...
Whilst the ārbhava-pavamāna(-laud) is being chanted, he (the Sacrificer) lies down, he head being covered by his uppergarment, to the south of the pillar of udumbara-wood. Then, he meets (his end). (5)
This is the stoma of Śunaskarṇa. This sacrifice was performed by Śunaskarṇa, the son of Baskika; hence it is called Śunaskarṇa's stoma. (6)

The crucial part is section 5. Does it tell us that the sacrificer enters the fire? The formulation of section 5 is too ambiguous to draw a conclusion, but it is hard to imagine that the death of the sacrificer can be scheduled so precisely without some way to speed it up.

The *Hiraṇyakeśi Śrautasūtra* (17.3.18-23) has the following:

trivṛto 'gniṣṭomaḥ/ (18)
śunaskarṇastomaḥ/ sarvasvāraḥ/ (19)
maraṇakāmo yajeta yaḥ kāmayetānāmayatāṃ svargaṃ lokam iyām iti vijñāyate/ (20)
yāmyaḥ paśuḥ śukaharita upālambhyaḥ/ (21)
kṛtānnaṃ dakṣiṇā/ (22)
ārbhave stūyamāne dakṣiṇenaudumbarīm ahatena vāsasā pattodaśena prāvṛtya dakṣiṇāśirāḥ saṃviśati brāhmaṇāḥ samāpayatam etaṃ yajñam iti/ yajñasaṃsthām anu saṃtiṣṭhate/ (23)

The *Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra* does not mention the name Śunaskarṇa, but the following passage clearly deals with the same sacrifice (22.6.1-6):

maraṇakāmasya sarvasvāraḥ/ (1)
kṛtānnadakṣiṇaḥ/ (2)
dīkṣādy avajighraty eva bhakṣān/ (3)
apsv avaharaṇam asomānām/ (4)
ārbhave stūyamāne dakṣiṇenaudumbarīṃ kṛṣṇājine saṃviśati dakṣiṇāśirāḥ prāvṛtaḥ/ (5)
tad eva mriyate/ (6)

[1037] Caland adds in a note: "Sāyaṇa supplies to *anāyamatā* (should no doubt be *anāmayamatā*, JB) the noun *dehena*: 'With a not sick body.'"

Ranade (1978: 570) translates:

> The Sarvasvāra Soma sacrifice (which is the fourth of the four Trivṛt sacrifices) is meant for one who is desirous of having a (successful) end to his life. (1)
> Food cooked properly is the priestly fee for the Sarvasvāra sacrifice. (2)
> From the Dīkṣaṇīyā iṣṭi onwards the Sacrificer consumes his iḍā-portion (just) by smelling. (3)
> The iḍā-portions of the Sacrificer excepting those of the Soma-juice are then to be thrown away into the water. (4)
> The Sacrificer lies down on a black-antelope skin to the south covered with a cloth while the Ārbhava-pavamāna sāman is chanted (in the evening session). (5)[1038]
> (And) he dies at that time. (6).

Both the *Hiraṇyakeśi* and the *Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra* use the word *saṃviśati*, similar to Śabara's *viśati*; both these words can mean 'enter'. But whereas Śabara's *viśati* has an object (*agniṃ viśati*; "he enters the fire"), the two Śrautasūtras don't, so that here the other possible translation for *saṃviśati* ("he lies down") has to be preferred.

The *Āpastamba Śrautasūtra* describes the sacrifice as follows (22.7.20-25):

> *caturthaḥ sarvasāraḥ śunaskarṇastomaḥ/ (20)*
> *maraṇakāmo yajeta yaḥ kāmayetānāmayatā svargaṃ lokam iyām iti/ (21)*
> *yāmyaḥ paśuḥ śukaharita upālambhyaḥ/ (22)*
> *kṛtānnaṃ dakṣiṇā/ (23)*
> *ārbhave stūyamāne dakṣiṇenaudumbarīṃ pattodaśenāhatena vāsasā dakṣiṇāśirāḥ prāvṛ[t]aḥ saṃviśann āha brāhmaṇ[ā]ḥ samāpayata me yajñam iti/ (24)*
> *tadaiva saṃtiṣṭhate/ (25)*

Thite (2004: 1314-1315) translates:

> The fourth (nine-versed Ekāha) is the Śunaskarṇastoma in which all the Sāmans are circumflexed at the end (*sarvasvāra*). (20)
> A sacrificer desirous of death and one who desires "May I go to heaven without having any disease" should perform (this sacrifice). (21)
> In addition to the Savanīya he-goat a yellowish parrot is to be seized as a victim. (22)
> Cooked rice (forms) the sacrificial gift. (23)
> When the Ārbhava-pavamāna (stotra) is being sung, (the sacrificer) lying down to the south of the Audumabarī (post) with his head to the south and being covered with a new garment the fringes of which should be towards the feet, says: "O Brahmins! Complete the sacrifice for me". (24)
> At that moment only, the sacrifice stands completely established (i.e. concluded). (25)

Caland (1928: 320-321) translates the same passage as follows:

[1038] This translation omits *audumbarīṃ* ("to the south of the pillar of Udumbara wood") and *dakṣiṇāśirāḥ* ("with the head pointing to the south").

> Der vierte Ekāha mit neunversigen Stotras ist der Stoma des Śunaskarṇa, in welchem alle Sāmans am Ende zirkumflektiert sind. (20)
> Diesen Ekāha verrichte ein zu sterben Wünschender, der den Wunsch hat: "Möchte ich ohne Krankheit zum Himmelraume eingehen." (21)
> Nach dem Savanaopferbock ist dem Yama ein zweiter zu opfern, welcher gelb wie ein Papagei (so!) sein soll. (22)
> Der Opferlohn besteht aus zubereitetem Reis. (23)
> Während das Ṛbhulob (das erste des Nachmittagsdienstes) abgehalten wird, legt sich der Opferherr südlich von dem feigenhölzern Pfeiler mit dem Haupte nach Süden gekehrt, und durch ein neues Gewand, dessen Fransen über seinen Füssen liegen, gänzlich verhüllt, hin und redet: "Ihr Brahmanen, bringet mir das Opfer zu Ende". In demselben Augenblick wird das Opfer abgeschlossen.

The *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa* (2.267) mentions the Śunaskarṇa, but provides few details:

> *athaiṣa śunaskarṇastomaḥ/ śunaskarṇo ha vai vārṣṇyakaḥ (v.l. vāṣkyahaḥ) puṇyakṛd apāpakṛd āsa/ sa ha cakame — puṇyam evāsmin loke kṛtvāpāpaṃkṛtya svargaṃ lokaṃ gaccheyam iti/ sa etaṃ yajñam apaśyat/ tam āharat/ tenāyajata/ tato vai sa puṇyam evāsmin loke kṛtvāpāpaṃkṛtya svargaṃ lokam agacchat/ sa yaḥ puṇyakṛt kāmayeta puṇyam evāsmin loke kṛtvāpāpaṃkṛtya svargaṃ lokaṃ gaccheyam iti, sa etena yajeta/ puṇyam evāsmin loke krtvāpāpaṃkṛtya svargaṃ lokaṃ gacchati/*

About this sacrifice in the *Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra*, Caland (1903: 28) says the following:

> Es giebt einen gewissen Ekāha, welchen derjenige verrichten soll, der sich den Tod wünscht, d. h., nach Āpastamba, der ohne Krankheit das Jenseits zu erreichen wünscht. Dieser Ekāha ist auch unter dem Namen sarvasvāra bekannt; in den Yajuṣ-texten trägt er den Namen: "Opfer" oder "Stoma des Śunaskarṇa". Über dieses Opfer lesen wir in Baudhāyana[1039]: "Es war einmal ein edler Fürst, der viele Opfer dargebracht hatte, Sunaskarṇa, des Śibi Sohn.[1040] Dieser, in traurigem Zustande verkehrend, weil er sein Volk *pratihitām* erblickte, fragte seine Opferpriester: "Giebt es wohl ein Opfer, durch dessen Darbringung ich hinscheiden könnte?" "Ja, das giebt es", antworteten die Opferpriester. Nun schöpfte (bei dem zu seinem Gefallen gehaltenen Somaopfer) der Adhvaryu die Grahas, während er die Opferschnur vom Halse herabhängend trug[1041] und jedesmal die Puroruc fortliess; der Sāmansänger sang (?) die Svāra-Sāmans mit Weglassung des Schlussrefrains; der Hotar sagte die Ṛkstrophen her, während er zurück (? nach Westen ?) hinlief (?). Als er (Śunaskarṇa) von dem Schlussbad zurückkehrte, da starb er. Wen er hasst, für den soll er dieses Opfer errichten, oder

[1039] [Caland's note:] XXI. 17.
[1040] [Caland's note:] Im Pañc. Br. heisst er Sohn des Baṣkiha.
[1041] [Caland's note:] Wenn *adhonivīti* zu lesen ist. Diese Tracht der Opferschnur ist bekanntlich die beim Pitṛmedha beim Hinaustragen der Leiche üblich.

> auch er bringe es dar für einen, der (um Erlösung seiner Leiden (?) zu ihm) herantritt. Dann geht er ohne Verzug aus dieser Welt fort (er stirbt)".

The quoted passage is as follows (*Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra* 18.48):

> *śunaskarṇo ha vai śaivyo rājā puṇyakṛd bahuyājy āsa/*
> *sa ha pāpīyāñ janatāṃ pratihitāṃ pratikhyāyartvijaḥ papracchāsti svit sa yajñakratur yenāham iṣṭvaiva prayāyām iti/*
> *asti hīti hainam ṛtvijaḥ pratyūcus/*
> *tasmā adhvaryur ayonīn apurorukkān grahān jagrāha/*
> *svarāṇy udgātā sāmāny anaiḍāny anidhanāni/*
> *parāṅ evargmiyaṃ hotānuvāca/*
> *sa hāvabhṛthād evodetya mamāra/*
> *yaṃ dviṣyāt tasyaivaṃ yajñaṃ kuryād upasṛtaṃ vā yājayet/*
> *kṣipraṃ haivāsmāl lokāt praiti/*

Kashikar (2003: III: 1243) translates:

> King Śunaskarṇa, son of Śibi was benevolent and had performed many sacrifices. Perceiving the people in poor and wretched condition, he asked the priests, "Is there any sacrifice, having performed which I would depart?" "Yes, there is one" the priests replied. The Adhvaryu took for him the Soma-draughts without reciting the formula referring to its birth-place and without the Puroruc. The Udgātṛ chanted the Svarasāmans without the stobha *iḍa* and without the Nidhana. The Hotṛ recited the set of Ṛks consecutively. After having returned from the Avabhṛtha, the sacrificer died. One should perform this sacrifice for one who hates, or one who approaches him (for this purpose). Soon he departs from this world.

The following, too, occur in the *Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra* (26.33):

> *athāsmiñ chunaskarṇayajñe*
> *tilamiśram aśitvā matsyān khāditvā kṣāramātraṃ pibet*
> *atha sāmapathe saṃviśet*
> *svapnād eva svapne gacchati*

Kashikar (2003: IV: 1713) translates:

> In this Śunaskarṇa sacrifice the sacrificer should eat food mixed with sesame, should eat fish and drink only salt water. He should lie down in the region destined for Sāman-chanting. He becomes asleep and attains (permanent) sleep.

Finally there is the *Lāṭyāyana Śrautasūtra* (8.8.1 & 5-6):[1042]

[1042] *Drāhyāyaṇa Śrautasūtra* 23.4.1 & 5-6 is the same, with this difference that sutra 5 here reads: *ārbhave pavamāne stūyamāne dakṣiṇenaudumbarīṃ kṛṣṇājinam upastīrya dakṣiṇaśirāḥ prāvṛto nipadyate/ tad eva saṃgacchate/ tad eva mriyate iti/.*

> *sarvasvāreṇa yakṣyamāṇo dīkṣāprabhṛti prayateta yathā sautye 'hani preyām iti/ (1)*
> ...
> *ārbhave pavamāne stūyamāna udumbaryā dakṣiṇā prāvṛto nipadyeta kṛṣṇājinam upastīrya dakṣiṇāśirās tad eva saṃgacchate tad eva mriyata iti/ (5)*
> *evaṃ mṛtaṃ yajamānaṃ havirbhiḥ saha rjīṣair yajñapātraiś cāhavanīye prahṛtya pravrajeyur iti śāṇḍilyaḥ/ (6)*

Ranade (1998: 838-841) translates:

> One who is going to perform the *Sarvasvāra* (*trivṛt agniṣṭoma*) sacrifice, should make efforts from the consecration ceremony thinking "I will proceed to the yonder world on the day of pressing". (1)
> ...
> When the *Ārbhava pavamāna* is being chanted he should lie covered to the south of the *Audumbarī* post on a black-antelope skin, having spread the same, with his head to the south. Thus itself he makes his departure. This is the way he breaths his last. (5)
> Śāṇḍilya opines that they (the officiating priests) should consign the sacrificer, who is thus dead, to the Āhavanīya fire along with the remaining oblations inclusive of the sacrificial utensils containing the residue of the Soma and quit the place. (6)

This is the only passage that indicates that the sacrificer is dead before he is consigned to the fire, and this passage (but only this one) is therefore in clear disagreement with the passage quoted by Śabara.

Appendix III: Manu's final chapter

A crucial element in the ideologies of the eastern Ganges valley was the belief in karmic retribution and the possibility of liberation from the resulting cycle of rebirths. A particularly striking feature of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* is that its final chapter, no. 12, deals with the law of karma.[1043] Olivelle looks upon verses 1-106 of this chapter as genuine, and presents the remaining verses 108-126 (verse 107 is a transitional verse) as 'excursus'. However, even about the 'genuine' part of chapter 12 he voices doubts (2005: 60):[1044]

> Chapter 12 poses unique problems because it is so very different from the rest of the work. It begins with the seers making one final request of Bhṛgu to teach them the law of *karma*. One is tempted to see this entire chapter as deriving from the work of redactors. There is, however, no clear evidence that it did not belong to the original work of Manu; we cannot detect the breaks in the line of discussion that we detected in other interpolated passages or the violation of structure that Manu has laid out.

[1043] Ludo Rocher (1980) deals with this chapter.
[1044] Similarly Olivelle 2003: 548-49, 569; 2004: xxxvii; 2005: 17-18

As was pointed out above, redactors do not see it as their task to introduce "breaks in the line of discussion" or "violation of structure". Absence of these shortcomings is therefore no proof of genuineness. As it is, it may be interesting to compare the contents of chapter 12 with those of the remainder of the 'genuine' *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*.

At first sight the remarks about karmic retribution in chapter 12 are not fundamentally different from those in the preceding chapters. Both enumerate the results of various activities in future lives, chapter 12 systematically in one short chapter, the remainder of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* here and there, and less elaborately. These earlier chapters mention mainly negative karmic consequences, and they do not give the impression that karmic retribution preoccupied the mind of their author(s) to an excessive degree.[1045] Heaven and hell are at least as often invoked, and not just as stages one passes through before a next rebirth.[1046] A particularly striking example is verse 11.241, which promises heaven (*div*) to insects, snakes, moths, animals, birds, and immobile creatures "by the power of ascetic toil" (*tapobalāt*). Had the frame of reference here been rebirth as determined by karmic retribution, more variety might have been on offer for these unfortunate creatures, including, for example, birth as a Brahmin. Verse 8.75, to take another example, tells us that a false witness "after death will plunge headlong into hell and suffer the loss of heaven" (*avāṅ narakam evaiti pretya svargāc ca hīyate*). Once again the impression is created that there is nothing in between these two extremes. Heaven, rather than a multiplicity of possibilities, is assumed as the normal outcome of human life in verse 8.103, which states that a man who, even though he knows the truth, gives evidence in lawsuits contrary to the facts for a reason relating to the Law, does not fall from the heavenly world.[1047] Unjust punishment, we learn from verse 8.127, is an obstacle to heaven for the king who inflicts it; the very next verse specifies what that implies: the king who punishes those who do not deserve to be punished and neglects to punish those who deserve it, will go to hell.[1048]

It would yet be difficult to conclude on these grounds alone that chapter 12 must have a different author; this last chapter presents itself after all as offering the "determination with respect to engagement in action" (Manu 12.2: *karmayogasya nirṇayam*). There is however a difference between chapter 12 and the rest of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* which may be significant. Unlike the remainder of the treatise, chapter 12 presents human life as the result of deeds performed in earlier lives. This idea is absent from the earlier chapters. And yet, this would have been a useful and perhaps convincing justification for the great differences between human beings that the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* proclaims. Brahmins, it may be recalled, are far superior to all other humans. It would be a fair question to ask why it is like this. Karmic retribution would provide an answer, but the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* (with the exception of chapter 12) does

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[1045] The situation is further confused by the fact that Manu 9.8-9 maintains that a man is born again in his wife. According to Manu 9.107 it is through his eldest son that a man obtains immortality (*ānantya*); according to Manu 9.137 it is through his grandson that this happens.

[1046] One gains a good first impression by looking up the references to 'heaven' and 'hell' in Olivelle's index to his translation (2004: 302; 2005: 1119).

[1047] Manu 8.103a-c: *tad vadan dharmato 'rtheṣu jānann apy anyathā naraḥ/ na svargāc cyavate lokād ….*

[1048] Manu 8. 128ab & d: *adaṇḍyān daṇḍayan rājā daṇḍyāṃś caivāpy adaṇḍayan/ ... narakaṃ caiva gacchati//.*

not offer it.[1049]

Consider first chapter 12. The very first verse that explains the fruits of action reads (Manu 12.3):[1050]

> Action produces good and bad results and originates from the mind, speech, and the body. Action produces the human conditions — the highest, the middling, and the lowest.

Details about how to become a human being, and a Brahmin in particular, are found in the section on the three Attributes (*guṇa*), viz. Goodness (*sattva*), Vigour (*rajas*) and Darkness (*tamas*), i.e. Manu 12.24-53. We read there (Manu 12.40):[1051]

> Those who possess Goodness become gods; those who possess Vigour become humans; and those who possess Darkness always become animals — that is the threefold course.

And lest there be confusion as to the category to which Brahmins and their likes belong, verse 48 specifies that they are associated with Goodness, the Attribute of gods:[1052]

> Hermits, ascetics, Brahmins, divine hosts in celestial chariots, asterisms, and Daityas — these constitute the first course related to Goodness.

Turning now to the other chapters of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, what justification does it offer for the social inequalities it preaches? An answer is provided by the following passage (Manu 1.28-30):[1053]

> As they are brought forth again and again, each creature follows on its own the very activity (*karman*) assigned to it in the beginning by the Lord. Violence or non-violence, gentleness or cruelty, righteousness (*dharma*) or unrighteousness (*adharma*), truthfulness or untruthfulness — whichever he assigned to each at the time of creation, it stuck automatically to that creature. As at the change of seasons each season automatically adopts its own distinctive marks, so do

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[1049] The buddhist canon does offer it. *Majjhima Nikāya* No. 129, for example, says, in the paraphrase of Schmithausen (1986: 209) "that the evil-doer, if perchance reborn as a human being, is reborn in a low caste (as a Caṇḍāla, etc.: MN III 169), whereas the person who has accumulated good karma is, after his return from heaven, reborn as a Kṣatriya or Brahmin, etc. (MN III 177)."

[1050] Manu 12.3: *śubhāśubhaphalaṃ karma manovāgdehasaṃbhavam/ karmajā gatayo nṝṇām uttamādhamamadhyamāḥ//*. Here and in what follows, I follow (unless otherwise indicated) the translation presented in Olivelle 2004.

[1051] Manu 12.40: *devatvaṃ sāttvikā yānti manuṣyatvaṃ tu rājasāḥ/ tiryaktvaṃ tāmasā nityam ity eṣā trividhā gatiḥ//*.

[1052] Manu 12.48: *tāpasā yatayo viprā ye ca vaimānikā gaṇāḥ/ nakṣatrāṇi ca daityāś ca prathamā sāttvikī gatiḥ//*.

[1053] Manu 1.28-30: *yaṃ tu karmaṇi yasmin sa nyayuṅkta prathamaṃ prabhuḥ/ sa tad eva svayaṃ bheje sṛjyamānaḥ punaḥ punaḥ// hiṃsrāhiṃsre mṛdukrūre dharmādharmāv ṛtānṛte/ yad yasya so 'dadhāt sarge tat tasya svayam āviśat// yathartuliṅgāny ṛtavaḥ svayam evartuparyaye/ svāni svāny abhipadyante tathā karmāṇi dehinaḥ//*.

> embodied beings adopt their own distinctive acts (*karman*).

The status of Brahmins, which is associated with the activity assigned to them, is due to a decision of the creator. It is in this way that the status of a Brahmin is never described as due to previous deeds, and indeed, unless something goes seriously wrong, a Brahmin will remain a Brahmin forever:

> a Brahmin's birth in the Veda is everlasting, both here and in the hereafter.[1054]

and

> the birth that a teacher who has fathomed the Veda brings about according to rule by means of the Sāvitrī verse — that is his true birth, that is not subject to old age and death.[1055]

To the general rule according to which the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* in its first eleven chapters does not invoke the doctrine of karmic retribution to explain the present state of human beings, there are some possible exceptions. The text occasionally uses the expression *pūrvakṛta*, either in contrast with *daiva* 'fate' (7.166; 11.47) or with *duścarita* "bad deeds committed in this world" (11.48). This suggests that *pūrvakṛta* here means "deeds performed in a previous life". These past deeds (they are always sins, it seems) are invoked to explain some otherwise inexplicable negative features of a person. This is summed up in 11.54cd: "for individuals whose sins have not been expiated are born with detestable characteristics" (*nindyair hi lakṣaṇair yuktā jāyante 'niṣkṛtainasaḥ*).[1056] Immediately preceding this line are the words "Therefore, one should always do penances to purify oneself" (*caritavyam ato nityaṃ prāyaścittaṃ viśuddhaye*). This shows that the threat of the negative consequences of one's deeds in a next life (a 'foreign' belief) was used to encourage the properly vedic penances, some of which might end in death. Nowhere in the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* (with the exception of chapter 12) are the positive consequences of one's deeds used to explain the superior status of Brahmins and other twice-born people. This is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that a text such as the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* had explicitly linked the status of Brahmins to good deeds done in an earlier life.[1057]

[1054] Manu 2.146cd: *brahmajanma hi viprasya pretya ceha ca śāśvatam*.

[1055] Manu 2.148: *ācāryas tv asya yāṃ jātiṃ vidhivad vedapāragaḥ/ utpādayati sāvitryā sā satyā sājarāmarā//*.

[1056] See also Manu 1.49-50: *tamasā bahurūpeṇa veṣṭitāḥ karmahetunā/ antaḥsaṃjñā bhavanty ete sukhaduḥkhasamanvitāḥ// etadantās tu gatayo brahmādyāḥ samudāhṛtāḥ/ ghore 'smin bhūtasaṃsāre nityaṃ satatayāyini//* "Wrapped in a manifold darkness caused by their past deeds, these [plants and animals?] come into being with inner awareness, able to feel pleasure and pain. In this dreadful transmigratory cycle of beings, a cycle that rolls on inexorably for ever, these are said to represent the lowest condition, and Brahmā the highest." These verses occur in a passage which Olivelle has identified as an "excursus", i.e., a later addition; moreover, they do not directly concern the present state of human beings.

[1057] ChānUp 5.10.7: *tad ya iha ramaṇīyacaraṇā abhyāśo ha yat te ramaṇīyāṃ yonim āpadyeran brāhmaṇayoniṃ vā kṣatriyayoniṃ vā vaiśyayoniṃ vā*. "Now, people here whose behavior is pleasant can expect to enter a pleasant womb, like that of a woman of the Brahmin, the Kṣatriya, or the Vaiśya class." Ed. tr. Olivelle.

> Manu 10.42 makes the following statement about low caste human beings:[1058]
>
> By the power of austerity and semen, in each succeeding generation they attain here among men a higher or a lower station by birth.

This verse is enigmatic, in that it does not state in so many words that it deals with karmic consequences of deeds. Assuming that it does, it is interesting, and no doubt significant, to observe that this one exception (if it is one) concerns humans of low and mixed castes, people far removed from the high positions that the Brahmins claimed for themselves.

The following verses, too, might be thought of as an exception to the general rule:[1059]

> He should reflect on the diverse paths humans take as a result of their evil deeds; on how they fall into hell; on the tortures they endure in the abode of Yama; on how they are separated from the ones they love and united with the ones they hate; on how they are overcome by old age and tormented by diseases; on how the inner self departs from this body, takes births again in a womb, and migrates through tens of billions of wombs; and on how embodied beings become linked with pain as a result of pursuing what is against the Law and with imperishable happiness as a result of pursuing the Law as one's goal.

This passage, too, does not explicitly attribute the present state of human beings to their past deeds. Indeed, its beginning presents the usual threats of hell and the abode of Yama, and its end the usual promise of imperishable happiness. However, the tens of billions of wombs in between do suggest that at least some of these will be human wombs, perhaps even brahmanical wombs. The theme is not elaborated, and as a matter of fact not even explicitly introduced, but it seems to be present, if only below the surface.

It would not be justified to draw far-reaching conclusions from this passage. The part of it which suggests that human conditions are determined by acts carried out in earlier lives are so close to some fundamental buddhist notions that they can be looked upon as a slightly adapted, and versified, version of them. Being separated from those one loves, being united with those one hates, old age and disease, are standard elements in the explanation of the first Noble Truth of Buddhism, the Noble Truth of suffering. "Tens of billions of wombs" were remembered by the Buddha at the moment of his enlightenment, and with it the truth of the unending continuation of suffering which also this passage emphasizes. All this entitles us to see in this passage (or in the relevant parts of it), a reflection of most probably buddhist ideas, which Manu somehow incorporated in his text. We should not conclude from this that Manu agreed with all its implications, such as the fact that the present state of human beings is determined by their past deeds. It seems more likely that Manu included these elements to show that the meditative way

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[1058] Manu 10.42: *tapobījaprabhāvaiś ca te gacchanti yuge yuge/ utkarṣaṃ cāpakarṣaṃ ca manuṣyeṣv iha janmataḥ//.*

[1059] Manu 6.61-64: *avekṣeta gatīn ṝṇāṃ karmadoṣasamudbhavāḥ/ niraye caiva patanaṃ yātanāś ca yamakṣaye// viprayogaṃ priyaiś caiva saṃprayogaṃ tathāpriyaiḥ/ jarayā cābhibhavanaṃ vyādhibhiś copapīḍanam// dehād utkramaṇaṃ cāsmāt punar garbhe ca saṃbhavam/ yonikoṭisahasreṣu sṛtīś cāsyāntarātmanaḥ// adharmaprabhavaṃ caiva duḥkhayogaṃ śarīriṇām/ dharmārthaprabhavaṃ caiva sukhasaṃyogam akṣayam//*

which he prescribed for the brahmanical wanderer was in no way inferior to the way of the Buddhists, and was not less concerned with the issue of ending suffering in all its forms. He did *not* do so because he had supposedly changed his mind about the ultimate justification of the superiority of the Brahmins.

Appendix IV: Passages dealing with five-nailed animals

Passages dealing with five-nailed animals and referred to in Lüders 1907 and/or the note in the critical edition of *Mahābhārata* 12.139.66.

1. *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra* 1.5.17.37:
   pañcanakhānāṃ godhā-kacchapa-śvāviṭ-charyaka-khaḍga-śaśa-pūtikhaṣa-varjam/

2. *Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra* 1.5.131:
   bhakṣyāḥ śvāviḍ-godhā-śaśa-śalyaka-kacchapa-khaḍgāḥ khaḍgavarjāḥ pañca pañcanakhāḥ/

3. *Gautama Dharmasūtra* 17.25:
   pañcanakhāś cāśalyaka-śaśa-śvāviḍ-godhā-khaḍga-kacchapāḥ (abhakṣyāḥ 32)

4. *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* 5.18:
   śvāvidhaṃ śalyakaṃ godhāṃ khaḍga-kūrma-śaśāṃs tathā/
   bhakṣyān pañcanakheṣv āhur anuṣṭrāṃś caikatodataḥ//

5. *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* 35.2cd-3ab:
   śaśakaḥ kacchapo godhā śvāvit khaḍgo 'tha putraka//
   bhakṣyā hy ete tathā varjyau grāmaśūkarakukkuṭau/

6. *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* 14.39-40:
   śvāvic-chalyaka-śaśa-kacchapa-godhāḥ pañcanakhānāṃ bhakṣyāḥ/
   anuṣṭrāḥ paśūnām anyatodantāś ca/

7. *Viṣṇusmṛti* 51.6:
   śaśaka-śalyaka-godhā-sedhā-khaḍga-kūrma-varjaṃ pañcanakhamāṃsāśane saptarātram upaviśet/

8. *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.176:
   bhakṣyāḥ pañcanakhāḥ sedhā-godhā-kacchapa-śalyakāḥ/
   śaśaś ca matsyeṣv api hi siṃhatuṇḍakarohitāḥ//

Appendix V: Liberation, enlightenment and death

Manu 6.44 reads:

   kapālaṃ vṛkṣamūlāni kucelam asahāyatā/

> *samatā caiva sarvasminn etan muktasya lakṣaṇam//*

This might be translated:

> A bowl, the foot of a tree, a ragged piece of cloth, a solitary life, and equanimity towards all — these are the marks of a *liberated person*. (emphasis added)

Olivelle (2005: 150) translates it differenty:

> A bowl, the foot of a tree, a ragged piece of cloth, a solitary life, and equanimity towards all — these are the marks of a *renouncer*. (emphasis added)

Olivelle tries to justify the translation 'renouncer' for Sanskrit *mukta* in a note (p. 290):

> *renouncer*: although the term *mukta* means literally 'a liberated man', it is used here in the same way as *mokṣa* (see 1.114 n.) to refer to a wandering ascetic. Bühler's 'one who has attained liberation' and Doniger's 'one who is Freed' are, I think, overly literal. The discussion here is about asceticism and ascetics, not about liberation and liberated individuals.

In the note referred to in this note, Olivelle states (p. 243):[1060]

> the Sanskrit term *mokṣa* literally means liberation. Manu, however, attaches a technical meaning to the term, using it as a synonym of renunciation and the fourth order of life dedicated exclusively to the search after personal liberation. The term *mokṣa* has the same meaning when used in the common compound *mokṣadharma*, which is a section of the [*Mahābhārata*] and a distinct topic in medieval legal digests (*nibandha*). Manu makes a clear distinction between this renunciatory asceticism and the life of the vedic retiree, which he designates as *saṃnyāsa* (see 6.86 n.). This term, which is the common word for renunciation in later literature, is never used by Manu with that meaning. Bühler's '(manner of gaining) final emancipation and (of) renouncing the world', and Doniger's 'Freedom, and renunciation' ignore the technical use of these two terms here and in ch. 6. For a more detailed study, see Olivelle 1981.

The more detailed study referred to is an article that appeared in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* in 1981, and which bears the title "Contributions to the semantic history of *saṃnyāsa*". True to its title, it says a lot of interesting things about *saṃnyāsa* and its cognates, but virtually nothing about *mokṣa*. All it says about this topic is found in the following laconic statement (p. 270): "Manu deals with the fourth *āśrama*, i.e. renunciation, which he calls *mokṣa* …, at 6.33-85." It follows that the translation 'renouncer' for Sanskrit *mukta*, and similarly the translation 'renunciation' for Sanskrit *mokṣa*, are based on Olivelle's fiat, not on any arguments that are presented or referred to in his book.

A priori there is reason to feel doubtful about this reinterpretation of words which have a literal meaning that is as clear as water to all users of Sanskrit. As a matter of fact,

[1060] See also Olivelle 2010: 41-442.

a few verses earlier in the same passage Manu uses almost the same word: *vimukta* rather than *mukta*. This earlier verse, 6.40, speaks about the same person and calls him *dehād vimukta*. This time Olivelle translates 'freed from his body', and we cannot but agree. The obvious conclusion would be that, if our *mukta* is freed from his body, there is no clear reason not to consider him 'freed, liberated' rather than a mere 'renouncer'.

Olivelle does not draw this conclusion. The whole verse in which *dehād vimukta* occurs (6.40) reads:

> *yasmād aṇv api bhūtānāṃ dvijān notpadyate bhayam/*
> *tasya dehād vimuktasya bhayaṃ nāsti kutaś cana//*

Olivelle translates this as follows:

> Because that twice born has not been the cause of even the slightest fear to creatures, he has nothing to fear from anyone *after he is freed from his body*. (emphasis added)

The English *after he is freed from his body* is somewhat ambiguous, but it seems clear that Olivelle understands the verse to refer to the state after death. In order to arrive at that interpretation, he subtly adjusts the translation to this understanding. A more literal interpretation of the verse would be:

> Because that twice born is not the cause of even the slightest fear to creatures, he, being freed from the body, has nothing to fear from anyone.

In this more natural interpretation of the verse, the expression "being freed from the body" would seem to qualify the living ascetic. We will return to this issue below.

Olivelle's biased interpretation of the passage becomes especially clear in his translation of verse 6.78. This verse reads:

> *nadīkūlaṃ yathā vṛkṣo vṛkṣaṃ vā śakunir yathā/*
> *tathā tyajann imaṃ dehaṃ kṛcchrād grāhād vimucyate//*

Olivelle translates:

> When a tree falls from a river bank, the bird leaves the tree; when he abandons this body in like manner, he escapes the alligator's painful grasp.

This translation suggests that liberation "from the alligator's painful grasp" occurs at death, when the person concerned abandons his body. However, this translation is highly problematic, as Olivelle himself indicates in an accompanying note. The note reads (p. 291):

> I think commentators and translators alike have failed to understand this simile, which, I must admit, has been cast in turbid syntax. All take the tree falling from the bank and the bird leaving the tree as two independent similes. That is very unlikely, given that the first foot concludes with *vṛkṣa* ('tree'), and the second foot begins with it, indicating that the latter picks up the theme of the former. Further,

> they take *grāha* (which I think means alligator rather than shark) only with the giving up of the body in the second half of the verse. I think the last foot is connected to both the simile and the ascetic giving up the body. The meaning then seems to be that a bird flying off before the fall of the tree escapes the alligator's grasp in the river. Likewise, when an ascetic abandons the body before its natural fall at death (which is here compared to the fall of the tree), he escapes the grasp of the alligator, probably Yama (6.61). This fits in nicely with the theme of the preceding verse, namely, that an ascetic must abandon the body voluntarily.

With all respect to Olivelle's attempts to make sense of this verse, one does have the feeling that his efforts were not necessary, for the syntax of this verse is far from turbid. It is turbid if one wishes to understand it in Olivelle's manner, but if one does not, it can be translated without difficulty, as follows:

> Just as a tree abandons the bank of a river, or a bird abandons a tree, abandoning in the same way this body he is liberated from the alligator's painful grasp.

Here the person concerned is described as abandoning his body. As a result, we may assume, he is liberated from his body. The precise meaning of abandoning one's body, and of being liberated from one's body, is open to debate, but there is no compelling reason to believe that it is to be identified with death. Indeed, 'abandoning the body' — the Sanskrit term used is *kāyotsarga* — is one of the six obligatory duties for members of the jaina mendicant order while they are alive.[1061]

It appears, then, that several of the problems mentioned by Olivelle turn out, at closer inspection, not to be problems at all. The words *mokṣa* and *mukta* are not used in a technical meaning in the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, the syntax of verse 6.78 is not turbid, and verse 6.40 can be interpreted more literally. However, the removal of these problems leads inescapably to the conclusion that Manu refers to living persons as being liberated. The marks of such a living liberated person, moreover, are a bowl, the foot of a tree, a ragged piece of cloth, a solitary life, and equanimity towards all; he is not the cause of even the slightest fear to creatures, and he abandons his body, which probably means that he engages in ascetic practices of a certain sort.

Yet it is understandable why Olivelle went a long way to prove that living liberated persons are not recognized by Manu. The way the presumably liberated person is described in the relevant section of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* (6.33-86), which is the section that deals with the fourth stage of life, is confusing or worse. Rather than describing a person who has reached his goal, it characterizes him as setting his mind on *mokṣa* (*mano mokṣe niveśayet*; Manu 6. 35, 36), as desiring *mokṣa* (*mokṣam icchan*; Manu 6. 37). This suggests that the liberated person is not completely liberated after all. The section is furthermore full of rules which the presumably liberated person must follow. Once again, one gains the impression that a state to be attained is talked about, rather than a state that has been attained. And to top it all, the section points out in verse 58 that "even an ascetic who has freed himself is shackled by what is received with a show of reverence" (cd: *abhipūjitalābhais tu yatir mukto 'pi badhyate*; tr. Olivelle). In other words, the liberation Manu talks about is relative, even confused. He calls 'liberated' a person who strives for liberation, treats the liberated person as someone who

[1061] Jaini 1979: 189 f.

must be told what to do, and specifies that being liberated is no guarantee against being shackled.[1062]

This, I think, is the conclusion we have to draw from Manu's references to liberation: Manu has a rather hazy, perhaps self-contradictory, notion of what liberation is. We can try to bring consistency into his statements by deciding that certain words are not used in their ordinary meanings, that certain verses must be interpreted in artificial ways. This will only hide from us that Manu's verses do not present a clear and coherent notion of what liberation is.

Perhaps this should not surprise us. Manu himself does not believe in liberation. For him the state of householder (*gṛhastha*) is the best from among the four stages of life (6.89). He pronounces in favour of something he calls *vedasaṃnyāsa* which leads to the *paramā gati* (6.88, 93), the highest state, but there is no hint that this highest state is liberation. To this must be added that it is rather tricky for a lawgiver to accept the existence of living and yet irreversibly liberated people. Such people would obviously fall in a category totally different from everyone else. They would not be obliged to follow rules, and law books would have no advice to give them. It would have been more convenient for Manu if Olivelle had been right, if one could say that every liberated person is a dead person. Manu does not say so, as we have seen. He acknowledges the existence of living liberated people, but in a way takes their liberation away from them by subordinating them to his rules, and by pointing out that their state is not irreversible. This suggests that the belief in the existence of liberated people in Manu's time was wide-spread, too wide-spread to be simply ignored.

This interpretation of the way the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* envisages liberation is confirmed when we look at the *Bhagavadgītā*. Here we can follow the lead of Peter Schreiner, who brought out a study and translation of this text in 1991. In the introduction he states (p. 30):

> Die Bhagavad-Gītā stellt sich … als ein Text dar, der den Übergang vom Ideal des *videhamukta* ('Entkörpert-Erlösten') zum Ideal des 'Lebend-Erlösten' (*jīvanmukta*) markiert.

Schreiner argues that the Yoga that the *Bhagavadgītā* modifies and replaces strove for liberation at the moment of death. He cites in this context one verse in particular, which refers to a specific Yogic state and then continues (Bhag 2.72cd):

> He who abides therein also at the moment of death, he reaches the *brahmanirvāṇa* (*sthitvāsyām antakāle 'pi brahmanirvāṇam ṛcchati*)

According to Schreiner, this notion of liberation at death changes in the *Bhagavadgītā*: "der Erlösungsbegriff [konnte] umgedeutet werden zu einer rein geistigen, rein psychischen Angelegenheit, zu einer Haltung, die man auch im Leben und in der Welt verwirklichen konnte" (p. 30).

If I understand this passage correctly, Schreiner claims that the *Bhagavadgītā* accepts, at least in some of its passages, the ideal of the *jīvanmukta*, the person liberated while alive. He does not say that this term is actually used in the *Bhagavadgītā*, and

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[1062] This manner of speaking also occurs elsewhere in the text, in connection with death, for example; so Manu 7.143d: *mṛtaḥ sa na sa jīvati*.

indeed it is not. But if he is right, we would expect that the *Bhagavadgītā* uses the expression 'liberated' or some similar term in connection with people who are still alive. Unfortunately Schreiner gives no references to passages that do so; to my knowledge no unambiguous passages to that effect exist. Schreiner does speak about *bhakti* 'teilhabende Hingabe an eine Gottheit' and the role that Kṛṣṇa plays in it, and then states (p. 33):

> Die Teilhabe an Kṛṣṇa ahmt also einen Yoga-Weg nach, welcher vermutlich nicht mehr ausschliesslich als ein Weg völliger und endgültiger Entsagung (mit dem Ziel erlösenden Sterbens) angesehen wurde; mit dem Ideal der Bhakti setzt sich die Vorstellung der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten endgültig durch. Thesenhaft vereinfacht: Verkörpert der *yukta* ('Geeinte') das Ideal jener Erlösungslehren, denen Erlösung nur nach dem Sterben denkbar war, so belegt der *bhakta* ('der hingebungsvoll Teilhabende') den vollzogenen Übergang zur Lehre von der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten.

I am not sure why this passage should be applicable to the *Bhagavadgītā*. Recall, to begin with, *Bhagavadgītā* 2.72, which we considered above, and which stated that he who abides in a specific Yogic state also at the moment of death reaches the *brahmanirvāṇa*. Schreiner cited this verse as being an illustration of the Yogic belief in liberation at death. However, the fulfilment of *bhakti* comes at death, too, judging by *Bhagavadgītā* 8.5:

> He who dies remembering only me at the moment of death, when abandoning his body, he will go to my state of being; there is no doubt about this.
> *antakāle ca mām eva smaran muktvā kalevaram/*
> *yaḥ prayāti sa madbhāvaṃ yāti nāsty atra saṃśayaḥ//*

Moreover, I have the impression that the *Bhagavadgītā* speaks about liberation and the liberated person in the same vague and somewhat inconsistent manner as the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*. Consider *Bhagavadgītā* 5.28:

> The sage who controls his senses, mind and intellect, who is intent on liberation, who has no desire, fear or wrath, he is really eternally liberated.
> *yatendriyamanobuddhir munir mokṣaparāyaṇaḥ/*
> *vigatecchābhayakrodho yaḥ sadā mukta eva saḥ//*

Here the person who is 'intent on liberation' (*mokṣaparāyaṇaḥ*) is, in the very same breath, characterized as being 'eternally liberated' (*sadā mukta eva*). The similarity with Manu's characterization of the liberated person as 'setting his mind on liberation' and as 'desiring liberation' is striking.

The general presupposition in the *Bhagavadgītā*, however, would seem to be that liberation takes place at death. Consider *Bhagavadgītā* 5.23:

> He who can in this world, before he leaves his body, bear the impulse that arises from desire and wrath, he is controlled (*yukta*), he is a happy man.
> *śaknotīhaiva yaḥ soḍhuṃ prāk śarīravimokṣaṇāt/*
> *kāmakrodhodbhavaṃ vegaṃ sa yuktaḥ sa sukhī naraḥ//*

Nothing would have been easier here than to read *muktaḥ* ('liberated') for *yuktaḥ* ('controlled'). But this is not even recorded as a variant reading in the critical edition of the text. This suggests that life before death is not the time during which one can be liberated.[1063]

There are many more passages that could be considered. I will not do so here. Let me simply state that I have found no indications in the *Bhagavadgītā* that compel us to believe that this text accepts the notion of liberation while alive. A number of passages suggest the opposite. Others betray a rather imprecise use of the words *mukta* and *mokṣa*.

The two texts which we have considered so far — the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* and the *Bhagavadgītā* — suggest that there was some imprecision in the use of the terms 'liberation' and 'liberated', at least in brahmanical circles, around the time when these texts were composed. This should not really surprise us. The Sanskrit verb *muc-* and its derivatives are very common and can be used in contexts that have nothing to do with high spiritual goals. One can be liberated from many things. The question 'liberated from what?' was therefore as essential to the early Indians as it is for modern research. We are primarily interested in liberation from *saṃsāra*, from the cycle of renewed births. It is therefore legitimate to ask how one could possibly be alive *and* liberated from the cycle of rebirths. A living being is by definition in his cycle of rebirths. For some this may be their last birth, but this does not change the fact that it is one in their series of births and rebirths. Understood in this way, *liberation while alive* is a contradiction in terms.

This observation has to be qualified. It is conceivable that certain people are alive, but have undergone inner transformations that guarantee that they will never be born again. They are like the prisoner who knows that he will be freed soon. They are not liberated in the strict sense, but they are *as good as liberated*. If the transformations they have undergone are moreover irreversible, if nothing whatsoever could ever undo them, then the expression 'liberated while alive' becomes understandable, though strictly speaking still metaphorical.[1064]

However, the term 'liberated' can also be used with regard to features that bind a person to this world. This person can then be liberated from these features, and therefore presumably certain of liberation from this world after death, while yet living in this world. With this in mind I propose to consider a third passage, a conversation recorded in the *Mahābhārata* (12.308); it has recently been studied by James Fitzgerald (2003a). This conversation calls itself, in Fitzgerald's translation, "a conversation between a man who had gained Absolute Freedom in the midst of the royal parasol and such things and the woman who had gained Absolute Freedom with the triple staff of renunciation".[1065] In other words, it opposes two persons who are both convinced that they are, at the moment they confront each other, liberated.

[1063] Nelson (1996: 21) interprets *Bhagavadgītā* 5.23 and 5.28 together: "*Bhagavad Gītā* 5.28 tells us that the ascetic who has controlled his senses and attained identity with Brahman is eternally liberated (*sadā mukta eva*). This is possible, we read at 5.23, 'prior to release from the body (*prāk śarīra-vimokṣaṇāt*).'" This interpretation leaves out of consideration inconvenient elements.

[1064] I cannot deal with the (primarily Advaita) notion according to which liberation is really beginningless and only need to be realized. It is however to be noted that the expressions *jīvanmukta* and *jīvanmukti* flourished primarily, if not exclusively, in such intellectual surroundings.

[1065] Mhbh 12.308.19: *saṃvādaḥ … chattrādiṣu vimuktasya muktāyāś ca tridaṇḍake*.

The two participants in this conversation are King Janaka of Mithilā and a nun called Sulabhā. Both of them have serious doubts about the liberated state of the other. It is not our task to decide who of the two is 'really' liberated; the epic appears to opt for Sulabhā. We are rather more interested in the notion of liberation that the two accept. It turns out that the disagreement between the two does not concern the question what liberation is. They agree on the features *from which* a liberated person is believed to be freed.

There is a lot of talk about freedom and freed persons in this conversation, and it is not always clear what the protagonists are supposed to be free from. However, some passages are explicit in this regard. King Janaka describes himself as 'freed from passion' (*muktarāga* [28]), 'freed from attachments' (*muktasaṅgin* [31], *muktasaṅga* [37], *saṅgā[t] … mucyate* [44]). He is apparently also free from the pairs of opposites, about which it is stated: "That transcends all the different stages and is Perfection."[1066]

Information about liberation can also be extracted from Sulabhā's criticism of the king:[1067]

> Why, King of Mithilā, does someone who is Freed from the pairs of opposites (such as, "This is mine and this is not mine") ask "Who are you, whose are you, and where do you come from?" O lord of the earth, what indication is there that one is Freed when he treats some as an enemy, others as allies, and others as neutrals in victory, in alliances, and in war? … What indication is there that one is Freed when he does not see the sameness in kindness and unkindness, in weakness and in strength? So you are not Freed, and the conceit you may have in believing you have Absolute Freedom should be suppressed by your friends, as medicines might be used for someone who is unconscious. O suppressor of your enemies, if one looks at these points of attachment here and those there and sees them within himself, what indication is there then that he is Freed?

The liberated person is here, once again, characterized as being free from the pairs of opposites, and free from attachments, as seeing the sameness in kindness and unkindness, in weakness and in strength (more literally perhaps: as having the same eye with regard to kindness and unkindness, with regard to weakness and strength). Sulabhā further points out that a king is always dependent upon others, suggesting that the liberated person is independent. Since the liberated person is the opposite of those who are bound by attachment and aversion (*abhiṣaṅgāvarodhābhyāṃ baddhaḥ* (166)), he is not so bound. Among the further characteristics that we can cull from Sulabhā's words, we find that liberated persons have no attachment to their own body (*svadehe nābhiṣaṅga[ḥ]* [162]), that they are, once again, free from attachment (*muktasaṅga* [164]), and that they have overcome the bonds that fettered them (*pāśān ākramya* [164]).

It seems, then, that King Janaka and the nun Sulabhā agree on the main characteristics of a liberated person. Such a person is primarily and essentially liberated

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[1066] Mhbh 12.308.30cd: *mahad dvaṃdvapramokṣāya sā siddhir yā vayotigā.*

[1067] Mhbh 12.308.127b-132: *idaṃ me syād idaṃ neti dvaṃdvair muktasya maithila/ kāsi kasya kuto veti vacane kiṃ prayojanam// ripau mitre 'tha madhyasthe vijaye saṃdhivigrahe/ kṛtavān yo mahīpāla kiṃ tasmin muktalakṣaṇam// …// priye daivāpriye caiva durbale balavaty api/ yasya nāsti samaṃ cakṣuḥ kiṃ tasmin muktalakṣaṇam// tad amuktasya te mokṣe yo 'bhimāno bhaven nṛpa/ suhṛdbhiḥ sa nivāryas te vicittasyeva bheṣajaiḥ// tāni tāny anusaṃdṛśya saṅgasthānāny ariṃdama/ ātmanātmani saṃpaśyet kiṃ tasmin muktalakṣaṇam//*

from attachment, from the pairs of opposites, from aversion. The cycle of rebirths does not, or hardly,[1068] enter into the picture.

Toward the end of her discourse, Sulabhā makes a remark that may be revealing. She says: "Someone who is already Freed does not become Free; someone who is already at peace does not become peaceful."[1069] This remark, I propose, is directed against the attitude that finds expression in Manu's observation to the extent that the liberated person sets his mind on liberation or desires liberation, and in the statement of the *Bhagavadgītā* according to which the liberated person is intent on liberation. It appears to be directed against all those who confuse *striving for* liberation with *being* liberated. Sulabhā considers herself as *being* liberated and not as *striving for* liberation. She obviously considers herself liberated while alive. When she has to specify what she is liberated from, she stipulates that she is liberated from attachments and the like, not from the cycle of rebirths.

All the three texts we have considered so far are brahmanical texts. I have argued elsewhere that Brahmanism borrowed the notion of liberation from religious currents that originated outside the realm where it held sway. It adopted this notion with all that came with it, adapting it to its own needs and requirements.[1070] Since some of the currents that were originally independent of Brahmanism have survived, it will be interesting to see what position they, or at least one of them, take with regard to liberation and death.

One of these currents is Jainism. Its founder — or more correctly, its most recent 'fordmaker' (*tīrthaṅkara*) — was sure that he would never be born again. He was, in that sense, sure of his forthcoming liberation. But was he liberated at the time of his last earthly existence, say from the time of his enlightenment onward?

The answer provided by the jaina tradition is a clear *no*. This is how Paul Dundas explains the difference between liberation and enlightenment (2002: 104):

> Spiritual deliverance (*mokṣa*) is defined in simple terms by Umāsvāti ([*Tattvārtha Sūtra*] 10.5)[1071] as release from all karma. This should in its finality be clearly distinguished from the attainment of enlightenment which, after the cultivation of morally positive attitudes, the practice of austerity and the gradual suppression of negative discriminative mental processes, involves the uprooting of deluding karma which is then succeeded by the removal of the remaining three harming karmas, thus liberating the innate qualities, such as omniscience, of the *jīva*. Enlightenment, however, does not of itself entail death, for the operation of the four non-harming karmas is still unimpaired, with life and name karma guaranteeing the continuation of embodied existence and experience karma ensuring bodily sensations, although the latter point was a source of sectarian dispute for the Digambaras who denied that a *kevalin*'s feeling karma could bring about an effect such as hunger. The enlightened person, whether fordmaker or

[1068] Mhbh 12.308.32 states that "people's deeds produce their coming to be again" (*janayati … karma nṛṇāṃ … punarbhavam*), which may hint at the effect of liberation on rebirth.
[1069] Mhbh 12.308.188: *mukto na mucyate yaś ca śānto yaś ca na śāmyati*.
[1070] *Greater Magadha*. In spite of claims to the contrary, the idea of liberation took time to settle in Brahmanism: "References to derivatives of the verb *muc* are surprisingly rare in the early Upaniṣads. They appear mostly in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Kaṭha, and many of the usages that exist do not suggest Advaitic liberation." (Fort 1998: 30). See further § III.1.
[1071] This is 10.3 in Tatia's translation (1994).

> *kevalin*, may therefore spend a considerable period after enlightenment engaging in mental and physical activities such as walking, preaching and meditation. However, no new karma is bound by these activities nor is it possible in this state to carry out acts of violence, even involuntarily.

It is clear from this passage that the enlightened jaina sage, the *kevalin*, is alive but not liberated. The liberated jaina sage is called *siddha*, but he is not embodied and is therefore dead from a physiological point of view: the *siddha* resides in the realm of the *siddha*s "at the top of the universe where it will exist perpetually without any further rebirth in a disembodied and genderless state of perfect joy, energy, consciousness and knowledge" (p. 105).

The jaina tradition, as can be seen from the above, accepts the existence of two different but clearly defined and irreversible transitions: the moment of enlightenment and the moment of liberation. The second of these two coincides with physical death. If one is to follow this scheme, strictly speaking the only way to call people *liberated* even though they, or rather their bodies, are still alive, is by downplaying the importance of the second transition, death. This is what Advaita Vedānta in particular appears to have done. Śaṅkara on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.6, for example, states: "For the knower who dies there is no change of condition — no state different from that experienced while living."[1072] I will not say more about Advaita, whose ideas about *jīvanmukti* have been studied by others,[1073] but will very briefly touch upon the question how early Buddhism considered these two transitions: enlightenment and death.

This is not the occasion for an in-depth study of the notion of 'liberation' in Buddhism, so that some impressions must suffice. The term 'liberated' (*vimutta*) is often used in the Pāli canon, very often in connection with the mind (*citta*, *cetas*).[1074] It is most typically used with reference to people who are still alive, perhaps never with reference to people who have died. But the freedom referred to does not normally seem to concern rebirth, but rather the taints (*āsava*): The Buddha and the Arhats have been able to free themselves from those taints. This would allow us to say that the Buddha and the Arhats were liberated in life, but only if we specify what they were liberated from: the taints, or perhaps something else.

However, no hasty conclusions should be drawn here. The precise significance of the first transition, the one associated with enlightenment, was not altogether clear to the early Buddhists, because a debate took place with regard to whether the state of Arhat was really irreversible, or whether an Arhat could still fall back into the ordinary state of being.[1075] With this vital issue pending, it is not obvious that an Arhat is really and fully liberated from the cycle of rebirths. Some schools also maintained that the two transitions — enlightenment and death — coincided in the case of certain Arhats, the so-called 'level-headed' (*samaśīrṣin*) Arhats.[1076]

The precise significance of the second transition, the one at death, is not easy to determine either. The Buddha is believed to have refused to answer the question whether

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[1072] *na hi viduṣo mṛtasya bhāvāntarāpattir jīvato 'nyo bhāv[aḥ]*; tr. Nelson 1996: 24.
[1073] E.g., Sprockhoff 1964; Nelson 1996; Fort 1996; 1998.
[1074] Note that "[i]n many … places in the Suttapiṭaka the verb *vi* + *muc* is attested as a textual variant for *adhi* + *muc*, and vice versa. In the places where the verbs are alternatives, they refer to a state of concentration rather than liberation." (Wynne 2007: 79)
[1075] Bareau 1957: 244 f.
[1076] Bareau 1957: 248 f.

a Buddha (*tathāgata*) exists after death. This is the last of the four so-called 'unexplained' (Pāli *avyākata*, Sanskrit *avyākṛta*) questions, to which the Buddha always reacts by remaining silent.[1077] It is safe to claim that the Buddha, or any Arhat for that matter, was not believed to be reborn after the life in which he attained Arhatship, but this is a negative observation. The early buddhist texts add no positive information.

It is common in scholarly literature to distinguish between *nirvāṇa* and *parinirvāṇa*. The Buddha is supposed to have reached the former while in his thirties, the second at death in his early eighties. Indeed, *parinirvāṇa* is often used to refer to the death of the Buddha. This does not, however, appear to be justified. The term *parinirvāṇa* is used, in early buddhist literature and in certain Mahāyāna Sūtras, almost as a synonym of *nirvāṇa*.[1078] More precisely perhaps, as Thomas pointed out (1947: 295), "*Nirvāṇa* expresses the state, *parinirvāṇa* the attaining of the state, or in Pāli, he *parinibbāyati*, attains the state, and then *nibbāyati*, he is in the state expressed by *nibbāna*."

By way of conclusion we may observe that it is important to know, when the early texts speak of liberation, what the person concerned is supposed to be liberated from. If it is from the cycle of rebirths, liberation is likely to coincide with death, for the simple reason that the person remains part of this cycle until then. Jainism takes this position, in spite of the fact that its sages may have entered long before their death stages from which there is no return and from which liberation is guaranteed.

Liberation can also be thought of as freedom from something else, say attachment. In such cases liberation in life becomes conceivable. It goes without saying that being liberated while alive, among those who believe in it, is an enviable qualification, which almost predictably led to competition between claimants and their followers. King Janaka and the nun Sulabhā illustrate this. Lawgivers, on the other hand, felt no doubt hesitant to admit the existence of people who do not fit into any legal category, and who are not bound by any rules. The early Buddhists had second thoughts about assigning the irrevocable title of Arhat to people still alive, and therefore considered the possibility that Arhats, too, might fall back. We have seen that the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* and the *Bhagavadgītā*, though not denying the possibility of liberation in life, reduce it in practice to the solemn pursuit of a high but distant aim.

Appendix VI: The Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya and its Śākhā

The *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* gives a detailed description of the phonetic aspects of the *Ṛgveda* and its Pada- and Kramapāṭha. The agreement with the *Ṛgveda* known to us[1079] is almost complete, so much so that Max Müller (1891: li) could say, on the basis of this Prātiśākhya, that "previously ... to the time when the Prātiśākhya was composed, both the Pada and the Saṃhitā texts were so firmly settled that it was impossible, for the sake of uniformity or regularity, to omit one single short *a* ...". Surya Kanta (1933: 78-96) made a detailed comparison of the lengthening of final vowels in the *Ṛgveda* and its description

[1077] E.g. SN II p. 222 f. Cf. Oetke 1994: 88 f.
[1078] Thomas 1947; Nattier 2003: 148-49 n. 26.
[1079] Not to prejudge the issue, I shall speak of the '*Ṛgveda* known to us', 'our *Ṛgveda*' etc., instead of using the term '*Śākala Saṃhitā*' or some of its equivalents. See below.

in the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*, and found the latter to be "entirely free from all oversights" (p. 78).

There are, none the less, some points where the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* does not agree with our *Ṛgveda*. Some of these have given rise to expressions of doubt if the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* was meant for the version of the *Ṛgveda* that we are acquainted with, first by Rudolph Roth (1852: XLV), later by Hannes Sköld (1926: 42-46). Also Müller (1860: 135-136) said that it is "doubtful how far the rules [of the Prātiśākhya] can be considered as representing the general opinion of the Śākalas." (The Śākalas constitute the Śākhā to which our *Ṛgveda* is said to belong [Renou 1947: 24 n; Bhandarkar 1893: 419]; see below.) Yet Müller (1860: 135, 137) thought that the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* is intimately connected with our *Ṛgveda* and did not hesitate to call it "*Śākala-prātiśākhya*". We will see below that he was mistaken.

On a number of occasions the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* presents a point of view that does not agree with our *Ṛgveda*. In some cases it contrasts this with a view that is in complete agreement with the text known to us, but which it attributes to others.

RPr I.43 (44) says that *ṣ*, *ṭ*, *ṭh*, *ḍ*, *ḍh*, *ṇ* are retroflex (*mūrdhanya*). RPr I.51 (52) tells us that Vedamitra holds a partially different opinion: the places of articulation of *ḍ* are the root of the tongue (*jihvāmūla*) and the palate (*tālu*). The very next sūtra then adds that his (i.e. Vedamitra's) *ḍ* becomes *ḷ* when standing between two vowels, and his aspirated *ḍh* becomes *ḷh*; examples are *iḷā*, *sāḷhā*, as well as *vīḍvaṅga* when with an Avagraha (i.e., in the Padapāṭha: *vīḷu'aṅga*).[1080] This change of *ḍ* to *ḷ* and *ḍh* to *ḷh* characterizes our *Ṛgveda*, but is, apparently, not accepted by the author of the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*.

RPr VI.1-13 (378-389) gives a detailed description of the circumstances in which doubling of consonants takes place. The Prātiśākhya then proceeds (sūtra VI.14 [390]): *saṃyuktaṃ tu vyañjanaṃ śākalena*. The commentator Uvaṭa (p. 200) gives two explanations of this sūtra. In the first one, a consonant which is connected with another one, which comes after a long vowel and is at the beginning of a word, is not doubled according to the precept of the Śākalas[1081] (*saṃyuktaṃ vyañjanaṃ dīrghāt paraṃ na krāmati śākalena vidhānena/ ... padādir ity evānuvartate/*). According to the second explanation of this sūtra, a consonant that is connected with another one is never doubled according to the precept of the Śākalas (*apare dīrghagrahaṇaṃ padādigrahaṇaṃ ca nānuvartayanti/ aviśeṣeṇa sarvatra śākalam icchanti/*). The second interpretation seems to be the better one; it coincides with what we find in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. P. 8.4.51 reads: *sarvatra śākalyasya [yaro (45), dve (46), na (48)]* "In all [the contexts described in the preceding rules there is] no [substitution of] two [consonants] in the place of a consonant different from *h*, according to Śākalya." The opinion here ascribed to the Śākalas is in agreement with our *Ṛgveda*, which does not contain doubled consonants in such contexts (Müller 1869: CXIII). This opinion is again not shared by the author of the Prātiśākhya, who even considers absence of doubling a fault (RPr XIV.58 [816]).

[1080] RPr I.52 (53): *dvayoś cāsya svarayor madhyam etya saṃpadyate sa ḍakāro ḷakāraḥ/ ḷhakāratām eti sa eva cāsya ḍhakāraḥ sannūṣmaṇā saṃprayuktaḥ/ iḷā sāḷhā cātra nidarśanāni vīḍvaṅga ity etad avagraheṇa/.*

[1081] The word *śākala* could here be translated either 'of Śākalya' or 'of the Śākalas'. I choose for the second translation since Śākalya's opinion — as against the one of the Śākalas (see below) — is not always in agreement with our *Ṛgveda*. See Müller 1869: 9 and below. It is true that on this particular point the Śākalas seem to be of one mind with Śākalya, as may follow from P. 8.4.51, to be mentioned presently.

RPr XI.17-19 (629-631) gives three opinions regarding the correct form of the Kramapāṭha on RV 8.70.9: *ud ū ṣu ṇo vaso* (see Müller 1869: CCXXVIII; Uvaṭa, pp. 334-335). Sūtra XI.17 (629; *anantare trikramakāraṇe yadi tribhiś ca gārgyaḥ punar eva ca tribhiḥ*) gives the opinion of Gārgya; according to him the correct form is: *ud ū ṣu/ ū ṣu ṇaḥ/.* Sūtra XI. 18 (630; *trisaṃgame pañcabhir ārṣyyanugrahaḥ*) mentions no name and favours acceptance of the whole row of five words *ud ū ṣu ṇo vaso* into the Kramapāṭha. Sūtra XI.19 (631; *catuḥkramas tv ācarito 'tra śākalaiḥ*), finally, describes the practice of the Śākalas; they take four words into the Kramapāṭha: *ud ū ṣu ṇaḥ*. One gets the impression that sūtra XI.18 (630) expresses the view of the author of the Prātiśākhya, not of some teachers (*eka ācāryāḥ*) as Uvaṭa (p. 334) has it. But this view is not in agreement with the present-day practice of the Vaidikas. Present-day practice is the same as what sūtra XI.19 (631) describes as the practice of the Śākalas: four words are taken into the Kramapāṭha. This I could ascertain by consulting Pandit Kinjawadekar Shastri in Poona, who had the *Ṛgveda* and its Pada- and Kramapāṭha committed to memory.

[The *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* gives another detail regarding how the Śākalas recite the Kramapāṭha in sūtra XI.61 (673). The Śākalas, we here learn, never recite a word in their Kramapāṭha *upasthita* (i.e., merely followed by *iti*); instead they recite such a word *sthitopasthita* (followed by *iti*, after which the word itself is repeated), since only thus the word is seen as it is (*sthitisthitopasthitayoś ca dṛśyate padaṃ yathāvad vyayavad dhy upasthite/ kvacit sthitau caivam ato 'dhi śākalāḥ krame sthitopasthitam ācaranty uta//*). Uvaṭa (p. 360) gives as illustrations: *áraig íty áraìk* (to RV 1.113.16), *sv iti su* (to RV 1.173.12), *prātar iti prātaḥ*. This also is in agreement with present-day practice, as I again learned from Pandit Kinjawadekar Shastri. This time, however, the practice of the Śākalas is not explicitly contrasted with the practice of others.]

According to RPr I.64 (65) the Śākalas show nasalization in the vowel of three mātrās that occurs in a pause, in order not to neglect the instruction of the teachers (*tat trimātre śākalā darśayanty ācāryaśāstrāparilopahetavaḥ*). This concerns the last word of RV 10.146.1, which the Śākalas read *vindatī3ṃ* as does our *Ṛgveda*. The last part of the sūtra is not fully clear (cf. Müller 1869: XXIII), but seems to contrast this sūtra with the preceding one. According to the preceding sūtra, the teachers say that the first eight vowels (i.e., *a ṛ i u e o ai au*) are nasalized when they occur in a pause and are not pragṛhya (RPr I.63 [64]: *aṣṭāv ādyān avasāne 'pragṛhyān ācāryā āhur anunāsikān svarān*). If the opinion of the teachers coincides with the opinion of the author of the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* — which is likely (cf. Shastri 1937: 154), but not fully certain — this is the fourth instance where the version of the *Ṛgveda* which agrees with the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* differs from the version known to us.

RPr IV.17 (236) gives the opinion of 'some' (*eke*, RPr IV.16 [235]). According to them, when *ṭ* or *n* is followed by *s*, *t* comes in between (*ṭakāranakārayos tu āhuḥ sakārodayayor takāram*). This rule is followed in our *Ṛgveda*, as far as the sound *n* is concerned. Examples are: RV 2.1.15 *tān-t-saṃ*; 3.1.4 *avardhayan-t-subhagaṃ*; 3.2.10 *akṛṇvan-t-svadhitim*. The version underlying the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* did not, to all appearances, insert *t* in these cases.

Some more deviations of the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* from our *Ṛgveda* may be mentioned. RPr IV.36 (255) prescribes elision of *visarjanīya* before a fricative which is itself followed by a voiceless consonant, also when the fricative is made retroflex (*ūṣmaṇy aghoṣodaye lupyate pare nate 'pi*). This rule is normally not obeyed in our *Ṛgveda*. For example, RV 6.69.6 reads *samudraḥ sthaḥ* where we would expect *samudra*

sthaḥ on the basis of this sūtra. Similarly, RV 5.59.1 reads *vaḥ spaḻ* instead of *va spaḻ*, RV 6.47.30 *niḥ ṣṭanihi* instead of *ni ṣṭanihi*.[1082] The *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* does not give the opinion of others this time.

RPr IV.6 (225) tells us that according to all teachers the sound *m*, when followed by an explosive which has a different place of articulation, changes into the nasal which has the same place of articulation as that following consonant (*visthāne sparśa udaye makāraḥ sarveṣām evodayasyottamaṃ svam*). This rule is not followed in our *Ṛgveda*, witness RV 10.135.3 *yaṃ kumāra*, not *yaṅ kumāra*; 8.62.11 *ahaṃ ca*, not *ahañ ca*; 3.48.2 *taṃ te*, not *tan te*. Again no contrasting opinions are given.

RPr IV.7 (226) says that *m* before *y*, *l*, *v* which occur in the beginning of a word, becomes itself nasalized *ỹ, l̃, ṽ* respectively *(antasthāsu*[1083] *rephavarjaṃ parāsu tāṃ tāṃ padādiṣv anunāsikāṃ tu*). Our *Ṛgveda* does not obey this rule: RV 2.25.1 reads *yaṃ yaṃ yujaṃ* instead of *yaỹ yaỹ yujaṃ*; 10.71.2 *bhadraiṣāṃ lakṣmīr* instead of *bhadraiṣāl̃ lakṣmīr*; 6.48.14 *taṃ va* instead of *taṽ va*.

According to RPr IV.8 (227), *n* becomes nasal *l̃*, when followed by *l*. Our *Ṛgveda* does not oblige, vide RV 2.12.4 *jigīvāṃ lakṣam* (Pp. *jigīvān*) instead of *jigīvāl̃ lakṣam*.

On a number of occasions the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* talks about verses which do not occur in our *Ṛgveda*:

RPr XVIII.56 (1057) reads: *caturbhis tu paraṃ dvābhyāṃ tava svādiṣṭhā tacchaṃyoḥ* "But the verses *tava svādiṣṭhā* ... and *tacchaṃyoḥ* ... are with four, then with two [versefeet]." The first of these two verses is RV 4.10.5. The second does not occur in our *Ṛgveda*. It occurs in the *Ṛgveda Khila* (5.1.5 and 5.3.7) and reads there: *tac chaṃyyor ā vṛṇīmahe gātuṃ yajñāya gātuṃ yajñapataye daivī svastir astu nas svastir mānuṣebhyaḥ/ ūrdhvaṃ jigātu bheṣajaṃ śan no astu dvipade śañ catuṣpade//*. (It is not clear how this verse is to be divided into six versefeet [cf. Müller 1869: CCCLIII].) We learn from the commentator Nārāyaṇa on *Āśvalāyaṇa Gṛhyasūtra* 3.5.9 that it is the final verse of the *Bāṣkala Saṃhitā* (Scheftelowitz 1906: 132; Müller 1869: CCCLIII).

RPr XVII.45 (996) reads: *ekādaśaiva chandasi pādā ye ṣoḻaśākṣarāḥ/ sarve trikadrukīyāsu nākule 'ṣṭādaśākṣaraḥ//* "There are eleven versefeet in the Sāṃhitā[1084] which have sixteen syllables; they are all in the verses of the Trikadruka. There is a versefoot of eighteen syllables in the hymn of Nakula." Our *Ṛgveda* contains no hymn that is ascribed to Nakula. Uvaṭa (p. 485) quotes in this connection the following line: *arcāmi satyasavaṃ ratnadhām abhi priyaṃ matiṃ kavim*. This occurs in the *Ṛgveda Khila* (3.22.4a).

RPr XVI.88-92 (947-951) deals with the Subheṣaja hymn, which does not occur in our *Ṛgveda*. The reading of sūtra XVI.92 (951) has been corrected by Scheftelowitz (1906: 125) and shown to be about *Ṛgveda Khila* 4.9.

RPr II.46 (150) refers to the verse *tena no 'dya* ... This is *Ṛgveda Khila* 5.1.3b, which reads: *tena nodya viśve devās sam priyām sam avivanan*.

The *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* refers five times to verses which occur neither in our *Ṛgveda* nor in the Khilas known to us, viz., in sūtras XVI.19 (878), XVI.17 (876), V.24 (341), VII.33 (465), IX.11 (548); see Scheftelowitz 1906: 18-19. Two of these five

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[1082] The rule of the Prātiśākhya is at least once obeyed in our *Ṛgveda*. RV 1.182.7 reads *niṣṭhito* for Pp. *niḥ'sthitaḥ*. More interesting is that the text of the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* itself follows the rule (Shastri 1959: 63).

[1083] Müller's edition reads *antaḥsthāsu*. But see above.

[1084] This translation of *chandasi* follows Uvaṭa (p. 484).

references can be traced in the Brāhmaṇas and Śrautasūtras of the *Ṛgveda*. RPr XVI.19 (878) uses the word *indra* to refer to a three-verse (*tṛc*) which, according to Uvaṭa (p. 445), begins thus: *indra juṣasva pravahā yāhi śūra harīha/ pibā sutasya matir na madhvaś cakānaś cārur madāya//*. This section occurs at *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 4.1.2, *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa* 17.1, *Āśvalāyana Śrautasūtra* 6.3.1, and *Śāṅkhyāyana Śrautasūtra* 9.5.3. RPr V.24 (341) seems to refer to the line *te devāḥ parisvṛteṣv eṣu lokeṣu* (Uvaṭa, p. 177). This is quoted at *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa* 8.8.[1085]

It is clear that the deviations of the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* from our *Ṛgveda* described above constitute strong evidence that this Prātiśākhya primarily deals with a version of the *Ṛgveda* that differed in some points from ours. The mention of other views that agree with our *Ṛgveda* indicates that the author of the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* was also, be it secondarily, familiar with our text.

It is not so certain what conclusions can be drawn from the fact that the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* refers to verses that do not occur in our *Ṛgveda*, as shown above. One might base oneself upon the hypothesis of Scheftelowitz (1906: 11-13) that all verses contained in the *Ṛgveda Khila* belonged to other Śākhās of the *Ṛgveda*, and argue that all the verses referred to in the Prātiśākhya and not occurring in our *Ṛgveda* belonged to the Śākhā of the Prātiśākhya. Many of these verses, as we have seen, do indeed occur in the *Ṛgveda Khila*, and some of the remaining ones are quoted in the ancillary literature, which also seems to agree with the thesis that they once belonged to at least some version of the *Ṛgveda*.

Unfortunately, it is far from certain that Scheftelowitz's hypothesis regarding the Khilas is correct (Renou 1947: 21; Oldenberg 1907: 217-235; Keith 1907: 225-228). Moreover, we know that the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* does not limit its description to its own version of the *Ṛgveda*, for it gives information about our version of it. It is therefore conceivable that the Prātiśākhya also commented upon the phonetic shape of verses which did not occur in its own version of the *Ṛgveda*. We shall find evidence to show this assumption right.[1086]

But if we cannot decide which is the Śākhā to which the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* primarily belongs on the basis of the verses it refers to, how can we come to know this Śākhā? The answer is easy: The Prātiśākhya tells us so itself.

The *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* says in an introductory verse that it comments upon the Śaiśirīya version of the *Ṛgveda* (verse 7: *asya jñānārtham idam uttaratra vakṣye śāstram akhilaṃ*[1087] *śaiśirīye*).

Not much can be learned about the Śaiśirīya version of the *Ṛgveda* from the ancient literature. There is, however, one old work which professes to deal with this same version, viz. the *Anuvākānukramaṇī*. This work admonishes the Śākalas, in an introductory verse, to hear, in due order, of how many *sūkta*s the *anuvāka*s consist in the

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[1085] If RPr V.24 (341) is really about this line, then Keith's (1920: 396 n) proposal to read *pariśṛteṣu* for *parisvṛteṣu* is in conflict with the Prātiśākhya, for the Prātiśākhya prescribes that *s* will remain unchanged (*prakṛtyā*).

[1086] Note that RPr XVI.87-88 (946-947) seems to indicate that the Subheṣaja hymn did not belong to the ten Maṇḍalas (Oldenberg 1907: 214). These sūtras read: *sarvā dāśatayīṣv etā uttarās tu subheṣaje* "All these metres are in the ten Maṇḍalas; the following ones, however, are in the Subheṣaja."

[1087] Oldenberg's (1907: 212) suggestion to understand *akhila* in the sense ‘die Khila übergehend’, ‘was nicht Khila ist’, seems belied by the circumstance that the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* draws the Vālakhilya hymns into the discussion. See below.

Ṛgveda, in the *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā* (verse 9: *ṛgvede śaiśirīyāyāṃ saṃhitāyāṃ yathākramam/ pramāṇam anuvākānāṃ sūktaiḥ śṛṇuta śākalāḥ//*). A perusal of the *Anuvākānukramaṇī* brings to light two further differences between the Śaiśirīya version of the *Ṛgveda* and the one known to us. First, the Śaiśirīya version did not, apparently, contain the Vālakhilya hymns (RV 8.49-59), for it counts 92, instead of 103, hymns in the eighth Maṇḍala (see verse 35: *dve caiva sūkte navatiṃ ca vidyād athāṣṭamaṃ* ...; cf. Macdonell 1886: xv).[1088] Second, the *Anuvākānukramaṇī* gives two different numbers for the verses contained in the Saṃhitā (Müller 1860: 220-221; Macdonell 1886: xvi; see also below). If we take the lowest number and compare this with the number of verses in our *Ṛgveda*, not counting the Vālakhilya hymns, we come to the closest agreement possible, but are still left with 15 extra verses that were apparently part of the Śaiśirīya version of the *Ṛgveda* (Oldenberg 1888: 498-503, esp. 502).

One more peculiarity of the Śaiśirīya version of the *Ṛgveda* may have been the following. Verse 43 of the *Anuvākānukramaṇī* gives as the total number of verses 10580,5. The total number contained in *varga*s, on the other hand, is 10417 (verses 40-42). This leaves 163,5 verses that are not contained in *varga*s. The *Anuvākānukramaṇī* (verses 7, 17, 36, 39) makes a mention of Khilas and adds that for them no *anuvāka*s are stated (verses 17 and 36; Oldenberg 1907: 211 n). Probably also no *varga*s were stated for the Khilas, for the total number given in the *Anuvākānukramaṇī* agrees with the number found in our *Ṛgveda* (Oldenberg 1888: 500; Keith 1907: 228). This would mean that the Khilas referred to in the *Anuvākānukramaṇī* contained 163 verses.

The *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* and the *Anuvākānukramaṇī* together have brought to light the following distinguishing features of the Śaiśirīya version of the *Ṛgveda*. They are distinguishing in the sense that they are not present in our version of the *Ṛgveda*. If they were all simultaneously present in the *Śaiśirīya Śākhā* depends on the question how far this Śākhā remained unchanged in the period between the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* and the *Anuvākānukramaṇī*. The features are:

(i) The *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā* did not contain the Vālakhilya hymns (RV 8.49-59).
(ii) The *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā* did not contain the sounds *l̤* and *l̤h*.[1089]
(iii) The *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā* doubled its consonants under the circumstances specified in RPr VI.1-13 (378-389).
(iv) The *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā* elided the *visarjanīya* before a fricative that is itself followed by a voiceless consonant.
(v) The *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā* did not insert *t* between *n* and *s*.
(vi) The *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā* had the nasal corresponding to the following explosive in the place of *m*.
(vii) The Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā had nasal *ỹ, l̃, ṽ* in the place of *m* before word-initial *y*, *l* and *v* respectively.
(viii) The Kramapāṭha to RV 8.70.9 of the Śaiśirīya school contained the row of five words *ud ū ṣu ṇo vaso*, whereas the Kramapāṭha known to us has no more than four words: *ud ū ṣu ṇaḥ*.

[1088] The Vālakhilya hymns are none the less dealt with in the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* (Müller 1891: xlvi f.; Scheftelowitz 1906: 18 [note that Khila 3.1-8 are the first 8 Vālakhilya hymns, i.e., RV 8.49-56, and Khila 1.6 = RV 8.59]; Oldenberg 1907: 213). This shows again that the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* did not confine itself to what it found in its own Saṃhitā.

[1089] According to Lüders (1923: 298) the Kāṇva recension of the *Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā* contained *l̤* and *l̤h*, whereas the Mādhyandina recension did not.

Perhaps we may add:
(ix) Vowels occurring in a pause, not being *pragṛhya*, were nasalized in the *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā*.
(x) The *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā* contained 15 verses more than our Saṃhitā (not counting the Vālakhilya hymns).
(xi) The Śaiśirīya Śākhā had Khilas, which contained 163,5 verses.
We note that the differences between the Śaiśirīya and the Śākala versions are no smaller than the ones which are known to exist between the Śākala and Bāṣkala versions (Renou 1947: 20, 22; Oldenberg 1888: 490 f.; Singh 1975).

A large number of these characteristics, which differentiate the Śaiśirīya Śākhā from our version of the *Ṛgveda*, are found in the *Ṛgveda* Ms. from Kashmir, on the basis of which Scheftelowitz made his edition of the Khilas (1906), and of which he gave a fuller description later (1907). How much agreement exists between this Kashmir *Ṛgveda* (KRV) and the Śaiśirīya Śākhā may become clear when we go through the points enumerated.
(i) The KRV does not contain the Vālakhilya hymns; they are included in the Khilas (Scheftelowitz 1920: 194 n; 1906: 35).
(ii) The KRV contains *l̤*, but not *l̤h* for which the Śāradā script (in which the Kashmir Ms. is written) has no sign.[1090]
(iii) The KRV often doubles *t* and *dh* after a short vowel or *anusvāra* before *y* and *v* (Scheftelowitz, 1907: 112). This agrees with RPr VI.1 (378), which prescribes doubling of consonants which are initial in a group of consonants, after a vowel or *anusvāra* (*svarānusvāropahito dvir ucyate saṃyogādiḥ sa kramo 'vikrame san*).
(iv) The KRV drops *visarjanīya* (or *s*) before *s* followed by a voiceless consonant. Examples of *s+st>st*, *s+sth>sth*, *s+sp>sp*, *s+sk>sk* can be found in Scheftelowitz 1907: 104-105.
(v) The KRV does not insert *t* between *n* and *s* (Scheftelowitz 1907: 118).
(vi) The KRV always has the nasal corresponding to the following explosive in the place of *m* (Scheftelowitz 1907: 115-16).
(vii) The KRV writes *ṃvv* and *ṃyy* where *m* precedes *v* and *y* respectively, initial in a word; *m+l* and *n+l* become *ṃll* or *m̆ll* (Scheftelowitz, 1907: 116). This seems closer to *ṽv*, *ỹy*, *l̃l* than what we find in our *Ṛgveda* (*ṃv*, *ṃy* and *ṃl* respectively).
(viii) About the Kramapāṭha of the KRV we have no information.
(ix) Scheftelowitz 1907 gives no information regarding nasalization of vowels in pausa;
(x) nor about possible additional verses in the KRV.
(xi) The KRV has Khilas, but the number of verses contained in them is greater than 163,5.

[1090] That the Kashmir Ms. has a sign for *l̤* was pointed out to me by Michael Witzel. It had not been noticed by Scheftelowitz (1906: 47). For the form of this sign, see Renou & Filliozat 1953: 692. The presence of *l̤* in the KRV may be due to śākalization, which also changed *ḍ* into *l̤* in the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* (see below). That the KRV considered itself to be the *Śākala Saṃhitā* (Scheftelowitz 1906: 168) merely strenghthens this supposition. Note that the orthography of the concluding portion of the Kashmir Ms. that contains this information "weicht ... schon ein wenig von den ihm vorangehenden vedischen Texten ab, indem *v* und *y* nach einem Anusvāra nicht verdoppelt werden. Ausl. *m* wird hier vor anl. Sibilant, h, r, Nasal, Palatal gewöhnlich zum Anusvāra" (Scheftelowitz 1906: 167).

The agreement between the KRV and the Śaiśirīya Śākhā[1091] is clearly great, but not complete. It cannot be explained by assuming that someone 'improved' the text of the *Ṛgveda* on the basis of the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*. Several circumstances exclude this possibility. The most important is perhaps that the KRV contains features which are characterized as faults (*doṣa*) in the Prātiśākhya. The KRV often contains single consonants where it should have two of them (Scheftelowitz 1907: 105-107); this is a fault according to RPr XIV.16 (774) and XIV.58 (816). Further, at some points our *Ṛgveda* is in closer agreement with the Prātiśākhya than the KRV. RPr IV.18 (237) says that *c* is inserted to make *-ñ cch-* **according to some**. The *Śaiśirīya Śākhā* therefore probably had *-ñ ch-*, as has our *Ṛgveda*. The KRV, on the other hand, has *-ñ ch-* only when a vowel (or *r*) follows, when a consonant follows it has *-ñ cch-* (Scheftelowitz 1907: 120).

It is of some importance to note that the KRV is independent of the Padapāṭha. This appears most clearly from the deviant readings in the Vālakhilya hymns (Schroeder 1898: 283; Scheftelowitz 1906: 36-45), but also from those in the main body of the KRV (Scheftelowitz 1907: 85-90).

The above suggests that the version of the *Ṛgveda* known from the Kashmir Ms. is closely related to, but not fully identical with, the version primarily described in the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*. The latter was compared with, and perhaps to some extent adjusted to, the Padapāṭha, which the former was apparently not. The two versions are so close that we are tempted to think that the KRV is a descendant of the *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā*, or perhaps both are descendants from a common ancestor.

[Caution is however required. Some (or even all) of the similarities between the KRV and the *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā* may be due to other factors. Witzel (1980: 45-46), for example, has argued that the absence of *t* between *n* and *s* (point (v) above) is a peculiarity of the Veda tradition of Kashmir: it is also found in the Kaṭha material from Kashmir and in the Kashmir Ms. of the *Paippalāda Saṃhitā*. It might of course be maintained that this is explained by the fact that in Kashmir the prestigious *Ṛgveda* was preserved in the Śaiśirīya version, which contained this feature. Alternatively, this feature might have existed independently in the KRV and, say, the Kaṭha school. Witzel thinks that it came about under the influence of the Kaṭha school. The case of *anunāsika* before *v*, *y*, *l* (point (vii) above) is similar; see Witzel 1980: 21-22.]

There are some more works that claim to belong to the Śaiśirīya Śākhā. One of them is the *Vikṛtivallī*, which says of itself that "the eight *vikṛti*s (modified ways of recitation of the Veda, viz.,) *jaṭā* etc. are characterized, not too extensively, by the great Seer Vyāḍi, with respect to the Śaiśirīya text" (verse 4, p. 1: *śaiśirīye samāmnāye vyāḍinaiva maharṣiṇā/ jaṭādyā vikṛtīr aṣṭau lakṣyante nātivistaram//*; note the 'archaic' (?) Nom. Pl. *vikṛtīḥ*!). It seems that the author of the *Vikṛtivallī* blindly followed the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* and *Anuvākānukramaṇī* in expressing its allegiance to the *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā*, for his *Ṛgveda* did not agree with what we know about the *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā* in at least one respect. In verse 13 we read: *ḍakārādividhānaṃ tat svarāntaḥparivartanam* " That

[1091] Another *Ṛgveda* Ms. from Kashmir, discovered by M. A. Stein in 1896, shows striking similarities with the KRV, at least in points (iii), (iv), (vi) and (vii), and possibly in others (Dumont 1962). Interestingly, this Ms. claims to belong to the Āśvalāyana Śākhā. B. B. Chaubey's (2009) recent edition of the *Āśvalāyana Saṃhitā* does not appear to be based on this Ms.

rule regarding *ḍ* etc. is a change [which takes place when *ḍ* etc. are] between vowels." We know that in the *Śākala Saṃhitā ḍ* becomes *l̤* when between two vowels, but not in the *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā* (see above). The *Vikṛtivallī* therefore deals either with the same version of the *Ṛgveda* as ours, or at best with a śākalized version of the *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā*. Mīmāṃsaka (1973: I: 278, 291) has argued on other grounds that the *Vikṛtivallī* is a late work. See also Abhyankar & Devasthali 1978: XIV-XV. This makes it all the more likely that this text concerns itself with our *Ṛgveda*.

The same is true of the *Śaiśirīyaśikṣā*. This treatise describes a Saṃhitā that knows the sounds *l̤* and *l̤h* (here called *duspṛṣṭa*; see p. 2, l. 22) and prescribes insertion of *t* between *n* and *s* (p. 5, l. 96; p. 16, l. 307-08). In general it may be said that this Śikṣā follows the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* upon its heels.

What more do we know about the Śaiśirīya Śākhā of the *Ṛgveda*? Verse 9 of the *Anuvākānukramaṇī* (quoted above) suggests that there was a close connection between the *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā* and the Śākalas. The same is done by verse 36, which reads: *tān pāraṇe śākale śaiśirīye vadaṃti śiṣṭā na khileṣu viprāḥ* "The learned Brahmins do not state those (i.e., *anuvāka*s) in the Khilas in the Śākala, in the Śaiśirīya text." The most natural interpretation of this verse leads us to the assumption that the Śākala text and the Śaiśirīya text were one and the same. This is in perfect agreement with verse 9, and not contradicted by anything in the *Anuvākānukramaṇī*. It is not, however, in agreement with the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*. This Prātiśākhya, as we have seen, contrasts on three occasions its own view (which is the view of the Śaiśirīyas), with the view of the Śākalas. The views of these Śākalas are embodied in our *Ṛgveda*, so that we have no reason to doubt that our *Ṛgveda* is the text of the Śākalas. And our *Ṛgveda* deviates in two further respects from the description of the *Anuvākānukramaṇī* (see above).

We might try to interpret verses 9 and 36 in such a way that the Śaiśirīyas are a branch of the Śākala Śākhā. This interpretation would be in agreement with the Purāṇas, which tell us that Śākalya taught the *Ṛgveda* to five pupils, one of them being Śaiśiri or Śiśira (Sagar Rai 1964: 101-105; Renou 1947: 52-56). Unfortunately, our most ancient sources of information regarding the Śākhās of the *Ṛgveda* make no mention of such a subdivision of the Śākala, or indeed any other, Śākhā. They are Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* (Vol. I, p. 9, l. 22) and the *Mahābhārata* (12.330.32). Also the *Caraṇavyūha* (1.5; p. 253) and the *Caraṇavyūha* contained in the Pariśiṣṭas of the *Atharvaveda* (49.1.6; Bolling-Negelein 1909: 335) keep silence on this point. Moreover, this interpretation agrees as little with the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* as the former one. The account of the Purāṇas may have been an attempt to explain such passages as the two verses under discussion of the *Anuvākānukramaṇī*. Renou's (1947: 54-56) attempt to show the "well-foundedness of certain purāṇic traditions" (p. 54) may well have succeeded in doing the opposite: demonstrating on the basis of what meagre information the Purāṇas built their account. When, e.g., the *Bṛhaddevatā*[1092] mentions the names of Baudhya and Māṭhara in a passage which deals with the Bāṣkala version of the *Ṛgveda*, and the Purāṇas make Baudhya and (Agni-)māṭhara into pupils of Bāṣkala, then the Purāṇas may very well have done so in

[1092] *Bṛhaddevatā* 8.84-85 (ed. Macdonell); 8.78-79 (ed. Tokunaga). Neither of these two editions reads Baudhya in the first verse (Tokunaga not even in the critical notes), but Renou (1947: 54), following Bhagavad Datta, reads this verse thus: *āśiṣo yogam etaṃ hi baudhyo 'rdharcena manyate* "telle est la combinaison de prière que vise Baudhya au moyen de cette demistrophe".

order to explain this passage of the *Bṛhaddevatā*. We must, therefore, be careful with the use we make of the Purāṇic account of the vedic schools.

We must also be careful not to draw conclusions from the fact that the only two commentators whose comments on the eighth Maṇḍala of the *Ṛgveda* have survived — Sāyaṇa and Venkaṭamādhava — failed to comment on sūktas 49-59, the Vālakhilya hymns, which were absent from the *Śaiśirīya Saṃhitā*. There is no reason to think that these hymns were late additions to the text.[1093] On the contrary, they are accompanied by a Padapāṭha, and belonged therefore — in spite of Scheftelowitz 1920: 194-198 — to a version of the *Ṛgveda* even before the time of the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* (see further Müller 1891: xlvi f.). Probably these commentators, too, were led astray by the *Anuvākānukramaṇī*, as were Ṣaḍguruśiṣya, who commented on the *Sarvānukramaṇī* (Müller 1891: xlvi), and perhaps the author of the *Sarvānukramaṇī*, seven of the nine Mss. of which used by Macdonell (1886: 30 n) leave out the Vālakhilyas (Scheftelowitz 1920: 194).

It seems that in the *Anuvākānukramaṇī* we are witnessing an attempt to unite the Śaiśirīya and the Śākala Śākhā of the *Ṛgveda*; more precisely, an attempt on the part of the Śaiśirīya Śākhā to be considered identical with, or part of, the Śākala Śākhā. This supposition, which solves the difficulty raised by the contradictory information provided by the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* and the *Anuvākānukramaṇī*,[1094] is further supported by number of facts, which will now be discussed.

To begin with, both the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* and the *Anuvākānukramaṇī* mention Śākalya. The Prātiśākhya gives the latter's opinion regarding certain matters in a number of sūtras. In one case Śākalya's opinion deviates from our *Ṛgveda*, i.e., in RPr IV.13 (232) (Renou 1947: 22 n; Müller 1869: 8).[1095] This suggests that the author of the Prātiśākhya knew that Śākalya's opinion was not always identical with the opinion of the Śākalas,[1096] even though the latter derived their name from the former: 'Śākalas' means

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[1093] The great length of Adhyāya 6.4 (Roth 1846: 34-36), which encompasses the Vālakhilya hymns, merely suggests that the division into Adhyāyas originally belonged to a Śākhā which did not contain the Vālakhilya hymns, possibly the Śaiśirīya Śākhā. This is confirmed by the fact that in the KRV the division into Adhyāyas is the main one (Scheftelowitz 1906: 32-33).

[1094] It also explains why the KRV claims to belong to the Śākala Śākhā.

[1095] Also from Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* we learn that Śākalya's opinion did not always agree with our *Ṛgveda* (Geldner 1901: 145); similarly from the *Vājasaneyi Prātiśākhya* (Weber 1858: 72-73).

[1096] It seems that also the later tradition discovered the disagreement between Śākalya and the Śākalas. They solved it (or so it seems) by calling the final redactor of the *Ṛgveda* 'Śākala' instead of 'Śākalya', as he is called in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* (vol. I, p. 347, l. 3). Müller (1860: 237) cites a verse from Ṣaḍguruśiṣya's commentary on Kātyāyana's *Sarvānukramaṇī*, which reads: *śākalasya saṃhitaikā bāṣkalasya tathāparā* "There was one Śākhā of Śākala, another of Bāṣkala" (tr. Müller 1869: 232). The author of the *Vikṛtivallī* (supposedly Vyāḍi) says: *namāmi śākalācāryaṃ śākalyaṃ sthaviraṃ tathā*. This can mean either of two things: "I bow to the teacher Śākala and to the old Śākalya"; or: "I bow to [Śākalya] the teacher of the Śākalas, and to the old Śākalya". The second interpretation is closer to the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*, which seems to distinguish between Śākalya and the old Śākalya. The commentator Gangādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, nevertheless, chooses in his *Vikṛtikaumudī* for the first interpretation (p. 6). On p. 7, moreover, he quotes some verses (reproduced below) which speak of Śākala and his five pupils. Renou (1947: 24b) mentions another occurrence of the personal name 'Śākala'.

Śākalya is again mentioned on several other occasions in the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*. In RPr III.13 (199) he is made to uphold the view that in the case of *praśleṣa* sandhi of two short vowels *i*, and in the case of *kṣaipra* and *abhinihita* sandhi, the resulting vowel gets *svarita* accent, if the

'pupils of Śākalya' (*śākalyasya cchātrāḥ*), as Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* (vol. II, p. 210, l. 7-8) tells us. In short, the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* presents us Śākalya as a historical person, who had held certain views. In the *Anuvākānukramaṇī*, on the other hand, Śākalya is promoted to the rank of having seen the Veda (verse 45). This indicates that the *Anuvākānukramaṇī* is later than the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*, farther removed in time from Śākalya; it further suggests why the Śākala Śākhā could absorb the Śaiśirīya Śākhā; if the Veda had been seen by Śākalya, only the Śākalas, Śākalya's followers, could be in possession of the correct form of the Veda.

Secondly, the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* mentions many authorities, the *Anuvākānukramaṇī* knows only of two Śākhās. Müller (1860: 142-143) gives the following list of authorities met with in the Prātiśākhya: Ānyatareya,[1097] Gārgya, Pañcālas, Prācyas, Bābhravya, Māṇḍūkeya, Yāska, Vedamitra, Vyāḷi, Śākaṭāyana, Śākala, Śākalya, Śākalya-pitṛ (sthavira), Śaunaka (?). The Śākalas represent, to all appearances, the version of the *Ṛgveda* known to us.[1098] Vedamitra is mentioned once and seems to be one of the Śākalas (see above).[1099] Māṇḍūkeya is, as his name suggests, to be connected with the Māṇḍūkāyanas, who had an own version of the *Ṛgveda* according to the *Caraṇavyūha* (1.5; p. 253). Behind one or more of the other names may hide representatives of the Bāṣkala Śākhā, because the Prātiśākhya refers to a verse that we only know to have been part of the *Bāṣkala Saṃhitā* (as indicated above). The *Anuvākānukramaṇī*, on the other hand, makes only mention of the Śākalas and the Bāṣkalas (verses 21 and 36), and of course the Śaiśirīyas, but these last as identical with, or perhaps a subdivision of, the Śākalas. It is, of course, possible that the author of the *Anuvākānukramaṇī* simply had no urge or occasion to vent his knowledge regarding the other Śākhās. More probably the process of absorption and identification had considerably reduced the number of Śākhās.

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first of the two vowels was *udātta* (*ikārayoś ca praśleṣe kṣaiprābhinihiteṣu ca/ udāttapūrvarūpeṣu śākalyasyaivam ācaret//*). This agrees with our *Ṛgveda*. On three other occasions it is not possible to decide on agreement or otherwise. RPr II.81 (185) and III.22 (208) give Śākalya's opinion on details of pronunciation which are not reflected in writing. [The former of these two sūtras speaks of the 'old Śākalya' (*śākalyasya sthavirasya*), which leaves us in doubt if not someone else is meant.] RPr XII.31 (739) merely tells us in what sense the teachers Vyāli, Śākalya and Gārgya used the term *samāpādya*. RPr IV.4-5 (223-224), finally, ascribe opinions to Śākalya's father, which agree with our *Ṛgveda*.

[1097] Müller sometimes writes 'Ānyatareya' (1860: 142), sometimes 'Anyatereya' (1869: LXVII). The commentator on *Caturādhyāyikā* 3.75 speaks about an 'Ānyatareya' (Whitney 1862: 174).

[1098] This follows from the passages collected above, and from the fact that the other opinions ascribed to the Śākalas in the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* nowhere conflict with our *Ṛgveda*. The remaining passages that use the word *śākala* are as follows. RPr I.75 (76) mentions in passing that the particle *u* is nasalized and lengthened, according to the Śākalas (or Śākalya; Uvaṭa [p. 53] explains *śākalena* as *śākalena matena*) in the Padapāṭha (*ukāraś cetikaraṇena yukto rakto 'pṛkto drāghitaḥ śākalena*). RPr VI.20 (396) ff. ascribe some particular kind of pronunciation to the Śākalas, which it is hard to check against existing practice (assuming that such niceties of pronunciation remained unchanged, which is not certain). RPr XI.21 (633) speaks about a *śākalam* which people often remember/cite (*smaranti*) regarding the correct recitation of the Kramapāṭha. Uvaṭa (p. 337) explains this word as *śākalavidhānam* 'precept of the Śākalas/Śākalya'; Müller translates 'Śākala-Lehrbuch'.

[1099] The Purāṇas identify Vedamitra (sometimes called 'Devamitra') with Śākalya (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 3.4.20; *Vāyu Purāṇa* 1.60.63; *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 12.6.57; all quoted in Sagar Rai 1964: 98-100). They may have based this identification on the mention of Vedamitra in the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*.

The last fact that supports the thesis that the Śaiśirīya Śākhā came to be absorbed by the Śākala Śākhā is perhaps the most striking of all. We have seen above that the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* is against the substitution of *l̤* for *ḍ* in its own Śākhā. But the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* itself shows this forbidden feature (Shastri 1959: 63)! The sound *l̤* occurs in quotations as well as outside them, as follows. In quotations: RPr II.71 (175) *ratholha*; 72 (176) *vīlū*; IV.49 (268) *ilāyāḥ*, *ilaḥ*; V.55 (371) *dūlabha*; 59 (375) *heḷaḥ*; VII.19 (451) *mṛl̤ayadbhyām*; 33 (465) *mṛl̤a*, *īl̤iṣva*; VIII.34 (521) *mṛl̤ayantaḥ*; 35 (522) *mṛl̤ayā*; XI.40 (652) *dūl̤abha*; XVI.17 (876) *vīl̤itaḥ*; 73 (932) *krīl̤an*; XVIII.53 (1054) *īl̤e*. Not in quotations: the word *vyāl̤i* occurs 5 times (RPr III.23 [209]; 28 [214]; VI.46 [419]; XIII.31 [739]; 37 [745]), *ṣal̤* followed by a vowel 9 times (RPr IX.35 [572]; XVI.11 [871]; 13 [872]; 16 [875]; 23 [882]; 28 [887]; 34 [892]; 35 [894]; 75 [934]), *pīl̤ana* 4 times[1100] (RPr XIV.3 [761]; 11 [769]; 17 [775]; 29 [787]), *ṣoḷaśa* 3 times (RPr XVII.44 [995]; 45 [996]; XVIII.54 [1055]), *vrīl̤ana*[19] (RPr XIV.6 [764]), and *kṣveḷana*[19] (RPr XIV.20 [788]), each once. The quoted word *niṣṣāṭ* followed by *avikramā* becomes *niṣṣāl̤* in RPr XIV.36 (794). The Prātiśākhya of the Śaiśirīya Śākhā has thus adjusted itself to the Śākala Śākhā.

So there is reason to believe that the Śaiśirīya Śākhā was once an independent branch of the *Ṛgveda* and disappeared completely as the result of a process of absorption and identification. The last step of this process is taken in the *Anuvākānukramaṇī*, which virtually denies the existence of an independent Śaiśirīya Śākhā. An earlier step was taken in the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*, in that it commented, not only on the Śaiśirīya version of the *Ṛgveda*, but simultaneously also on other versions. We find traces of the former existence of the Śaiśirīya Śākhā in the refusal of the commentators to comment on the Vālakhilya hymns, and in the Purāṇic accounts. There is, however, no reason to think that these later authors had access to important sources of information regarding the Śaiśirīya Śākhā beyond what they found in the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* and the *Anuvākānukramaṇī*.

The absorbing Śākhā is here the Śākala Śākhā. It seems likely that the absorbing force of the Śākala Śākhā increased as the sanctity of Śākalya grew.

It is interesting that the same absorbing force of the Śākala Śākhā shows itself in the work of a much later author, this time with respect to the Bāṣkala Śākhā, the only other Śākhā which survived for some time besides the Śākala Śākhā (Renou 1947: 20). Gangādhara Bhaṭṭācārya's *Vikṛtikaumudī*, commenting on the *Vikṛtivallī* (1.4) ascribed to Vyāḍi, contains these two verses (p. 7; quoted by Bhagwaddatta [1920: 3]):

> *śākalasya śataṃ śiṣyā naiṣṭhikabrahmacāriṇaḥ/*
> *pañca tatra gṛhasthās te dharmiṇaś ca kuṭumbinaḥ//*
> *śaiśiro bāṣkalaḥ śāṅkho*[1101] *vātsyaś caivāśvalāyanaḥ/*
> *pañcaite śākalāḥ siṣyāḥ śākhābhedapravartakāḥ//*
> Śākala[1102] had hundred pupils, perfect brahmacārins. Five among them were householders, and virtuous heads of a family: Śaiśira, Bāṣkala, Śāṅkha, Vātsya

[1100] Müller's (1869) edition writes *pīḍana*, *vrīḍana*, and *kṣveḍana*, but has *l̤* in all the other cases.
[1101] The edition reads *sāṃkhyo*. Another edition — without title page, but apparently edited by Satya Vrata (Śarman or Bhaṭṭācārya?) and published by the Satya Press, Calcutta, 1890 — has *śāṅkho*, which must be preferred on account of its relatedness to *śāṅkhāyana*.
[1102] On Śākala, see above.

and Āśvalāyana. These five pupils of Śākala produced the differences between the Śākhās.

Clearly this account of the origin of the Śākhās is influenced by the Purāṇas (cf. Sagar Rai 1964: 102-105). But here we find among Śākala's pupils also Bāṣkala mentioned! In other words, the Bāṣkala Śākhā is here not represented as an independent Śākhā, but as a subdivision of the Śākala Śākhā!

It is tempting to think that this process of absorption and unification existed already before the time of the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* and is ultimately responsible for the fixed form which characterizes our *Ṛgveda*, down to the minutest details. If this is true, we shall have to abandon the idea that the Śākhās of the *Ṛgveda* all presuppose its finally redacted text (Renou 1947: 21, 35). On the contrary, the final redaction will then have to be considered the final outcome of this process. This would of course agree with the evidence presented and discussed elsewhere.[1103]

Appendix VII: Did Patañjali know Pāṇini's original text?

Many modern scholars hold that Patañjali did not know Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* in its original form.[1104] Their position may need revision. There are clear indications that Patañjali believed he knew the text of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* in the form in which Pāṇini had taught it to his pupils.

Consider first a passage in the *Mahābhāṣya* that shows that Patañjali knew sūtra 1.4.1 in two different forms.[1105] It is tempting to interpret this as proof that the textual tradition through which Patañjali knew the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* was insecure. Patañjali himself interprets it quite differently. Having pointed out that this one sūtra has the two forms *ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā* and *prāk kaḍārāt paraṃ kāryam*, he concludes that the Master has taught it in these two forms to his pupils.[1106] Far from worrying about the correct form of the sūtra, as a modern philologist might, Patañjali is convinced he has access to the text that Pāṇini himself had taught to his pupils, which includes two forms for P. 1.4.1.

The same is true for the passage that raises the question which is the correct pronunciation of the vowel *a* in the first *Śivasūtra*. What is at stake is the interpretation of the following *vārttika* (Mahā-bh I p. 15 l. 2):

akārasya vivṛtopadeśa ākāragrahaṇārthaḥ (vt. 1)
Teaching of *a* as open in order to grasp *ā*.

Patañjali raises the following question (Mahā-bh I p. 15 l. 9-12):

[1103] *Greater Magadha* § III.2 (*The Ṛgveda at the time of Pāṇini*) and Appendix IV, pp. 204 f. & 335 ff.
[1104] E.g., Kielhorn 1896; Thieme 1935: 120 f.; Renou 1940: 12 n. 3; Scharfe 1977: 89 f.
[1105] The *Mahābhāṣya* also contains indications to show that Patañjali knew P. 6.1.115 in two different forms: **nāntaḥpādam avyapare** and **prakṛtyāntaḥpādam avyapare**; see Kielhorn 1887: 182 [230].
[1106] Mahā-bh I p. 296 l. 11-13: *kathaṃ tv etat sūtraṃ paṭhitavyam/ kim ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñeti/ āhosvit prāk kaḍārāt paraṃ kāryam iti/ kutaḥ punar ayaṃ saṃdehaḥ/ ubhayathā hy ācāryeṇa śiṣyāḥ sūtraṃ pratipāditāḥ/ kecid ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñeti/ kecit prāk kaḍārāt paraṃ kāryam iti/.* Cp. Scharfe 1977: 90.

> *kiṃ punar idaṃ vivṛtasyopadiśyamānasya prayojanam anvākhyāyata āhosvit saṃvṛtasyopadiśyamānasya vivṛtopadeśaś codyate/ vivṛtasyopadiśyamānasya prayojanam anvākhyāyate/ kathaṃ jñāyate/ yad ayam a a* (P. 8.4.68*) ity akārasya vivṛtasya saṃvṛtatāpratyāpattiṃ śāsti/*
> -Is here the purpose explained of [the vowel *a*] that is being taught as open; or is here rather the teaching as open proposed for [the vowel *a*] that is being taught as closed?
> -The purpose of [the vowel *a*] that is being taught as open is here explained.
> -How do you know?
> -Because [the Master] teaches the reinstoration of closedness for the open vowel *a* in [sūtra 8.4.68:] *a a*.[1107]

It seems clear that Patañjali did not know the correct form of the vowel *a* in the first *Śivasūtra* and uses an inference to find out. But this does not necessarily mean that there had been a break in the tradition. The open vowel *a* is not one of the vowels of Sanskrit, and Patañjali says so himself: *naiva loke na ca vede 'kāro vivṛto 'sti* (Mahā-bh I p. 15 l. 14). It follows that no Indian script has a character for this sound, and oral tradition would inevitably pronounce is as closed. With or without interrupted tradition (and with or without written tradition), Patañjali would be confronted with the same problem, viz., the difficulty of deciding whether the vowel *a* in the first *Śivasūtra* must be considered open or closed.

The passage that is most often cited to prove that there had been a break in the tradition before Patañjali occurs under P. 1.3.11 (*svaritenādhikāraḥ*). It is supposed to show that Patañjali no longer knew which words in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* had the *svarita* accent. Franz Kielhorn (1896) has given this passage its henceforth classical interpretation. He correctly sums up part of the passage, as follows (pp. 29-30 [290-291]):[1108]

> Die Paribhāṣā *svaritenādhikāraḥ* lehrt, das Pāṇini gewisse Worte, Suffixe u. s. w. seiner Regeln mit einem Svarita versieht um zu zeigen, dass jene Worte u. s. w. auch in der Folge zu ergänzen sind. Sein Verfahren entspringt dem Wunsche, sich die wiederholte Setzung ein und desselben Wortes in jeder der Regeln, in der das Wort gelten soll, zu ersparen.
>
> Hiergegen liesse sich sagen, dass sich das, was durch den Gebrauch des Svarita und die Paribhāṣā, die seinen Zweck erklärt, angeblich erreicht werden soll, schon aus der Praxis des gewöhnlichen Lebens ergiebt. Wenn man mir sagt

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[1107] On the unjustified assumption that P. 8.4.68 was not part of the original *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, see Deshpande 1975.

[1108] Mahā-bh I p. 271 l. 18 - p. 272 l. 10 : **svaritenādhikāraḥ** (P. 1.3.11)*// kimartham idam ucyate/* ***adhikāraḥ pratiyogaṃ tasyānirdeśārthaḥ*** (vt. 1)*// adhikāraḥ kriyate pratiyogaṃ tasyānirdeśārthaḥ/ .../* ***na vā nirdiśyamānādhikṛtatvād yathā loke*** (vt. 2)*// na vaitat prayojanam asti/ kiṃ kāraṇam/ nirdiśyamānādhikṛtatvād yathā loke/ nirdiśyamānam adhikṛtaṃ gamyate/ tad yathā/ devadattāya gaur dīyatāṃ yajñadattāya viṣṇumitrāyeti/ gaur iti gamyate/ evam ihāpi* **padarujaviṣaspṛśo ghañ** (P. 3.3.16) **sṛ sthire** (P. 3.3.17) **bhāve** (P. 3.3.18) *ghañ iti gamyate//* ***anyanirdeśas tu nivartakas tasmāt paribhāṣā*** (vt. 3)*// anyanirdeśas tu loke nivartako bhavati/ tad yathā/ devadattāya gaur dīyatāṃ yajñadattāya kambalo viṣṇumitrāya ceti/ kambalo gor nivartako bhavati/ evam ihāpy* **abhividhau bhāva inuṇ** (P. 3.3.44) *ghaño nivartakaḥ syāt/ tasmāt paribhāṣā/ tasmāt paribhāṣā kartavyā//*

> ‘gieb dem Devadatta eine Kuh, dem Yajñadatta, dem Viṣṇumitra’, so weiss ich, das ich auch dem Yajñadatta eine Kuh geben soll, und ebenso dem Viṣṇumitra. Gerade so, könnte man sagen, ist es in der Grammatik. Wenn Pāṇini in iii, 3, 16 die Anfügung des Suffixes *ghañ* an *pad* u. a. lehrt, und dann in iii, 3, 17 fortfährt ‘an *sṛ*’, so versteht es sich von selbst, dass ich *ghañ* auch an *sṛ* füge ; *ghañ* gilt aus iii, 3, 16 in iii, 3, 17 fort, auch ohne dass es mit dem Svarita versehen wird und ohne die Paribhāṣā *svaritenādhikāraḥ*.
>
> Allein ein solcher Einwand wäre nicht stichhaltig. Wenn Jemand sagt ‘gieb dem Devadatta eine Kuh, ein Gewand dem Yajñadatta, und dem Viṣṇumitra’, so meint er doch, das Viṣṇumitra ein Gewand und keine Kuh erhalten soll. Wollten wir nun in der Grammatik wie im gewöhnlichen Leben verfahren, so würden wir, wenn Pāṇini z. B., nachdem er in iii, 3, 16 ff. die Anfügung des Suffixes *ghañ* gelehrt hat, in iii, 3, 44 die Anfügung des Suffixes *inuṇ* vorschreibt, und dann in iii, 3, 45 kein Suffix ausdrücklich nennt, für die Regel 45 *inuṇ* aus 44, und nicht *ghañ* aus 16 ergänzen. Das wäre aber nicht was Pāṇini will ; und um einer solchen falschen Erklärung vorzubeugen hat er hier das Suffix *ghañ* mit dem Svarita versehen, und hat uns die Paribhāṣā *svaritenādhikāraḥ* gegeben, nach der das so mit dem Svarita versehene *ghañ* trotz des dazwischen tretenden Suffixes *inuṇ* aus iii, 3, 16 in iii, 3, 45 fortgilt. Die Praxis der Grammatik ist eben eine andere als die des gewöhnlichen Lebens.

So far, Kielhorn account is correct. He clearly shows that up to this point nothing suggests that Patañjali did not know which words in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* have the *svarita* accent. Quite the contrary, the passage creates the impression that Patañjali knew that the suffix *ghañ* in P. 3.3.16 had this accent. Kielhorn then raises some critical questions (p. 30 [291]):[1109]

> Nachdem so die Notwendigkeit des Svarita und der Paribhāṣā gezeigt ist, wird darauf hingewiesen, dass wir darüber, wie weit ein [A]dhikāra gelte, durch den vorliegenden Text der Grammatik des Pāṇini nicht belehrt werden. Nun könnte man vielleicht behaupten, Pāṇini habe sich des Svarita bedient und die Paribhāṣā *svaritenādhikāraḥ* gegeben, gerade um zu lehren, wie weit ein Adhikāra gelte. *Svaritenādhikāraḥ* sei nämlich nicht in die **zwei** Worte *svaritena adhikāraḥ*, sondern in die **drei** Worte *svarite na adhikāraḥ* zu zerlegen, und bedeute demnach, ein Adhikāra **höre auf zu gelten** wo sich ein Svarita zeige.[1110] Hiernach würde z. B. ein in der Regel v, 1, 32 gesetzter Svarita andeuten, dass die Worte *dvitripūrvāt* der Regel v, 1, 30 in v, 1, 32 nicht mehr gelten. Eine solche Erklärung

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[1109] Mahā-bh I p. 272 l. 11-20 : ***adhikāraparimāṇājñānaṃ tu*** (vt. 4)// *adhikāraparimāṇājñānaṃ tu bhavati/ na jñāyate kiyantam avadhim adhikāro 'nuvartata iti/* ***adhikāraparimāṇajñānārthaṃ tu*** *adhikāraparimāṇajñānārtham eva tarhy ayaṃ yogo vaktavyaḥ/ adhikāraparimāṇaṃ jñāsyāmīti/ kathaṃ punaḥ svaritenādhikāra ity anenādhikāraparimāṇaṃ śakyaṃ vijñātum/ evaṃ vakṣyāmi/ svarite nādhikāra iti/ svaritaṃ dṛṣṭvādhikāro na bhavatīti/ kenedānīm adhikāro bhaviṣyati/ laukiko 'dhikāraḥ/* ***nādhikāra iti ced uktam*** (vt. 5)*// kim uktam/ anyanirdeśas tu nivartakas tasmāt paribhāṣeti//*

[1110] Kielhorn adds the following note: “Ich bemerke ausdrücklich, dass der Sinn nicht ist, ein durch den Svarita bezeichneter Adhikāra höre auf zu gelten, wo sich **ein anderer** Svarita zeige. Gemäss der hier vorgeschlagenen Erklärung wird der Adhikāra überhaupt nicht durch einen Svarita bezeichnet.”

> der Paribhāṣā wäre aber nicht zulässig, denn, wie wir gesehen haben, ist die Paribhāṣā in dem ihr oben beigelegten Sinne, bei dem sie aus den zwei Worten *svaritena adhikāraḥ* besteht und nach dem der Svarita **das Fortgelten** eines Wortes anzeigt, unentbehrlich. Sie kann deshalb nicht in drei Worten zerlegt werden, um etwas ganz anderes zu lehren.

This time Kielhorn moves away from the *Mahābhāṣya* by adding an example that does not occur in that text (he takes it from Kaiyaṭa's commentary). This addition is not innocent. Patañjali's text has no example, and immediately discards the new position. The added example creates the impression that Patañjali and Kātyāyana give the *svarita* accent to just any words of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* according to their liking. In the chosen example they presumably add it in P. 5.1.32 in order to prevent that the words *dvitripūrvāt* from a preceding sūtra be continued. But the *Mahābhāṣya* itself does not suggest anything of the kind. It rather suggests that the known *svarita* accents that occur in the text that Pāṇini had taught to his pupils could play the role of indicating the end of an *adhikāra*; this possibility is rejected without discussion. Nothing in the *Mahābhāṣya* passage obliges us to believe that Patañjali did not know the words or sentences that had been given the *svarita* accent by Pāṇini.

The *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 1.3.11 then discusses other means to indicate the end of an *adhikāra*. This discussion has nothing to do with the *svarita* accent. Kātyāyana makes two proposals, which Patañjali rejects. Patañjali himself then rejects his own initial interpretation of the sūtra, stating that the traditional interpretation of grammar renders this function of P. 1.3.11 superfluous.[1111] Nothing in this passage suggests that he did not know which words have the *svarita* accent. But Patañjali goes further. At the end of the discussion of this sūtras he proposes that it has three functions. These three functions he evidently invents himself, even without the support of a *vārttika*. All three are rather recherché, and no modern researcher would be tempted to believe that they correspond to Pāṇini's original interpretation of the sūtra. Patañjali proposes at this point to improve Pāṇini's grammar. The suggested improvements include the proposal to give a *svarita* accent to certain words that clearly did not yet have it. Here Patañjali uses the verbal forms *svarayiṣyate* and *svarayiṣyete* "will be pronounced with the *svarita* accent", which he had not used before.[1112] One example must here suffice. Patañjali proposes to add the *svarita* accent to the word *strī* in the sūtra *gostriyor upasarjanasya* (P. 1.2.48) to indicate that this word *strī* signifies the *adhikāra striyām* (P. 4.1.3). The word *strī* in P. 1.2.48 refers in this way to stems with feminin suffixes, and not to just any feminin word.[1113]

We can draw three conclusions from what precedes:

(i) The *Mahābhāṣya* under P. 1.3.11 does not provide us with proof that Patañjali did not know Pāṇini's original *svarita* accents.

[1111] Cp. Mahā-bh I p. 273 l. 3-5: *saṃdehamātram etad bhavati sarvasaṃdeheṣu cedam upatiṣṭhate vyākhyānato viśeṣapratipattir na hi saṃdehād alakṣaṇam itīnuṇghañ iti saṃdehe ghañ iti vyākhyāsyāmaḥ.*

[1112] This use of the future passive corresponds to the way in which Patañjali proposes adding elements to an already existing gaṇa: *...ādiṣu pāṭhaḥ kariṣyate* (Ojihara 1970: 81). In both cases additions are concerned to elements that are already present.

[1113] Mahā-bh I p. 273 l. 8-10: **gostriyor upasarjanasya** (P. 1.2.48) *ity atra goṭāṅgrahaṇaṃ coditaṃ tan na kartavyaṃ bhavati/ strīgrahaṇaṃ svarayiṣyate/ svaritenādhikāragatir bhavatīti* **striyām** (P. 4.1.3) *ity evaṃ prakṛtya ye pratyayā vihitās teṣāṃ grahaṇaṃ vijñāsyate/*

(ii) It shows that Kātyāyana, far from wishing to keep the original forms of the sūtras, proposes modifications.
(iii) Patañjali rejects Kātyāyana's modifications, but proposes others, such as the addition of the *svarita* accent to words that apparently did not yet have them.

Patañjali's concern was clearly not so much to reestablish Pāṇini's original text (which he had no reason to think he did not possess), but rather to interpret it in the best possible way, proposing improvements in cases where this might give a purpose to a sūtra that otherwise might seem superfluous. At the same time one has the impression that Patañjali did not wish to deviate too much from Pāṇini's text. As we have seen, he rejects some of Kātyāyana's proposals, which he no doubt considered going too far. Nor is he ready to suppress P. 1.3.11, this in spite of the fact that he considers it superfluous in its normal interpretation. He prefers to find new and artificial interpretations, whose main virtue is that they leave the text of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* almost intact.[1114] One has to say 'almost', for these new interpretations oblige him to add the *svarita* accent at places different from where this accent occurred in Pāṇini's traditional text.

It is well known that Patañjali was hesitant to deviate too much from the inherited text of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, as is his desire to 'save' the text by adding 'improvements'. There are, for example, two passages in the *Mahābhāṣya* where he rejects proposals made in a *vārttika* (or similar rule[1115]) with the words: *sidhyaty evam apāṇinīyaṃ tu bhavati* "That works, but it is not Pāṇinian".[1116] In these two passage Patañjali is not ready to follow Kātyāyana's (or someone else's) proposal to introduce relatively important changes into Pāṇini's grammar. Here Patañjali clearly prefers to remain 'Pāṇinian' in his proposals and interpretations. But elsewhere he goes further than Kātyāyana. Kielhorn (1876: 51) points out that where Kātyāyana formulates objections against the words *dīdhīvevī* in sūtra 1.1.6, Patañjali shows that the whole sūtra is superfluous (Mahā-bh I p. 55 l. 21: *ayaṃ yogaḥ śakyo 'kartum*); that where Kātyāyana defends P. 1.1.36 against an objection, Patañjali modifies it; etc.

It is surprising that this same Kielhorn who shows Patañjali's willingness to deviate from Pāṇini, claims that Patañjali would have felt bound by the *svarita* accents in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* if he had known them. This is why he concludes that *svarita* accents were no longer part of the text at the time of Patañjali. But we know, and we owe this to Kielhorn among others, that Patañjali regularly proposes modifications to Pāṇini's text.

These modifications do not only concern the sūtras. Yutaka Ojihara's research has shown that the *Mahābhāṣya* also proposes improvement elsewhere. According to his calculation, Patañjali proposes 22 modifications in the *Gaṇapāṭha*.[1117]

We are entitled to conclude that Patañjali, though confident that he possessed the text of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and its annexes as they had been taught by Pāṇini himself, felt free to propose modifications where he thought this would be useful.[1118]

[1114] Cp. Deshpande 1998: 19: "Often Patañjali agrees with the substance of Kātyāyana's objections to Pāṇini's wording of a rule, but rejects the need to reword the rule. The clear message is that a reinterpretation is a better choice as compared to a rewording of the rule."
[1115] Kielhorn (1886a: 228 [214]; cp. Joshi & Roodbergen 1986: 204 n. 855) observes that the line *liṅgārthā tu pratyāpattiḥ* (Mahā-bh I p. 14 l. 4) is a quarter strophe; he seems to conclude from this that it is not a *vārttika*.
[1116] Mahā-bh I p. 14 l. 7-8; p. 39 l. 8-9.
[1117] "[C'est] vingt-deux fois au total (dont cinq fois en s'alignant sur Kātyāyana et une fois en commentant un vārttika versifié) que Patañjali propose d'inclure (ou, rarement, de supprimer) tel mot dans la liste de tel groupe" (Ojihara 1968: 565; 1970: 81).

Appendix VIII: Why did Buddhism and Jainism develop differently in India?

Buddhism and Jainism arose in the same region of India, roughly during the same period. Both offered solutions to the same problem: how does one put an end to a potentially endless number of rebirths.[1119] Both of them put the remains of their founders in stūpas, or so it seems.[1120] Both preserved similar stories.[1121] Both exerted a profound influence on one another during the early period. Buddhism incorporated what we may safely consider jaina practices in its own arsenal of practices at an early stage, even before its Sūtras had attained their classical form.[1122] Influence the other way round, from Buddhism onto Jainism, becomes visible at a time when Buddhism had elaborated its Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma: a number of its features can be recognized in Śvetāmbara canonical texts.[1123]

With so many features in common, how do we explain that the developments of Buddhism and Jainism on the Indian subcontinent are so radically different? Indeed, one of the striking differences is that Jainism only developed on the Indian subcontinent, whereas Buddhism developed both there and elsewhere. But this difference does not appear to explain everything. Already on the Indian subcontinent Buddhism developed in a manner quite different from Jainism. I therefore propose to consider some developments of Buddhism and Jainism that took place on the subcontinent, and what is more: in geographical regions that the two religions shared.

This confronts us with an important question. Apart from both being present on the Indian subcontinent, to what extent did Buddhism and Jainism share the same regions? They both began in the same region, to be sure: the region I like to call Greater Magadha. Probably they continued sharing certain regions of the subcontinent, but we know that quite early in their history there were also regions that they did not share. Inscriptions reveal that there was a strong jaina presence in Tamil Nadu before the beginning of the Common Era, and well before any Buddhists settled there.[1124] And the buddhist presence in Gandhāra and surroundings also dates from the centuries preceding the Common Era, perhaps already from the time of Aśoka,[1125] while there were no Jaina

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[1118] He is not restrained by the fact that Pāṇini's sūtras are 'like vedic texts' (*chandovat sūtrāṇi bhavanti*; Mahā-bh I p. 37 l. 4; p. 313 l. 5), this because that comparison is only used to justify certain phonetic features. It is true that Deshpande (1998: 26-27) invokes the quasi-vedic character of Pāṇini's sūtras, which are part of the texts recited by *daśagranthī* Brahmins until today, to explain their preservation; this applies even to sūtras that are rejected by the commentators. However, this mechanism has not been able to maintain the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* in its original state during the centuries that separate Patañjali from the Kāśikā.

[1119] This appendix will not enumerate the numerous differences between Buddhism and Jainism, throughout history. It is however interesting, as pointed out by Naomi Appleton (2011; 2014: 90 ff.), to recall that Jainism, unlike Buddhism, did not, and could not, develop a Jātaka literature, nor, as a result, anything like jaina Mahāyāna.

[1120] See below.

[1121] See Wu 2014.

[1122] Bronkhorst 1993d; 2009: 44 ff.

[1123] See below.

[1124] Mahadevan 2003.

[1125] See Dietz 2007 and Seldeslachts 2007.

monks there.[1126] This does not, of course, exclude the possibility that there were Jaina merchants in Gandhāra and beyond.[1127]

[Interestingly,[1128] Marshall (1951: I: 145) makes the following observation: "We know from many passages in literature that Taxila was an important centre of Jainism, with numerous monuments of that faith in and around the city, and it can hardly be doubted that some, at any rate, of the stūpas unearthed in Sirkap and the neighbourhood belonged to the Jains, though which particular ones is necessarily conjectural, since no inscriptions or anything else of a definitely Jain character have been found in any of them." As tentative examples he mentions two small stūpas at Jaṇḍiāl that are "either Buddhist or Jaina" (1918: 8; 1951: I: 6), and "a stūpa of the Jains (?) at Sirkap" (1951: I: 140. Marshall becomes more confident in his second volume, where he states (1951: II: 463: "As there are grounds for believing that these two stūpas (i.e., the Bhiṛ and Sirkap Mounds, JB) were Jaina rather than Buddhist structures, and as none of the tanks has been found at any of the innumerable Buddhist stūpas at Taxila, it is not unreasonable to surmise that they were particularly connected with Jaina ritual." Marshall does not specify which these grounds are, and has a hard time (postulating religious contamination, and influence from Mohenjo-daro) to justify the link of tanks with jaina ritual. He does not specify the evidence that makes him think that Taxila was an important centre of Jainism. The *Āgamic Index of Prakrit Proper Names* (PPN I p. 331 s.v. Takkhasilā) says the following about this city: "Capital of the country of Bahalī where Bāhubali reigned. It was visited by Usabha. Bāhubali installed a jewelled dharmacakra on the foot-prints left by Usabha at that place". It gives references to the *Āvaśyaka-cūrṇi*, the *Āvaśyaka-nirukti*, the *Āvaśyaka-vṛtti* by Haribhadra, the *Āvaśyaka-vṛtti* by Malayagiri, the *Kalpasūtra-vṛtti* by Śāntisāgara, the *Kalpasūtra-vṛtti* by Dharmasāgara, the *Kalpasūtra-vṛtti* by Vinayavijaya, and to the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*. The frequent mention of Takṣaśilā in what are presumably stories does not by itself turn it into 'an important centre of Jainism'. The frequent mention of this city in Pāli literature provides a significant parallel: "It is frequently mentioned as a centre of education, especially in the Jātakas. It is *significant that it is never mentioned in the suttas*, though, according to numerous Jātaka stories, it was a great centre of learning from pre-Buddhist times." (DPPN I p. 982 s.v. Takkasilā, emphasis added).]

I do not know — and perhaps it is not at present possible to know — whether and to what extent the early Jainas of Tamil Nadu were involved in activities that left marks on their religion. We are luckier with regard to the Buddhists of Greater Gandhāra. These Buddhists rethought and reworked their heritage and created in so doing something new

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[1126] Gandhāra is beyond the lands where a Jaina monk is allowed to travel, even after the extension created by King Samprati; see Jain 1984: 23-24 (with note 2), 337 ff.; further PPN II s.v. Saṃpai (Samprati), with references. *Kalpasūtra* 1.50 reads: "monks and nuns may wander eastward as far as Anga-Magadha, southward as far as Kosambī, westward as far as Thūṇā and northward as far as Kuṇālā. They may wander thus far, (for) thus far there are Āryan countries, but not beyond unless the Dhamma flourishes there" (tr. Bollée 1998: xxiv). According to PPN I s.v. Thūṇā (Sthūṇā), this place is identified with Thaneshwar. On the absence of Brahmins in Gandhāra during this period, see § I.1.3, above.

[1127] Gail (1994) points out that there is a possible depiction of an Ardhapālaka Jaina monk on a relief from Gandhāra. According to Pal (2007), "the material evidence from Afghanistan and the evidence from a Jain literary source ... do at least demonstrate that Jain merchants from India did venture forth beyond the Khyber Pass" (p. 32).

[1128] I thank Peter Flügel for helping me in writing this paragraph.

altogether: a systematized philosophical ontology that came to be known as Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, even though we cannot be sure that the Sarvāstivādins invented it. But whoever invented it, once it was there, it was going to have a determining influence on the future development of Buddhism all over India.[1129]

Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma influenced certain Śvetāmbara canonical texts.[1130] Already the *Sūyagaḍa*, or *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, is aware of the developments that had taken place (or were taking place) in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, some of which are silently taken over, usually with appropriate modifications, in more recent texts of the canon. This suggests that the jaina composers of these texts were already acquainted with these developments in Buddhism at a relatively early date. It further suggests that there was at that time a rather intensive interaction between Buddhists and Jainas. Since there were apparently no Jainas in Greater Gandhāra, one would like to know where in India — preferably not too far from Gandhāra — Buddhists and Jainas rubbed shoulders during, say, the early centuries of the Common Era. The answer that presents itself is: Mathurā under the Kuṣāṇas.[1131] We know that there was a strong presence of Jainas in Mathurā at that time,[1132] but also of Buddhists. Moreover, Mathurā and Gandhāra were two centres — perhaps the two main centres — of Kuṣāṇa power in India, so that it seems plausible that buddhist ideas from Gandhāra also came to be discussed in Mathurā. Mathurā, it appears, was not only a place that brought Buddhists and Jainas together (again), but also a place where some crucial events took place that sent Buddhism and Jainism henceforth into different directions (figuratively speaking).

Consider first a new shared feature that Buddhism and Jainism appear to have developed in or around Mathurā. Both preserve the legend of a rival to their respective founders. In Buddhism he is called Devadatta, in Jainism Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta. The story of Devadatta has been preserved in various sources, mainly Vinaya texts;[1133] Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta is primarily dealt with in the jaina *Viyāhapannatti* chapter 15.[1134] In the case of Devadatta, the source material allows us to make a more or less plausible reconstruction of the development of the legend. In the case of Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta we have little beyond the final version as we find it in the *Viyāhapannatti*.[1135]

In spite of the differences, the two legends have a surprising number of features in common. Both Devadatta and Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta begin their career as pupils of their respective teachers: Devadatta is accepted as a monk by the Buddha, Gosāla is accepted, be it only after repeated attempts, by Mahāvīra as his disciple. Both Devadatta and Gosāla subsequently distinguish themselves by their magical powers. Both make a bid for the supreme position in their respective communities. Both try to harm their respective teachers in various ways, and seem to come close to succeeding, but are ultimately

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[1129] See § III.2.1 and § III.3, above.
[1130] Bronkhorst 2000.
[1131] On the importance of Mathurā as a centre of Brahmanism, Buddhism and Jainism, see the chapter "Why Mathurā?" by Srinivasan (1997: 305-324).
[1132] Ohira (1982: 43-44) suggests, on the basis of the similarity between lists of teachers in inscriptions from Mathurā and in the *Kalpasūtra* and of the fact that many names in the *Kalpasūtra* are derived from place names from all over North India, "that the Jainas at Mathurā had come from all these places, attesting that Mathurā likely became the centre of the Jainas by the 2nd century A.D. in the North".
[1133] For Devadatta as presented in the *Ekottarika Āgama*, see Legittimo 2012: 357-360.
[1134] Cf. Deleu 1970: 214 ff.
[1135] Jinadāsa's *cūrṇī* to the *Āvaśyaka Sūtra* adds further material; see Basham 1951: 41 ff.

incapable of inflicting more than superficial harm onto them. Both come to a grievous end as a result. To the preceding we must add a final and very important feature: Both leave communities of followers whose existence, centuries after the presumed events and even after the composition of the texts that relate the legends, seems confirmed by independent testimony.[1136]

Neither of the two legends in the form here presented is particularly old. Both were created at some point in time, and it is not difficult to see why. Both criticize a religious group that was presumably too close for comfort. The followers of Devadatta were essentially Buddhists who criticized the comfortable forms of monastic life that had developed. The followers of Gosāla were the Ājīvikas, about whom we know a certain amount from buddhist and jaina sources; the Ājīvikas held views that were close to those of the Jainas, yet different in some essential points.[1137]

As stated above, the development of the story of Devadatta can be retraced.[1138] This has been done most convincingly by André Bareau (1989; 1991; 1997), whose reconstruction shows that the most striking points of similarity between Devadatta and Gosāla occur in the most recent part of the story of Devadatta, found in the Vinaya texts of various schools. It is not necessary to repeat Bareau's analysis of the pertinent Vinaya passages. It allows him to propose three developmental phases in the legend of Devadatta:

1) The earliest phase merely presents the first schism and does not even mention Devadatta.
2) In the second phase this schism becomes associated with the name of Devadatta, who is however not yet depicted as a fundamentally evil person.
3) This changes in the third phase, where Devadatta carries out all the evil deeds mentioned above. It is in this third phase that the parallels we noticed with the story of Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta become part of his legend.

It is probably impossible to determine with certainty when the third phase of the legend was added. The similarities between the different versions of the legend in the

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[1136] See Deeg 2005: 316 ff. Faxian apparently met followers of Devadatta during the early years of the fifth century: "There are also companies of the followers of Devadatta still existing. They regularly make offerings to the three previous Buddhas, but not to Śākyamuni Buddha." (Legge 1886: 62; cp. Deeg 2005: 540). For Yijing's remarks on the followers of Devadatta, see Deeg 1999: 188 ff. Xuanzang, writing almost two and a half centuries after Faxian, still states, with regard to a region in Bengal: "There were also three Buddhist monasteries in which in accordance with the teaching of Devadatta milk products were not taken as food." (Watters 1905: II: 191; cp. Beal 1884: II: 201; Li 1996: 303). Watters comments (p. 192): "With reference to the Brethren who abstained from the use of milk, curds, and as articles of food our pilgrim's statement that they did so as followers of Devadatta may have been the suggestion of a Mahāyānist Brother. All Mahāyānists were supposed to abstain from milk food, and I-ching states expressly that it is unlawful food." (reference to Takakusu 1896: 43: "We may regard milk, cream, &c., as besides the two groups of the five mentioned above; for they have no special name given in the Vinaya, and it is clear that they are not included in the proper food.") Does this mean that there were perhaps no followers in the strict sense of Devadatta left at the time of Xuanzang?

[1137] Bronkhorst 2003a; 2013a. Balcerowicz (forthcoming, chapters 5 and 6) discusses Ājīvika scriptures (Abhayadeva-sūri calls them *śāstra*). Also a passage in the *Vajrasūcī* attributed to Aśvaghoṣa (ed. Mukhopadhyaya, p. 4 l. 2-4; cited in Eltschinger forthcoming: *dṛśyante ca kvacic chūdrā api vedavyākaraṇamīmāṃsāsāṅkhyavaiśeṣikanagnājīvikādisarvaśāstrārthavidaḥ*) confirms that the Ājīvikas had Śāstras.

[1138] On the story of Devadatta, see Mukherjee 1966; Bareau 1989; R. A. Ray 1994: 162-178.

texts of different buddhist schools allow us to conclude that the legend spread quickly over the subcontinent and perhaps beyond, and reached all the schools whose Vinaya texts have survived.[1139] The popularity of the tale in its expanded version, and the virulence with which it attacks Devadatta, may yet give an indication as to the period in which it came about.

Devadatta is stated to have upheld a number of points, all of them aiming at imposing a severe ascetic lifestyle on the monastics, and all of them favouring life in the forest. His criticism of settled monastic life was threatening, especially at the time when settled monasticism had become a feature of Buddhism. This did not happen at the time of the Buddha, and apparently not until well after Emperor Aśoka. It happened during "the Middle Period of Indian Buddhism, the period between the beginning of the Common Era and the year 500 C.E. … [T]his was the period during which the various named monastic orders — the Sarvāstivādins, Mahāsāṃghikas, Dharmaguptakas, and so on — appeared in Indian inscriptions as the recipients of what must have been an enormous amount of surplus wealth."[1140] We know that, once settled monasticism was in place, settled monks tended to be very critical of forest ascetics.[1141] We may assume that the name Devadatta came to stand for all that the monks (and nuns) in their monasteries detested: living in the forest, severe asceticism, etc. This does not mean that the schism associated with Devadatta's name must have taken place during this Middle Period. It merely means that the third phase of the legend was probably added during this period. An additional reason may well be that, as Deeg (2005: 316 ff.) argues, the sect of Devadatta may have been created late, perhaps as late as the Guptas. Elsewhere Deeg (1999: 194 [219]) suggests "that such a group had developed in the time of the Kuṣāṇa-empire".

The preceding reflections can be amplified with Deeg's (1999: 194-195 [219-218]) thoughts about the matter: "A really existing saṅgha of Devadatta, institutionalizing itself with the help of the old Devadatta-legend in the Vinaya, would then have had an impact on … the [more recent] Devadatta-legend …"

It is this third phase of the legend that resembles the story of Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta. Is it possible that the two legends somehow influenced each other? that one of the two was created under the influence of the other? or that both somehow arose more or less simultaneously, each being so to say an adjusted version of basically the same underlying story?

In order to answer these questions, we have to look more closely at Jainism during the 'Middle Period' introduced above. During this period Buddhism underwent major changes, receiving the quantity of surplus wealth that resulted in a form of monasticism very different from forest life and severe asceticism. The centres of political power were

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[1139] Cf. Schopen 2012: 596 [120]: "[Those] who might think — like the still pertinent Vasilyev — that all the Vinayas as we have them are late, might want to suggest that such shared material could have resulted from a long process of leveling and cross-contamination carried forward by the continual itinerancy of a good part of the South Asian Buddhist monastic population."

[1140] Schopen 2004: 94-95.

[1141] See, e.g., Schopen 2004: 26 f.; 2005: 15 f.; 82 f. Interestingly, presumably during the same period and in the same region, the 'Prophecy of Kauśāmbī' emerges, according to which the end of the Dharma is brought about by "the munificence of a well intentioned Buddhist king"; Nattier 1991: 227. Eltschinger (2012: 65) proposes the following explanation: "the 'Prophecy of Kauśāmbī' perhaps mirrors the worries aroused in a disciplinary conservative fraction of northwestern Buddhist communities by the saṅgha's laxity under Kushana rule."

one of the sources of this surplus wealth. Buddhism in northern India succeeded at that time in establishing very profitable links with those centres. From its side, Buddhism made various adjustments, too, some of which have been studied in *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism*. One of these adjustments may here be mentioned: Buddhism 'brahmanized' itself to a considerable extent, up to the point of adopting Sanskrit as its language. This happened during the very first centuries of the Common Era, presumably under the rule of the Kuṣāṇas. Jainism, on the other hand, did not undergo these same changes.[1142] It did not turn to Sanskrit at that time, did not receive state patronage, did not obtain land grants, and its monks basically remained wanderers.[1143] It is therefore not immediately clear why the Jainas of that period needed to attack the founder of Ajivikism through the intermediary of such a legend. We are not even sure that there were Ājīvikas in the Kuṣāṇa Empire.[1144] As noted above, there was a relatively strong interaction, and presumably competition, between Buddhists and Jainas under the Kuṣāṇas, especially in and around the city of Mathurā.[1145] It is tempting to consider that the local Jainas, influenced by the newly expanded buddhist story of Devadatta, used vague memories of the founder of Ajivikism — the ancient buddhist texts call him Makkhali Gosāla — and a more or less superficial acquaintance with existing Ājīvikas, to invent an arch-enemy for Mahāvīra as well. This is and can be no more than a guess, but a guess that may make the presence of two parallel, but relatively late, stories in buddhist and jaina literature intelligible.[1146]

[1142] The non-adoption of Sanskrit by the Jainas of that period is all the more remarkable in that Indian inscription dating from the second to the fourth century CE and found on the island of Socotra, hundreds of miles west of India and near the Arab peninsula, written by sailors and merchants from Western India, were mainly in Sanskrit (Strauch 2012: 261 f., 341 f.) This suggests that Sanskrit was adopted rather widely at that time, and that Jainism consciously resisted this transformation. Note in this connection the expression *catuvarṇa saṃgha* in a jaina inscription from Mathurā (Lüders 1910: 12 no. 57), apparently to refer to "the community of the four orders, consisting of the monks, the nuns, and the lay-followers, male and female" (Sharma 2001: 153). No need to point out that the four *varṇa*s are, primarily, the four brahmanical caste-classes. According to Das (1980: 111), this is "an inscription of the Kuṣāṇa period dated in the year 62 of the Kaṇiṣka or Śaka era". It would seem that Jainism here gives a jaina interpretation to a brahmanical concept.

[1143] *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism* p. 138 f. See also below. The Jainas were yet popular; as Ohira (1994a: 481 n. 33) points out: "Out of 159 Mathura inscriptions of this period [i.e. the Kuṣāṇa period, during the reigns of King Kaniṣka and King Vāsudeva] listed in Lüder's *List of Brahmī Inscriptions*, 87 belong to the Jainas, 55 to the Buddhists and 17 to the non-sectarians …" The much more recent jaina caves at Ellora "seem to have been sustained and expanded primarily through the efforts of those who worshipped there" (Owen 2012: 163).

[1144] See however Bronkhorst 2013a. Basham (1951: 165), on the basis of a "puzzling reference in the *Vāyu Purāṇa*", thinks "that there survived in North India in Gupta times an Ājīvika community, which had by now become corrupt and was probably rapidly declining". Qvarnström (2015: 53) states: "The very existence of the *Niyatidvātriṃśikā* possibly indicates that during the sixth century CE the Ājīvikas were still engaged in polemics with Jainas and Buddhists, and that the philosophical discourse was conducted in the Sanskrit idiom."

[1145] See *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism* p. 130 ff. ("Jainism, Mathurā and Sanskrit").

[1146] Balcerowicz (forthcoming) argues that the story of Gosāla as we find it in the *Viyāhapannatti* "must belong to earlier literary layers of what ultimately became the Jaina canon", but this is not necessarily in conflict with our suggestion that it dates from the time of the Kuṣāṇa Empire.

This short excursus into the stories of Devadatta and Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta made it necessary to draw attention to some differences, beside similarities, between Buddhists and Jainas at the time of the Kuṣāṇas. While buddhist monks and nuns had settled in monasteries, jaina monks remained wanderers. This difference may be connected to another difference that appears to become important in those days. Whereas Buddhism concentrated its cultic life on the veneration of stūpas, Jainism largely abandoned the worship of stūpas at or around that time. It is tempting to think that this development was linked to the increasing importance of monasteries in Buddhism, and their absence in Jainism. Buddhist stūpas were often built in the immediate vicinity of monasteries, and some of the tasks of the monks were associated with those stūpas. The absence of jaina monasteries implied that the stūpas of Jainism could easily become victims of neglect.[1147] Moreover, it left Jainism with two altogether different and unconnected objects of veneration: on one hand its renouncers, i.e. its monks and nuns, and on the other the stūpas containing relics of former saints.[1148]

Let us look more closely into this matter. To begin with, buddhist stūpas and monastic establishments are often found together. To cite Schopen (2005: 350):

> Perhaps the most characteristic element of Buddhist sites in India is the presence of a stūpa, which is — where topography allows — the fixed focal point of the entire complex. There are, in fact, literary sources that declare that the stūpa was to be the first element established and that its position should determine the position of all monastic residential quarters.[1149] A glance at the site plans of almost any moderately well-preserved or studied monastic complex in India will show how frequently this pattern — again, when topography allows — holds.

Second, the Jainas had no monastic establishments under the Kuṣāṇas.[1150] Scholars make much of the word *vihāra* in a jaina inscription in Mathurā,[1151] but probably without

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[1147] And competition. "The Jaina texts do speak of tussles between the Buddhists and the Jainas over the ownership of the stūpa at Mathura." (Sahgal 1994: 229, with a reference to *Vyavahārasūtra Bhāṣya*, 5, 2728). "We learn from the Jaina tradition recorded in Vyavahārasūtra Bhāṣya, Bṛhat-Kathākośa of Hariṣe[ṇ]a, Yaśastilakacampū of Somadeva, and Vividha-Tīrtha-Kalpa of Jinaprabha Sūri that the Buddhists entered into a dispute with the Jainas for the possession of the stūpa at Kaṅkālī Ṭīlā. The controversy regarding the ownership of this stūpa raged for about six months, but the issue was decided in favour of the Jainas by the king." (V. K. Sharma 2001: 140, with a reference to V. S. Agrawala, *Studies in Indian Art*, 1965, p. 167). For further details, see Shah & Bender 1987: 88-89 [210-211]; also Bühler 1898.

[1148] Note however: "South Asia is dotted with numerous funerary cenotaphs for Jaina mendicants. These memorials are often relic *stūpa*s. They generally mark the sites of cremation, rather than death, of renowned historical individuals, often monks or nuns who died a special death through self-starvation, or *sallekhanā*." (Flügel 2013: 24).

[1149] In a footnote Schopen refers to Bareau 1962: 234.

[1150] About this issue, different scholars hold different opinions. In a private discussion, Monika Zin and Patrick Krüger raise the issue how a wandering monk can possess the numerous (25) items that the scriptures allow him (Schubring 2000: §§ 142-146): for so many items one presumably needs a monastery. In my understanding there are here too many interpretational and chronological questions to consider this argument clinching.

[1151] See, e.g., the following: "Unlike the Buddhists, the Jainas still did not acquire any land base. Jaina monks basically remained wanderers. We do get references to Jaina Vihāras at Mathura … but not many evidences come [our] way." (Sahgal 1994: 226). "One of the fragmentary *āyāga-*

justification. *Vihāra* in early Jainism does not mean 'monastery', but rather 'roaming' (Shatavadhani & Ratnachandra 1923: IV: 476-477), 'itinerary' (Tatia & Kumar 1981: 41, 45 ff.; see also Sheth 1928: 811).[1152] What is more, this one occurrence of *vihāra* is found in the following, 'badly defaced' and partly reconstructed, line: … *vihāre koḷiyāto gaṇāto ṭhāṇikiyāto kula(to)* … *śa(khāto)* … (Quintanilla 2000: 123). Quintanilla translates "… in the living quarters of the Koḷiya *gaṇa*, Ṭhāṇikiya *kula*, and the … *śakhā* …". It is yet difficult to accept that this single fragment, containing the word *vihāra* which does not normally mean 'monastery' in Jainism, is a reliable basis for conclusions about the existence of jaina monasteries at that time.[1153] The word *vihāra* is of course common in non-jaina, esp. buddhist, inscriptions from Mathurā, where it *does* appear to refer to monasteries.[1154]

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*paṭṭa*s, presently in the collection of Government Museum, Mathurā, contains the word *vihāra*. It is certain that *vihāra*s (monasteries), too, were built for the residence of the Jaina monks." (V. K. Sharma 2001: 143, with reference to Mitra 1974: 52 ["The word *vihāra* occurs on a fragmentary *āyāga-paṭa*"] & 62 ["There were no doubt *vihāra*s as well for the residence of the Jaina monks. It is, however, not possible to reconstruct these structures from the available evidence."]). "It appears certain that *vihāra*s, i.e., monasteries for the residence of Jaina monks, were also built at Mathurā. This is evident from the word *vihāra* which occurs on a fragmentary *āyāga-paṭṭa* discovered at Mathurā." (Sharma 2001: 220, with a reference, here too, to Mitra 1974: 52 & 62). "The fragmentary Koḷiya Gaṇa *āyāgapaṭa* inscription mentions the *vihāra*, or 'monastic quarters', of the specific branch of Jaina monks in the locative case … This inscription suggests that the plaque was found in a Jaina monastic complex, which, as we know from the intact western Indian cave temples, could include small shrines with sacred objects or images." (Quintanilla 2007: 100).

[1152] Jacobi (1884: 90) translates the word *vihārabhūmi* in *Āyāraṅga Sutta* 2.1.1.8 as 'out-of-door place for study'; he follows in this respect Śīlāṅka (*svādhyāyabhūmi*). See further Mette 2010: 214-215: "Anders als die Buddhisten entwickelten die Jaina bis in die jüngste Zeit keine klösterlichen Einrichtungen (*vihāra*), sondern sie blieben umherziehende Wandermönche (*vihārin*, entsprechend der eigentlichen Bedeutung des Wortes)." Even in Buddhism *vihāra* never lost its meanings 'walking or touring for pleasure', 'sport, play, pastime, or diversion', 'a place of recreation, pleasure ground', beside 'monastery'; Aśoka uses the term only in the first of these meanings. See Schopen 2006. An early (perhaps the earliest?) inscription where the word *vihāra* seems to refer to a jaina monastic establishment is the Paharpur copper-plate inscription from 479 CE (Dikshit 1933). Beckwith (2012: 41, with references to Dutt 1962: 62 ff., 211 ff.) states that "the plan of the *vihāra* is strikingly different from that of the *saṅghārāma*, the typical earlier, strictly Indian, Buddhist monastic design" and that the earliest examples of *vihāra*s date to the period of the Kushan Empire, being "a specifically Central Asian innovation developed under the Kushans and spread by them". These claims, and especially the second one, are not substantiated but cannot here be further examined; see however Schopen 2004: 73-80; 2006.

[1153] Shimada (2013: 166 f.) draws attention to the fact that "kings preferred to show royal support of Buddhism through *vihāra*-s rather than the *stūpa*-s". Well, Jainism during this period did not receive, or did not wish to receive, royal support (see below). This may have contributed to the absence of Jaina *vihāra*s. Other cultic structures, on the other hand, were present in Mathurā: "Jain cultic structures at Mathura included at least one temple, several shrines, and a *stūpa*. One temple (*pāsāda*) is mentioned in an inscription of the mid-second century B.C.E. and another in an inscription from just before the time of Kaniṣka. Other inscriptions mention Arhat shrines (*devakula*) and Arhat sanctuaries (*āyatana*)." (Cort 2002: 68, with references to N. P. Joshi 1989: 332; Mitra 1974: 51-52; Lüders 1912: inscriptions 78, 93, 99 and 102).

[1154] See, e.g., the index in Lüders 1961: 232 s.v. *vihāre*. For the use of *vihāra* in Indian Buddhism in general, see Durt 1983.

Temple dwelling became an issue in Jainism, but only at a more recent period, it seems. Dundas says the following about it (2002: 136):

> By Śvetāmbara reckoning, the temple-dwelling monks appeared in about the fourth century CE,[1155] but it is impossible to trace their early history beyond the odd reference such as that to a king of Pāṭaṇ who banned non-temple-dwelling monks from his city.[1156]

And again (1988: 190-191):

> A particularly pertinent Jain example [of the loosening of laws of monastic behaviour] can be found in the verse-commentary (*bhāṣya*) (third-fourth cent. A.D.) on the highly authoritative Niśīthasūtra, 'the emissary from the city of *nirvāṇa*', where several reasons are given why a monk might be permitted to cease from the normative, wandering life and live permanently *(ṇicca)* in one place:
>
> > "when there is inauspiciousness, when there is famine (*omoyariya*), when there is great danger due to oppression by a king, in illness and when there is lack of correct behaviour and study".
>
> According to Jinadāsa's (seventh cent.?) prose commentary (*cūrṇi*) on Niśīthabhāṣya 1024, there is no sin in living somewhere on a permanent basis in order to increase qualities such as knowledge. If leading the wandering life in the wide world (*bahiḥ*) causes decrease of knowledge, then one should avoid it. While elsewhere (verse 1016) the Niśīthabhāṣya is more guarded, pointing out that *ṇicca* need not always mean 'permanent', this relaxation of the rules about monastic lodging in such an authoritative text, though doubtless made with the best intentions, must have provided ample justification for the defence of the institution of temple-dwelling …

Dundas (1988: 182-183) further points out that the members of the Kharatara Gaccha, whose origins can be located in the eleventh century CE, tried to replicate the *jinakalpa*, the mode of life followed long ago by the *tīrthaṅkara*s and their disciples, in designating themselves as 'forest-dwelling'. This "served to differentiate them from the *caityavāsin* monks who lived a permanent and sedentary life in temples (*caitya*) or monasteries (*maṭha*), which were part of temple complexes and had been built specially for them, ignoring the scriptural injunctions about the wandering life and the temporary lodging (*vasati*) appropriate to it, failing to observe correct rules for alms-begging and avoidance of injury to life-forms, and appropriating temple funds and property for their own uses, including the staging of rituals in a conspicuously Hindu idiom."

Stories confirm that Jaina monastics endured, volontarily, more hardships than their buddhist colleagues. Consider the following passage from an article by Phyllis Granoff (1994: 259):

[1155] In a note Dundas refers to Jain 1963: 88-91 and Jhavery 1944: 178-179. V. K. Sharma (2001: 151, with references to Lüders 1910: 18-19 no. 102 and B. N. Puri, *India under the Kuṣāṇas*, Bombay, 1965, p. 149) states, with regard to the Kuṣāṇa period: "The Jaina temples were probably residences of the ascetics also"; one is entitled to remain sceptical.

[1156] Dundas refers to Prabhācandra's *Prabhāvakacarita* (ed. Jinavijaya, Ahmedabad / Calcutta 1940), 19.71-76.

> It is a common theme of Jain stories that Jains may be wrongly duped into becoming Buddhists, particularly because they are attracted to the lush life in a Buddhist monastery compared to the severity of life as a Jain monk. Thus in a biography of the Jain monk Ārya Khapaṭācārya we hear of the master's nephew, Bhuvana, who becomes a Buddhist and magically causes wonderful food to appear in the begging bowls of the Buddhist monks. The Jains lose many of their faithful, who are enticed by the promise of such rich delights.[1157]
>
> Buddhists countered these Jain stories with their own stories in which they justified the Buddhist monastic practices and criticized the strict regimen of the Jain ascetic. One very telling story is the Vītaśokāvadāna that occurs in the Divyāvadāna.[1158] Vītaśoka, the brother of the famous king Aśoka, is persuaded by the harsh asceticism of the Jain monks that they must be the true ascetics and not the Buddhist monks who live a life of relative ease and comfort. Aśoka devises a stratagem to make him realize his mistake; he has him sentenced to death and then allows him the pleasures of being king for seven days before the sentence is to be carried out. Vītaśoka does not take pleasure in his week as king, for he becomes obsessed with his death sentence. King Aśoka finally tells him that all has been a ruse, to show him that although the Buddhist monks may live a life of comfort, they find no pleasure in that life for they are ever occupied with the thought that death pursues all mortals.

There are indications showing that Jainism once had its stūpas.[1159] But it appears that these stūpas stopped playing a central role in jaina religious life. Indeed, a late Śvetāmbara canonical text, the *Jambuddīvapannatti*, contains an insertion according to which the bodily remains of the *tīrthaṅkara*s were taken away by the gods. This story, as I said elsewhere, pulled away the rug from underneath all forms of relic worship related to the *tīrthaṅkara*s.[1160]

Let us now combine these elements. Jaina stūpas tended to be neglected because the ascetic community was not organized to look after them. The state of the buddhist monastic community was altogether different, and this allowed stūpas to play a central role among monastics and lay people alike. In regions where Buddhism and Jainism coexisted, this led to an almost exclusive identification of stūpas with Buddhism, at the expense of Jainism. The jaina community took note, and abandoned stūpa worship, wholly or largely, consecrating in a way their new position by including in their canon the story according to which there are no bodily relics of *tīrthaṅkara*s on earth.[1161]

[1157] Reference to Granoff 1990: 153-156.

[1158] Divy(V) pp. 272-278, story number 28.

[1159] *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism* p. 132 ff., 225 ff., with references to further literature; see also Jain 1984: 258 f., 281, 390 f.; N. P. Joshi 1989: 333; Flügel 2012. Granoff (2012: 529-530) expresses doubts about relic worship in early Jainism. Colas (2012a: 83-84) wonders whether jaina stūpas ever contained relics.

[1160] *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism* p. 132-133, with references to further literature.

[1161] Johnson (2003: 224) draws attention to the competition from the side of images: "It seems … to me … that whatever emotional satisfaction and ritual effectiveness there may have been in stūpa worship, another form — one which historically overlaps with the stūpa — the Jina image, is destined to supersede it, simply because it has the evolutionary advantage of ambiguity. An ambiguous image is an advantage because it leaves room for the experience of real presence

The abandonment of stūpa worship, seen this way, is indirectly the result of the more severe lifestyle of jaina monks and nuns compared with their buddhist colleagues.[1162] Recall in this context that the freedom of movement of jaina monks and nuns was more restricted: they were not allowed to venture beyond a number of circumscribed regions.[1163] This limitation may have had its effect on the spread of Jainism, and it is perhaps not surprising that Jainism remained largely confined to the Indian subcontinent.

A further point requires attention. North Indian Jainism during the period we are considering did not receive royal support, and may not have wished to receive it.[1164] Jaina ascetics depended on their lay followers, perhaps exclusively so. This would explain that Jainism appears to have cultivated its lay people far more than Buddhism ever did. P. S. Jaini (1980: 84 [144]), having drawn attention to the relative neglect of lay people in Buddhism, presents some numbers: "The Jainas … eventually produced some fifty texts on conduct proper to a jaina lay person (*śrāvakācāra*), while the Buddhists, as far as we know, managed only one (and that not until the eleventh century)."[1165] There is already a Śvetāmbara canonical text, the *Uvāsaga-dasāo* (Skt. *Upāsaka-daśāḥ*), dealing with the duties of lay people.[1166] We may wonder whether Jainism abandoned its stūpa cult also for financial reasons: It could not compete with Buddhism in this respect because, unlike Buddhism, it did not receive royal support.

Jainism may have undergone other changes during the period just considered. Ohira (1994a) has argued that the tradition of twenty-four *tīrthaṅkara*s (of which Mahāvīra was the last) was created in Mathurā at that time. The parallelism with the tradition of twenty-four Buddhas in Buddhism does indeed suggest that these two traditions are not independent of each other, and that Jainism and Buddhism coexisted when this notion passed from Buddhism to Jainism (so Ohira) or vice-versa (so Gombrich 1980: 64); i.e., in Mathurā under the Kuṣāṇas.

What happened after the Kuṣāṇa period? Ohira (1994a: 481) makes the following observation:[1167] "At the beginning of the Gupta age … the number of the Jaina inscriptions and archaeological remains [in Mathurā] suddenly decreases, and the number of those in south India centering around Mysore increases. There are hardly any Jaina

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without bringing it into direct conflict with emerging Jaina doctrines about the Jina's absence, as these become more clearly and consistently formulated."

[1162] Appleton points out in several publications (e.g. 2011) that buddhist and jaina narrative literature differ in the different emphasis put on devotion to the Buddha and asceticism respectively.

[1163] See above.

[1164] See *Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism* p.137 ff. (with references) for details.

[1165] See, however, Heim 2004: 24: "scholars have perhaps somewhat overstated the contrast between Jains and Buddhists on this point, in suggesting that the Buddhists produced only one work, the *Upāsakajanālaṅkāra*, that might be similar to the vast literary output of the Jains systematizing the rules of lay moral practice … . As I demonstrate here, there are in fact a number of works either devoted entirely to lay conduct or which give significant treatment to it, which simply have not attracted much modern scholarly notice." On the then following pages (and on p. 151 note 33), Heim presents some buddhist texts dealing with lay practice. See also Shih 1994, a translation of the *Upāsakaśīla-sūtra*.

[1166] See Norman 1991; further Williams 1963.

[1167] Cp. Ohira 1982: 116 ff.

remains in south India between the beginning of the Christian era and the Gupta period …, but they suddenly begin to appear at the beginning of the Gupta age, and their number continues to grow. Since then south India and west India have become the two centres of the Jainas." Ohira proposes the following explanation: "The strange phenomenon of this archaeological evidence seems to suggest that some friction must have occurred between the Jainas (along with the Buddhists) and the Vaiṣṇavas during the Kuṣāṇa and Gupta periods under the Vaiṣṇava renaissance movement of Sanskrit culture at Mathura, the birth-place of Kṛṣṇa, and this led to mass exodus of the Jainas from Mathura to the South and West, which later caused the Great Schism of the Jainas into the Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras."[1168]

We cannot here deal with this proposition in detail. It seems conceivable that crucial developments in Jainism took place roughly during the period of the Kuṣāṇas, and in the region of Mathurā.[1169] From there, modified Jainism may have spread to other regions of India. This, if true, would explain that post-Kuṣāṇa Jainism — i.e., the Jainism that we know from its scriptures and most other manifestations — is in a number of crucial respects different from the earlier form of Jainism that reveals itself (but only with the greatest resistance) through some archaeological and philological remains.[1170]

[The preceding pages suggest that Jainism — or at least the North Indian Jainas of roughly the Kuṣāṇa period and after — consciously abandoned the worship of stūpas.[1171] An interesting parallel to this (or at least an attempted parallel) may have taken place in Theravāda Buddhism, if the proposal made by Gregory Schopen in his article "The stūpa cult and the external Pāli Vinaya" is correct.[1172] Schopen suggests here that rules regarding stūpas may have been systematically removed from the Pāli Vinaya (which in this respect is different from the other surviving Vinayas). He does not claim to know why or even when exactly this may have happened, but his arguments make it likely *that* it happened. This parallel case of what may have been another attempt to remove stūpa worship, this time from the lives of buddhist monks and nuns, may add to the questions attached to the abandonment of this practice in Jainism. Alternatively, these parallel cases may ask for parallel, perhaps even identical explanations. What these explanations might be, I do not know. Future research may shed light on these matters.]

Appendix IX: Bhāskara's acquaintance with grammatical literature

[1168] Note in this connection André Couture's (2015: 86) remark: "Pressed to suggest a likely date for the composition of the version of the [Harivaṃśa] found in the Critical Edition, the Kuṣāṇa era would appear to be the most plausible choice …".
[1169] Schubring (2000: 50) concludes from the nakedness of sculptured figures at Mathura "that the schism of the Order into Śvetāmbara and Digambara dates from as early as the 2nd century A.D." This conclusion may have to be looked upon with great caution. See further Jaini 1995.
[1170] The question why Jainism survived in India whereas Buddhism did not does not fall within the scope of this appendix. For some thought about this issue, see Verardi 2011a: 338 ff.
[1171] Cf. Folkert 1989: 111: "The Mathurā evidence … could provide useful concrete models for taking seriously the fluidity of the [Jain] tradition in the face of the usual assumption about its unchanging character."
[1172] Schopen 1997: 86-98; originally published in 1989.

Pāṇini's grammar was studied by all or almost all classical brahmanical scholars in whatever disciplines, as well as by others (such as buddhist and jaina scholars). Bhāskara's commentary, too, contains ample signs that its author was thoroughly acquainted with it (even though his text, in its edited form, contains a number of grammatical infelicities). The fourth appendix to K. S. Shukla's edition of the text enumerates eight quotations from Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, one from its *Dhātupāṭha*, ten from Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*,[1173] one from Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*,[1174] and one passage referring to the list of sounds that precedes Pāṇini' s grammar (the 'Śivasūtras'). This enumeration is far from complete. A quotation from the *Mahābhāṣya* that has not been identified by the editor is the line *sāmānyacodanāś ca viśeṣe 'vatiṣṭhante* (p. 39 l. 23; p. 55 l. 12-13), which is cited from the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 4.1.92 vt. 3.[1175] Other quotations that could be added are the following. The comparison *yathā 'kṅiti ca' ity atra luptanirdiṣṭo gakāraḥ* (p. 9 l. 18-19) refers, without saying so, to a discussion in the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 3.2.139. The line *yaś ca sarvaś ciraṃ jīvati sa varṣaśataṃ jīvati* (p. 13 l. 16) echoes a line from the *Paspaśāhnika*;[1176] *dṛṣṭānuvidhitvāc chandasaḥ* (p. 14 l. 22) is part of P. 1.1.6 vt. 1; *iṅgitena ceṣṭitena nimiṣitena mahatā vā sūtraprabandhena [ca] ācāryāṇām abhiprāyo gamyate* (p. 34 l. 16-17) is quoted from the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 6.1.37;[1177] *tātsthyāt tācchabdyam* (not °*chābdyam*; p. 35 l. 10) occurs on P. 5.4.50 vt. 3.[1178] Particularly interesting is the line *anityaḥ samāsāntavidhiḥ* (p. 23 l. 22); this reflects a position taken in the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 6.2.197 (III p. 140 l. 6: *vibhāṣā samāsānto bhavati*) but is identical in form with a grammatical *paribhāṣā* which we find, perhaps for the first time, in Vyāḍi's *Paribhāṣāvṛtti* (no. 69: *samāsāntavidhir anityaḥ*; Wujastyk 1993: I: 70).[1179] Equally interesting is Bhāskara's use of the grammatical expression *sambandhalakṣaṇā ṣaṣṭhī* (p. 38 l. 2), which does not seem to occur in the *Mahābhāṣya*, but which is attested in the *Kāśikāvṛtti* (on P. 7.1.90). The editor has furthermore not identified *a i uṇ ṛ ḷk* (p. 18 l. 16), which is 'Śivasūtra' 1 & 2. To this must be added that there are many implied references to *sūtra*s of Pāṇini. One occurs on p. 60 l. 8-9 of the edition, where the correct reading must be *anyapadārthena* (rather than *anyapādārthena*) *samapariṇāhaśabdena kṣetrābhidhānāt*, which means: "because the expression *samapariṇāha* — [being a *bahuvrīhi* compound and therefore] referring to something else [on account of P. 2.2.24: *anekam anyapadārthe (bahuvrīhiḥ)*] — would denote the field". Similarly, p. 116 l. 2-3: *trirāśiḥ prayojanam asya gaṇitasyeti trairāśikaḥ* "the *trairāśika* ('rule of three') is called thus because three quantities (*trirāśi*) are the purpose

[1173] This enumeration is not exhaustive even with regard to passages identified in the text. Passages from the *Mahābhāṣya* are identified p. 3 l. 7-9, p. 8 l. 1-2, p. 23 l. 25-26; but they are not mentioned in the appendix.

[1174] It is tempting to see, furthermore, in the line *loke ca na so 'sti gaṇitaprakāraḥ yo 'yaṃ vṛddhyātmako 'pacayātmako vā na bhavati* (p. 44 l. 6-7; introducing Gaṇitapāda 1) a reflection of Vkp 1.131ab: *na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte.* Cp. however *na so 'sti puruṣo loke yo na kāmayate śriyam* in Jagajjyotirmalla's *Ślokasārasaṃgraha*, quoted from the *Hitopadeśa* (Lindtner 2000: 60, 65).

[1175] Mahā-bh II p. 246 l. 6: *sāmānyacodanās tu viśeṣeṣv avatiṣṭhante*.

[1176] Mahā-bh I p. 5 l. 28: *yaḥ sarvathā ciraṃ jīvati sa varṣaśataṃ jīvati.*

[1177] Mahā-bh III p. 32 l. 4-5.

[1178] Mahā-bh II p. 437 l. 2. Mahā-bh II p. 218 l. 15-16 (on P. 4.1.48 vt. 3) gives as example of *tātsthyāt*: *mañcā hasanti,* where Bhāskara gives *mañcāḥ krośanti*.

[1179] The *Kāśikā* on P. 6.4.11 has *samāsānto vidhir anityaḥ* with variant reading *samāsāntavidhir anityaḥ*.

(*prayojana*) of this calculation" contains an implicit reference to P. 5.1.109 *prayojanam*, which prescribes the suffix *ṭhaÑ* (= *ika*). The immediately preceding line *trayo rāśayaḥ samāhṛtāḥ trirāśiḥ* "three quantities combined are [called] *trirāśi*" implicitly refers to P. 2.1.51 (*taddhitārthottarapadasamāhāre ca*) and 52 (*saṅkhyāpūrvo dviguḥ*) which prescribe the compound called *samāhāra dvigu,* which is a kind of *tatpuruṣa*. P. 7 l. 3 *tasmin krakace bhavaḥ krākacikaḥ* and p. 11 l. 3 *navānte bhavaṃ navāntyam* similarly refer to P. 4.3.53 *tatra bhavaḥ*; p. 180 l. 15 *ādau bhavati iti ādyaḥ* to P. 4.3.54 (*digādibhyo yat*). P. 2 l. 4 *ktvāpratyayena pūrvakālakriyā 'bhidhīyate* evokes P. 3.4.21 *samānakartṛkayoḥ pūrvakāle (ktvā 18)*. In a way each and every analysis of a compound — of which there are numerous instances in the *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya*, even though their technical names are rarely used — can be considered an implicit reference to Pāṇini's grammar. The influence of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* on early mathematical literature can also be deduced from the fact that Bhāskara refers to the works of Maskari(n), Pūraṇa and Mudgala as providing the *lakṣaṇa* and the *lakṣya* of various branches of mathematics; these are precisely the terms used in the *Paspaśāhnika* of the *Mahābhāṣya* to designate grammar: *lakṣaṇa* designates the *sūtra*s, *lakṣya* the objects to be studied, i.e. words in the case of grammar.[1180] It is in this context interesting to note that Bhāskara refers to Āryabhaṭa's text using these same expressions *lakṣaṇa* and *sūtra*: *lakṣaṇa* infrequently, e.g. p. 74 l. 3; *sūtra* very often.[1181] This means that Bhāskara, like Patañjali, uses the terms *lakṣaṇa* and *sūtra* as synonyms. This is particularly clear on p. 49 l. 16, where the two are simply juxtaposed to each other; p. 51 l. 12 cites a *lakṣaṇasūtra*. [It is clear from his discussion that these *sūtra*s do not always coincide with the verses of Āryabhaṭa,[1182] but can be parts of them. An extreme case is verse 19 of the *Gaṇitapāda*, in which Bhāskara distinguishes no fewer than five different *sūtra*s.[1183]]

[1180] Compare *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* p. 7 l. 7-8 (*etad ekaikasya granthalakṣaṇalakṣyaṃ maskaripūraṇamudgalaprabhṛtibhir ācāryair nibaddhaṃ kṛtaṃ ...*) with Mahā-bh I p. 12 l. 15-17 (*lakṣyalakṣaṇe vyākaraṇam* [vt. 14]*/ lakṣyaṃ ca lakṣaṇaṃ caitat samuditaṃ vyākaraṇaṃ bhavati/ kiṃ punar lakṣyaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ ca/ śabdo lakṣyaḥ sūtraṃ lakṣaṇam/*)

[1181] David Pingree (private communication) informs me that this employment of *sūtra* became common in commentaries on mathematical and astronomical texts. In other disciplines the word *sūtra* refers much less commonly to a metrical *mūla* text; two texts that do so are the *Yuktidīpikā* (on the *Sāṃkhyakārika*) and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

[1182] They can coincide with verses, in which case Bhāskara, in the first chapter, uses the expression *gītikāsūtra* (or *gītikasūtra*, *gītisūtra*; e.g. *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* p. 1 l. 10-11, p. 7 l. 13 & 16, p. 11 l. 14 & 20, etc.), elsewhere *āryāsūtra* (e.g. p. 247 l. 20).

[1183] *Āryabhaṭīya Bhāṣya* p. 105 l. 12-17; p. 107 l. 10-11.

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Abbreviation:

Abhidh-d	Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti, ed. P. S. Jaini, Patna 1959 (TSWS 4)
Abhidh-k(VP)	Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośa, traduit et annoté par Louis de La Vallée Poussin, 6 vols., Paris 1923-1931
Abhidh-k-bh(Hi)	Akira Hirakawa, Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, pt. 1-3, Tokyo 1973-1978
Abhidh-k-bh(P)	Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, ed. P. Pradhan, rev. 2nd ed. Aruna Haldar, Patna 1975 (TSWS 8)
ABORI	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona
AHES	Archive for History of Exact Sciences
AitBr	Aitareya Brāhmaṇa
AL	Abhyankar and Limaye’s edition of Bhartṛhari’s *Mahābhāṣya Dīpikā*

AN	Aṅguttara-Nikāya, ed. R. Morris, E. Hardy, 5 vols., London 1885-1900 (PTS); vol. 6 (Indexes, by M. Hunt and C. A. F. Rhys Davids), London 1910 (PTS)
ANISt	Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien, Hamburg
ĀpDhS	Āpastamba Dharmasūtra
ĀpŚS	Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra
AS	Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques, Bern
ASS	Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, Poona
ĀśvGS	Āśvalāyana Gṛhya Sūtra
AVŚ	Atharva Veda (Śaunakīya)
Avś	Avadānaśataka, ed. J. S. Speyer, St. Petersburg 1906-1909 (BBu 3)
BĀrUp	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (= Olivelle 1998: 36-164)
BaudhDhS	Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra
BaudhŚS	Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra
BBu	Bibliotheca Buddhica, St. Petersburg (Leningrad)
BEI	Bulletin d'Études Indiennes, Paris
BEH	Brill's Encyclopedia of Hinduism, ed. Knut A. Jacobsen, Leiden: Brill, 2009-2015. 6 volumes. (Handbook of Oriental Studies 2/22/1-6.)
Bhag	Bhagavadgītā (ed. BORI, 1968)
BHSD	Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary by F. Edgerton
BIL	Brill's Indological Library, Leiden
BORI	Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona
BraSū	Brahmasūtra
ChānUp	Chāndogya Upaniṣad (= Olivelle 1998: 166-287)
CESS	David Pingree, Census of the Exact Sciences in Sanskrit, Series A, vol. 1-5, Philadelphia 1970-1994
CII	Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum
Dīp	Dīpavaṃsa, ed. H. Oldenberg, London 1879
Divy	Divyāvadāna, ed. E. B. Cowell, R. A. Neil, Cambridge 1886
Divy(V)	Divyāvadāna, ed. P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga 1959 (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, 20)
DN	Dīghanikāya, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, J. E. Carpenter, 3 vols. 1890-1911 (PTS)
DNC	Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram of Mallavādin, with the commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Siṃhasūri, 3 parts, ed. Muni Jambuvijaya, Bhavnagar: Sri Jain Atmanand Sabha (Śrī Ātmānanda Jaina Granthamālā no. 92, 94, 95), 1966, 1976, 1988.
DPPN	G. P. Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, 2 vols., London 1937-1938
EW	East and West, Roma
GautDhS	Gautama Dharmasūtra
GobhGS	Gobhila Gṛhyasūtra
GOS	Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda
GPaBr	Gopatha Brāhmaṇa

HIL	A History of Indian Literature, ed. J. Gonda, Wiesbaden 1973ff.
HistDh	See Kane, HistDh
IIJ	Indo-Iranian Journal, Den Haag, Dordrecht
IL	Indian Linguistics, Pune
IndTib	Indica et Tibetica, Bonn
IsMEO	Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, Roma
Jā	*Jātaka* (= Fausbøll, 1877-1896)
JA	Journal Asiatique, Paris
JaimBr	Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa
JIP	Journal of Indian Philosophy, Dordrecht
JORM	Journal of Oriental Research, Madras
JPTS	Journal of the Pali Text Society, London
Kane, HistDh	Pandurang Vaman Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, second edition, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 5 vols., 1968-1977
KAŚ	*Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, ed. R. P. Kangle, second edition, Bombay 1969
KāṭhS	Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā
KauṣBr	Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa
KauṣUp	*Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* (= Olivelle 1998: 324-361)
Ki.	Praśastapādabhāṣyam with the commentary Kiraṇāvalī of Udayanācārya. Ed. Jitendra S. Jetly. Baroda: Oriental Institute. 1971. (GOS 154.)
KlSchr	Kleine Schriften (Serie der Glasenapp-Stiftung), Wiesbaden, Stuttgart
KRV	Kashmir Ṛgveda
Lal(V)	Lalitavistara, ed. P.L. Vaidya, Darbhanga 1958 (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, 1)
MadhK(deJ)	Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ, ed. J. W. de Jong, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras 1977
Mahā-bh	Patañjali, (Vyākaraṇa-)Mahābhāṣya, ed. F. Kielhorn, Bombay 1880-1885
MaitS	Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā
MaitUp	Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad (= van Buitenen 1962: 97-122)
Manu	Mānava Dharmaśāstra, ed. Olivelle 2005
MCB	Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, Bruxelles
Mhbh	Mahābhārata, crit. ed. V.S. Sukthankar u.a., Poona 1933-66 (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona)
Mil	Milindapañha, ed. V. Trenckner, London 1880
Mīmāṃsākoṣa	Mīmāṃsākoṣaḥ, 7 parts, ed. Kevalanandasaraswati, Wai 1952-1966
MīmSū	1) Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. Edited, with Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Tantravārttika and Śabara's Bhāṣya, by Pt. Gaṇeśaśāstrī Jośī. Pādas 1.2 - 2.1. Poona: Ānandāśrama. 1981. 2) Śābara-Bhāṣya. Translated into English by Ganganatha Jha. Vol. I. Baroda: Oriental Institute. 1973.

MN	Majjhima-Nikāya, ed. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers, 3 vols., London 1888-1899 (PTS)
MPS	*Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*
Ms	Manuscript of Bhartṛhari's *Mahābhāṣya Dīpikā*
MŚS	Mānava Śrautasūtra
Mvu	Mahāvastu-Avadāna, ed. Émile Senart, 3 vols., Paris 1882-1897
MW	Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Oxford 1899
NBh	Nyāyabhāṣya of Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana
Nir	Nirukta
Nm	Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa
N.S.	New Series
NV	Nyāyavārttika de Uddyotakara
P.	Pāṇinian sūtra
PārGS	Pāraskara Gṛhyasūtra
PEFEO	Publications de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient, Paris
PEW	Philosophy East and West
Pp.	Padapāṭha
PPN	Āgamic Index, vol. I: Prakrit Proper Names, compiled by Mohanlal Mehta & K. Rishabh Chandra, edited by Dalsukh Malvania, 2 parts, Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology, 1970-1972 (Lal Dalpatbhai Series, 28 & 37)
PTS	Pali Text Society, London
PTSD	The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, W. Stede, London 1921
RPr	*Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya*
RV	*Ṛgveda*
ŚāṅGS	*Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtra*
Sn	Suttanipāta, ed. D. Andersen, H. Smith, London 1913 (PTS)
SN	*Saṃyutta Nikāya* (PTS edition)
Sp.	Saṃhitāpāṭha
ŚPaBr	Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (Mādhyandina)
ŚPaBrK	*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (Kāṇvīya recension) = Caland, 1926.
StII	Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik
Sw	Swaminathan's edition of Bhartṛhari's *Mahābhāṣya Dīpikā*
TaitBr	Taittarīya Brāhmaṇa
TaitS	Taittirīya Saṃhitā
TanVār	Tantravārttika of Kumārilabhaṭṭa (ASS, 97)
TatKaum	Tattvakaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra
Th	Theragāthā, in: Thera- and Therī-Gāthā, ed. H. Oldenberg and R. Pischel, rev. K. R. Norman, L. Alsdorf, London, 2nd ed. 1966 (PTS)
TI	Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō or Taishō Issaikyō, 100 vols., Tōkyō 1924 ff.
TSWS	Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Patna
VasDhS	Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra
Viy	Viyāhapannatti (Jaina-Āgama-Series 4)

Vkp	Bhartṛhari, Vākyapadīya, ed. W. Rau, Wiesbaden 1977
VS(C)	Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the commentary of Candrānanda, ed. Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji, reprint: Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1982
vt.	vārttika on Pāṇinian sūtra
VWC	A Vedic Word Concordance, by Vishva Bandhu, 5 vols., Hoshiarpur: V.V.R. Institute, 1955-1965
WI	Word Index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya: A complete word index to the printed editions of the Praśastapādabhāṣya, by Johannes Bronkhorst & Yves Ramseier, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994
WZKS	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens, Wien
YD (P)	Yuktidīpikā, ed. Pandeya
YD (WM)	Yuktidīpikā, ed. Wezler & Motegi
ZDMG	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Leipzig, later Wiesbaden

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Yāska
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Yijing
yin ming
Yoga
Yogabhāṣya
Yogācāra
Yogaśāstra
Yogasūtra
Yogavāsiṣṭha
Yona
Yudhiṣṭhira
Yuga
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Yuktidīpikā